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This	  thesis	  describes	  financial	  markets	  as	  complex	  machines	  in	  the	  broader	  sense,	  as	  
systems	   for	   organizing	   informational	   flows	   and	   performing	   certain	   functions	   in	  
regards	  to	  the	  processing	  of	  transactions.	  We	  focus	  on	  the	  transaction	  infrastructure	  
of	  financial	  markets,	  on	  the	  flow	  architecture	  that	  allows	  transactions	  to	  happen	  in	  
the	   first	   place.	   First,	   in	   order	   for	   a	   financial	  market	   to	   function	   there	   needs	   to	   be	  
some	   mechanism	   for	   aggregating	   and	   matching	   disparate	   transactional	   requests.	  
Another	  mechanism	  is	  then	  needed	  in	  order	  to	  untangle	  and	  reduce	  the	  complexity	  
of	  overlapping	  exposures	  between	  participants.	  The	  history	  of	  finance	  shows	  us	  that	  
there	   are	   indeed	   certain	   patterns	   and	   regularities,	   procedures	   and	   mechanisms	  
present	  in	  any	  system	  that	  processes	  financial	  transactions.	  The	  thesis	  describes	  this	  
sequence	   of	   functions	   as	   transaction	   machines,	   understood	   as	   complex	   socio-­‐
technical	   systems	   for	   the	   execution	   of	   financial	   transactions.	   This	   is	   achieved	   by	  
leveraging	   a	   specific	   philosophical	   account	   of	   technology	   coupled	   with	   a	  
computational	   and	   evolutionary	   account	   of	   financial	  markets.	  We	   ultimately	   focus	  
two	  types	  of	  transaction	  machines,	  performing	  the	  matching	  and	  clearing	  of	  financial	  
flows,	  acting	  as	  the	  infrastructure	  of	  financial	  markets.	  We	  also	  provide	  a	  sketch	  for	  
an	   evolutionary	   trajectory	   of	   these	   machines,	   evolving	   under	   the	   demands	   and	  
needs	   of	   marker	   participants.	   From	   medieval	   fairs	   to	   the	   millisecond	   electronic	  
platforms	  of	   today,	   transaction	  machines	  have	  gradually	   transitioned	   from	  human-­‐
based	   ‘hardware’	   to	   electronic	   automated	   platforms.	  Moreover,	   we	   also	   describe	  
the	  complex	  power	  dynamics	  of	  contemporary	  transaction	  machines.	  In	  as	  much	  as	  
they	   are	   the	   dominant	   hubs	   of	   global	   financial	  markets,	   the	   thesis	   argues	   for	   the	  
necessity	  of	  a	  more	  granular	  account	  of	  the	  functioning	  and	  evolution	  of	  transaction	  
machines.	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Introduction	  
	  
	  	  	  	  ‘Two	  hundred	  fifty	  milliseconds	  are	  hardly	  noticeable	  while	  talking,	  but	  
it’s	  long	  enough	  for	  a	  crowd	  to	  get	  ahead	  of	  you	  in	  the	  market’	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (Leinweber,	  2009,	  p.72)	  
	  
In	  2010,	  a	  firm	  called	  Spread	  Networks	  unveiled	  a	  new	  fiber	  optic	  cable	  affording	  a	  
13.10	  millisecond	  round	  trip	  between	  New	  York	  and	  Chicago.	  While	  this	  might	  seem	  
like	   an	   unusual	   venture,	   high-­‐speed	   connectivity	   is	   absolutely	   crucial	   in	   today’s	  
financial	   markets.	   In	   order	   to	   be	   successful	   today,	   latency	   must	   be	   reduced	   to	   a	  
minimum,	   as	   argued	   by	   a	   recent	   study	   on	   the	   optimal	   geographical	   locations	   for	  
trading	  (Wissner-­‐Gross	  and	  Freer,	  2010).	  	  Taking	  into	  account	  the	  distances	  between	  
the	  major	  financial	  centers,	  Wissner-­‐Gross	  and	  Freer	  calculated	  the	  precise	  strategic	  
locations	   on	   the	   planet	  where	   one	  would	   have	   to	   position	   computers	   in	   order	   to	  
optimize	   low-­‐latency	   trading	   arbitrage.	   In	   any	   case,	   since	   the	   advent	   of	   electronic	  
trading,	  our	  view	  of	  financial	  markets	  seems	  to	  be	  increasingly	  dominated	  by	  recent	  
technological	   transformations.	   In	   fact,	   some	   have	   even	   suggested	   that	   finance	  
deserves	   the	   same	   kind	   of	   attention	   as	   other	   complex	   technical	   systems,	   such	   as	  
nuclear	  reactors,	  particle	  colliders	  or	  the	  Internet	  (Arnoldi,	  2009).	  In	  fact,	  rather	  than	  
allowing	  finance	  to	  be	  an	  enclave	  for	  economists,	  scientists	  such	  as	  Didier	  Sornette	  
have	  offered	  deep	  insights	  into	  the	  working	  of	  the	  financial	  system,	  modeling	  it	  as	  a	  
complex	   dynamic	   system	   (Sornette,	   2003).	   This	   complements	   the	   more	   recent	  
efforts	  in	  economic	  sociology	  to	  open	  up	  the	  black	  box	  of	  finance	  (MacKenzie	  et	  al.,	  
2012).	  In	  any	  case,	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  our	  contemporary	  situation,	  technology	  
and	  financial	  markets	  seem	  to	  have	  two	  closely	  intertwined	  trajectories.	  One	  cannot	  
begin	   to	   think	  about	  contemporary	   financial	  markets	  without	  being	  struck	  by	   their	  
high	   level	  of	   technological	  sophistication.	  Nevertheless,	  what	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  recent	  
development	  is	  perhaps	  better	  understood	  as	  a	  more	  complex	  long-­‐term	  tendency.	  
One	   could	   argue	   that	   finance	   has	   always	   been	   directly	   impacted	   by	   the	   latest	  
technical	   developments	   from	   the	   streets	   of	   medieval	   Amsterdam	   and	   the	   coffee	  
houses	  of	   London,	   to	   the	  millisecond	  electronic	   ecology	  of	   the	  21st	   century.	  Going	  
back	  in	  history,	  one	  can	  look	  at	  the	  impressive	  evolution	  form	  ancient	  Mesopotamia,	  
where	  the	  venues	  of	  exchange	  were	  primarily	  religious	  temples	  (Swan,	  2000)	  to	  the	  
medieval	  fairs	  of	  Champagne	  (Braudel,	  1982),	  the	  pits	  of	  modern	  futures	  exchanges	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(Knorr-­‐Cetina	   and	   Preda,	   2005;	   Zaloom,	   2006)	   and	   finally	   to	   the	   electronic	   low-­‐
latency	  data	   centers	  of	   today	   (MacKenzie,	   2015).	  Reuters	   and	   the	  Rothschild	  Bank	  
used	  carrier	  pigeons	   in	  the	  19th	  century	  (Freedman,	  2006),	  while	  the	  telegraph	  and	  
the	  stock	  ticker	  transformed	  financial	  markets	  in	  their	  own	  right	  later	  in	  the	  century	  
(Preda,	   2009).	   Closer	   to	   our	   present,	   the	   adoption	   of	   information	   and	  
communication	   technology	   (ICT)	   has	   allowed	   for	   the	   recent	   transition	   towards	   a	  
truly	  global	   financial	  system,	  where	  more	  and	  more	  operation	  are	  being	  controlled	  
by	  computer	  algorithms2.	  While	   it	   is	  certainly	  possible	  to	  think	  about	  the	  impact	  of	  
technology	  on	  finance	  (Pardo-­‐Guerra,	  2012)	  or	  the	  way	  in	  which	  finance	  can	  be	  seen	  
as	  a	  tool	  for	  achiving	  our	  goals	  (Shiller,	  2012),	  it	  might	  be	  more	  interesting	  to	  think	  of	  
financial	   markets	   in	   themselves	   as	   a	   series	   of	   complex	   technological	   systems	  
processing	   and	   executing	   financial	   transactions.	   In	   fact,	   this	   constitutes	   the	   initial	  
research	   question	   underpinning	   the	   whole	   thesis.	   Namely,	   is	   it	   possible	   to	   think	  
about	  financial	  markets	  as	  being	  complex	  machines	  from	  the	  outset?	  Moreover,	  this	  
initial	   position	   can	   actually	   be	   broken	   down	   in	   four	   different	   inter-­‐connected	  
research	  questions:	  
	  
1. How	   can	   a	   broader	   notion	   of	   technology	   and	   machines	   be	   used	   to	  
understand	  financial	  markets?	  
2. More	  to	  the	  point,	  can	  we	  understand	  financial	  markets	  as	  complex	  machines	  
developed	  for	  the	  execution	  of	  specific	  financial	  transactions?	  
3. Does	  an	  understanding	  of	   financial	  markets	  as	   transaction	  machines	  offer	  a	  
different	   perspective	   to	   some	   of	   the	   established	   approaches	   in	   the	   social	  
sciences	  and	  humanities?	  
4. Can	   such	   an	   account,	   namely	   of	   machines	   designed	   for	   the	   processing	   of	  
transactions,	   offer	   a	   meaningful	   understanding	   of	   the	   past	   and	   present	   of	  
financial	  markets?	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Following	  the	  work	  done	  in	  Software	  Studies	  (Chun,	  2006;	  Fuller,	  2008;	  Manovich,	  
2013)	   it	   has	   become	   clear	   that	   algorithms	   guide	  most	   of	   our	   daily	   existence.	   The	  
Black	   Box	   Society	   (Pasquale,	   2015)	   offers	   a	   detailed	   account	   of	   how	   algorithms	  
control	  more	  and	  more	  of	  our	  social	  interaction,	  including	  the	  financial	  flows	  of	  the	  
global	  economy.	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This	   thesis	   will	   attempt	   to	   answer,	   elaborate	   and	   develop	   these	   very	   questions	  
through	   an	   interdisciplinary	   approach,	   leveraging	   insights	   from	   contemporary	  
sociology,	  cultural	  theory,	  philosophy	  of	  technology	  and	  unorthodox	  economics.	  The	  
first	  step	  is	  to	  understand	  that	  the	  term	  ‘machines’	  is	  used	  in	  the	  broadest	  sense	  of	  
the	  word,	  as	  socio-­‐technical	  systems.	  But	  more	  importantly,	  that	  our	  understanding	  
of	   machines	   is	   positioned	   within	   the	   trajectory	   of	   20th	   century	   cybernetics,	  
information	   theory	   and	   computer	   science.	   Current	   understandings	   of	   machines	  
largely	  gravitate	  around	   the	  differentiation	  between	  a	   set	  of	   instructions	  and	   their	  
material	  execution,	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  between	  software	  and	  hardware.	  Software	  (stored	  
in	  the	  computer’s	  memory)	  relates	  to	  instructions	  that	  cause	  the	  CPU	  to	  perform	  a	  
certain	  set	  of	  operations.	  Hardware,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  relates	  to	  the	  actual	  material	  
components	   of	   computers	   that	   run/execute	   the	   software	   (Kitchin,	   2014).	   In	   short,	  
any	   procedure	   or	   operation,	   which	   can	   be	   formalized	   as	   a	   set	   of	   step-­‐by-­‐step	  
instructions,	  can	  also	  be	  translated	  or	  coded	  so	  that	   it	  can	  run	  on	  a	  machine.	  With	  
the	  advent	  of	  modern	  computers,	  which	  essentially	  operate	  with	  symbols,	  there	  has	  
been	  a	  decisive	  mutation	  in	  our	  understanding	  of	  machines	  as	  primarily	  information	  
processing	  machines.	  In	  as	  much	  as	  this	  functional	  perspective	  can	  be	  translated	  into	  
logical	  operations,	  machines	  are	  thus	  best	  understood	  as	  algorithmic	  structures	  (set	  
of	  instructions)	  executed	  by	  specific	  hardware.	  	  
	  
While	  all	  of	  this	  might	  seem	  too	  abstract,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  understand	  that	  what	  we	  
mean	  by	   ‘complex	  machines’	   are	  by	  no	  means	  a	   recent	  phenomenon,	  particularly.	  
Following	  cybernetics	  and	  information	  theory,	  machines	  (or	  technology	  broadly)	  can	  
be	   understood	   as	   any	   system	   that	   organizes	   material,	   energetic	   and	   information	  
flows	   in	   the	   context	   of	   human	   social	   interaction.	   The	   history	   of	   technology	   thus	  
moves	   from	  machines	  that	  required	  humans	  or	  animals	   to	  provide	  energy,	   then	  to	  
machines	   that	   could	  access	  energy	  directly	   from	  nature	   (wind,	  water,	   combustion)	  
and	   finally	  cybernetic	  machines,	  which	  achieve	  a	  higher	  degree	  of	  automation	  and	  
autonomy	   through	   self-­‐regulation.	   In	   fact,	   as	  Mumford	   understood	   them,	   the	   first	  
machines	  were	  not	  made	  of	  bolts	  or	  cogs,	  but	  of	  flesh	  and	  blood,	  comprising	  human	  
	   11	  
beings	  as	  component	  parts	  Mumford,	  1967,	  1971)3.	  This	  approach	   is	   similar	   to	   the	  
work	   of	   historians	   of	   computation	   and	   technology	   such	   as	  Martin	   Campbell-­‐Kelly,	  
who	  understands	  Victorian	  data-­‐processing	  institutions	  such	  as	  the	  Railway	  Clearing	  
House	  or	  the	  Post	  Office	  Savings	  Bank	  as	  complex	  information	  processing	  machines	  
whose	  ‘hardware’	  was	  the	  Victorian	  clerk	  (Campbell-­‐Kelly,	  1998,	  2010).	  Therefore,	  it	  
is	   obvious	   that	   our	   perspective	   is	   indebted	   to	   the	   likes	   of	   Claude	   Shannon	   (1936),	  
Alan	  Turing	  (1937),	  John	  von	  Neumann	  (1951)	  and	  Norbert	  Weiner	  (1965),	  all	  of	  who	  
understood	   complex	  machines	   as	   information	   processing	   systems	   that	   can	   have	   a	  
variety	  of	  material	  instantiations.	  
	  
It	  was	   important	   to	   clarify	  what	   this	   thesis	  means	  by	   ‘machines’	   as	   it	   allows	  us	   to	  
differentiate	   from	  other	   approaches	  within	   the	   social	   sciences	   and	   humanities.	   As	  
we	  will	  see	  in	  Chapter	  1,	  within	  contemporary	  economic	  sociology	  there	  is	  a	  growing	  
body	  of	   literature	   looking	  at	  markets	   in	  general	  and	   financial	  markets	   in	  particular	  
through	   the	   lens	   of	   Actor-­‐Network	   Theory	   (ANT)4.	   In	   this	   context,	   markets	   are	  
understood	  as	  hybrid	  assemblages	  or	  associations	  of	  all	  sorts	  of	  elements.	  This	  thesis	  
doesn’t	   approach	   socio-­‐technical	   systems	   as	   networks	   made	   up	   of	   discrete	  
elements,	  either	  human	  or	  non-­‐human.	  As	  we	  have	  said,	  drawing	  from	  cybernetics	  
and	  computer	  science,	  we	  look	  at	  socio-­‐technical	  systems	  in	  general	  as	  information	  
processing	   machines	   with	   their	   own	   abstract	   schematic	   or	   algorithmic	   structure,	  
controlling	   the	   way	   in	   which	   they	   perform	   certain	   functions.	   In	   the	   context	   of	  
financial	   markets,	   these	   specific	   functions	   relate	   to	   the	   processing	   of	   financial	  
transactions.	   For	  much	  of	   history,	   human	  beings	   and	   their	   technical	   artifacts	   have	  
been	   the	   component	   parts	   of	   complex	  machines	   performing	   certain	   transactional	  
functions.	  While	  the	  execution	  of	   these	  functions	  has	  recently	  shifted	  to	  electronic	  
platforms,	   which	   an	   interesting	   development	   in	   itself,	   focusing	   too	   much	   on	   the	  
composition	   of	   these	   complex	   machines	   runs	   the	   risk	   of	   missing	   their	   broader	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 	  According	   to	   Mumford,	   as	   machines	   evolve	   they	   become	   less	   dependent	   on	  
humans	  for	  their	  operation	  and	  direction	  (Trogemann,	  2013a;	  Trogemann,	  2013b).	  
4	  While	  these	  approaches	  are	  interesting	  in	  terms	  of	  offering	  insightful	  narratives	  of	  
financial	  markets	  as	  a	  coming	  together	  of	  human	  beings	  and	  technical	  artifacts,	  they	  
are	  less	  suited	  for	  giving	  an	  account	  of	  the	  long	  term	  evolution	  of	  financial	  markets	  
as	  complex	  machines	  in	  their	  own	  right,	  performing	  certain	  transactional	  functions.	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evolutionary	   trajectory.	   Namely	   that	   from	   the	   beginning,	   financial	  markets	   can	   be	  
seen	   as	   certain	   types	   of	   complex	  machines	   and	   that	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   look	   at	   their	  
operational	  architecture,	  independent	  of	  who	  or	  what	  executes	  the	  actual	  functions.	  	  
	  
This	   could	   be	   an	   interesting	   approach,	   as	   financial	   transactions	   do	   not	   just	   occur	  
randomly.	   Namely	   there	   are	   specific	  mechanisms	   entailing	   certain	   operations	   and	  
sequences	   of	   instructions,	   affording	   the	   execution	   and	   settlement	   of	   financial	  
transactions.	   This	   of	   course	   points	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   most	   transactional	   processes	  
entail	   rule-­‐based	   structures	   (which	   can	   thus	   be	   formalized5)	   and	   suggests	   that	  
financial	  markets6	  have	  an	  algorithmic	  or	  technical	  nature	  from	  the	  very	  beginning.	  
This	  points	  to	  the	  second	  step,	  namely	  that	   it	   is	  possible	  to	  model	  and	  understand	  
even	   the	   oldest	   forms	   of	   financial	   markets	   as	   comprising	   precise	   rules	   and	  
procedures	   that	  can	  be	   formalized	  as	  a	   series	  of	  algorithms.	  Moreover,	   the	  way	   in	  
which	  humans	  interact	  with	  the	  market	  can	  also	  be	  seen	  in	  an	  algorithmic	  gaze7.	  In	  
this	   sense,	   the	   thesis	   endeavors	   to	   understand	   the	   ‘machinic’	   nature	   of	   financial	  
markets	  as	  something	  intrinsic	  to	  their	  mode	  of	  functioning,	  rather	  than	  as	  a	  recent	  
epochal	   shift	   disrupting	   a	   pre-­‐established	   social	   structure	   (Knorr-­‐Cetina	   and	  
Bruegger,	  2002).	  	  Rather	  than	  focusing	  too	  much	  on	  the	  recent	  impact	  of	  electronic	  
trading	  and	  e-­‐commerce,	  one	  should	  perhaps	  ask	  in	  what	  way	  have	  financial	  markets	  
always	  been	  complex	  machines,	  i.e.	  socio-­‐technical	  systems.	  In	  as	  much	  as	  one	  looks	  
even	  at	  the	  earliest	  and	  simplest	  designs,	  one	  can	  already	  see	  the	  basic	  blueprints	  of	  
machines	   constructed	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	   processing	   some	   form	   of	   financial	  
transaction.	  
	  
In	  order	  to	  fully	  grasp	  what	  is	  at	  stake	  in	  this	  account	  of	  financial	  markets	  as	  complex	  
machines	  we	  will	   engage	  with	  a	  particular	  philosophy	   (Gilbert	   Simondon),	  opening	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  The	  formal	  nature	  of	  these	  process	  points	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  can	  be	  described	  as	  
specific	  algorithms.	  
6We	   define	   financial	   markets	   as	   the	   venues	   where	   buy	   and	   sell	   requests	   are	  
aggregated	  and	  executed.	  
7	  The	   philosopher	   John	   Searle	   (1995)	   has	   rigorously	   analyzed	   the	   formal	   nature	   of	  
social	   institutions,	  based	  on	  his	  understanding	  of	   language	  as	  a	  system	  of	   rules	   for	  
the	  production	  of	  speech	  acts.	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up	  an	  understanding	  of	  technology	  as	  a	  complex	  evolving	  system	  in	  its	  own	  right.	  In	  
addition,	  as	  we	  engage	  with	  the	  detailed	  operations	  of	  financial	  markets	   in	  a	  more	  
granular	   way,	   we	   will	   also	   leverage	   a	   specific	   approach	   to	   markets	   as	   formal	  
automata,	   or	   information	   processing	   systems	   (Philip	   Mirowski).	   Once	   we	   have	   a	  
clear	  understanding	  of	  financial	  markets	  as	  complex	  machines	  for	  the	  processing	  of	  
transactions,	  we	  will	  attempt	  to	  read	  through	  the	  history	  of	  these	  markets	  from	  the	  
Middle	  Ages	  to	  the	  present.	  At	  the	  end,	  through	  a	  series	  of	  interviews,	  we	  will	  also	  
endeavor	  to	  analyze	  some	  of	  the	  recent	  developments	  affecting	  the	  very	  structure	  of	  
financial	  markets.	  The	  overall	  aim	   is	  not	   simply	   to	  satisfy	  a	   theoretical	   curiosity	  on	  
the	  topic	  of	  the	  technological	  or	  ‘machinic’	  nature	  of	  financial	  markets.	  The	  ultimate	  
goal	  is	  to	  show	  how	  this	  perspective	  can	  be	  used	  to	  offer	  a	  different	  understanding	  
of	   the	   history	   of	   financial	   markets	   and	   shed	   a	   light	   on	   their	   contemporary	  
transformations.	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What	  is	  a	  Transaction	  Machine?	  
	  
	  
While	  most	  people	  would	  profess	  to	  have	  a	  clear	  and	  transparent	  understanding	  of	  
what	   it	  means	   to	   transact,	   it	   is	   certainly	  worth	   distinguishing	   it	   from	   the	   broader	  
category	  of	   exchange.	  Within	   the	   social	   sciences,	   the	  notion	  of	   exchange	  has	   long	  
been	   considered	   as	   one	   of	   the	   most	   basic	   forms	   of	   social	   interaction.	   For	   Max	  
Weber,	   exchange	   was	   a	   voluntary	   agreement	   between	   parties	   ‘’in	   the	   course	   of	  
which	   goods	   or	   other	   advantage	   are	   passed	   as	   reciprocal	   compensation’’	   (Weber,	  
1978,	  p.	  72).	  One	  basic	  example	  of	   this	   is	  barter,	  where	   something	  changes	  hands	  
without	   any	   kind	   of	   monetary	   quantification.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   Georg	   Simmel,	  
‘’exchange	   is	   the	   purest	   and	   most	   concentrated	   form	   of	   all	   human	   interactions’’	  
(Simmel,	   1971,	   p.43).	   For	   him,	   this	   social	   form	   has	   a	   certain	   sacrificial	   nature,	  
because	   in	  the	  course	  of	  exchange	  you	  have	  to	  give	  up	  something	   in	  order	  to	  gain	  
something	   new.	   For	   both	   of	   them,	   the	   introduction	   of	   monetary	   exchange	  
represents	   a	   major	   turning	   point	   in	   terms	   of	   rational	   quantification	   of	   goods,	  
replacing	   personal	   economic	   ties	   with	   more	   impersonal	   formal	   relationships	  
(Simmel,	  2011).	  Once	  the	  monetary	  equivalent	   is	   in	  place,	  exchange	  fundamentally	  
takes	  a	  transactional	  form	  whereby	  a	  buyer	  and	  a	  seller	  enter	  into	  a	  legal	  agreement	  
to	   transfer	   an	  asset	   for	   a	  monetary	  payment.	   In	   this	   sense,	   transacting	  entails	   the	  
negotiation,	  writing,	  execution	  and	  enforcement	  of	  legal	  contracts/agreements,	  with	  
the	   end	   result	   of	   exchanging	   property	   rights	   over	   certain	   assets	   for	   money.	  	  
Therefore	  the	  transactional	  form	  of	  exchange	  requires	  a	  certain	  formal	  institutional	  
and	  technical8	  framework	  within	  which	  it	  can	  be	  executed.	  	  
	  
At	  the	  same	  time,	  it	   is	   important	  to	  note	  that	  throughout	  history	  transactions	  have	  
been	  performed	  by	  a	  variety	  of	  different	  means	   including	  clay	  tablets,	  metal	  coins,	  
double-­‐entry	  books,	  centralized	  ledgers,	  electronic	  order	  books,	  blockchains,	  etc.	  For	  
instance,	  in	  his	  recent	  work,	  Michael	  Castelle	  (2014,	  2015)	  has	  gone	  to	  great	  lengths	  
in	   researching	   the	   most	   recent	   stage	   of	   the	   technological	   formalization	   of	  
transactions.	   For	   Castelle,	   a	   transaction	   is	   that	   form	   of	   ‘’exchange	   which	   in	   its	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8As	   Oliver	  Williamson	   pointed	   out,	   ‘’transactions	   occur	   when	   a	   good	   or	   service	   is	  
transferred	  across	  a	  technologically	  separable	  interface’’	  (Williamson,	  1981,	  p.552).	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conceptual	   disembeddedness	   has	   been	   most	   amenable	   to	   implementation	   via	  
symbolic	   intermediating	   systems’’	   (Castelle,	  2015,	  p.1).	  While	   the	   formal	  nature	  of	  
any	   transactional	   operation	   is	   probably	   as	   old	   as	   accounting	   and	   money	   itself,	  
Castelle	  constructs	  a	  recent	  genealogy	  of	  the	  financial	  and	  technological	  innovations	  
resulting	  in	  the	  current	  omnipresence	  of	  standardized	  and	  automated	  transactional	  
capabilities.	   In	   his	   work,	   he	   highlights	   the	   crucial	   aspects	   of	   contemporary	  
transactions:	   atomicity,	   consistency,	   isolation,	   and	   durability,	   in	   the	   context	   of	   ICT	  
and	  relational	  databases	  going	  back	  to	  the	  1970s	  and	  1980s	  (Castelle,	  2015,	  p.2).	  	  In	  
this	   context,	   these	   features	   refer	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   a	   transaction	   is	   a	   discrete	  
operation,	   it	   has	   a	   beginning	   and	   an	   end,	   it	   either	   completes	   or	   it	   doesn’t.	   In	  
addition,	  its	  execution	  is	  recordable	  and	  retrievable	  and	  it	  can	  be	  audited	  at	  a	  later	  
point	   in	  time	  (Castelle,	  2015,	  p.24).	  Perhaps	  more	   importantly	  still,	  a	   transaction	   is	  
seen	   as	   a	   reversible	   operation	   similar	   to	   most	   process	   entailed	   by	   information	  
processing	   systems.	   In	   his	   view,	   the	   formal	   nature	   of	   transactions	   is	   largely	   why	  
contemporary	   economic	   exchange	   becomes	   increasingly	   dominated	   by	   automated	  
electronic	  platforms	  processing	  global	  financial	  flows.	  	  
	  
From	   a	   broader	   historical	   perspective,	   whether	   they	   are	   executed	   with	   a	   pile	   of	  
blankets,	   as	   records	   in	   a	   ledger	   or	   as	   changes	   in	   electronic	   databases,	   we	   can	  
understand	   transactions	   as	   formal	   procedures	   executed	   over	   an	   information-­‐
processing	  medium.	   This	   doesn’t	   seem	   so	   strange	   once	  we	   understand	   the	   act	   of	  
transacting	  from	  a	  functional	  perspective,	  as	  the	  execution	  of	  a	  step-­‐by-­‐step	  process,	  
i.e.	   an	   algorithm.	   The	   history	   of	   markets	   shows	   us	   that	   there	   are	   indeed	   certain	  
patterns	  and	  regularities,	  procedures	  and	  rules	  evident	  most	  complex	  machines	  that	  
process	  financial	  transactions.	  In	  fact,	  it	  might	  be	  interesting	  to	  look	  at	  one	  example	  
that	  has	  apparently	  almost	  no	  technological	  underpinning	  or	  financial	  complexity,	  as	  
for	   instance	   the	   research	   done	   on	   the	   Kwakiutl	   tribe	   in	   North	   America	   (MacLeod,	  
1925).	   It	   is	   commonly	   held	   that	   North-­‐American	   societies	   were	   non-­‐monetary	  
societies	   in	   the	   Western	   European	   sense,	   and	   that	   they	   relied	   heavily	   on	   a	   gift	  
economy	  (Curtis,	  1976).	  Few	  things	  could	  be	  more	  different	  from	  western	  financial	  
markets	   then	   the	   famous	   potlatch,	   a	   massive	   exchange	   of	   gifts,	   the	   result	   being	  
status	  gains	  within	  the	  community.	  One	  example	  regards	  gifts	  comprising	  pieces	  of	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metal	   such	   as	   copper,	   which	   were	   particularly	   valued	   for	   potlatch	   purposes.	   The	  
drive	  and	  determination	  to	  pursue	  the	  ritual	  of	  potlatch	  posed	  specific	  transactional	  
problems,	  of	  how	  to	  actually	  get	  hold	  of	  copper	  plates.	  As	  a	  response	  to	  bottlenecks,	  
the	   tribe	   developed	   an	   interesting	   practice	   called	   ‘’giving-­‐out-­‐of-­‐the-­‐door’’	  
(MacLeod,	  1925).	  The	  central	  mechanism	  was	  a	  pile	  of	  blankets,	  which	  can	  be	  seen	  
as	  a	  centralized	  ledger.	  When	  a	  certain	  quantity	  of	  copper	  would	  become	  available,	  
the	  seller	  and	  the	  buyer	  would	  meet	  under	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  whole	  tribe.	  The	  potential	  
acquirer	  o	  copper	  would	  advance	  his	  pile	  of	  blankets	  but	   there	  was	  a	   risk	   that	   the	  
quantity	  was	  not	  enough	  to	  cover	   the	  needs	  of	   the	  copper	  seller.	   In	   that	  case,	   the	  
buyer	  would	  call	  upon	  some	  other	  tribe	  member	  who	  owed	  him	  a	  debt	  and	  ask	  him	  
to	  pay	  his	  debts.	  If	  this	  third	  person	  could	  not	  repay	  his	  debt,	  he	  might	  call	  upon	  the	  
first	  person	  (the	  initial	  seller	  of	  copper)	  and	  ask	  him	  for	  credit.	  If	  the	  seller	  of	  copper	  
agrees,	   he	   could	   take	   some	   blankets	   from	   the	   central	   pile	   and	   extended	   them	   as	  
credit	   to	   the	   third	   person,	  who	   in	   turn	  pays	   his	   debt	   to	   the	   second	  participant	   by	  
putting	  the	  blankets	  back	  on	  the	  pile.	   	  What	  happened	  was,	   in	  effect,	  a	  transfer	  of	  
accounts,	  with	  the	  ‘’physical	  handling	  of	  the	  blankets	  merely	  being	  a	  visualization	  of	  
the	  transfers	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  surrounding	  witnesses’’	  (MacLeod,	  1925,	  p.454).	  	  
What	   is	   important	   to	   note	   is	   that	   the	   central	   pile	   of	   blankets	   functioned	   as	   a	  
transactional	  mechanism	  for	  reducing	  the	  complexity	  of	  conflicting	  balances.	  That	  is	  
to	  say,	  what	  we	  have	  here	  is	  a	  socio-­‐technical	  system	  made	  up	  of	  human	  beings	  and	  
technical	   artefacts	   whose	   primary	   function	   is	   to	   clear	   the	   bottlenecks	   of	   an	  
overlapping	  series	  of	  transactions.	  
	  
This	   is	  of	   course	  a	  much	   too	   simplistic	   example	  of	  what	  happens	   in	   contemporary	  
financial	   markets.	   But	   it	   does	   highlight	   the	   importance	   of	   certain	   transactional	  
mechanisms,	   which	   can	   be	   modelled	   as	   instructions	   subject	   to	   algorithmic	  
formalization	  and	  can	  thus	  be	  executed	  on	  number	  of	  different	  physical	  hardware9.	  
As	   we	   will	   see,	   modern	   financial	   markets	   entail	   a	   number	   of	   different,	   and	   quite	  
complex	  mechanisms	  performing	  a	  number	  of	  transactional	  functions.	  First,	  in	  order	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  We	   can	   reference	   here	   most	   of	   the	   literature	   on	   market	   design,	   microstructure	  
research,	  experimental	  economics,	  etc.	  We	  will	  develop	  this	  further	  in	  the	  context	  of	  
Philip	  Mirowski’s	  theory	  of	  markets.	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for	  a	  financial	  market	  to	  function	  there	  needs	  to	  be	  some	  system	  for	  aggregating	  and	  
linking	   disparate	   transactional	   requests	   (matching).	   Second,	   the	   growth	   of	   trading	  
volumes	   leads	   to	   complex	   overlapping	   exposures	   between	   participants.	   Another	  
mechanism	   is	   then	   needed	   in	   order	   to	   untangle	   and	   reduce	   the	   complexity	   of	  
transactional	   flows	   (clearing).	   This	   simplified	   sequence	   of	   functions,	   composed	   of	  
very	  specific	  step-­‐by-­‐step	  procedures	  and	   instructions,	   represents	  a	  basic	  blueprint	  
of	   the	   infrastructure	   of	   financial	   markets,	   which	   affords	   smooth	   flow	   of	   financial	  
transactions10.	  	  
	  
For	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  thesis	  we	  put	  forward	  the	  notion	  of	  transaction	  machines11	  
as	  those	  socio-­‐technical	  systems	  performing	  certain	  functions	  that	  maintain	  the	  flow	  
of	   financial	   transactions,	   otherwise	   understood	   as	   the	   infrastructure	   of	   financial	  
markets.	   In	   terms	   of	   their	   most	   basic	   formal	   blueprint,	   these	   machines	   receive	   a	  
certain	  number	  of	  inputs	  (trade	  requests/orders),	  process	  them	  according	  to	  a	  set	  of	  
rules	   and	   procedures	   (algorithms)	   and	   provide	   certain	   outputs.	   Transaction	  
machines	  should	  not	  be	  conflated	  with	  the	  wider	  and	  more	  complex	  phenomenon	  of	  
financial	   markets,	   but	   are	   best	   understood	   as	   the	   basic	   infrastructure	   of	   these	  
markets,	  maintaining	  the	  regular	  flow	  of	  financial	  transactions.	  Moreover,	  looking	  at	  
the	  history	  of	  financial	  markets,	  one	  can	  see	  how	  specialized	  human	  individuals	  and	  
technical	   artifacts	   assemble	   together	   as	   complex	   machines	   processing	   and	  
maintaining	   the	   flow	   of	   financial	   transactions.	   Different	   transaction	   machines	  
perform	   different	   functions	   such	   as	   aggregation,	   matching,	   clearing,	   settlement,	  
custody,	   order	   routing,	   dissemination	   of	   price	   information,	   reporting,	   etc.	   (Lee,	  
1998)12.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  We	  will	  devote	  a	  considerable	  part	  of	  the	  thesis	  to	  tracking	  the	  evolution	  of	  some	  
of	  these	  systems	  for	  the	  special	  case	  of	  certain	  financial	  securities.	  	  
11	  Throughout	  the	  thesis	  we	  understand	  machines	  as	  socio-­‐technical	  systems	  in	  the	  
broadest	  sense.	  This	  is	  very	  much	  in	  the	  tradition	  initiated	  by	  Lewis	  Mumford	  (1934,	  
1967,	  1971).	  In	  his	  account,	  the	  first	  machines	  were	  not	  made	  of	  bolts	  or	  cogs,	  but	  
were	  very	  much	  social	  machines,	  comprising	  human	  beings	  as	  component	  parts.	  
12	  It	   is	   important	   to	   note	   that	  we	  do	  not	   apply	   this	   framework	   to	   the	   economy	   in	  
general	   but	   only	   to	   the	   exchange	   of	   securities	   such	   as	   stocks,	   bonds,	   exchange	  
traded	  derivatives	  (futures,	  options),	  over-­‐the-­‐counter	  products	  (interest	  rate	  swaps,	  
credit	  default	  swaps,	  repos,	  etc.).	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Over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  thesis	  we	  will	  only	  focus	  on	  two	  functions,	  namely	  matching13	  
and	   clearing	  14,	   in	   the	   specific	   context	  of	   specific	   financial	  markets.	   For	   instance,	   a	  
matching	  machine	  would	  receive	  a	  number	  of	  orders	  to	  buy	  or	  sell	  certain	  quantities	  
of	  financial	  securities	  at	  certain	  price	  levels.	  These	  disparate	  requests	  would	  then	  be	  
matched	   according	   to	   a	   specific	   algorithm	   producing	   certain	   outputs	   such	   as	   the	  
most	  up	   to	  date	  market	  price	   for	   that	   security.	   In	  a	   less	   complicated	   scenario,	   the	  
final	   settlement	   of	   these	   requests	   can	   happen	   on	   the	   spot	   directly	   between	  
participants.	   But	   in	   the	   case	   of	   financial	   securities	   such	   as	   stocks,	   bonds,	   futures,	  
options,	   etc.,	   the	   accumulation	   of	   complex	   and	   overlapping	   trading	   positions	   is	  
inevitable.	   A	   second	   systems	   is	   thus	   required,	   namely	   a	   clearing	   machine	   that	  
receives	   the	  different	  exposures	  of	  each	  market	  participant	  as	   inputs.	  Through	   the	  
use	   of	   another	   algorithm,	   this	   second	   machine	   would	   reduce	   the	   complexity	   of	  
trading	  positions	  by	  netting	  offsetting15	  exposures.	  
	  
As	  we	  have	  said,	  the	  execution	  of	  these	  functions	  follows	  different	  algorithms,	  which	  
have	  qualitatively	  and	  quantitatively	  different	  outputs	  and	  are	  more	  or	  less	  resilient.	  
Over	   time,	   more	   elaborate	   designs	   emerge	   under	   the	   pressure	   of	   larger	   trading	  
volumes	   and	   more	   complex	   financial	   products.	   Thus	   the	   daily	   operation	   of	   these	  
machines	  transitions	  from	  human-­‐based	  ‘hardware’	  to	  electronic	  systems	  exhibiting	  
ever-­‐higher	  degrees	  of	  automation	  and	  standardization	  (Muniesa,	  2003;	  MacKenzie	  
et	   al.,	   2012;	   Pardo-­‐Guerra,	   2012;	   Beunza	   and	   Millo,	   2013).	   Finally,	   as	   these	  
transaction	  machines	   become	   the	   dominant	   hubs	   of	   financial	   flows,	   they	   are	   also	  
crucial	   for	   understanding	   the	   complex	   power	   dynamics	   in	   both	   old	   and	  
contemporary	  financial	  markets.	  	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  Matching	  refers	  to	  the	  collection	  of	  intentions	  to	  trade	  (orders/requests)	  and	  their	  
subsequent	  execution.	  
14 	  In	   economics,	   the	   standard	   definition	   of	   clearing	   refers	   to	   the	   convergence	  
between	  supply	  and	  demand	  and	  the	  discovery	  of	  a	  price	  that	  clears	  the	  market.	  In	  
financial	   markets,	   clearing	   can	   also	   refer	   to	   the	   management	   of	   trade	   exposures	  
between	  matching	  and	  final	  settlement,	  which	   includes	  operations	  such	  as	  netting,	  
novation	  and	  risk	  management	  through	  margining.	  
15	  Offsetting	  positions	  are	  trades	  that	  cancel	  each	  other	  out.	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Theory,	  History	  and	  Empirical	  
	  
	  
The	   genesis	   of	   the	   thesis	   began	   by	   reading	   the	   recent	   of	   literature	   in	   the	   social	  
sciences	   and	   humanities	   where	   social-­‐technical	   systems	   are	   understood	   as	   hybrid	  
assemblages,	   associations	   or	   networks	   comprising	   a	   diverse	   set	   of	   elements.	   This	  
includes	   broader	   philosophical	   accounts	   such	   as	   Manuel	   DeLanda’s	   assemblage	  
theory	   and	   the	   new	   economic	   sociology	   of	   financial	   markets,	   the	   so-­‐called	   Social	  
Studies	  of	  Finance	  (SSF).	  Both	  of	  these	  strands	  of	  theory	  address	  the	  topic	  of	  markets	  
in	  general	  and	  financial	  markets	  in	  particular	  based	  on	  what	  can	  be	  roughly	  called	  an	  
assemblage	   view	  of	   the	   social	   and	   the	   technical.	   This	   triggered	   an	   interest	   for	   the	  
changing	   landscape	  of	  contemporary	   financial	  markets,	  particularly	   in	   terms	  of	   the	  
impact	  of	  information	  technology	  on	  the	  structure	  of	  finance.	  In	  this	  regard,	  the	  SSF	  
literature	   leverages	   the	   theoretical	   and	   ontological	   framework	   of	   Actor-­‐Network	  
Theory,	  paving	  the	  way	  for	  an	  understanding	  of	  markets	  as	  assemblages	  comprising	  
human	  beings	  and	  technical	  artifacts.	  This	  approach	  leads	  to	  detailed	  descriptions	  of	  
the	   complex	   web	   of	   relations	   that	   make	   up	   the	   day-­‐to-­‐day	   existence	   of	   financial	  
institutions,	  markets	  and	  actors.	   In	  addition	   to	   that,	  we	   reviewed	  some	  of	  Manuel	  
DeLanda’s	   recent	   work,	   where	   markets	   are	   understood	   as	   complex	   assemblages	  
made	   up	   of	   physical,	   biological,	   social	   and	   technical	   components.	   Both	   of	   these	  
approaches	  suggest	  that	  the	  functioning	  of	  financial	  markets	  cannot	  be	  reduced	  to	  a	  
set	   of	   inter-­‐personal	   relations,	   so	   that	   any	   account	   of	   these	   systems	   needed	   to	  
seriously	   consider	   the	   ontological	   overlap	   between	   the	   social	   and	   the	   technical.	  
Moreover,	   DeLanda’s	   work	   also	   suggested	   that	   some	   of	   the	   recent	   technological	  
transformations	   of	   financial	   markets	   are	   perhaps	   part	   of	   a	   more	   complex	   longer-­‐
term	   process,	   thus	   the	   importance	   of	   history	   and	   evolution	   in	   his	   work.	   The	  
confluence	  of	  these	  two	  strands	  ultimately	  led	  to	  one	  of	  the	  research	  question	  of	  the	  
thesis.	   Namely,	   is	   it	   possible	   to	   think	   of	   financial	   markets	   beyond	   understanding	  
them	  as	  assemblages	  of	  a	  multitude	  of	  discrete	  elements	  (particularly	  human	  begins	  
and	  technical	  artifacts).	  If	  the	  recent	  technologization	  of	  financial	  markets	  is	  part	  of	  a	  
longer-­‐term	  process,	  then	  perhaps	  these	  markets	  are	  best	  understood	  as	  machines	  
from	  the	  very	  beginning.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  drawing	  from	  an	  understanding	  of	  machines	  
as	   information	   processing	   systems	   (i.e.	   cybernetics,	   computers	   science,	   etc.),	   one	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could	   focus	   on	   the	   detailed	   functioning	   of	   these	   systems	   rather	   than	   their	  
composition.	  Perhaps	  a	  more	  adequate	  approach	  would	  be	  to	  think	  of	  these	  systems	  
as	  transaction	  machines	  in	  their	  own	  right.	  In	  this	  context,	  the	  way	  in	  which	  different	  
elements	  (both	  human	  and	  non-­‐human)	  come	  together	  becomes	  secondary	  to	  what	  
exactly	  it	  is	  that	  they	  to,	  the	  way	  in	  which	  a	  specific	  design	  performs	  a	  transactional	  
function.	   The	   aim	   of	   the	   thesis	   thus	   shifted	   to	   understanding	   financial	  markets	   as	  
having	   always	   been	   complex	   machines	   in	   their	   own	   right,	   focusing	   on	   the	  
infrastructure	  that	  performs	  the	  execution	  of	  financial	  transactions.	  	  
	  
The	  next	  step	  was	  to	  acknowledge	  that,	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  this	  goal,	  it	  is	  necessary	  
to	   adopt	   a	   broader	   inter-­‐disciplinary	   theoretical	   framework.	  On	   the	   one	   hand,	  we	  
looked	   for	   a	  broader	  perspective	  on	   technology,	   giving	   an	  account	  of	  machines	   as	  
information	  processing	  systems.	  Drawing	   from	  cybernetics,	   information	  theory	  and	  
the	   history	   of	   technology,	   Chapter	   2	   of	   the	   thesis	   focuses	   on	   the	  work	   of	   French	  
philosopher	   Gilbert	   Simondon.	   Following	   his	   account	   of	   what	   he	   calls	   technical	  
ensembles,	  we	  gain	  an	  understanding	  of	  machines	  as	   complex	   systems	  defined	  by	  
certain	  operational	   schematics,	   i.e.	   their	   formal	   algorithmic	  mode	  of	   functioning16.	  
While	  for	  most	  of	  history,	  humans	  have	  been	  the	  most	  important	  component	  parts	  
of	   complex	   machines	   (technical	   ensembles),	   the	   advent	   of	   modern	   information	  
processing	   capabilities	   leads	   to	   an	   increased	   degree	   of	   autonomy	   in	   relation	   to	  
humans.	   Importantly	   for	   Simondon,	   the	   actual	   make	   up	   of	   these	   machines	   is	  
secondary	  to	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  actual	  operational	  design	  or	  mode	  of	  functioning	  
evolves	  through	  time.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  while	  Simondon	  looks	  at	  the	  evolution	  of	  
machines	   in	   general,	   our	   aim	   was	   to	   focus	   on	   the	   granular	   details	   of	   specific	  
machines	  underpinning	  the	  functioning	  of	  financial	  markets.	  In	  this	  sense,	  Chapter	  3	  
focuses	  on	  the	  work	  of	  Philip	  Mirowski	  and	  his	  theory	  of	  markets	  as	  specific	  types	  of	  
information	   processing	   machines.	   Similar	   to	   Simondon,	   Mirowski’s	   perspective	   is	  
heavily	   indebted	   to	   cybernetics	   and	   computer	   science.	   In	   his	   account,	   specific	  
market	   functions	   are	   formal	   automata,	   understood	   as	   algorithmic	   structures	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  Their	  basic	   functioning	   is	  akin	   to	  any	   input/output	   system	   in	   that	   they	   receive	  a	  
certain	   number	   of	   inputs,	   which	   are	   processed	   according	   to	   a	   set	   of	   rules	   and	  
procedures/algorithms	  and	  provide	  certain	  outputs.	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performing	  a	  series	  of	   functions	  relative	  to	  the	  processing	  of	  transactions.	   In	  other	  
words,	   Mirowski	   thinks	   of	   financial	   markets	   as	   machines	   running	   a	   series	   of	  
algorithms,	  ultimately	  evolving	  under	  the	  constraints	  of	  human	  culture	  and	  society17.	  	  
	  
Thus,	   leveraging	  both	  Simondon	  and	  Mirowski,	   the	   thesis	  began	   to	   frame	   financial	  
markets	  as	  some	  sort	  of	   information	  processing	  machines	  performing	  a	  number	  of	  
functions,	  such	  as	  processing	  the	  flows	  of	  financial	  transactions.	  	  It	  became	  clear	  that	  
using	  Simondon	  and	  Mirowski	  (following	  cybernetics,	  computer	  science,	  information	  
theory,	  the	  history	  of	  technology)	  it	  would	  be	  possible	  to	  give	  an	  account	  of	  financial	  
markets	  substantially	  different	  form	  SSF	  as	  well	  as	  DeLanda’s	  assemblage	  theory.	  As	  
our	   understanding	   of	   transaction	   machines	   matured,	   it	   also	   became	   clear	   that	  
history	   would	   have	   a	   crucial	   part	   to	   play	   in	   any	   kind	   of	   adequate	   account	   of	   the	  
contemporary	   transformations	   of	   financial	   markets	   as	   for	   both	   in	   Simondon	   and	  
Mirowski	  the	  present	  is	  intimately	  linked	  with	  past	  evolutions.	  The	  next	  logical	  step	  
was	  thus	  to	  apply	  the	  theoretical	  framework	  to	  several	  historical	  examples	  in	  order	  
to	   track	   the	   long-­‐term	   evolution	   of	   transaction	  machines.	   Consequently,	   Part	   II	   of	  
the	  thesis	  comprises	  three	  chapters	  where	  the	  framework	  of	  transaction	  machines	  is	  
used	  in	  order	  to	  read	  through	  or	  re-­‐interpret	  the	  evolution	  of	  financial	  markets	  from	  
medieval	  times	  up	  to	  the	  present.	  	  
	  
The	   first	   encounter	  with	   the	  history	  of	   financial	  market	  occurred	   in	   the	   context	  of	  
Fernand	  Braudel’s	  encyclopedic	  work	  comprising	  Capitalism	  and	  Material	  Life	  1400-­‐
1800	   (Braudel,	   1975)	   and	   Capitalism	   and	   Civilization	   15th-­‐18th	   Century	   (Braudel,	  
1981;	  1982;	  1984).	  Braudel’s	  work	  addresses	   the	   complex	  history	  of	   the	  European	  
economy,	   tracing	   the	   roots	   of	   medieval	   commerce,	   finance	   and	   their	   impact	   on	  
modern	   capitalism.	   More	   importantly,	   his	   work	   offers	   detailed	   descriptions	   of	  
market	  institutions	  and	  the	  genesis	  of	  medieval	  finance.	  From	  this	  starting	  point	  the	  
present	   thesis	   branched	   out	   into	   the	   secondary	   literature	   looking	   the	   history	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  In	  a	  period	  when	  technical	  artifacts	  were	  more	  primitive,	   these	   functions	  had	  to	  
be	  performed	  by	  human	  beings	  and	  their	  prosthetics.	  In	  our	  contemporary	  situation,	  
the	   execution	   of	   these	   functions	   has	   been	   integrated	   (coded)	   within	   the	   internal	  
workings	  of	  computers.	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medieval	  finance.	  As	  we	  will	  see	  in	  Chapters	  4,5	  and	  6,	  the	  thesis	  provides	  a	  review	  
of	   the	   history	   of	   medieval	   merchant	   banking	   as	   well	   as	   the	   genesis	   of	   financial	  
institution	  such	  as	  brokerages,	  exchanges	  and	  clearinghouses.	  	  
	  
While	   drawing	   from	   a	   diverse	   set	   of	   secondary	   historical	   sources,	   this	   thesis	   is	  
nevertheless	  driven	  by	  theory	  and	  the	  attempt	  to	  construct	  a	  framework	  allowing	  for	  
a	  better	  understanding	  of	  past	  and	  present	  financial	  markets.	  While	  a	   large	  part	  of	  
the	   thesis	   is	   engaged	   with	   historical	   narratives,	   this	   is	   by	   no	   means	   a	   history	   of	  
financial	   markets	   in	   the	   classical	   sense18.	   The	   three	   historical	   chapters	   should	   be	  
seen	  as	  the	  canvas	  on	  which	  the	  thesis	  attempts	  to	  paint	  the	  evolutionary	  trajectory	  
of	  certain	  transaction	  mechanisms,	  of	  machines	  performing	  functions	  relative	  to	  the	  
processing	   of	   financial	   flows.	   Throughout	   the	   thesis,	   it	   is	   the	   theoretical	  
understanding	  of	  transaction	  machines	  that	  guides	  the	  reading	  and	  interpretation	  of	  
medieval,	  modern	  and	  contemporary	  financial	  markets.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  reading	  of	  
history	  also	  provided	  valuable	  feedbacks	  for	  the	  theoretical	  framework.	  The	  history	  
of	   finance	   shows	   us	   that	   there	   are	   indeed	   certain	   patterns	   and	   regularities,	  
procedures	   and	   mechanisms	   present	   in	   any	   system	   that	   performs	   certain	  
transactional	   functions.	  Moreover,	   it	  also	   indicated	  that	   the	   thesis	   should	   focus	  on	  
two	   distinct	   types	   of	   functions,	   that	   of	   matching	   and	   clearing	   as	   the	   essential	  
mechanisms	  underpinning	  the	  existence	  of	  financial	  markets.	  Therefore,	  this	  led	  to	  a	  
reading	   of	   the	   historical	   evolution	   of	   financial	   markets	   through	   the	   gradual	  
development	   of	   these	   two	   types	   of	   transaction	   machines.	   Where	   the	   standard	  
historical	   account	   (Ferguson,	   2008)	   might	   focus	   on	   the	   way	   in	   which	   financial	  
‘technicians’	   invent	   new	  products	   and	   create	   new	   financial	   institutions,	   this	   thesis	  
sees	   the	   gradual	   evolution	   of	   specific	   transactional	   designs	   and	   algorithms.	   Over	  
time,	   it	   is	   interesting	   to	   see	   how	   both	   the	   ‘hardware’	   and	   the	   ‘software’	   of	   these	  
machines	   changes	   and	   responds	   to	   various	   pressures	   and	   constraints	   (technical,	  
social,	  cultural,	  etc.).	  The	  table	  below	  offers	  a	  visual	  illustration	  of	  our	  understanding	  
of	  the	  historical	  evolution	  of	  transaction	  machines:	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 	  Each	   chapter	   comprising	   Part	   II	   of	   the	   thesis	   is	   effectively	   a	   review	   of	   the	  
secondary	  literature	  addressing	  the	  history	  financial	  markets.	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Figure	  1:	  Historical	  sketch	  of	  transaction	  machines	  
As	  we	  progressed	  through	  the	  theoretical	  and	  historical	  chapters,	  our	  initial	  position	  
was	   reinforced,	   namely	   that	   the	   framework	   of	   transactions	   machines	   offers	   a	  
different	  way	  of	  approaching	  financial	  markets,	  particularly	  in	  light	  of	  recent	  events	  
such	  as	  the	  2008	  financial	  crisis.	  Within	  public	  discourse,	  the	  critique	  of	  the	  financial	  
system	  has	   largely	   revolved	  around	   the	  moral	   condemnation	  of	  greed,	   the	  age-­‐old	  
problem	  of	  debt	  accumulation	  or	  the	  inherent	  contradictions	  of	  capitalism.	  Different	  
to	  these	  approaches,	  our	  framework	  allows	  us	  to	  deconstruct	  the	  functional	  layers	  of	  
financial	  markets	  and	  understand	   that	   the	   current	   structure	  of	   finance	   is	  part	  of	   a	  
long	   and	   convoluted	   history.	   Moreover,	   it	   also	   allows	   us	   to	   see	   that	   there	   are	  
different	  designs	  pertaining	  to	  different	  transactional	  functions	  and	  that	  throughout	  
history,	   a	   certain	   community	   of	   users	   relied	   on	   complex	   machines	   for	   the	  
maintenance	   of	   financial	   flows.	   It	   shows	   us	   that	   certain	   transactional	   designs	   are	  
more	  or	  less	  efficient	  in	  processing	  flows,	  more	  or	  less	  resilient	  in	  the	  face	  financial	  
shocks	   and	   thus	   can	   have	   a	   very	   different	   impact	   on	   the	   stability	   of	   financial	  
markets.	   It	   finally	   allows	   us	   to	   distinguish	   between	   ways	   of	   organizing	   financial	  
markets	   that	  are	   less	   robust	  but	  perhaps	  more	  profitable	  and	  other	  ways	   that	  are	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  Medieval	  Bourses	  where	  essentially	  meeting	  places	  for	  merchants,	  while	  clearing	  
fairs	  allowed	  them	  to	  reduce	  and	  settle	  overlapping	  exposures.	  
20	  ECNs	   (Electronic	   Communication	   Networks)	   are	   electronic	   trading	   platforms	   for	  
share	  and	  bond	  trading	  in	  the	  US,	  MTFs	  (Multilateral	  Trading	  Facility)	  represent	  the	  
European	   equivalent	   of	   ECNs	   and	   SEFs	   (Swap	   Execution	   Facility)	   are	   the	   new	  
generation	  of	  electronic	  platforms	  for	  Over-­‐the-­‐Counter	  (OTC)	  derivatives.	  
21	  CCPs	   (Central	   Counterparties)	   are	   clearinghouses	   that	   perform	   central	   clearing,	  
becoming	  the	  buyer	  to	  every	  seller	  and	  the	  seller	  to	  every	  buyer.	  
	   24	  
more	   resilient	  but	  are	  perhaps	  more	  difficult	   to	   implement,	   expensive	   to	  maintain	  
and	   therefore	   less	   profitable.	   Therefore,	   instead	   of	   rejecting	   finance	   outright	   it	  
would	  be	  more	  interesting	  to	  look	  at	  the	  long	  evolution	  of	  transaction	  machines	  and	  
how	  it	  helps	  shed	  a	  different	  light	  recent	  events	  such	  as	  the	  2008	  financial	  crisis.	  	  
	  
Consequently,	  Part	   III	  of	   the	   thesis	  applies	   the	   transaction	  machines	   framework	   to	  
the	  current	  state	  of	   finance.	  This	   is	  achieved	  by	  reviewing	  the	  secondary	   literature	  
within	   economic	   sociology	   and	   financial	   economics,	   dealing	   with	   issues	   such	   as	  
electronic	   trading,	   automated	   market	   making,	   high	   frequency	   trading	   and	  
centralized	   clearing.	   Moreover,	   in	   order	   to	   get	   a	   better	   grasp	   of	   current	  
developments	  we	  began	  a	  series	  of	  interviews	  with	  professionals	  from	  the	  financial	  
services	  industry.	  The	  aim	  was	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  current	  state	  of	  clearing	  machines,	  in	  
the	  context	  of	  the	  regulatory	  overhaul	  in	  the	  OTC	  derivatives	  markets	  post	  the	  2008	  
financial	  crisis.	   It	   is	   important	  to	  highlight	  one	  of	  the	  limitations	  of	  the	  research,	  as	  
the	   results	   represent	   only	   a	   limited	   snapshot	   at	   a	   particular	   point	   in	   time.	  
Nevertheless,	  this	  was	  an	  attempt	  to	  introduce	  a	  certain	  empirical	  dimension	  to	  the	  
thesis.	  The	  semi-­‐structured	  approach	  was	  complemented	  by	  open-­‐ended	  questions,	  
through	  which	   interviewees	  were	  encouraged	   to	  expand	  were	  appropriate.	  During	  
the	  course	  of	  the	  interviews	  it	  became	  clear	  that	  the	  major	  themes	  emerging	  could	  
be	  brought	  back	  and	  reinterpreted	  in	   light	  of	  our	  transaction	  machines	  framework.	  
Namely,	  that	  the	   intricate	  details	  surrounding	  the	  current	  regulatory	  reforms	  could	  
actually	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  process	  of	  redesigning	  a	  complex	  machine.	  The	  reform	  
represented	   the	   transition	   from	  a	  bilateral	   to	  a	   centralized	   clearing	  design,	   from	  a	  
more	  opaque	  and	  fragile	  to	  a	  more	  transparent	  and	  more	  resilient	  clearing	  machine.	  
We	   also	   discovered	   that	   most	   of	   the	   technical	   details	   of	   this	   process	   of	  
reconfiguration	   were	   also	   political.	   As	   we	   will	   see,	   the	   new	   centralized	   clearing	  
design	  was	   also	   in	   the	   process	   of	   altering	   the	   power	   distribution	   and	   dynamics	   of	  
these	  markets,	  shifting	  the	  centre	  of	  gravity	  from	  the	  dealer	  banks	  to	  clearinghouse.	  
As	  one	  interviewee	  described	  it:	  ‘‘everything	  technical	  is	  political’’.	  
	  
This	  thesis	  thus	  revolves	  around	  a	  theoretical	  account	  of	   financial	  markets	  through	  
the	   interdisciplinary	   lens	  of	   transaction	  machines.	  Both	  the	  historical	  and	  empirical	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chapters	   function	   as	   the	   foundation	   allowing	   us	   to	   unfold	   the	   various	   layers	   that	  
make	   up	   the	   convoluted	   trajectory	   of	   transaction	   machines.	   The	   final	   aim	   is	   to	  
demonstrate	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  gain	  a	  different	  understanding	  of	  financial	  markets	  
by	  focusing	  on	  the	  actual	  functioning	  of	  their	  transactional	  mechanisms.	  Moreover,	  
this	   allows	   us	   to	   focus	   on	   what	   is	   at	   stake	   in	   the	   current	   transformation	   of	  
transaction	   machines,	   which	   is	   particularly	   important	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   political	  
economy	  contemporary	  finance.	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Chapters	  
	  
Chapter	  1	  reviews	  the	  so-­‐called	  Social	  Studies	  of	  Finance	  (SSF),	  underpinned	  by	  Actor	  
Network	   Theory	   (ANT)	   and	   Manuel	   DeLanda’s	   account	   of	   markets,	   according	   to	  
assemblage	  theory.	  Both	  approaches	  share	  a	  common	  ground	  in	  thinking	  in	  terms	  of	  
socio-­‐technical	  hybrids	   (so-­‐called	  assemblages	  or	  agencements	   of	  human	  and	  non-­‐
human	   elements)	   while	   highlighting	   the	   importance	   of	   materiality	   and	   technical	  
artefacts	   in	   the	   shaping	   of	  markets	   in	   general	   and	   financial	  markets	   in	   particular.	  
Drawing	   from	   Simondon’s	   philosophy	   and	  Mirowski’s	   economics,	   (both	   influenced	  
by	  cybernetics	  and	  computer	  science),	  we	  propose	  a	  different	  framework	  by	  looking	  
at	  financial	  markets	  as	  complex	  machines	  in	  their	  own	  right,	  performing	  a	  series	  of	  
functions	  relative	  to	  the	  processing	  of	  financial	  flows.	  
	  
Chapter	  2	  is	  devoted	  to	  the	  work	  of	  Gilbert	  Simondon,	  who	  understands	  technology	  
as	   an	   individuation	   or	   as	   complex	   systems	   in	   itself.	   The	   most	   common	   mode	   of	  
existence	   of	   technical	   objects	   is	   what	   he	   calls	   technical	   ensembles	   (made	   up	   of	  
humans	   and	   technical	   artifacts)	   performing	   specific	   functions.	   For	   Simondon,	   the	  
composition	   of	   technical	   ensembles	   becomes	   secondary	   to	   the	   technical	  
schematic/design,	   i.e.	   the	   actual	   algorithmic	   blueprint.	   Moreover,	   each	   new	  
generation	  of	  technical	  ensembles	  is	  more	  complex	  and	  integrates	  a	  larger	  umber	  of	  
component	  parts,	  while	  also	  becoming	  less	  reliant	  on	  human	  beings	  for	  maintenance	  
and	  self-­‐regulation.	  While	  Simondon	  focuses	  on	  technology	  in	  general,	  we	  leverage	  
his	   perspective	   in	   looking	   at	   financial	   markets	   as	   machines	   for	   the	   processing	   of	  
financial	  flows.	  	  
	  
Chapter	   3	  builds	  on	   the	  previous	  chapter	  by	  addressing	   the	  detailed	  operations	  of	  
markets	  and	  looking	  at	  specific	  transactional	  designs.	  This	  is	  achieved	  by	  leveraging	  
Philip	   Mirowski’s	   theory	   of	   markomata	   (markets	   +	   automata).	   In	   this	   context,	  
markets	  are	  seen	  as	  formal	  automata,	  as	  algorithmic	  structures	  performing	  a	  series	  
of	   functions	   relative	   to	   the	   processing	   of	   transactions.	   While	   also	   being	   heavily	  
influenced	   by	   information	   theory,	   computation	   and	   cybernetics,	   Mirowski	   has	   a	  
more	  narrow	  focus	  than	  Simondon,	  looking	  specifically	  at	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  certain	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transactional	   functions	   are	   performed	   in	   the	   context	   of	  markets.	   Thus,	   leveraging	  
both	   Simondon	   and	  Mirowski,	   the	   thesis	   can	   begin	   to	   frame	   financial	   markets	   as	  
some	   sort	   of	   information	  processing	   systems	  performing	   a	  number	  of	   functions	   in	  
regards	  to	  processing	  the	  financial	  flows.	  
	  
Chapter	  4	  applies	  this	  theoretical	  framework	  to	  the	  history	  of	  financial	  markets.	  We	  
start	  with	  medieval	  Europe	  and	  describe	  the	  development	  of	  two	  different	  types	  of	  
transaction	  machines,	   a	  matching	  machine	   and	   a	   clearing	  machine.	   Both	   of	   them	  
developed	  in	  order	  to	  service	  the	  needs	  of	  international	  merchant-­‐bankers	  and	  their	  
intricate	   web	   of	   transactions.	   The	   first	   matching	   machines	   developed	   around	   the	  
activity	   of	   brokers	   and	   their	   specific	   matching	   algorithms.	   With	   the	   increase	   in	  
transaction	   volumes,	   merchant-­‐bankers	   also	   needed	   to	   reduce	   and	   compress	   the	  
complex	   web	   of	   exposures	   accrued	   amongst	   themselves.	   Thus	   a	   new	   clearing	  
machine	  developed	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  clearing	  fairs	  of	  Champagne	  and	  Piacenza.	  
While	   they	   represented	   a	   substantial	   increase	   in	   transactional	   capability,	   these	  
machines	  were	  essentially	   based	  on	  human	  beings	   and	   required	  extensive	  manual	  
labor.	  	  
	  
Chapters	  5	  and	  6	  shift	  the	  focus	  to	  modern	  financial	  markets,	  looking	  at	  some	  of	  the	  
innovations	  developed	  in	  Amsterdam,	  London	  and	  New	  York.	  Among	  these,	  we	  will	  
focus	  on	  the	  advent	  of	  floor	  trading	  in	  stocks	  and	  derivatives,	  and	  the	  development	  
of	  specialized	   individuals	   (such	  as	   jobbers	  and	  specialists)	  allowing	  the	  stabilization	  
of	   more	   efficient	   transaction	   machines,	   in	   the	   context	   of	   exchanges	   and	  
clearinghouses.	   Using	   Mirowski,	   we	   identify	   an	   evolutionary	   trajectory	   whereby	  
more	   complex	   and	   transaction	   machines	   emerge	   over	   time,	   evolving	   under	   the	  
constraints	  and	  demands	  of	  users.	  These	  constraints	  can	  comprise	  everything	  from	  
higher	  trading	  volumes,	  more	  diverse	  trading	  strategies,	  decrease	  in	  order	  size,	  more	  
complex	  products,	  need	  for	  faster	  execution,	  more	  complex	  financial	  instruments,	  to	  
more	   scrutiny	   and	   regulation.	   In	   this	   sense,	   the	   recent	   push	   for	   automation	   and	  
efficiency	  has	  led	  to	  the	  development	  of	  more	  advanced	  matching	  machines,	  in	  the	  
context	   of	   electronic	   trading.	   We	   will	   also	   construct	   a	   similar	   narrative	   for	   the	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clearing	  function	  focusing	  specifically	  on	  the	  central	  clearing	  for	  derivatives	  and	  the	  
emergence	  of	  new	  clearing	  machines	  in	  the	  form	  of	  Central	  Counterparties	  (CCPs).	  	  
	  
Chapter	   7	   engages	  with	   the	  most	   recent	   transformation	  of	  matching	  machines,	   in	  
the	  context	  of	  High	  Frequency	  Trading	  (HFT)	  and	  electronic	  market	  making.	  Within	  
the	  current	  ecosystem	  of	  electronic	  trading,	  HFT	  trading	  firms	  are	  at	  the	  forefront	  of	  
an	  arms	  race	  for	  higher	  speeds,	  lower	  latency	  and	  more	  advanced	  algorithms.	  Being	  
at	  the	  centre	  of	  liquidity	  and	  controlling	  the	  matching	  of	  order	  flow	  affords	  a	  crucial	  
advantage	   in	   any	   market	   as	   well	   as	   substantial	   profits.	   We	   also	   offer	   an	  
understanding	  the	  2010	  Flash	  Crash	  in	  arguing	  that	  while	  HFT	  firms	  are	  not	  directly	  
to	   blame	   for	   the	   crash,	   such	   events	   might	   now	   be	   the	   normal	   output	   of	   HFT-­‐
dominated	  financial	  markets.	  While	  contemporary	  matching	  machines	  have	  reached	  
high	   levels	  of	  efficiency	  and	   immediacy	  of	  execution,	  there	  are	   important	  concerns	  
regarding	  market	  stability.	  We	  also	  review	  some	  of	  the	  current	  reform	  initiatives	  and	  
new	  market	  designs,	  shifting	  the	   focus	   from	   immediacy	  of	  execution	  the	  quality	  of	  
liquidity	  and	  overall	  market	  resilience.	  
	  
Chapter	   8	   looks	   at	   the	   contemporary	   reforms	   of	   clearing	   machines	   for	   complex	  
financial	   products	   such	   as	   Over-­‐the-­‐Counter	   (OTC)	   derivatives,	   following	   the	   2008	  
crisis.	   We	   thus	   review	   the	   impact	   on	   OTC	   markets	   in	   the	   context	   of	   current	  
regulatory	  reforms	  mandating	  the	  shift	  from	  bilateral	  to	  central	  clearing.	  The	  chapter	  
also	   summarizes	   a	   number	   of	   interviews	   with	   professionals	   of	   CCPs,	   exchanges,	  
global	  banks,	  trade	  associations,	  UK	  and	  EU	  regulators	  and	  independent	  consultants.	  
We	   highlight	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   details	   of	   the	   new	   clearing	   machine	   are	   not	   just	  
technical	   issues	   but	   directly	   impact	   the	   power	   distribution	  within	  market,	   shifting	  
the	  centre	  of	  gravity	  from	  banks	  to	  central	  clearing	  utilities	  such	  as	  CCPs.	  While	  the	  
post-­‐crisis	   period	   has	   been	   dominated	   by	   the	   critique	   of	   major	   banks,	   it	   is	   the	  
integrated	  financial	  infrastructure	  providers	  that	  are	  now	  the	  dominant	  transactional	  
hubs	  increasingly	  controlling	  the	  matching	  and	  clearing	  of	  financial	  flows.	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PART	  I:	  THEORY	  
	  






The	   aim	   of	   this	   chapter	   is	   to	   position	   the	   thesis	   within	   the	   social	   sciences	   and	  
humanities	  literature	  on	  the	  topic	  of	  finance.	  It	  also	  highlights	  the	  merits	  and	  limits	  of	  
certain	  approaches	  such	  as	  the	  Social	  Studies	  of	  Finance	  and	  DeLanda’s	  assemblage	  
theory	   as	   applied	   to	   the	   topic	   of	   markets	   and	   capitalism.	   We	   review	   the	   recent	  
sociological	   and	   anthropological	   research	   on	   financial	   markets	   and	   elaborate	   on	  
some	  of	   its	   theoretical	   underpinnings,	   such	  as	  Actor	  Network	   Theory	   (ANT).	   In	   this	  
context,	  financial	  markets	  are	  understood	  as	  hybrid	  assemblages,	  composed	  of	  both	  
human	   and	   non-­‐human	   elements.	   While	   the	   sociology	   of	   finance	   offers	   detailed	  
description	   of	   markets	   as	   hybrid	   assemblages,	   it	   is	   less	   capable	   of	   grasping	   the	  
‘machinic’	   nature	   of	   financial	   markets.	   Drawing	   from	   cybernetics	   and	   computer	  
science,	   we	   propose	   a	   different	   framework	   by	   looking	   at	   financial	   markets	   as	  
complex	  machines	  in	  their	  own	  right,	  performing	  a	  series	  of	  functions	  relative	  to	  the	  
processing	  of	  financial	   flows.	  We	  also	  review	  Manuel	  DeLanda’s	  assemblage	  theory	  
and	  his	  history	  of	  capitalism,	  which	  is	  another	  account	  of	  markets	  as	  complex	  socio-­‐
technical	   assemblages.	   While	   providing	   an	   insightful	   narrative,	   DeLanda	   cannot	  
describe	   market	   structures	   in	   any	   relevant	   detail,	   while	   contending	   himself	   with	  
simple	   dichotomies	   (markets	   vs.	   antimarkets).	  While	   it	   is	   important	   to	   incorporate	  
DeLanda’s	  historical	  and	  evolutionary	  approach,	  an	  account	  of	  transaction	  machines	  
requires	   a	   deeper	   engagement	   with	   the	   detailed	   functioning	   of	   financial	   markets,	  
which	   is	   difficult	   to	   achieve	   in	   the	   context	   of	   his	   assemblage	   theory.	   Finally,	   this	  
chapter	  sets	  the	  stage	  for	  the	  subsequent	  theory	  chapters,	  where	  we	  leverage	  Gilbert	  
Simondon’s	   philosophy	   of	   technology	   and	   Philip	   Mirowski’s	   theory	   of	   markets	   as	  
computational	  systems.	  The	  overlap	  of	  these	  two	  thinkers	  will	  afford	  a	  more	  rounded	  
and	  elaborate	  definition	  of	  transaction	  machines.	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1.1	  New	  Sociology	  of	  Finance	  
	  
	  
Once	   could	   argue	   that	   there	   has	   always	   been	   a	   certain	   interest	   for	   the	   topic	   of	  
finance	  within	   the	  broader	   social	   sciences	  and	  humanities	   (Simmel,	  1978;	  Menger,	  
1892;	  Proudhon,	  1857).	  Max	  Weber	  addressed	   the	   topic	  of	   financial	  markets	  early	  
on,	  in	  his	  1894	  essay	  entitled	  The	  Stock	  Exchange	  (Weber,	  2000).	  In	  that	  context,	  he	  
describes	   some	   of	   the	   institutional	   aspects	   of	   19th	   century	   German	   stock	   and	  
commodity	  exchanges.	   In	  his	   account,	  he	   criticizes	   the	  view	   that	   these	   institutions	  
were	   simply	   ways	   to	   defraud	   ordinary	   investors.	   While	   he	   acknowledged	   that	  
plutocratic	   financiers	   could	   dominate	   public	   exchanges,	   these	   institutions	   were	  
necessary	   in	   order	   to	   modernize	   the	   German	   economy.	   Moreover,	   he	   saw	   the	  
modern	  stock	  exchange	  as	  a	  promoter	  of	  the	  national	  interest	  as	  ‘’a	  means	  of	  power	  
in	  the	  economic	  struggle’’	  (Swedberg,	  1998,	  p.184).	  More	  recently,	  there	  has	  been	  a	  
renewed	   interest	   in	   the	   topic	   of	   markets	   and	   finance	   within	   the	   social	   sciences	  
broadly.	   This	   comprises	   anthropological	   and	   sociological	   analyses	   focusing	   on	   a	  
variety	  of	  different	   financial	   institutions	   (Mark	  Granovetter,	  1985;	  Granovetter	  and	  
Swedberg,	  2001;	  Abolafia,	  1996;	  Fligstein,	  1996;	  Callon,	  1998):	  
	  
(…)	   In	   the	   reconstituted	   perspective	   of	   economic	   sociology,	  markets	   are	   not	  
merely	   mechanisms	   for	   the	   exchange	   and	   re-­‐allocation;	   they	   are,	   overall,	  
signalling	   systems	   embedded	   in	   a	   wider	   set	   of	   social	   relations	   that	   allow	  
evaluating	   risks,	   dealing	  with	   uncertainty,	   and	   stabilizing	   economic	   networks	  
across	  space	  and	  time	  (Pardo-­‐Guerra,	  2013b,	  p.5).	  
This	  new	  avenue	  for	  social	  research	  is	  clearly	  trying	  to	  set	  itself	  apart	  from	  the	  more	  
traditional	  understanding	  of	  financial	  markets	  developed	  in	  economic	  theory.	  Rather	  
than	   looking	   at	   markets	   as	   mechanisms	   for	   the	   efficient	   allocation	   of	   resources	  
among	   scares	  means,	   this	   literature	   understands	   financial	  markets	   as	   very	   specific	  
social	   structures.	  More	   recently,	   a	   growing	  body	  of	   research	  has	  been	   focusing	  on	  
the	   impact	   of	   technology	   on	   the	   structure	   of	   finance.	   To	   a	   certain	   extent,	   the	  
question	  of	  technology	  has	  been	  a	  central	  concern	  in	  sociology	  for	  some	  time	  (Lash,	  
2002;	  Castells,	  2004)	  but	  this	  new	  sociology	  of	  finance	  revolves	  around	  a	  new	  strand	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of	   social	   theory	  namely	   the	  Actor-­‐Network	  Theory	   (ANT)	  developed	  by	   the	   likes	  of	  
Bruno	   Latour	   (1991,	   1993,	   1996)	  Michel	   Callon	   (1998)	   and	   John	   Law	   (1992).	   ANT	  
represents	  an	  important	  theoretical	  turn	  within	  the	  social	  sciences	  in	  that	  it	  entails	  a	  
novel	  approach	  to	  age-­‐old	  question	  of	  the	  social.	  To	  be	  more	  precise,	  they	  adopt	  a	  
constructivist	   position	  whereby	  what	   exists	   are	   associations	   of	   people	   and	   things.	  
The	   study	   of	   the	   social	   is	   no	   longer	   at	   the	   centre	   of	   sociological	   inquiry,	   but	   the	  
research	  and	  mapping	  of	  various	  associations	  (Gane	  &	  Beer,	  2008,	  p.82).	  	  In	  addition	  
to	  human	  beings,	  these	  associations	  and	  inevitably	  made	  up	  of	  other	  objects.	  In	  this	  
sense,	   ANT	   expands	   the	   realm	   of	   sociology	   beyond	   human	   interpersonal	  
interactions.	   Within	   this	   new	   paradigm,	   human	   beings	   are	   no	   longer	   the	   only	  
relevant	  objects	  of	  social	  research:	  
For	   no	   longer	   is	   it	   possible	   to	   treat	   social	   relations	   as	   arising	   simply	   from	  
human	  relations	  (as	  did	  Marx	  and	  Weber),	  to	  confine	  social	  interaction	  to	  the	  
face-­‐to-­‐face	   interactions	  of	   human	   'agents',	   or	   to	   talk	  of	   society	   in	   the	   same	  
breath	  as	  the	  social	  (as	  was	  the	  trend	  for	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century	  
(Gane,	  2004,	  p.1)	  
	  
In	  this	  sense,	  ANT	  provides	  an	  alternative	  to	  the	  social	  theory	  developed	  in	  the	  19th	  
and	   20th	   century.	   	   Following	   Latour’s	  work	   it	   becomes	   problematic	   to	   continue	   to	  
think	  of	  human	  beings	  as	  self-­‐contained	  social	  agents,	  as	   ‘islands’	  of	  agency	  within	  
an	   ‘ocean’	   of	   passivity.	   	   The	   traditional	   framework	   of	   social	   theory	   grants	   human	  
beings	  an	  absolute	  monopoly	   in	   terms	  of	  agency,	  power	  and	  control	   in	   relation	   to	  
their	  environment.	  This	  of	  course	  extends	  to	  technical	  artifacts,	  which	  only	  exist	  as	  
expressions	  and	  extensions	  of	  human	  agency.	   In	   this	   context,	   the	  human	   is	  a	   tool-­‐
bearer	   and	   technical	   artifacts	   are	   simple	   means	   of	   amplifying	   human	   agency.	  
Contrary	   to	   this	   tradition,	   ANT	   grants	   no	   privilege	   to	   human	   individuals	   and	   their	  
motivations.	   Social	   actors	   have	   no	   essential	   nature	   but	   become	   what	   they	   are	  
through	   their	   interaction	   in	   a	   network,	   where	   an	   actor	   can	   ‘’literally	   be	   anything	  
provided	   it	   is	   granted	   to	   be	   the	   source	   of	   an	   action’’	   (Latour,	   1996).	   Within	   the	  
framework	  of	  ANT,	  both	  human	  and	  non-­‐human	  elements	   interact	   in	  material	  and	  
semiotic	   ways,	   and	   ultimately	   stabilize	   in	   coherent	   forms	   of	   associations	   or	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networks.	   Consequently,	   agency	   comes	   from	   the	   coordination	   of	   a	   diversity	   of	  
elements	  within	  a	  network	  and	  a	  certain	  dynamic	  between	  human	  and	  non-­‐humans	  
(their	   interaction	   is	   understood	   as	   a	   negotiation	   or	   a	   translation)	   (Callon,	   1984).	  
While	   this	   approach	   was	   first	   used	   in	   the	   anthropology	   of	   science,	   thanks	   to	   the	  
work	  of	  Latour	  and	  Callon	   it	  has	  also	  been	  adopted	   in	  sociology	  more	  broadly	  and	  
economic	  sociology	   in	  particular.	  Rather	  than	  relying	  on	  reified	  notions	  such	  as	  the	  
Market,	  or	  Capitalism,	  this	  new	  sociology	  attempts	  to	  describe	  economic	  institutions	  
as	   complex	   processes	   of	   assembling	   and	   disassembling	   where	   actors,	   knowledge,	  
scientific	   theories	   and	   technological	   artefacts	   all	   play	   a	   part	   (Muniesa	   and	   Callon,	  
2003;	  MacKenzie,	  2009a;	  Callon	  and	  Latour,	  2011).	  As	  Michel	  Callon	  understands	  it:	  
(…)	   the	  way	  we	   are	   now	   studying	   social	   sciences	   is	   only	   an	   extension	  of	   the	  
work	   done	   on	   the	   natural	   sciences.	   It’s	   simply	   the	   continuation	   of	   the	  
anthropology	   of	   science,	   but	   an	   anthropology	   of	   science	  which	   is	   concerned	  
with	   economics	   in	   the	   broadest	   sense	   of	   the	   term,	   including,	   for	   example,	  
marketing	  and	  accountancy	  (Barry	  &	  Slater,	  2004,	  p.101).	  
One	  of	  the	  most	  famous	  examples	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  Social	  Studies	  of	  Finance	  (SSF)	  is	  
Michel	   Callon’s	   well-­‐known	   book	   The	   Laws	   of	   the	  Markets	   (Callon,	   1998).	   In	   that	  
text,	   he	   introduces	   the	   crucial	   understanding	   of	   performativity,	   challenging	   the	  
neutrality	  of	  economic	  models	  and	  showing	  how	  they	  actually	  help	  construct	  what	  
he	  calls	  market	  devices.	  This	  point	  has	  also	  ben	  addressed	  by	  Donald	  MacKenzie	  and	  
Yuval	  Millo,	   arguing	   against	   an	   understanding	   of	   economic	   theory	   as	   an	   accurate	  
description	  of	   the	  economy	   (Millo	  and	  MacKenzie,	  2009),	   and	   interpret	   it	   as	  being	  
part	   of	   a	   process	   that	   creates	   the	   economy.	   Callon	   and	  MacKenzie	   shows	   us	   how	  
economic	  theory	  can	  be	  deployed	  in	  order	  to	  induce	  patterns	  that	  end	  up	  converging	  
with	   the	   initial	   theoretical	   predictions,	   such	   as	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	   Black-­‐Scholes	  
formula	   for	   pricing	   options	   (Herrmann-­‐Pillath,	   2012).	   That	   being	   said,	   the	   use	   of	  
performativity	  as	  a	  guiding	  concept	  can	  be	  confusing,	  as	  it	  can	  easily	  be	  understood	  
in	   linguistic	   terms	   as	   an	   enunciation,	   a	   performative	   declaration22.	   What	   Callon	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  Speech	  act	  theory	  has	  been	  developed	  by	  John	  Austin	  (1962)	  and	  later	  refined	  by	  
John	  Searle	  (1969).	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actually	   means	   by	   performativity	   is	   that	   when	   a	   model	   is	   adopted,	   endorsed	   by	  
market	  participants	  this	  contributes	  to	  it	  being	  true	  (successful),	  which	  feeds	  back	  to	  
the	  interactions	  between	  market	  participants	  and	  further	  normalizes	  its	  use	  (Callon,	  
2007).	  	  In	  this	  sense,	  performativity	  is	  much	  more	  a	  question	  of	  a	  performance	  in	  the	  
sense	   of	   acting	   something	   out,	   deploying	   a	   certain	   process	   of	   framing	   and	  
formatting.	  Similarly	  to	  the	  option	  pricing	  formula,	  Callon’s	  looks	  at	  how	  in	  the	  wider	  
economy,	  something	  like	  Homo	  Economicus	  (i.e.	  the	  rational	  economic	  agent)	  comes	  
about	  through	  the	  performative	  effort	  of	  mainstream	  economic	  theory.	  Many	  voices	  
have	   criticized	   Callon’s	   performativity	   thesis,	   either	   for	   lack	   of	   proof	   (Fine,	   2005;	  
Santos	  and	  Rodrigues,	  2009)	  or	  its	  neutrality	  towards	  the	  neoclassical	  tradition	  (Nik-­‐
Khah	  and	  Mirowski,	  2007;	  Whittle	  and	  Spicer,	  2008).	  Nevertheless,	  Callon’s	  approach	  
has	  been	   crucial	   in	  opening	  up	  new	  kinds	  of	  questions,	   such	  as	  understanding	   the	  
impact	   of	   financial	   and	   economic	   theory	   on	   certain	   financial	   products	   or	   broader	  
market	  dynamics	  (MacKenzie	  and	  Spears,	  2014).	  	  
While	  Michel	  Callon	  has	  applied	  ANT	  to	  economic	  sociology	  and	  market	  institutions	  
more	   broadly,	   it	   was	   Donald	  MacKenzie	   who	   offered	   a	   more	   rigorous	   theoretical	  
framework	   for	   SSF.	   In	   fact,	   the	   collective	   work	   of	   Donald	  Mackenzie,	   Yuval	  Millo,	  
Fabian	   Muniesa,	   Daniel	   Beunza,	   Karin	   Knorr	   Cetina,	   Alex	   Preda	   and	   Juan	   Pablo	  
Pardo-­‐Guerra,	   to	  name	  but	  a	   few	  (Arminen,	  2010)	   is	  now	  considered	  the	  core	  of	  a	  
new	   sociology	   of	   financial	   markets.	   All	   of	   these	   social	   scientists	   attempt	   to	  
understand	  the	  ‘’hybrid,	  social,	  technical	  and	  material	  character	  of	  market	  devices’’	  
(Mcfall,	  2009).	  Donald	  MacKenzie’s	  statement	  that	  ‘’all	  sociology	  should	  be	  material	  
sociology”	  (MacKenzie,	  2009b,	  p.88)	  highlights	  the	  fact	  that	  all	  sorts	  of	  elements	  are	  
crucial	  in	  understanding	  the	  functioning	  of	  social	  institutions	  and	  financial	  markets	  in	  
particular.	  His	  research	  on	  the	  LIBOR	  rate	  analyses	  the	  rate	  setting	  mechanism	  as	  a	  
market	   device	   composed	   of	   different	   arrangements	   of	   humans	   and	   technical	  
artifacts	   (MacKenzie,	   2009b).	   In	   fact,	   considerable	   efforts	   have	   been	   made	   in	  
exploring	   the	   way	   in	   which	   existing	   markets	   have	   reacted	   and	   adapted	   to	   the	  
disruptions	   entailed	   by	   contemporary	   technology	   (Muniesa,	   2003;	   Zaloom,	   2006).	  
Moreover,	   MacKenzie’s	   percept	   that	   ‘’equipment	   matters’’	   means	   that	   technical	  
artifacts	  are	  crucial	  in	  understanding	  the	  way	  in	  which	  economic	  agents	  and	  markets	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are	  assembled.	  One	  can	  reference	  here	  the	  work	  done	  by	  Alex	  Preda	  (2009)	  on	  the	  
stock	  ticker	  and	  its	  influence	  on	  19th	  century	  Chartism	  and	  the	  more	  recent	  influence	  
of	  computer	  screens	  on	  market	  dynamics	  (Knorr-­‐Cetina	  and	  Preda,	  2006).	  Within	  the	  
broader	  framework	  of	  ANT	  MacKenzie	  understands	  financial	  markets	  as	  necessarily	  
collective,	   in	   the	   sense	   they	  are	  associations	  of	  human	  beings,	   tools,	   technological	  
platforms,	   otherwise	   articulated	   as	   market	   devices	   or	   agencements	   (Callon	   and	  
Caliskan,	  2005;	  Hardie	  and	  MacKenzie,	  2007;	  Arminen,	  2010)23.	  	  
In	   this	   sense,	   SSF	   look	   at	   how	   human	   actants	   mobilize	   alliances	   with	   non-­‐human	  
actors	   (algorithms,	   formula,	   technical	   artifacts,	   etc.)	   in	   order	   to	   construct	   financial	  
markets.	   This	   ultimately	   begs	   the	   question	   whether	   or	   not	   human	   actants	   are	  
absolutely	   necessary	   for	   these	   assemblages	   to	   function.	   Given	   the	   state	   of	  
contemporary	   financial	   markets	   and	   the	   tendency	   towards	   electronic	   and	  
automated	  trading,	  it	  might	  be	  more	  interesting	  to	  give	  an	  account	  from	  the	  point	  of	  
view	  of	  the	  technological	  infrastructure	  itself.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  to	  look	  at	  the	  evolution	  
of	   financial	   markets	   as	   the	   gradual	   development	   of	   more	   complex	   technological	  
systems.	  Juan	  Pablo	  Pardo-­‐Guerra	  has	  probably	  gone	  the	  furthest	  in	  researching	  the	  
complex	  dynamic	  between	  finance	  and	  the	  evolution	  of	   technical	   infrastructure.	   In	  
his	   description	   of	   the	   automation	   of	   the	   London	   Stock	   Exchange	   (Pardo-­‐Guerra,	  
2010;	   Pardo-­‐Guerra,	   2012),	   he	   provides	   a	   detailed	   account	   of	   the	   mutation	   of	  
market	   devices	   from	   human	   dominated	   configurations	   to	   electronic	   automated	  
systems.	   Moreover,	   in	   a	   recent	   paper	   he	   offers	   a	   detailed	   description	   of	   the	  
evolution	  of	  stock	  markets	  through	  the	  history	  of	  a	   technical	  object,	   the	  electronic	  
order	   book	   (Pardo-­‐Guerra,	   2013a).	   As	  we	  will	   see	   later,	   the	   electronic	   order	   book	  
represents	  the	  most	  recent	  disruption,	  ushering	  a	  new	  era	  in	  financial	  markets,	  such	  
as	  the	  advent	  of	  electronic	  computerized	  trading.	  While	  Pardo-­‐Guerra	  tends	  to	  focus	  
on	  the	  work	  of	  the	  financial	  engineers	  who	  helped	  bring	  this	  new	  infrastructure	  into	  
being,	  he	  also	  proposes	  a	  novel	  avenue	  of	  research	  for	  SSF.	  As	  he	  puts	  it,	  the	  current	  
sociological	  research	  on	  financial	  markets	  does	  not	  deal	  with:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  Their	  use	  of	  the	  language	  of	  assemblage	  theory	  occurs	  with	  minimal	  reference	  to	  
Gilles	  Deleuze	   and	   Felix	  Guattari	   (1988)	   and	   none	   to	   the	  more	   recent	   assemblage	  
theory	  of	  Manuel	  DeLanda.	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(…)	   how	   these	   infrastructures	   came	   to	   be,	   but	   rather	   with	   the	   imbrications	  
between	  devices,	  social	   institutions	  and	  economic	  practice	  (…)	  Answering	  the	  
question	   of	   how	   markets	   change	   needs	   engaging	   with	   an	   obviated	   fact:	  
infrastructures	  matter	  (Pardo-­‐Guerra,	  2013a,	  p.5)	  
That	   is	   to	   say,	   most	   researchers	   look	   at	   how	   traders,	   bankers,	   economists,	  
regulators,	  technological	  artefacts,	  economic	  theories	  assemble	  in	  networks	  in	  order	  
to	  achieve	  certain	  objectives,	  such	  as	  creating	  a	  market	  for	  credit	  derivatives	  (Huault,	  
2009),	   profiting	   form	   arbitrage	   trades	   (Stark,	   2009)	   or	   assembling	   a	   hedge	   fund	  
(Hardie,	  2007).	  Pardo-­‐Guerra’s	   infrastructural	  perspective	  represents	  an	   interesting	  
shift	   in	   focus,	   looking	   at	   financial	   infrastructures	   as	   being	   already	   there	   in	   the	  
background,	  but	  without	  which	  no	  transactional	  process	  would	  be	  possible.	  He	  also	  
looks	   at	   how	   the	   recent	   evolution	   of	   stock	  markets	   has	   largely	   been	   a	   process	   of	  
challenging	   the	  dominance	  of	   legacy	   technological	   infrastructures.	   In	   this	   sense,	   in	  
order	   to	  understand	   the	  genesis	  of	   a	   certain	   financial	  markets	  he	   starts	  with	   their	  
technical	  and	  infrastructural	  underpinnings.	  	  
	  
This	  thesis	  is	  situated	  at	  this	  very	  junction,	  aiming	  to	  describe	  the	  past	  and	  present	  
evolution	   of	   transaction	  machines	   as	   the	   infrastructural	   underpinnings	   of	   financial	  
markets.	  The	  crucial	  difference	  is	  that	  the	  present	  thesis	  doesn’t	  simply	  advocate	  a	  
shift	   in	   focus,	   but	   argues	   for	   a	   different	   approach	   and	   understanding	   of	   financial	  
markets.	  This	  move	   towards	   the	   technological	  and	   infrastructural	  underpinnings	  of	  
financial	  markets	   also	   assumes	   a	   different	   understanding	   of	   the	   basic	   functions	   of	  
financial	  markets.	  Within	   the	  SSF	   literature,	   there	   is	  a	   tendency	   to	  assign	  a	  certain	  
calculative	   function	  to	   financial	  markets,	  namely	  as	  so-­‐called	   ‘’calculative	  collective	  
devices’’	  (Muniesa	  and	  Callon,	  2003).	  Financial	  markets	  would	  thus	  be	  human/non-­‐
human	  hybrids	  with	   the	  ultimate	  aim	  of	  computing	  prices,	   (which	   in	  some	  cases	   is	  
understood	   as	   a	   consensus	   regarding	   the	   value	   of	   goods).	   As	   Vincent	   Lepinay	   has	  
argued,	   at	   the	   core	   of	   this	   literature	   is	   the	   assertion	   that:	   ‘’behind	   each	   price,	   a	  
design’’	   (Lepinay,	  2011,	  p.XVII).	   In	  a	  certain	  sense,	  our	  thesis	  will	  also	   focus	  on	  the	  
question	   of	   design,	   but	   without	   reducing	   the	   diversity	   of	  market	   functions	   to	   the	  
ultimate	  aim	  of	  price	  discovery.	  The	  point	  is	  not	  that	  one	  shouldn’t	  pay	  attention	  to	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the	  issue	  of	  pricing24.	  While	  prices	  are	  an	  important	  aspect	  of	  financial	  markets,	  they	  
are	   better	   understood	   as	   an	   output	   rather	   than	   the	   core	   operation	   underpinning	  
financial	   markets.	   This	   thesis	   will	   argue	   that	   the	   core	   functionality	   of	   financial	  
markets	   is	   the	   ability	   to	   maintain,	   organize	   and	   process	   the	   flow	   of	   financial	  
transactions	  (Herrmann-­‐Pillath,	  2013),	  which	  is	  precisely	  why	  we	  look	  at	  transaction	  
machines	  as	  the	  infrastructural	  underpinnings	  of	  financial	  markets.	  In	  this	  sense,	  we	  
can	  argue	  that	  the	  efficient	  functioning	  of	  transaction	  machines	  is	  a	  prerequisite	  for	  
the	  continuous	  and	  consistent	  output	  of	  prices.	  This	  is	  self-­‐evident	  when	  we	  consider	  
that	  efficient	  matching	  and	  clearing	  of	  order	  flow	  is	  a	  necessary	  even	  for	  something	  
as	  simple	  as	  the	  ultimate	  dissemination	  of	  price	  data.	  As	  soon	  as	  there	  is	  continuous	  
pricing,	   a	   lot	   of	   other	  operations	   are	  possible	   (e.g.	   investing,	   hedging,	   speculating,	  
arbitrage,	  etc.).	  There	   is	   therefore	  s	  a	  risk	   in	   focusing	  too	  much	  on	  the	  question	  of	  
pricing,	  namely	  that	  we	  obscure	  the	  rich	  diversity	  of	  processes	  and	  mechanisms	  that	  
allow	  financial	  markets	  to	  work	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  Our	  aim	  is	  not	  to	  reduce	  the	  whole	  
complexity	   of	   financial	   markets	   to	   its	   transactional	   infrastructure.	   It	   is	   simply	   to	  
suggest	   that	   before	   we	   approach	   more	   complex	   market	   phenomena	   such	   as	  
valuation,	   pricing,	   benchmarking	   or	   arbitrage,	   it	   might	   be	   useful	   to	   gain	   a	   better	  
understanding	  of	  the	  basic	  transactional	  infrastructure	  of	  financial	  markets25.	  	  
	  
Consequently,	  the	  present	  thesis	   is	   less	   interested	  in	  mapping	  networks	  of	  humans	  
and	  non-­‐humans	  but	  posits	  the	  terminology	  of	  transaction	  machines	  understood	  as	  
the	  infrastructure	  of	  financial	  markets.	  This	  requires	  a	  broader	  evolutionary	  account	  
of	   socio-­‐technological	   systems,	   beyond	  what	   is	   possible	   in	   the	   context	   of	   SSF	   and	  
ANT.	  In	  leveraging	  the	  ontology	  of	  ANT,	  SSF	  are	  not	  longer	  restricted	  to	  the	  study	  of	  
human	  interpersonal	  relationships	  and	  go	  beyond	  an	  understanding	  of	  agency	  as	  the	  
sole	  monopoly	  of	   human	  beings.	  As	  Donald	  MacKenzie	  put	   it,	   equipment	  matters,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  In	  fact,	  Caliskan	  (2010)	  has	  recently	  shown	  how	  something	  as	  simple	  as	  the	  price	  
of	   cotton	   is	  underpinned	  by	  a	   complex	  web	  of	   technological	  platforms,	   specialized	  
intermediaries,	  political	  and	  cultural	  constraints,	  etc.	  
25	  In	   this	   regard	  we	   followed	  on	   the	   footsteps	  of	   Juan	  Pablo	  Pardo-­‐Guerra	   and	  his	  
assertion	   that	   infrastructure	   matters.	   His	   history	   of	   the	   London	   Stock	   Exchange	  
through	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  electronic	  order	  book	  had	  a	  decisive	   influence	  on	  this	  
thesis.	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that	  is	  to	  say	  the	  object	  of	  sociological	   inquiry	  should	  comprise	  a	  wider	  diversity	  of	  
hybrid	  associations.	  While	   this	  allows	  us	   to	   incorporate	  technical	  artefacts	   into	  the	  
real	   of	   sociology,	   the	   mapping	   of	   networks	   of	   humans	   and	   non-­‐humans	   is	   not	  
sufficient	  for	  a	  detailed	  understanding	  of	  the	  functions	  performed	  by	  these	  markets.	  
Unlike	  SSF,	   thesis	  will	  not	   focus	  on	   the	  question	  of	  who	   is	   connected	   to	  what	   in	  a	  
specific	  market	  device	  (agencement),	  but	  think	  in	  terms	  of	  more	  complex	  transaction	  
machines	   where	   both	   humans	   and	   technical	   artefacts	   as	   components	   parts.	   The	  
difference	  between	  this	  thesis	  and	  SSF	   is	  not	  restricted	  to	  a	  shift	  of	   focus,	  but	  also	  
revolves	  around	  a	  different	  ontological	  positioning	  on	  the	  question	  of	  technology.	  If	  
the	   recent	   technologization	   of	   financial	   markets	   is	   part	   of	   a	   longer-­‐term	   process,	  
then	  perhaps	  these	  markets	  are	  best	  understood	  as	  complex	  machines	  from	  the	  very	  
beginning.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  drawing	  from	  an	  understanding	  of	  machines	  as	  information	  
processing	  systems	  (i.e.	  cybernetics,	  computers	  science,	  etc.),	  one	  could	  look	  at	  the	  
core	   operations	   of	   financial	   markets	   as	   specific	   transactional	   structures	   and	  
mechanisms.	   That	   is	   to	   say,	   different	   to	   SSF,	   we	   posit	   the	   ‘machinic’	   nature	   of	  
financial	  markets	  as	  intrinsic	  to	  their	  functioning	  form	  the	  very	  beginning,	  in	  as	  much	  
as	   we	   understand	   them	   as	   so-­‐called	   transaction	  machines.	   The	   aim	   is	   to	   offer	   an	  
account	  of	  these	  machines	  as	  exhibiting	  certain	  transactional	  regularities,	  which	  are	  
independent	  of	  them	  being	  executed	  by	  human	  beings	  or	  electronic	  platforms.	  What	  
matters	  here	  is	  their	  design,	  their	  operational	  schematic,	  or	  in	  other	  words,	  the	  way	  
in	  which	   these	   systems	   perform	   specific	   transactional	   functions.	   Finally,	   the	   thesis	  
will	   focus	   on	   how	   certain	   transactional	   capabilities	   are	   necessary	   in	   order	   to	  
maintain	   functional	   financial	   markets	   and	   also	   how	   these	   so-­‐called	   transaction	  
machines	  evolve	  through	  time.	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1.2	  Assemblage	  Theory	  and	  Markets	  
	  
	  
As	  we	  have	  seen,	  the	  SSF	  literature	  is	  a	  compelling	  application	  of	  the	  ontology	  and	  
methods	  of	  ANT	  to	  financial	  markets.	  The	  output	  has	  been	  a	  number	  of	  very	  detailed	  
descriptions	   of	   financial	   markets	   comprising	   human	   beings,	   technical	   artefacts,	  
economic	   and	   financial	   theories,	   assembled	   together	   in	   a	   functioning	   whole,	   an	  
agencement.	  While	   the	   sociology	   of	   finance	  makes	   ample	   use	   of	   the	   language	   of	  
assemblage	  theory,	  it	  does	  so	  without	  actually	  engaging	  with	  the	  broader	  philosophy	  
of	  Gilles	  Deleuze	  and	  Felix	  Guattari	  (1980)	  or	  the	  more	  systematic	  assemblage	  theory	  
of	  Manuel	  DeLanda	   (2006).	   	  DeLanda’s	  work	   is	   interesting	   in	   that	  he	  offers	  both	  a	  
refinement	   of	   Deleuze	   &	   Guattari’s	   philosophy	   as	   well	   as	   addressing	   the	   topic	   of	  
markets	   and	   capitalism.	   In	   one	   of	   his	   well-­‐known	   books,	   A	   Thousand	   Years	   of	  
Nonlinear	   History	   (1997)	   DeLanda	   tracks	   the	   evolution	   of	   geological,	   biological,	  
linguistic	   and	   urban	   assemblages	   in	   an	   attempt	   to	   describe	   the	  morphogenesis	   of	  
modern	  Western	   societies	   and	   Capitalism.	   This	   is	   an	   approach	  where	   the	   gradual	  
stabilization	  of	  bureaucracies,	  markets	   and	  other	   institutions	  are	  part	  of	   a	  process	  
leading	   to	   the	   emergence	   of	   large	   cities,	   nation	   states	   and	   multinational	  
corporations,	   and	   all	   of	   these	   entities	   are	   analysed	   trough	   the	   lens	   of	   assemblage	  
theory.	  One	  of	  Deleuze’s	  favourite	  examples	  of	  an	  assemblage	  is	  the	  mounted	  archer	  
of	  the	  Mongolian	  steps.	  The	  interaction	  between	  a	  horse,	  an	  archer	  and	  a	  bow	  leads	  
to	  the	  emergence	  of	  an	  assemblage,	  a	  whole	  that	  is	  much	  more	  than	  the	  sum	  of	  its	  
parts.	  One	  the	  one	  hand,	  this	  new	  assemblage	  exhibits	  emergent	  properties	  such	  as	  
amplifying	  the	  power	  of	  the	  archer	  relative	  to	  a	  standing	  archer.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  
it	  also	   forms	   the	  basis	   for	   larger	  assemblages,	   in	   that	   it	  drives	   the	  development	  of	  
nomadic	   armies,	   which	   are	   more	   adaptable	   fighting	   formations	   (DeLanda,	   2010).	  
One	  initial	  observation	  would	  be	  that	  an	  assemblage	  is	  not	  just	  a	  hybrid	  collection	  of	  
different	   elements,	   but	   a	   more	   complex	   whole	   exhibiting	   a	   series	   of	   emergent	  
properties	  (new	  functions	  and	  capabilities).	  In	  any	  case,	  DeLanda’s	  belief	  is	  that	  the	  
two	   French	  philosophers	   never	  managed	   to	   fully	   develop	   a	   theory	  of	   assemblages	  
and	  only	  left	  us	  with	  bits	  and	  pieces.	  He	  describes	  his	  own	  work	  as	  attempt	  to	  get	  rid	  
of	  the	  rough	  edges	  of	  their	  theory	  and	  offer	  additional	  clarifications.	  In	  this	  context,	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what	  makes	  DeLanda	  particularly	  interesting	  is	  his	  commitment	  to	  a	  materialist	  and	  
realist	  interpretation	  of	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari’s	  philosophy	  (Harman,	  2008).	  DeLanda	  
seems	  to	  be	  one	  of	  the	  few	  continental	  philosophers	  who	  can’t	  really	  be	  classified	  as	  
a	  correlationist26.	   	  For	  him,	  what	   is	   important	   is	  not	  so	  much	  how	  we	  relate	  to	  the	  
world,	  but	  how	  the	  world	  itself	  changes	  over	  time	  and	  how	  we	  emerge	  and	  are	  part	  
of	   this	   process	   of	   change.	   In	   fact,	   this	   it	   the	   fundamental	   difference	   between	   his	  
theory	   and	   the	   more	   common	   notion	   of	   network,	   namely	   that	   assemblages	   are	  
wholes	  that	  exhibit	  emergent	  properties.	  Drawing	  from	  Deleuze	  &	  Guattari,	  DeLanda	  
relies	  more	  on	  concepts	  such	  as	  rhizome	  and	  multiplicity,	  rather	  than	  network.	  
	  
Firstly,	   assemblages	   are	   composed	   of	   parts,	   which	   themselves	   are	   assemblages	  
composed	  of	  other	  elements,	  and	  so	  on.	  	  Secondly,	  assemblages	  are	  aggregates	  but	  
not	  totalities,	  as	  they	  can’t	  be	  reduced	  to	  their	  parts.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  an	  assemblage	  
emerges	  as	  a	  more	  or	   less	  coherent	  whole	   from	  the	  relative	  disparity	  of	   the	   lower	  
levels	   of	   complexity.	   	   Crucial	   here	   is	   that	   an	   assemblage	   is	   always	   a	  whole	   that	   is	  
more	  than	  the	  sum	  of	  its	  parts.	  To	  put	  it	  differently,	  there	  is	  redundant	  potential	  in	  
the	   interaction	   between	   different	   elements,	   which	   makes	   the	   emergence	   of	  
assemblages	   a	   non-­‐linear	   process.	   An	   additional	   important	   point	   is	   that	   an	  
assemblage	   is	   characterizes	  by	   the	  external	   relations	  between	   its	  parts,	  which	  also	  
means	   that	   some	   parts	   can	   be	   detached	   and	   inserted	   into	   other	   assemblages	  	  
(DeLanda,	   2006)27.	   It	   is	   interesting	   to	   see	   that	   his	   method	   avoids	   essentialism	   by	  
acknowledging	   that	   an	   assemblage	   is	   never	   defined	   by	   a	   stable	   form	  but	  must	   be	  
understood	  as	  a	  process	  of	  becoming.	   In	  this	  sense,	  DeLanda	   is	  reluctant	  to	  accept	  
reified	  generalities	  like	  Nature,	  the	  Human,	  Society,	  Capitalism	  or	  the	  Market,	  but	  is	  
interested	  in	  the	  morphogenetic	  process	  through	  which	  ecosystems,	  individuals	  and	  
groups,	  markets	  and	  corporations	  come	  about.	  Moreover,	   in	  an	  evolutionary	  twist,	  
there	  is	  always	  a	  population	  of	  different	  types	  of	  markets,	  societies,	  cities,	  that	  is	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  The	  term	  correlationism	  (Meillassoux,	  2008)	  refers	  to	  a	  philosophy	  that	  focuses	  on	  
the	   mutual	   hermeneutics	   between	   human	   being	   and	   the	   world,	   as	   ‘’a	   primordial	  
correlation’’	  according	  to	  Graham	  Harman	  (2008).	  
27	  This	  actually	  means	  that	  assemblages	  are	  a	  shorthand	  for	  open	  systems,	  which	  can	  
receive	   various	   inputs	   from	   their	   environment	   and	   but	   also	   dissipate	   various	  
outputs.	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say	   populations	   of	   different	   assemblages,	   rather	   than	   immutable	   essences.	   As	  
DeLanda	   himself	   argues,	   there	   is	   no	   such	   thing	   as	   a	   zebra	   essence,	   but	   only	   real	  
individual	  zebras,	  similarly,	  there	  is	  not	  one	  Market	  with	  a	  capital	  ‘’M’’,	  but	  just	  real-­‐
life	  markets	  (irreducible	  to	  an	  eternal	  essence	  of	  markets).	  Third,	  DeLanda	  is	  clearly	  
indebted	   to	   Deleuze	   and	   Guattari’s	   notions	   of	   territorialisation	   and	  
deterritorialisation,	  which	  means	  that	  his	  assemblage	  theory	  constantly	  tries	  to	  track	  
specific	  processes	  of	  dissembling	  and	  reassembling	  (Harman,	  2008).	  
	  
According	   to	   DeLanda	   and	   following	   Deleuze,	   assemblages	   become	   particularly	  
interesting	  above	  certain	   thresholds	  of	  complexity	   relative	   to	   ‘’the	  kinds	  of	  wholes	  
that	  could	  be	  assembled	  on	  this	  planet’’	  (DeLanda,	  2006,	  p.14).	  One	  can	  think	  of	  the	  
emergence	   of	   genes	   or	   language	   as	   such	   examples	   of	   increasing	   complexity,	   but	  
DeLanda	   argues	   that	   even	   atoms	   are	   capable	   of	   expression.	   As	  we	   already	   noted,	  
most	  of	  the	  physical	  assemblages	  in	  nature	  are	  independent	  of	  humans	  being	  there.	  
From	  atomic	  radiation	  to	  hurricanes	  and	  chemical	  clocks,	  most	  physical	  assemblages	  
are	   independent	   of	   human	   presence.	   Living	   organisms	   represent	   more	   complex	  
assemblages	   as	   they	   depend	   on	   basic	   physical/thermodynamic	   and	   chemical	  
process,	   but	   they	   are	   also	   independent	   of	   human	   presence.	   While	   it	   is	   true	   that	  
humans	  can	  act	  on	   these	  process	  and	  even	   trigger	  certain	   results	   that	  would	  have	  
been	  very	  unlikely	  otherwise,	  these	  assemblages	  would	  still	  retain	  autonomy	  outside	  
of	  human	  existence.	  	  The	  narrative	  becomes	  more	  difficult	  when	  he	  tries	  to	  give	  an	  
account	   of	   social	   assemblages,	   As	   DeLanda	   himself	   describes	   it,	   while	   social	  
institutions	   are	   independent	   of	   the	   content	   of	   our	   minds,	   they	   are	   vey	   much	  
observer	   relative.	   That	   is	   to	   say,	   humans	   need	   to	   maintain	   a	   certain	   level	   of	  
interaction	   in	   order	   to	   maintain	   social	   assemblages.	   This	   also	   applies	   to	   his	  
understanding	  of	  technology.	  Within	  the	  context	  of	  social	  assemblages,	   technology	  
represents	  a	  further	  increase	  in	  complexity.	  	  In	  fact,	  rather	  than	  thinking	  in	  terms	  of	  
a	   hybrid	  mix	   of	   humans	   and	   artefacts,	   the	   ultimate	   aim	   of	   DeLanda’s	   assemblage	  
theory	  is	  to	  track	  the	  gradual	  evolution	  of	  these	  more	  complex	  assemblages.	  	  
	  
In	   analysing	   more	   complex	   social	   and/or	   technological	   assemblages,	   DeLanda	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presents	  his	  readers	  with	  long	  encyclopaedic	  narratives	  (looking	  at	  everything	  from	  
language,	  urban	  architecture	  and	  communication	  technologies).	  This	  is	  also	  the	  case	  
in	   his	   treatment	   of	   markets	   and	   Capitalism.	   For	   him,	   markets	   are	   assemblages	  
’’made	   out	   of	   people	   and	   the	   material	   and	   expressive	   goods	   people	   exchange’’	  
(DeLanda,	  2006,	  p.17).	  They	  are	  also	  historical	  processes	  of	  becoming	  dependant	  on	  
the	  structure	  and	  the	  intensity	  of	  human	  interaction.	  	  He	  actually	  starts	  his	  account	  
of	  markets	  by	  looking	  at	  the	  evolution	  of	  bazaars	  and	  medieval	  village	  markets,	  their	  
integration	   into	   regional	   markets/fairs	   and	   ultimately	   their	   centralization	   into	  
national	  markets	  such	  as	  England	  in	  the	  19th	  century	  (DeLanda,	  2010).	  In	  this,	  he	  very	  
much	   follows	   the	  work	  of	  Fernand	  Braudel,	  whom	  he	  considers	   to	  be	   the	  greatest	  
historian	   of	   capitalism.	   Braudel’s	   legacy	   is	   part	   of	   the	   so-­‐called	   Annales	   School,	  
where	  the	  historical	  account	   is	  not	  centred	  around	  major	  historic	   figures	  or	  events	  
but	  focuses	  on	  complex	  process	  where	  everything	  from	  geology	  to	  climate	  and	  from	  
epidemics	  to	  technological	  innovations	  have	  a	  role	  to	  play.	  	  This	  is	  very	  important	  for	  
DeLanda	   as	   it	   helps	   him	   reject	   the	   Marxist	   partitioning	   of	   history	   into	   slavery,	  
feudalism	   and	   capitalism	   (DeLanda,	   1999).	   All	   of	   these	   distinctions	   are	  
generalizations	   that	   preclude	   the	   more	   complex	   processes	   of	   ecological,	   socio-­‐
economic	  and	  technological	  evolution.	  By	  largely	  ignoring	  the	  Marxist	  tradition,	  he	  is	  
thus	  able	  to	  reject	  any	  notion	  of	  a	  ‘’monolithic	  and	  homogeneous	  ‘capitalist	  system’’’	  
(DeLanda,	  1999).	  In	  other	  words,	  he	  is	  not	  trying	  to	  give	  an	  account	  of	  Capitalism	  or	  
the	  Market	   but	   a	   detailed	   description	   of	   how	   certain	  markets	   emerged	   in	   specific	  
environmental,	  cultural	  and	  technological	  conditions.	  In	  his	  view	  not	  all	  markets	  are	  
the	   same	   and	   he	   subscribes	   to	   Braudel’s	   position	   that	   ‘’we	   must	   make	   an	  
unequivocal	   distinction	   between	   markets	   and	   capitalism’’.	   	   This	   goes	   against	   the	  
ideological	  traditions	  of	  the	  Left	  and	  the	  Right,	  which	  tend	  to	  equate	  Capitalism	  with	  
the	  Market.	  As	  Braudel	  famously	  put	  it:	  
We	  should	  not	  be	  too	  quick	  to	  assume	  that	  capitalism	  embraces	  the	  whole	  of	  
western	  society,	  that	   it	  accounts	  for	  every	  stitch	   in	  the	  social	   fabric…that	  our	  
societies	   are	   organized	   from	   top	   to	   bottom	   in	   a	   ‘capitalist	   system’.	   On	   the	  
contrary,	  …there	  is	  a	  dialectic	  still	  very	  much	  alive	  between	  capitalism	  on	  one	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hand,	   and	   its	   antithesis,	   the	   ‘non-­‐capitalism’	   of	   the	   lower	   level	   on	   the	   other	  
(Braudel,	  1984,	  p.630).	  
	  
DeLanda	   also	   follows	   Braudel	   in	   his	   distinction	   between	   two	   types	   of	   economic	  
institutions:	   markets	   (meshworks,	   decentralized	   interaction)	   and	   capitalism	  
(monopolies,	   bureaucratic	   and	   hierarchical	   control).	   In	   short,	   the	   argument	   is	   that	  
capitalism	   is	   a	   tendency	   toward	   oligopolistic	   price	   setting	  while	  markets	   involve	   a	  
large	   number	   of	   anonymous	   interactions	   and	   exchanges.	   The	   capitalistic	   tendency	  
refers	  to	  the	  establishment	  of	  ‘’large	  enterprises,	  large	  that	  is,	  relative	  to	  the	  size	  of	  
the	  markets	  where	  they	  operate’’	  (DeLanda,	  1996).	  Braudel	  highlights	  this	  tendency	  
in	   the	   operations	   and	   behaviour	   of	   Italian	   medieval	   merchants	   (wholesalers),	  
something	   that	   persists	   today	   in	   the	   dominant	   position	   of	   multinational	  
corporations28.	  Markets,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  refer	  to	  more	  direct	  interaction	  without	  
the	  need	   for	   large	   intermediary	  structures,	  which	  makes	   these	  markets	   truly	   ‘’self-­‐
organized	  decentralized	  structures’’	  that	  ‘’arise	  spontaneously	  without	  the	  need	  for	  
central	   planning’’	   (DeLanda,	   1996).	   So	   according	   to	   Braudel	   and	   DeLanda,	   we	   are	  
faced	  with	  this	  duality	  between	  two	  socio-­‐economic	  assemblages,	  one	  in	  which	  price	  
setting	   is	   achieved	   through	   decentralized	   interaction	   and	   the	   other	   using	   network	  
power	   to	   set	   prices	   in	   a	   non-­‐competitive	   way.	   This	   ultimately	   leads	   to	   a	   very	  
interesting	   position,	   namely	   that	   capitalism	   is	   by	   and	   large	   a	   non-­‐competitive	  
tendency,	  one	  that	  continuously	  attempts	  to	  control	  market	  dynamics.	   In	  returning	  
to	   DeLanda’s	   assemblage	   theory,	   we	   could	   say	   that	   markets	   are	   deterritorialised	  
assemblages	   while	   anti-­‐markets	   (capitalism	   or	   oligopolies)	   represent	   a	   more	  
territorialized	  form	  of	  that	  assemblage.	  Moreover,	  in	  Braudel’s	  opinion,	  ignoring	  the	  
distinction	  between	  capitalism	  and	  markets	  has	  been	  one	  of	  the	  major	  mistakes	  of	  
the	   Left.	   Because	   of	   this,	   the	   rich	   potential	   of	   markets	   as	   mechanisms	   for	   social	  
change	   is	   lost.	   Therefore	   one	   ends	   up	   focusing	   solely	   on	   the	   duality	   between	  
authoritarian	   state	   vs.	   unregulated	   free	  markets.	   In	   the	   last	   pages	   of	   his	  magnum	  
opus	  Capitalism	  and	  Civilization	  (Braudel	  et	  al.,	  1981;	  Braudel,	  1982;	  Braudel,	  1984),	  
Braudel	   seems	   to	   suggest	   that	   we	   should	   not	   contend	   ourselves	   with	   this	   false	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  One	  can	  think	  here	  of	  the	  ample	  literature	  on	  the	  topic	  of	  vertical	  integration	  and	  
monopolies.	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opposition	   between	   the	   state	   and	   the	   so-­‐called	   free	  market.	   On	   the	   contrary,	   he	  
stresses	   the	   importance	   of	  more	   granular	   distinctions	   such	   as	   that	   between	  more	  
transparent	   versus	   more	   opaque	   systems	   of	   exchange,	   markets	   vs.	   oligopolies	  
(Wallerstein,	  1991a).	  Braudel	  elaborates	  this	  view	  in	  the	  well-­‐known	  second	  volume	  
of	  Capitalism	  and	  Civilization,	  entitled	  The	  Wheels	  of	  Commerce.	  In	  that	  context,	  the	  
market	   was	   a	   space	   of	   ‘’liberation,	   openness,	   access	   to	   another	   world’’	   (Braudel,	  
1982,	  p.26)	  whereas	  the	  antimarket	  was	  the	  place	  "where	  the	  great	  predators	  roam	  
and	   the	   law	  of	   the	   jungle	  operates"	   (Braudel,	  1982,	  p.230;	  Wallerstein,	  1991b,	  pp.	  
209-­‐210).	  
	  
Interesting	  as	  it	  may	  be,	  the	  distinction	  between	  markets	  and	  capitalism	  is	  ultimately	  
based	  on	  a	  dialectical	  relationship.	  As	  DeLanda	  himself	  argues,	  even	  though	  we	  can	  
distinguish	   between	   markets	   and	   oligopolies,	   they	   ultimately	   ‘’coexist	   and	  
intermingle’’	  and	  ‘’constantly	  give	  rise	  to	  one	  another’’	   (DeLanda,	  2006,	  p.	  32).	  We	  
would	  argue	  that	  his	  is	  precisely	  the	  problem	  with	  relying	  on	  dialectical	  dichotomies	  
as	   sooner	   or	   later	   one	   is	   always	   forced	   to	   acknowledge	   their	   correlation	   and	  
constitutive	   intermingling	   (Meillassoux,	  2008).	  At	   this	  point,	  we	  can	  clearly	   identify	  
the	   limits	   of	   DeLanda	   and	   Braudel’s	   approach.	   The	   problem	   in	   thinking	   along	   the	  
lines	  of	   a	  dialectical	   contamination	   is	   that	  one	   risks	   getting	   stuck	   in	   an	  ambiguous	  
aporetic	   dynamic.	   If	   any	   given	   socio-­‐economic	   assemblage	   is	   always	   some	  
combination	  of	  markets	  and	  capitalism,	  what	  can	  we	  really	  say	  about	  the	  functioning	  
of	  specific	  markets?	  Do	  markets	  ever	  really	  change	  or	  are	  they	  the	  endless	  repetition	  
of	  this	  market/anti-­‐market	  dialectic?	  Moreover,	  even	  when	  DeLanda	  addresses	  the	  
question	   of	   decentralized	   transparent	   markets,	   he	   understands	   them	   as	   meeting	  
places	  for	  open	  exchange.	  That	   is	  to	  say,	  there	   is	   little	  or	  no	  interest	   in	  the	  precise	  
mechanisms	  of	  aggregating,	  matching	  and	  clearing	  transactions.	  This	  runs	  the	  risk	  of	  
ignoring	  the	  greater	  diversity	  of	   firms	  and	  non-­‐market	   forms	  of	  exchange.	   In	  other	  
words,	  relying	  too	  much	  on	  the	  market/anti-­‐market	  dichotomy,	  we	  miss	  some	  of	  the	  
finer	  details	  about	  how	  certain	  exchange	  mechanisms	  are	  constructed	  and	  how	  they	  
evolve	  in	  time.	  	  
	  
Both	  DeLanda	  and	  Braudel’s	  narratives	  offer	  great	  insight	  into	  the	  history	  of	  markets	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but	  they	  do	  not	  really	  address	  the	  transactional	  infrastructure	  and	  their	  diverse	  set	  
of	  functionalities.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  this	  thesis	  will	  attempt	  to	  have	  amore	  granular	  
approach	   and	   focus	   on	   certain	   transactional	   functions,	   such	   as	   matching	   and	  
clearing.	  While	  the	  transaction	  machines	  performing	  these	  functions	  can	  all	  be	  seen	  
as	  complex	  assemblages,	  it	   is	  difficult	  to	  construct	  a	  more	  detailed	  account	  of	  their	  
functioning	   and	   evolution	   by	   relying	   solely	   on	   assemblage	   theory.	   As	   we	   will	   see	  
later,	  Philip	  Mirowski’s	  theory	  of	  markets	  as	  evolving	  computational	  systems,	  allows	  
us	  to	  smooth	  out	  the	  rough	  edges	  of	  assemblage	  theory.	  We	  will	  address	  this	  topic	  in	  
Chapter	  3	  of	  the	  thesis.	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Conclusion	  
	  
The	   aim	   of	   this	   chapter	  was	   to	   discuss	   two	   separate	   approaches	  within	   the	   social	  
sciences	   and	   humanities,	   where	   markets	   in	   general	   and	   financial	   markets	   in	  
particular	   as	   viewed	   as	   assemblages	   of	   different	   elements,	   including	   humans	   and	  
technical	   artefacts.	   We	   draw	   valuable	   insights	   and	   also	   highlight	   some	   of	   the	  
limitations	  and	  differences	  with	  the	  present	  thesis.	  We	  began	  by	  reviewing	  SSF	  in	  the	  
context	  of	  Michel	  Callon’s	  The	  Laws	  of	  the	  Markets	  (1998)	  and	  Donald	  MacKenzie’s	  
An	  Engine,	  Not	  a	  Camera	  (2006).	  These	  authors	  provide	  the	  basic	  building	  blocks	  of	  a	  
new	   sociology	   looking	   at	   how	   different	   elements,	   including	   humans	   and	   non-­‐
humans,	  are	  assembled	  together	  in	  the	  construction	  of	  financial	  markets.	  In	  relation	  
to	   this	   sociology	   of	   finance,	   the	   present	   thesis	   attempts	   a	   shift	   in	   both	   focus	   and	  
approach,	   consistent	  with	   our	   understanding	   of	   transaction	  machines.	   Throughout	  
this	  thesis,	  we	  will	  not	  focus	  on	  why	  market	  participants	  decide	  to	  trade	  this	  or	  that	  
financial	   asset	  or	  why	   someone	  makes	  a	   certain	   investment.	  We	  are	  also	  not	   very	  
interested	   in	  economic	  or	   financial	  models	  and	   their	  performativity.	   Lastly,	  we	  are	  
not	   concerned	   with	   the	   effects	   of	   contemporary	   financial	   technology	   on	   the	  
behavioural	   patterns	   of	   individual	   traders	   or	   how	   new	   products	   and	   markets	   are	  
assembled.	  As	  stated	  above,	  this	  thesis	  doesn’t	  approach	  socio-­‐technical	  systems	  as	  
networks	  made	  up	  of	  discrete	  elements,	  either	  human	  or	  non-­‐human.	  Drawing	  from	  
cybernetics	   and	   computer	   science,	   we	   look	   at	   socio-­‐technical	   systems	   as	   types	   of	  
information	  processing	  machines,	  with	  their	  own	  abstract	  schematic	  or	  algorithmic	  
structure,	   that	   is	   to	   say,	   focusing	   on	   they	   way	   in	   which	   they	   perform	   certain	  
functions.	   Within	   the	   framework	   of	   transaction	   machines,	   both	   humans	   and	  
technical	   artefacts	   are	   components	   parts	   of	   complex	   machines	   exhibiting	   certain	  
transactional	  regularities,	  such	  as	  the	  mechanism	  for	  matching	  and	  clearing	  financial	  
transactions.	  	  
	  
We	  then	  reviewed	  Manuel	  DeLanda’s	  assemblage	  theory,	  which	  represents	  a	  more	  
rigorous	  systematization	  of	  the	  philosophy	  of	  Deleuze	  &	  Guattari	  and	  their	  notion	  of	  
assemblage	   or	   agencement.	   In	   his	   writings,	   drawing	   heavily	   form	   the	   work	   of	  
historian	  Fernand	  Braudel,	  DeLanda	  spends	  a	   lot	  of	  time	  describing	  morphogenetic	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processes	   through	   which	   ecosystems,	   individuals	   and	   groups,	   markets	   and	  
corporations	  come	  about.	  While	  he	  avoids	  thinking	  in	  terms	  of	  reified	  totalities	  such	  
as	   the	  Market	   (with	  a	   capital	  M),	  he	  contends	  himself	  with	  dialectical	  dichotomies	  
such	   as	   market/anti-­‐market	   and	   doesn’t	   approach	   market	   functions	   in	   any	  
granularity.	  As	  we	  have	  argued,	  his	  account	  of	  markets	  does	  not	  allow	  him	  to	  look	  at	  
the	   finer	   details	   of	   how	   these	   systems	   actually	   work	   and	   how	   their	   precise	  
mechanisms	  evolve	  through	  time.	  Nevertheless,	  we	  retain	  from	  DeLanda	  his	  central	  
focus	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  evolution	  and	  history	  in	  accounting	  for	  the	  present	  state	  of	  any	  
assemblage,	  that	  is	  to	  say	  his	  commitment	  to	  the	  question	  of	  becoming.	  In	  fact,	  this	  
is	  perhaps	  the	  most	  important	  aspect	  of	  his	  work,	  namely	  looking	  at	  the	  evolution	  of	  
social	   and	   technological	   assemblages	   through	   time.	   Following	   in	  his	   footsteps,	   this	  
thesis	   attempts	   to	   track	   and	   describe	   the	   evolutionary	   trajectory	   of	   transaction	  
machines.	  
	  
Both	   SSF	   and	   DeLanda’s	   assemblage	   theory	   are	   hugely	   influential	   for	   the	   present	  
thesis	   while	   also	   highlighting	   the	   need	   for	   a	   different	   approach.	   The	   subsequent	  
theory	  chapters	  will	  attempt	  to	  address	  some	  of	  these	  points.	  For	  instance,	  Chapter	  
2	  will	  focus	  on	  Gilbert	  Simondon’s	  philosophy	  of	  technology	  as	  a	  complex	  system	  in	  
its	   own	   right.	   Rather	   than	   relying	   on	   the	   ontology	   of	   networks	   and	   associations,	  
Simondon	  draws	  from	  cybernetics	  and	  looks	  complex	  machines	  as	  systems	  exhibiting	  
their	  own	  mode	  of	   functioning,	  operational	  schematics	  and	  designs,	   irrespective	  of	  
their	  components	  parts.	  	  Chapter	  3	  then	  attempts	  to	  elaborate	  on	  the	  precise	  details	  
of	   these	   machines.	   	   Drawing	   from	   Philip	   Mirowski’s	   theory	   of	   markets	   as	  
computational	  systems,	  we	  gain	  a	  better	  grasp	  of	  the	  formal	  functions	  performed	  by	  
markets	   in	  general.	  Leveraging	  the	  work	  of	  those	  two	  thinkers,	  we	  will	  gain	  both	  a	  
functional	  and	  an	  evolutionary	  understanding	  of	  socio-­‐technical	   systems	   in	  general	  
and	  provide	  a	  more	  solid	  basis	  for	  the	  understanding	  of	  transaction	  machines.	   	  
	   47	  





The	   chapter	   addresses	   the	   philosophy	   of	   Gilbert	   Simondon	   and	   his	   account	   of	  
technology,	   in	   as	   much	   as	   he	   draws	   from	   cybernetics,	   information	   theory	   and	  
computer	  science.	   In	  this	  context,	  technology	  is	  the	  most	  recent	  phase	  of	  a	  broader	  
process	  of	  individuation.	  He	  identifies	  several	  phases	  of	  individuations	  as	  the	  passing	  
of	   thresholds	  towards	  more	  complex	  systems.	  The	  process	  of	   individuation	  takes	  us	  
from	   the	   physical	   to	   the	   living,	   the	   psychic	   and	   the	   psychosocial	   and	   finally	   to	   the	  
technological	   phase	   of	   individuation.	   While	   being	   the	   most	   recent	   phase	   of	   this	  
process,	  technical	  individuation	  emerges	  and	  is	  constrained	  by	  the	  other	  phases.	  One	  
the	  one	  hand,	  technical	  objects	  are	  independent	  of	  human	  beings	  in	  as	  much	  as	  they	  
are	  physical	  and	  material	  objects.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  technical	  objects	  are	  invented	  
and	  continue	  to	  develop	  under	  the	  constraints	  of	  a	  community	  of	  users.	  Moreover,	  he	  
pursues	   an	   analysis	   of	   machines	   based	   on	   the	   functional	   differentiation	   between	  
different	   modes	   of	   existence	   of	   technical	   objects	   (elements,	   individuals	   and	  
ensembles).	  Until	  the	  modern	  age,	  human	  beings	  have	  been	  the	  dominant	  technical	  
individuals,	   building	   and	  maintaining	   technical	   ensembles	   and	   perfecting	   technical	  
elements.	   What	   is	   particularly	   interesting	   about	   Simondon’s	   account	   of	   technical	  
individuation	  is	  that	  he	  describes	  the	  way	  in	  which	  humans	  are	  gradually	  displaced	  as	  
the	  dominant	  component	  parts	  of	  complex	  technical	  ensembles.	  In	  the	  industrial	  age	  
this	  tendency	  is	  clearly	  at	  work	  in	  the	  march	  towards	  standardization,	  whereby	  tasks	  
that	  were	  performed	  by	  human	  individuals	  are	  gradually	  integrated	  into	  the	  internal	  
working	   of	   machines.	   Similarly,	   the	   20th	   century	   has	   seen	   an	   equally	   impressive	  
tendency	   towards	   higher	   levels	   of	   automation,	   whereby	  many	   cognitive	   processes	  
performed	   by	   human	   beings	   can	   now	   be	   codified	   and	   performed	   by	  what	   he	   calls	  
information	  machines.	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2.1	  Philosophy	  of	  Individuation	  
	  
As	  we	  already	  noted,	  this	  thesis	  provides	  an	  understanding	  of	  machines	  as	  complex	  
systems	   in	   themselves,	   rather	   then	   relying	   on	   a	   clear	   distinction	   between	   the	  
humans	   and	   non-­‐humans.	   Rather	   than	   thinking	   about	   technology	   as	   a	   tool	   to	   be	  
mastered	  by	  humans,	  Simondon	  offers	  a	  more	  nuanced	  understanding	  of	  technology	  
as	   a	   continuation	   of	   a	  much	  more	   general	   process	   of	   change,	   as	   the	  most	   recent	  
phase	  of	  individuation.	  The	  philosophy	  of	  Gilbert	  Simondon	  has	  received	  increasing	  
attention	   recently,	   both	   in	   French	   and	  English	   speaking	   academic	   circles.	  His	  work	  
has	  come	  to	  the	  forefront	  because	  of	  his	  analysis	  of	  modern	  technology	  but	  also	  for	  
his	  influence	  on	  philosophers	  such	  as	  Gilles	  Deleuze	  and	  Bernard	  Stiegler.	  The	  more	  
recent	   literature	   on	   Simondon	   has	   emphasized	   his	   relevance	   for	   science	   and	  
technology	   studies	   (Chabot,	   2003;	   Barthélémy,	   2005;	   Barthélémy,	   2008;	   Bontems,	  
2009)	   or	   bioethics	   (Hottois,	   1993).	   There	   is	   also	   a	   keen	   interest	   in	   Simondon	   as	   a	  
potential	   renewal	   of	   political	   thought	   and	   critical	   theory	   (Combes,	   1999;	   Toscano,	  
2006;	  Bardin,	  2015).	  Several	  conferences	  and	  publications	  (Roux,	  2002;	  Roffe	  et	  al.,	  
2013;	  David	  Scott,	  2014)	  have	  provided	  a	  renewed	  momentum	  for	  the	  study	  of	  this	  
conceptually	   rich	   philosophy.	   Moreover,	   Brian	   Massumi	   (2009)	   has	   offered	   an	  
interesting	  interpretation	  of	  Simondon’s	  understanding	  of	  technical	  invention,	  which	  
seems	  to	  be	  a	  fruitful	   line	  of	   inquiry	  given	  the	  recently	  published	  manuscripts	  such	  
as	  Imagination	  et	  Invention	  (Simondon	  et	  al.,	  2008).	  	  
	  
Our	  own	   interest	   for	  Simondon	  comes	  as	  a	   result	  of	  numerous	  conversations	  with	  
the	  likes	  of	  Bernard	  Stiegler.	  In	  fact,	  he	  explicitly	  states	  that	  the	  core	  of	  his	  project	  is	  
an	  attempt	  to	  formulate	  a	  conceptual	  synthesis	  of	  the	  two	  very	  different	  projects	  of	  
Heidegger	   and	   Simondon	   (Stiegler,	   2009).	   He	   extracts	   from	   Simondon’s	   work	   the	  
idea	  that	  our	  exosomatic	  organs	  (technical	  prosthetics)	  are	  just	  as	  important	  as	  our	  
endosomatic	  organs.	  Moreover,	  all	  organs	  have	  a	  pharmacological	  nature	  entailing	  
the	   ambiguous	   possibility	   of	   both	   negentropy	   and	   entropy	   (both	   gift	   and	   poison)	  
(Stiegler,	  2003).	  While	  for	  Simondon,	  the	  technical	  object	  fights	  against	  the	  death	  of	  
the	   Universe	   (i.e.	   an	   increase	   in	   order)	   Stiegler	   understands	   technology	   as	   an	  
ambiguous	   mix	   of	   entropy	   and	   negentropy,	   as	   both	   order	   and	   disorder.	   One	   can	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understand	   Stiegler’s	   subsequent	   writings	   on	   attention,	   loss	   of	   knowledge,	  
exhaustion	  of	  libido,	  etc.,	  as	  a	  response	  to	  precisely	  these	  entropic	  tendencies	  at	  the	  
heart	   of	   modern	   technology	   (Stiegler,	   2010b;	   Stiegler,	   2010a).	   While	   Stiegler’s	  
philosophy	  is	  very	  interesting,	  especially	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  a	  critical	  political	  
economy,	  it	  is	  less	  useful	  for	  the	  present	  thesis.	  	  As	  we	  will	  see,	  Simondon	  thus	  offer	  
a	  very	  unique	  understanding	  of	  technical	  objects,	  their	  individuation	  and	  a	  detailed	  
analysis	  of	  their	  modes	  of	  existence.	  A	  more	  detailed	  explanation	  would	  be	  needed	  
here,	   but	   actually	   the	   basic	   tenants	   of	   Simondon’s	   philosophy	   are	   largely	  
incompatible	   with	   much	   of	   Stiegler’s	   thought,	   particularly	   due	   to	   his	   reliance	   on	  
Derrida’s	  deconstruction	  and	  Heidegger’s	  version	  of	  phenomenology.	  In	  many	  ways,	  
Simondon	   is	   much	   closer	   to	   cybernetics	   and	   information	   theory	   and	   leaves	   little	  
room	  for	  the	  mutual	  hermeneutics	  between	  man	  and	  machine	  or	  the	  deconstructive	  
aporia	  of	  Dasein	  (Stiegler,	  1998;	  Guchet,	  2010).	  
	  
It	   fact,	   it	   might	   be	   more	   useful	   to	   introduce	   Simondon’s	   philosophy	   through	   the	  
work	  of	  his	  doctoral	  supervisor,	  Georges	  Canguilhem,	  by	  focusing	  on	  a	  text	  entitled	  
Machine	  and	  Organism.	  In	  that	  context,	  he	  proposes	  an	  understanding	  of	  technology	  
as	  a	   ‘’universal	  biological	  phenomenon’’	  that	  allows	  ‘’man	  to	   live	   in	  continuity	  with	  
life’’(Canguilhem,	   1992,	   p.63).	   He	   developed	   his	   thinking	   at	   the	   juncture	   of	  
philosophy	   of	   science,	   epistemology	   and	   the	   so-­‐called	   French	   biophilosophy,	  
influenced	   by	   the	   likes	   of	   Claude	   Bernard,	   Raymond	   Ruyer,	   Gaston	   Bachelard	   and	  
Kurt	   Goldstein.	   It	   has	   been	   argued	   that	   Canguilhem	   actually	   represented	   a	  
repositioning	  of	  biology	  and	  the	  life	  sciences	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  social	  research	  (Wolfe,	  
2010).	   Simondon	   is	   directly	   influenced	   by	   Canguilhem’s	   ideas	   and	   he	   understands	  
biological	  systems	  as	  being	  constantly	  open	  to	  contingency	  and	  change.	  For	  both	  of	  
them,	   no	  matter	   now	   complex	   and	   exceptional	   living	   organisms	  might	   seem,	   they	  
are	  still	  part	  of	  a	  broader	  process	  of	  change	  and	  by	  no	  means	  an	  exception	   to	   the	  
laws	  of	  physics	  or	  thermodynamics.	  In	  this	  sense,	  Simondon	  follows	  his	  professor	  to	  
the	   very	   end,	   as	   it	   was	   Canguilhem	   argued	   that	   there	   is	   ‘’no	   kingdom	  within	   the	  
kingdom’’,	   meaning	   more	   complex	   systems	   evolve	   all	   the	   time	   but	   they	   are	   not	  
exceptional	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   not	   being	   subject	   to	   the	   laws	   of	   nature	   (Canguilhem,	  
1965).	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In	  any	  case,	  Simondon’s	  own	  contribution	  (2009b)	  within	  the	  constellation	  of	  French	  
philosophy	   has	   been	   to	   think	   of	   any	   system	   within	   a	   more	   general	   process	   of	  
individuation,	  what	  he	  calls	  ontogenesis29.	  This	   is	  precisely	  why	   it	   is	  useful	  to	  draw	  
from	  his	  philosophy,	  because	  of	  his	  commitment	  to	  the	  process	  of	   individuation	  as	  
being	  that	  which	  always	  comes	  first	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  individuals	  it	  constitutes.	  That	  
is	   to	   say,	   he	   emphasizes	   the	   process	   by	   which	   something	   comes	   about,	   not	   the	  
already	   given	   effect	   or	   result.	   The	   question	   of	   stability	   and	   equilibrium	   offers	   a	  
perfect	   example.	   For	   Simondon,	   the	   Western	   philosophical	   tradition	   has	   strictly	  
differentiated	  between	  stability	  and	  instability,	  between	  order	  and	  chaos,	  being	  and	  
becoming.	   Contrary	   to	   this	   tradition,	   he	   understand	   individuation	   as	   the	   process	  
whereby	  a	  system	  gains	  coherence	  and	  identity,	  but	  remains	  at	  the	  same	  time	  at	  the	  
edge	   of	   chaos	   (Prigogine	   and	   Stengers,	   1984).	   His	   argument	   is	   that	   in	   order	   to	  
understand	   the	   process	   of	   individuation,	   one	   must	   think	   in	   terms	   of	   an	   unstable	  
equilibrium,	  a	  metastable	   state.	   Secondly,	  no	   individual	   is	   given	  as	   such,	  but	  has	  a	  
preindividual	   reality	   from	   which	   it	   emerged,	   that	   is	   to	   say	   it	   has	   a	   history	   or	   a	  
genesis.	   He	   does	   focuses	   on	   how	   various	   processes	   of	   individuation	   (physical,	  
biological,	   psychosocial,	   technical)	   come	   about,	   stabilize	   and	   provide	   support	   for	  
subsequent	   individuations	   or	   in	   other	   cases	   dis-­‐individuate	   themselves	   (decay	   and	  
disappear).	  Moreover,	  each	  phases	  of	  individuation	  is	  defined	  around	  certain	  critical	  
thresholds.	  Because	  of	  his	  admiration	  of	  cybernetics,	  he	  sometimes	  describes	  these	  
thresholds	  in	  informational	  terms	  (Simondon,	  2010)30.	  In	  his	  view,	  it	  is	  meaningful	  to	  
talk	   about	   individuation	   once	   a	   system	   reaches	   a	   certain	   scale,	   a	   certain	   order	   of	  
magnitude.	   Below	   a	   certain	   topological	   and	   chronological	   limit,	   we	   have	   the	  
preindividual,	   or	   the	   pre-­‐physical.	   Beyond	   this	   initial	   threshold	   he	   identifies	   the	  
phase	   of	   physical	   individuation	   and	   frequently	   references	   the	   formation	   of	   salt	  
crystals	   as	   paradigmatic	   example.	   The	   oversaturated	   solution	   of	   sodium	   chloride	  
undergoes	   crystallization	   (takes	   a	   new	   form)	   through	   the	   propagation	   of	   an	   initial	  
signal,	   or	   a	   structuring	   germ.	   This	   gradual	   process	   of	   taking	   form,	   which	   in	  many	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  Ontogenesis	   is	  understood	  here	  as	  the	  becoming	  of	  being,	   the	  gradual	  unfolding	  
of	  reality	  (Simodon,	  2009)	  
30	  By	   information,	   Simondon	   means	   any	   physical/energetic	   process	   or	   interaction	  
(Simondon,	  2010).	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cases	   is	   almost	   instantaneous,	   sheds	   light	   on	   his	   understanding	   of	   physical	  
individuation.	  That	   is	  to	  say,	  physical	  systems	  undergo	  individuation	  once	  and	  have	  
only	  a	  small	  capacity	  to	  continue	  to	  individuate,	  or	  it	   in	  other	  words	  to	  continue	  to	  
receive	   new	   information.	   This	   bears	   witness	   to	   his	   tremendous	   reliance	   on	  
cybernetics	   and	   his	   informational	   understanding	   of	   the	   process	   of	   individuation.	  
While	  the	  physical	   individuation	  can	  grow	  and	  amplify	   itself	  (just	   like	  in	  the	  case	  of	  
crystallization),	   it	   is	   less	   open	   to	   receiving	   new	   information	   (Simondon,	   1995).	  
Contrary	   to	   this,	   the	   living	   individuation	   can	   receive	   continuous	   inputs	   of	  
information,	   maintaining	   an	   on-­‐going	   individuation.	   In	   this	   sense,	   Simondon	  
understands	   information	  as	  a	   system’s	   interaction	  with	   its	  environment.	  Therefore	  
the	  transition	  towards	  the	  living	  individuation	  marks	  the	  passing	  of	  a	  threshold	  in	  the	  
degree	  of	  openness	  to	  new	  information	  (Simondon,	  1964;	  Simondon,	  2013,	  p.152).	  
To	  be	  precise,	  Simondon	  explains	   that	   the	   living	   individuation	  does	  not	  come	  after	  
the	  physical	  individuation,	  but	  during	  this	  process	  of	  individuation.	  He	  suggests	  that	  
we	  could	  think	  of	  the	  living	  as	  a	  physical	  individuation	  in	  suspension,	  maintaining	  the	  
capacity	   to	   receive	   information	   for	   a	   longer	   period	   of	   time,	   as	   opposed	   to	   quasi	  
instantaneity	   of	   the	   physical	   individuation.	   This	   point	   is	   particularly	   important,	   as	  
each	  subsequent	  phase	  of	  individuation	  distinguishes	  itself	  because	  it	  maintains	  the	  
capacity	   to	   receive	   information	   for	   a	   longer	   time,	   and	   from	   a	   wider	   variety	   of	  
sources.	   This	   also	   accounts	   for	   the	   fragility	   of	   the	   more	   complex	   phases	   of	  
individuation,	  which	   can	   only	  maintain	   themselves	   thanks	   to	   their	   reliance	   on	   the	  
previous	  phases	  (Iliadis,	  2013).	  
	  
As	  with	  all	  accounts	  of	  ontogenesis,	  defining	  the	  thresholds	  that	  separate	  different	  
domains	  is	  not	  always	  easy.	  	  In	  Simondon’s	  case,	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  physical	  
and	   the	   living	   individuation	   rest	   in	   the	   capacity	   to	   receive	   new	   information	  
(Simondon,	   2013,	   p.151).	   Subsequent	   phases	   of	   individuation	   such	   as	   the	   psychic	  
individuation	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  the	  passing	  of	  a	  threshold	  towards	  even	  more	  complex	  
systems.	  In	  short,	  the	  psychic	  is	  a	  continuation	  of	  the	  overall	  process	  of	  individuation	  
as	   something	   that	   happens	   in	   the	   context	   of	   certain	   living	   beings.	   This	   process	   of	  
psychic	   individuation	   takes	   us	   from	   living	   individuals	   to	   something	  more	   complex,	  
namely	  psychic	  reality.	  That	   is	  to	  say,	  the	  psychic	  occurs	  when	   living	  beings	  can	  no	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longer	   resolve	   their	   problematic	   interaction	   with	   the	   environment.	   In	   his	  
philosophical	   account,	   once	   the	   interaction	   between	   living	   individuals	   and	   the	  
environment	  reaches	  a	  certain	  threshold	  of	  complexity,	  the	   living	  reaches	  a	  certain	  
point	  of	   incompatibility	  with	  its	  milieu	  (Roffe	  et	  al.,	  2013,	  p.93).	  The	  passing	  of	  this	  
threshold	   is	   described	   as	   the	   formation	   of	   the	   psychic,	   which	   is	   gradual	   process	  
encompassing	   several	   stages	   including	   perception,	   affect,	   emotion	   and	   anxiety	  
(Krtolica,	   2009;	   Melanie	   Swan,	   2014).	   While	   we	   cannot	   describe	   here	   the	   full	  
richness	  of	  Simondon’s	  account,	  it	  is	  essential	  to	  note	  that	  he	  takes	  great	  care	  to	  give	  
an	   account	   of	   the	   gradual	   transition	   from	   living	   to	   psychic	   individuals	   as	   the	  
resolution	   of	   incompatibilities	   or	   conflicts	   with	   the	  milieu.	  Moreover,	   it	   is	   equally	  
crucial	  to	  note	  that	  for	  him	  the	  psychic	  individuation	  can	  only	  be	  fully	  accomplished	  
at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  group	  (Combes,	  1999;	  Toscano,	  2007).	  As	  he	  puts	  it,	  the	  resolution	  
of	  the	  psychic	  is	  accomplished	  by	  participating	  in	  the	  much	  broader	  individuation	  of	  
the	   collective	   (Crary	   and	   Kwinter,	   1992).	   Hence	   his	   interest	   for	   the	   next	   level	   of	  
complexity,	  what	  he	  calls	  the	  psychosocial	  individuation	  (Simondon,	  1989).	  In	  other	  
words,	   the	   psychic	   reality	   is	   itself	   transitory	   and	   a	   relatively	   unstable	   resolution.	  
Therefore,	   there	   is	   an	   immediate	   transition	   to	   the	   so-­‐called	   psychosocial	  
individuation	   (or	   the	   transindiviudal	   as	   he	   sometimes	   calls	   it)	   as	   a	   subsequent	   of	  
stabilization	  of	  psychic	  reality:	  
	  
The	  entry	   into	   the	  psychic	   reality	   is	   the	  entry	   into	  a	   transitory	  path,	  because	  
the	   resolution	   of	   the	   intra-­‐individual	   psychic	   problematic	   (that	   of	   perception	  
and	   affection)	   is	   achieved	   at	   the	   level	   of	   the	   trans-­‐individual31	  (Simondon,	  
2013,	  p.166)	  
	  
This	   paragraph	   is	   a	   testimony	   to	   Simondon’s	   innovative	   thinking	   but	   also	   to	   the	  
many	  unresolved	  questions	  surrounding	  his	  work.	  One	  recurrent	  issue	  is	  the	  inflation	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31	  	  Original	  French	  text:	   ‘’L’entre	  dans	   la	  réalité	  psychique	  est	  une	  entrée	  dans	  une	  
voie	   transitoire,	   car	   la	   résolution	   de	   la	   problématique	   psychique	   intra-­‐individuelle	  
(celle	  de	  la	  perception	  et	  celle	  de	  l’affectivité)	  amené	  au	  niveau	  du	  transindividuel‘’	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of	  new	  concepts,	  which	  are	  not	  always	  well	  defined32.	   For	   instance,	   sometimes	  he	  
seems	   to	  equate	   the	  psychosocial	  with	   the	   trans-­‐individual,	  while	   and	  other	   times	  
the	   trans-­‐individual	   seems	   to	   be	   a	   transitory	   stage	   between	   the	   psychic	   and	   the	  
psychosocial.	   Perhaps	   this	   is	   a	   symptom	   of	   his	   ambition	   to	   describe	   and	   give	   an	  
account	  of	  processes	  of	  formation	  rather	  than	  stable	  entities	  (individual,	  group,	  etc.).	  
The	  difficulty	   lies	   in	   the	   attempt	   to	   isolate	   and	   focus	  on	   specific	   details	   of	   a	  more	  
complex	  process	  of	   becoming.	  He	   starts	   by	   asserting	   the	   importance	  of	   describing	  
the	   process	   of	   individuation	   rather	   than	   focusing	   on	   already	   individuated	   entities.	  
But	  once	  you	  being	  to	  describe	  the	  actual	  process	  you	  are	  forced	  to	  develop	  further	  
conceptualizations.	   In	   other	   words,	   there	   is	   an	   intrinsic	   conflict	   in	   his	   philosophy	  
between	   the	   dialectic	   tendency	   to	   think	   in	   terms	   of	  wider	   processes	   of	   formation	  
and	  the	  analytical	  necessity	  to	  sometimes	  make	  more	  granular	  distinctions.	  
	  
Nevertheless,	   Simondon’s	   philosophy	   has	   been	   influential	   for	   contemporary	  
philosophers,	   among	   them	   Bernard	   Stiegler.	   In	   Stiegler’s	   account	   of	  
anthropogenesis,	  this	  stabilization	  of	  the	  psychic	  through	  the	  social	  occurs	  thanks	  to	  
external	   organs,	   or	   what	   he	   calls	   technical	   prosthetics.	   In	   fact,	   in	   Stiegler’s	  
philosophy,	  the	  human	  is	  at	  the	  same	  time	  fundamentally	  constrained	  and	  liberated	  
by	   his	   technical	   prosthetics.	   The	   resolution	   of	   the	   psychic	   individual	   within	   the	  
collective	  is	  only	  established	  through	  the	  intermediary	  of	  something	  other	  than	  the	  
biological.	  That	   is	  to	  say,	  the	  psychosocial	   individuation	  is	  achieved	  because	  groups	  
of	   psychic	   individuals	   are	   integrated	   through	   some	   sort	   of	   technical	   prosthetic.	   In	  
this	  regard,	  both	  Simondon	  and	  Stiegler	  are	  influenced	  by	  the	  likes	  of	  Leroi-­‐Gourhan	  
(1971)	   in	   that	   they	   understand	   the	   acquisition	   of	   technology	   as	   encompassing	  
everything	  from	  the	  most	  basic	  tools	  and	  techniques	  to	  the	  more	  advanced	  systems	  
such	  as	  language	  and	  writing.	  For	  Stiegler,	  the	  invention	  of	  fire	  is	  a	  perfect	  example	  
of	   a	   technical	   prosthetics,	   representing	   Prometheus’s	   gift	   to	   the	   handicapped	  
humans,	   after	  Epimetheus	   forgot	   to	  give	   them	  any	  evolutionary	  advantages	   in	   the	  
fight	   for	  survival	   (Stiegler,	  1998).	   In	  short,	  Stiegler’s	  argument	   is	   that	   the	  human	   is	  
the	   technical	   being	   par	   excellence.	   In	   this	   sense,	   anthropogenesis	   is	   a	   process	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32	  For	  a	  more	  detailed	  account	  of	  Simondon’s	  philosophy	  see	  (Scott,	  2014,	  Roffe	  et	  
al.,	  2013).	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whereby	  the	   instability	  of	  the	  psychic	   individuation	  can	  only	  be	  resolved	  through	  a	  
collective	   interaction,	   which	   itself	   can	   only	   be	   feasible	   in	   as	   much	   as	   it	   is	  
technological.	   In	  other	  words,	  Stiegler	  makes	  no	  real	  distinction	  between	  the	  social	  
and	  the	  technical,	  as	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  move	  from	  the	  psychic	  to	  the	  social	  without	  
the	   existence	   of	   a	   basic	   technical	   infrastructure.	   Somewhat	   different	   to	   this,	  
Simondon	   thinks	   in	   terms	   of	   hierarchies	   of	   complexity	   and	   does	   not	   necessarily	  
equate	   the	   social	   and	   the	   technical	   (Barthélémy,	   2009,	   p.29).	   For	   Simondon,	   both	  
the	   technical	   and	   the	   social	   are	   part	   of	   the	   process	   of	   individuation,	   while	   also	  
acknowledging	  that	  the	  advent	  of	  technical	   individuation	  has	  a	  solidifying	  effect	  on	  
the	  social,	  quite	  similar	  to	  Latour’s	  assertion	  that	  technology	  is	  society	  made	  durable	  
(Latour,	  1991).	  	  
	  
Both	   Stiegler	   and	   Latour	   draw	   from	   Simondon’s	   philosophy,	   which	   in	   itself	   is	   a	  
complex	   mix	   of	   Canguilhem’s	   work	   and	   French	   biophilosophy	   while	   remaining	  
grounded	   in	   cybernetics,	   information	   theory	   and	   thermodynamics.	   In	   his	   minor	  
doctoral	   thesis,	   On	   the	   Mode	   of	   Existence	   of	   Technical	   Objects	   (1980,	   1958),	   he	  
attempts	   to	   synthesize	   all	   of	   these	   sources	   and	   construct	   a	   consistent	   ontological	  
framework.	   The	   question	   of	  whether	   or	   not	   he	   succeeds	   in	   this	   endeavour	   is	   still	  
very	  much	  open	  to	  debate.	  Nevertheless,	  in	  his	  account	  technology	  is	  understood	  as	  
a	   complex	   system	   in	   itself,	  part	  of	  a	  more	  general	  process	  of	   change	   that	   includes	  
physical	   and	   living,	   psychic	   and	   psychosocial	   systems.	   With	   every	   new	   phase	   of	  
individuation	   we	   see	   the	   emergence	   of	   more	   organized	   or	   more	   individuated	  
systems,	  which	  are	  also	  more	  efficient	  at	  reducing	  their	  degree	  of	  entropy:	  
	  
The	  machine	  is	  a	  result	  of	  organization	  and	  information;	   it	  resembles	   life	  and	  
cooperates	  with	  life	  in	  its	  opposition	  to	  disorder	  and	  to	  the	  levelling	  out	  of	  all	  
things	  that	  tend	  to	  deprive	  the	  world	  of	  its	  powers	  of	  change.	  The	  machine	  is	  
something	  which	  fights	  against	  the	  death	  of	  the	  universe;	  it	  slows	  down,	  as	  life	  
does,	   the	   degradation	   of	   energy,	   and	   becomes	   a	   stabilizer	   of	   the	   world	  
(Simondon,	  1980,	  p.9)	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In	  this	  sense,	  we	  can	  see	  the	  huge	  influence	  of	  Norbert	  Weiner,	  in	  understanding	  the	  
evolution	   of	   complex	   systems	   (including	   machines)	   as	   a	   constant	   fight	   against	  
entropy	  understood	  as	  disorder.	  The	  problem	  with	  this	  conception	  is	  that	  both	  living	  
organisms	  and	  technical	  objects	  are	  not	  opposed	  to	  entropy	   in	  a	  kind	  of	  dialectical	  
standoff.	   The	   currently	   accepted	   view	   is	   somewhat	   more	   nuanced,	   stating	   that	  
complex	  living	  organisms	  evolve	  not	  so	  much	  by	  opposing	  entropy,	  but	  by	  efficiently	  
dissipating	  it	  (Prigogine	  and	  Stengers,	  1984)	  at	  the	  highest	  rate	  possible	  (Salthe	  and	  
Annilla,	   2009).	   Following	   the	   current	   understanding	   of	   dissipative	   systems,	   one	  
needs	   to	   make	   a	   distinction	   between	   the	   internal	   entropy	   the	   system	   and	   the	  
external	  entropy	  of	  its	  environment	  (Herrmann-­‐Pillath,	  2013).	  	  We	  could	  thus	  correct	  
Simondon’s	  position,	  by	   saying	   that	   the	  machine	   is	   truly	  a	  mix	  of	  organization	  and	  
information	   and	   that	   it	   resembles	   life	   in	   that	   it	   constantly	   minimizes	   its	   internal	  
entropy.	   It	   fights	  against	   its	  own	  death,	  by	  dissipating	  at	   the	  highest	   rate	  possible,	  
increasing	  the	  entropy	  of	  its	  environment.	  
	  
In	   any	   case,	   Simondon’s	   interdisciplinary	   framework	   allows	   him	   to	   think	   about	  
technology	  as	  coherent	  systems	  in	  itself,	  rather	  than	  something	  that	  is	  added	  on	  top	  
of	   an	   already	   existing	   social	   structure.	   As	   long	   as	   technical	   objects	  were	   relatively	  
simple	   artefacts,	   they	   were	   effectively	   exosomatic	   organs	   of	   human	   beings,	  
extensions	   of	   some	  of	   our	   bodily	   functions.	   Before	   the	   industrial	   period,	   technical	  
systems	  were	  largely	  composed	  of	  humans	  and	  their	  prosthetics.	  Nevertheless,	  what	  
is	   interesting	  about	  our	  modern	  age	   is	   that	   technical	   individuation	  moves	   towards	  
technical	   objects	   with	   higher	   degrees	   of	   autonomy	   from	   humans	   (Chabot,	   2003,	  
p.132).	  	  We	  will	  devote	  the	  rest	  of	  this	  chapter	  to	  unpacking	  his	  account	  of	  technical	  
individuation	  and	   follow	  his	  critique	  of	  our	  modern	  day	  understanding	  of	   technical	  
objects.	   As	   we	   will	   see,	   he	   argues	   for	   the	   inadequacy	   of	   distinctions	   such	   as	  
human/non-­‐human	  or	  the	  understanding	  of	  technology	  as	  a	  tool	  and	  of	  the	  human	  
as	   a	   tool-­‐bearer.	   In	   this	   sense,	   he	   argues	   that	  modern	   technology	   is	   a	   process	   of	  
individuation	  in	  its	  own	  right.	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2.2	  The	  Amplifying	  Relay	  and	  the	  Tendency	  of	  Concretization	  
	  
	  
As	   we	   have	   seen,	   Simondon’s	   approach	   to	   the	   question	   of	   technology	   has	   a	   high	  
degree	  of	  originality,	  while	  still	  being	  part	  of	  certain	  tradition	  of	  20th	  century	  French	  
philosophy.	   This	   is	   particularly	   true	   in	   the	   way	   in	   which	   he	   utilized	   the	   term	  
’mechanology’	   which	   was	   initially	   developed	   by	   figures	   such	   as	   Jacques	   Lafitte	  
(Iliadis,	  2013;	  Iliadis,	  2015).	  For	  Lafitte,	  machines	  were	  understood	  as	  an	  extension	  of	  
humans	   or	   as	   Lotka	   called	   them,	   exosomatic	   organs	   (Lotka,	   1925;	   Lafitte,	   1972).	  
According	   to	   Bernard	   Stiegler,	   Simondon’s	   philosophy	   of	   technology	   is	   very	  much	  
indebted	  to	  Lafitte,	  but	  also	  to	  the	  Leroi-­‐Gourhan’s	  anthropology	  and	  Betrand	  Gilles’	  
work	  on	  technical	  systems33	  (Gille,	  1964;	  Leroi-­‐Gourhan,	  1971;	  Gille,	  1978;	  Bontems,	  
2009).	  Simondon	  published	  his	  first	  book	  in	  1958	  and	  was	  clearly	  inspired	  by	  Norbert	  
Weiner’s	  cybernetics,	  leading	  to	  a	  negentropic	  interpretation	  of	  technology	  (drawing	  
from	  cybernetics	  and	  information	  theory).	  Furthermore,	  he	  understands	  the	  process	  
of	  individuation	  of	  technology	  as	  a	  continual	  development	  of	  systems	  that	  are	  more	  
ordered	   in	   a	   thermodynamic	   sense.	   Building	   on	   this	   perspective,	   he	   can	   say	   that	  
living,	   social	   and	   technical	   systems	   evolve	   by	   being	  more	   complex	   and	   efficient	   in	  
terms	   of	   their	   internal	   functioning	   as	  well	   as	   their	   interaction	   (material,	   energetic	  
and	   informational	   exchange)	   with	   their	   environment.	   This	   allows	   him	   to	   position	  
technical	   objects	   on	   the	   same	   path	   and	   trajectory	   as	   the	   other	   phases	   of	  
individuation.	  
	  
In	  the	  context	  of	  the	  On	  the	  Mode	  of	  Existence	  of	  Technical	  Objects	  (1980),	  technical	  
individuation	  is	  understood	  as	  a	  problem	  of	  science	  and	  engineering,	  while	  technical	  
invention	  would	  be	  a	  question	  of	  solving	  intrinsic	  problems	  of	  design.	  More	  recently,	  
Vincent	   Bontems	   (2009)	   and	   Simon	   Mills	   (2011)	   have	   attempted	   to	   criticize	   this	  
tendency	   in	  Simondon,	  namely	  his	  attempt	   to	   insulate	   the	  evolution	  of	   technology	  
from	   the	   interference	   of	   culture	   and	   the	   demands	   of	   social	   and	   economic	   forces.	  
This	   critique	   is	   consistent	   with	   Paul	   Dumouchel’s	   position,	   when	   he	   interprets	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  Bernard	   Stigler	   has	   explored	   this	   topic	   in	   great	   depths	   in	   his	   first	   volume	   of	  
Technics	  and	  Time	  (1998).	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Simondon’s	  philosophy	  as	  a	  failed	  attempt	  at	  a	  purist	  account	  of	  technology,	  which	  
would	  somehow	  be	  unaltered	  by	  social	  and	  cultural	  constraints	  (Dumouchel,	  1992).	  
Our	  own	  position	  is	  that,	  through	  a	  close	  reading	  of	  the	  second	  part	  of	  the	  book	  and	  
also	   some	   of	   the	   recently	   published	   text	   such	   as	   Invention	   dans	   les	   Techniques	  
(Simondon,	   2005)	   and	   Communication	   and	   Information	   (Simondon,	   2010),	   it	   is	  
possible	   to	   provide	   a	   more	   holistic	   understanding	   of	   Simondon’s	   philosophy	   of	  
technology.	  	  
	  
On	  the	  one	  hand,	  technical	  objects	  are,	  from	  a	  certain	  point	  of	  view,	  independent	  of	  
culture	  and	   social	  norms	  precisely	  because	   they	  are	   real	  physical/material	  objects,	  
and	   thus	   subject	   to	   the	   laws	   of	   physics	   and	   thermodynamics.	   Moreover,	   when	  
looking	   at	   the	   question	   of	   technical	   design	   it	   is	   apparent	   that	   specific	  
design/engineering	   problems	   remain	   the	   same,	   in	   most	   societies.	   This	   technical	  
autonomy	  is	  what	  Simondon	  tried	  to	  describe	  with	  his	  notion	  of	  concretization	  and	  
technical	   lineages.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   technical	   objects	   can	   also	   be	   seen	   as	  
evolving/developing	   under	   the	   constraints	   of	   living	   beings.	   This	   is	   true	   particularly	  
when	   one	   understands	   technical	   objects	   as	   exosomatic	   organs,	   which	   is	   Alfred	  
Lotka’s	   position.	   In	   this	   sense,	   technical	   evolution	   is	   also	   conditioned	   by	   human	  
physiology	   and	   metabolism,	   and	   represents	   an	   amplification	   of	   our	   capacity	   to	  
access	  resources	  and	  increase	  our	  energy	  intakes.	   	  Moreover,	  technical	  objects	  can	  
be	  said	  to	  evolve	  under	  the	  constraints	  of	  human	  culture	  and	  society	  (what	  he	  calls	  
the	   psychosocial).	   In	   this	   sense	   they	   are	   observer	   relative,	   as	   their	   functioning	  
depends	   on	   and	   is	   constrained	   by	   a	   community	   of	   users,	   both	   in	   terms	   of	   their	  
biological/physiological	  and	  in	  their	  cultural	  specificity.	  A	  hand-­‐axe	  can	  emerge	  as	  a	  
technical	   solution	   for	   cutting	   wood	   in	   many	   different	   geographical	   location	   and	  
cultural	  milieus.	  It	  evolves	  under	  the	  pressure	  of	  physical/material	  constraints,	  such	  
as	   available	  metals,	   climate,	   vegetation	   etc.	   In	   that	   sense,	   it	   is	   independent	   from	  
human	  observers.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	  could	  not	  exist	  outside	  of	  a	  society	  of	  users	  
and	  inventors.	  The	  design	  of	  the	  axe	  evolves	  relative	  to	  the	  size	  and	  strength	  of	   its	  
users	  and	  it’s	  also	  relative	  to	  their	  social	  interaction.	  Thus	  an	  axe	  can	  have	  different	  
functions	  as	  weapon	  or	  as	  a	  cutting	  tool,	  given	  different	  cultural	  settings	  and	  social	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scenarios) 34 .	   We	   can	   thus	   argue	   that	   Simondon	   has,	   in	   fact,	   a	   very	   complex	  
understanding	   of	   machines	   as	   part	   of	   the	   most	   recent	   phase	   of	   the	   process	   of	  
individuation	  developing	  under	  material,	  biological	  and	  social	  constraints.	  
	  
Two	   of	   Simondon’s	   most	   interesting	   essays	   L’Amplification	   dans	   le	   processus	  
d’information	  and	  Le	  Relais	  Amplificateur	   (Simondon,	  2010),	   focus	  on	  the	  technical	  
lineage	  of	  the	  electric	  relay	  as	  a	  paradigmatic	  exampled	  of	  technical	  individuation	  in	  
general.	   In	   this	   account	  he	   focuses	  on	  how	   subsequent	  designs	   are	  more	   complex	  
and	  also	  more	  efficient	  and	  synergetic	  or,	   in	  his	  own	  words,	  more	  concretized.	  He	  
begins	  the	  individuation	  of	  the	  electric	  relay	  by	  focusing	  on	  the	  vacuum	  tube,	  which	  
functions	   because	   to	   the	   transduction	  of	   electrons	   from	   the	  cathode	   toward	  
the	  anode.	  Additional	  electrodes	  can	  be	  interposed	  between	  the	  cathode	  and	  anode	  
to	   act	   as	   modulators.	   	   This	   is	   true	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   they	   modulate	   the	  electric	  
current,	   giving	   the	   tube	   the	   ability	   to	  switch.	   Although	   solid-­‐state	   devices	   such	   as	  
transistors	  have	  replaced	  vacuum	  tubes,	  they	  still	  represent	  the	  basic	  schematic	  for	  
modern	  electronic	  devices.	  The	  next	  generation	  of	  the	  triode,	  was	  born	  by	  placing	  an	  
additional	  electrode	  in	  between	  the	  filament	  (cathode)	  and	  plate	  (anode);	  resulting	  
in	   the	   ability	   of	   the	   new	   device	   to	   amplify	   signals.	   The	   triode’s	   functioning	   was	  
hampered	  by	  the	  capacity	  between	  anode	  and	  grid,	  which	  could	  easily	  result	   in	  an	  
undesired	  auto	  oscillation	  of	  the	  current	   in	  the	  tube.	  The	  pentode	  (five	  electrodes)	  
was	  eventually	  invented	  as	  a	  resolution	  of	  this	  problem,	  another	  grid	  was	  added	  to	  
the	   design,	   between	   anode	   and	   grid,	   and	   this	   functioned	   as	   an	   electrostatic	  
insulation.	   Because	   of	   the	   potential	   between	   the	   anode	   and	   this	   extra	   grid	   (and	  
between	   the	  extra	  grid	  and	   the	  original	   control	  grid)	   this	  new	  grid	  also	   functioned	  
both	  as	  another	  control	  grid	  for	  the	  anode	  and	  as	  an	  anode	  for	  the	  original	  control	  
grid,	   thus	   strongly	  enhancing	   the	  amplifying	   function	  of	   the	   tube	   (up	   to	  200	   times	  
amplification	  instead	  of	  30-­‐50	  times)	  (Simondon,	  2010).	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  extra	  grid	  
functioned	  both	  as	  a	  solution	  for	  the	  original	  problem	  and	  as	  an	  enhancement	  of	  the	  
overall	  function	  of	  the	  tube.	  This	  can	  also	  be	  understood	  as	  doing	  more	  with	  less,	  or	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34	  There	  are	  famous	  examples	  in	  the	  evolution	  of	  warfare,	  when	  the	  development	  of	  
certain	  weapons	  was	  stalled	  because	  they	  were	  considered	  as	  a	  dishonorable	  way	  of	  
fighting	  (crossbows,	  firearms).	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in	  Simondon’s	   case	   the	  gradual	   increase	   in	   the	  efficiency,	  as	  a	   small	   change	   in	   the	  
information	  grid,	  counts	  as	  a	  big	  change	  in	  the	  anode	  (Simondon,	  2010).	  	  
	  
The	   next	   stage	   in	   this	   phylogenetic	   line	   is	   the	   transistor,	   a	   device	   that	   can	   switch	  
electronic	   signals	   even	   more	   efficiently	   than	   vacuum	   tubes.	   It	   is	   composed	   of	  
semiconductor	  material	  with	  similar	   functional	  schematic	  as	   in	   the	  case	  of	  vacuum	  
tube.	   Today,	   some	   transistors	   are	   packaged	   individually,	   but	   most	   are	   part	   of	  
modern	   integrated	   circuits.	   These	   technical	   objects	   were	   made	   possible	   by	   the	  
discovery	  of	   semiconductor	  materials,	  which	  could	   replicate	   the	  switching	   function	  
of	  vacuum	  tubes.	  Simondon	  has	  never	  written	  about	   integrated	  circuits	  but	  we	  can	  
easily	   introduce	   it	   into	   his	   overall	   description	   of	   electric	   relays.	   	   It	   is	   clear	   that	  
integrated	   circuits	   represented	  a	  huge	   leap	   in	   terms	  of	  modulating	  electricity.	   The	  
basic	   problem	   of	   these	   technical	   objects	   is	   the	   integration	   of	   large	   numbers	   of	  
tiny	  transistors	  into	  a	  small	  chip,	  which	  represented	  an	  enormous	  improvement	  over	  
the	  manual	  assembly	  of	  circuits.	  The	   integrated	  circuit	  allows	   for	  mass	  production,	  
reliability	  and	  a	  building-­‐block	  production	  method.	  Cost	   is	  much	  lower	  because	  the	  
chips,	   with	   all	   their	   components,	   are	   printed	   as	   a	   unit	   by	  photolithography	  rather	  
than	  being	   constructed	  one	   transistor	  at	   a	   time.	  According	   to	  Moore’s	   law	   (1965),	  
the	  number	  of	  transistors	  within	  integrated	  circuits	  more	  or	  less	  doubles	  every	  two	  
years,	  recently	  reaching	  millions	  of	  transistors	  per	  square	  millimetre.	  Obviously	  there	  
is	  a	  huge	  difference	  between	  having	  one	  transistor	  to	  having	  one	  million	  transistors	  
that	   perform	   the	   same	   function	   in	   a	   more	   integrated	   way.	   In	   short,	   this	   process	  
entails	  a	  gradual	  convergence	  of	  separate	  elements	  towards	  a	  more	  efficient	  overall	  
functioning	  so	  that	  the	  concrete	  technical	  object	  is:	  
	  
(…)	   one	  which	   is	   no	   longer	   divided	   against	   itself,	   one	   in	  which	  no	   secondary	  
effect	  either	  compromises	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  whole	  or	  is	  omitted	  from	  that	  
functioning	   (…)	  The	  essence	  of	   the	  concretization	  of	  a	   technical	  object	   is	   the	  
organizing	   of	   functional	   sub-­‐systems	   into	   the	   total	   functioning	   (Simondon,	  
1980,	  p.31)	  
This	   can	   help	   us	   understand	   Simondon’s	   notion	   of	   concretization,	   in	   that	   the	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integrated	   circuit	   is	   more	   concrete	   than	   the	   basic	   transistor,	   which	   is	   also	   more	  
concrete	   than	   the	  older	  vacuum	  tubes.	   If	   the	   triode	  comprised	  3	  metal	  plates,	   the	  
integrated	   circuit	   is	   a	   more	   concretized	   design,	   effectively	   integrating	   millions	   of	  
different	  transistors.	  Simondon	  calls	  this	  a	  move	  towards	  a	  more	  concretized	  design	  
and	  it	  is	  the	  closest	  Simondon	  ever	  gets	  to	  a	  notion	  of	  technical	  evolution	  (Bontems,	  
2009).	  In	  this	  sense,	  concretization	  is	  a	  criterion	  that	  allows	  one	  to	  discern	  technical	  
lineages,	   as	   the	   gradual	   development	   of	   functional	   synergies	   (Simondon,	   1980,	   p.	  
14).	   	  Vincent	  Bontems	   (2009)	  has	  offered	  some	  of	   the	  most	  compelling	  analysis	  of	  
Simondon’s	  philosophy	  of	  technology.	  In	  his	  view,	  concretization	  is	  not	  just	  a	  way	  to	  
think	   about	   technical	   evolution,	   but	   it	   can	   also	   help	   us	  map	   a	   progression	   of	   this	  
technical	  individuality.	  While	  a	  simple	  tool	  becomes	  more	  concretized	  as	  it	  becomes	  
more	   solid	   and	   reliable	   in	   it’s	   handling,	   the	   combustion	   engine	   becomes	   more	  
concretized	  as	  it	  attains	  a	  greater	  degree	  of	  autonomy	  and	  self-­‐regulation.	  Bontems	  
describes	   the	   technical	   lineage	   of	   diesel	   engines	   and	   identifies	   a	   gradual	  
improvement	  as	  its	  functioning	  becomes	  more	  sustainable	  and	  concretized:	  
(…)	   the	   first	   diesel	   engine	   could	   not	   last	   because	   its	   conception	   could	   not	  
prevent	  it	  from	  bursting:	  oil	  and	  air	  were	  mixing	  before	  the	  compression.	  The	  
second	  diesel	  engine,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  was	  sustainable	  because	  the	  mixing	  
occurs	   after	   the	   compression	   (…)	   the	   different	   operations	   are	   thus	   well	  
coordinated	   in	   order	   to	   ensure	   coherent	   functioning,	   in	   a	   synergistic	   way,	  
while	  its	  “ancestor”	  was	  self-­‐destructing	  (Vincent	  Bontems,	  2009,	  p.5).	  
 
Bontems	   thus	  demonstrates	   that	   it	   is	  possible	   to	  use	  Simondon	   to	  understand	   the	  
increased	   concretization	  of	   the	  diesel	   engine,	  which	   is	   consistent	  with	   Simondon’s	  
own	   example	   of	   the	   Guimbal	   turbine,	   where	   the	   oil	   and	   water	   serve	   multiple	  
functions	  accounting	  for	  a	  more	  concretized	  design	  relative	  to	  earlier	  versions.	  These	  
earlier	  designs	  are	  more	  abstract	  as	  they	  are	  composed	  of	  isolated	  objects,	  which	  is	  
more	   like	  an	  aggregation	  of	  different	   components	   (Guchet,	  2010).	  An	  evolutionary	  
step	   occurs	   when	   a	   more	   concretized	   design	   is	   invented,	   broadly	   synergy	   and	   a	  
higher	   efficiency	   in	   terms	   of	   performing	   certain	   crucial	   functions.	   In	   this	   sense,	  
concretization	  is	  a	  gradual	  movement	  from	  one	  synergy	  to	  the	  next,	  as	  obstacles	  are	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incorporated	   into	   a	   new	   multifunctional	   whole.	   Thus	   Simondon	   envisages	   the	  
evolution	  of	  technology	  as	  the	  passing	  of	  certain	  synergetic	  thresholds,	  moving	  from	  
more	   abstract	  modes	   to	  more	   concrete	   ones	   (Simondon,	   1980,	   p.21).	   This	   applies	  
both	   to	   technical	   objects	   such	   as	   the	   electric	   relay	   but	   also	   to	   more	   complex	  
machines,	  what	  the	  calls	  technical	  ensembles	  (workshops,	  factories,	  networks,	  etc.).	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2.3	  The	  Modes	  of	  Existence	  of	  Technical	  Objects	  
	  
In	   line	   with	   his	   general	   account	   of	   individuation,	   Simondon	   looks	   at	   machines	   as	  
having	   their	   own	   type	   genesis,	   understood	   as	   a	   ‘’unity	   of	   becoming’’	   (Schmidgen,	  
2004).	  One	  should	  not	  focus	  too	  much	  on	  particular	  technical	  objects	  but	  one	  must	  
always	  look	  at	  the	  historical	  development	  of	  technical	  lineages.	  As	  we	  have	  seen	  in	  
the	   previous	   section,	   his	   account	   of	   the	   electric	   relay	   hinges	   on	   describing	   the	  
subsequent	  designs	  whereby	  the	  same	  schematic	  becomes	  more	  concretized.	  While	  
the	  integrated	  circuit	  is	  evidently	  more	  complex	  than	  a	  vacuum	  tube,	  it	  is	  part	  of	  the	  
same	  technical	  lineage	  (Combes,	  1999,	  p.13).	  When	  talking	  about	  technical	  lineages,	  
Simondon	   often	   refers	   to	   an	   operational	   schematic	   (‘’chaine	   operatoire’’)	   as	   the	  
formal	  algorithmic	  description	  of	  a	   function.	  The	  function	  of	   the	  electric	   relay	   is	   to	  
modulate	   electricity	   (or	   to	   switch),	   and	   subsequent	   designs	   can	   be	   understood	   as	  
performing	   this	  modulating	   function.	  What	   changes	   through	   time	   is	   the	   degree	  of	  
concretization,	   which	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	   electric	   relay	   translates	   to	  more	   efficient	  
designs	  affording	  the	  switching	  and	  amplifying	  electric	  current.	  
	  
In	  Simondon’s	  account	  of	  technology	  technical	  objects	  are	  not	  natural	  objects	  in	  the	  
sense	   that	   they	   do	   not	   simply	   emerge	   in	   the	   wild,	   but	   have	   their	   own	  modes	   of	  
existence.	  Technical	  objects	  are	  invented	  within	  a	  certain	  social	  milieu,	  that	  is	  to	  say	  
they	   evolve	   under	   the	   constraints	   of	   a	   certain	   community	   of	   users.	   This	   is	   what	  
Simondon	   means	   by	   the	   associated	   milieu	   of	   technical	   objects,	   namely	   the	  
environment	   that	   affords	   the	   invention	  and	   improvement	  of	   technical	  objects.	   For	  
instance,	   an	   adequate	   understanding	   of	   the	   electric	   relay	   is	   not	   confined	   to	   the	  
actual	   technical	   artefact	  but	  extends	   to	   the	   community	  of	  users,	   electric	   grids	  and	  
power	  plants,	   that	   is	   to	  say,	   in	  as	  much	  as	   they	  are	  part	  of	  what	  he	  calls	   technical	  
ensembles	  or	  what	  he	  have	  referred	  to	  when	  speaking	  of	  complex	  machines.	  
When	   addressing	   these	   complex	   machines,	   Simondon	   utilizes	   an	   interesting	  
analytical	  framework,	  distinguishing	  between	  three	  modes	  of	  existence	  of	  technical	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objects,	  namely	  the	  element35,	  the	  individual	  and	  the	  ensemble.	  There	  is	  no	  vertical	  
hierarchy	   between	   these	   aspects,	   only	   a	   functional	   differentiation	   in	   terms	   of	   the	  
role	  played	  in	  the	  evolution	  of	  a	  technical	  lineage.	  Whereas	  elements	  refer	  to	  basic	  
technical	   artefacts,	   technical	   individuals	   refer	   to	   the	   integration	   of	   a	   number	   of	  
different	   elements	   affording	   self-­‐regulation	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   interaction	   with	   its	  
environment.	   Technical	   individuals	   are	   those	   component	   parts	   that	   are	   open	   to	  
outside	   information	   and,	   more	   importantly,	   are	   self-­‐regulating.	   The	   cybernetic	  
conceptualization	  of	  feedbacks	  and	  information	  was	  a	  huge	  influence	  on	  Simondon,	  
in	   as	   much	   as	   he	   defines	   technical	   individuality	   based	   on	   the	   ‘’the	   criterion	   of	  
recurrent	   causality’’	   (Simondon,	   1980,	   p55).	   This	   reiterates	   the	   importance	   of	  
Norbert	   Wiener’s	   cybernetics	   (Bontems,	   2009),	   particularly	   his	   understanding	   of	  
negative	  and	  positive	   feedbacks	   for	  control	  and	  self-­‐regulation	   in	  complex	  systems	  
(Carver	  &	  Scheier,	  1998).	  As	  Wiener	  himself	  put	  it,	  the:	  
(…)	  physical	   functioning	  of	   the	   living	   individual	  and	   the	  operation	  of	   some	  of	  
the	   newer	   communication	  machines	   are	   precisely	   parallel	   in	   their	   analogous	  
attempts	   to	   control	   entropy	   through	   feed	   back.	   Both	   of	   them	   have	   sensory	  
receptors	  as	  one	  stage	  in	  their	  cycle	  of	  operation:	  that	  is,	  in	  both	  of	  them	  there	  
exists	   a	   special	   apparatus	   for	   collecting	   information	   from	   the	   outer	  world	   at	  
low	  energy	  levels,	  and	  for	  making	  it	  available	  in	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  individual	  
or	  of	  the	  machine	  (Wiener,	  1967,	  p.26)	  
Therefore	  the	  term	  of	  technical	  individual	  does	  not	  refer	  to	  human	  individuals	  but	  to	  
that	  mode	  of	  existence	  of	   technical	  objects	   that	   is	   in	  constant	   interaction	  with	   the	  
environment,	   regulating	  material,	   energetic	   and	   informational	   exchanges	   affording	  
the	  stability	  to	  the	  more	  complex	  machine,	  what	  he	  calls	  technical	  ensembles.	   In	  a	  
less	   known	   interview	   from	   1968	   entitled	   Entretien	   sur	   la	  mecanologie	   (Simondon,	  
2009a)	   Simondon	   states	   that	   in	   order	   for	   a	  machine	   to	   exist	   in	  must	   not	   be	   self-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35	  Simondon	   adopts	   a	   very	   general	   perspective	   when	   talking	   about	   the	   modes	   of	  
existence	   of	   technical	   objects.	   Technical	   elements	   refer	   to	   technical	   objects	   as	  
material	  artifacts,	  or	  prosthetics	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Stiegler.	  The	  term	  technical	  individual	  
should	   not	   be	   reduced	   to	   human	   individuals,	   but	   it	   refers	   the	   capacity	   to	   self-­‐
regulate	   in	   relation	   to	   a	   milieu.	   Technical	   ensembles	   refer	   to	   the	   integration	   of	  
technical	  individuals	  into	  a	  more	  complex	  whole.	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destructive,	  or	  that	   it	  must	  maintain	  the	  stability	   in	  regards	  to	  the	   interaction	  with	  
the	  milieu.	  One	  can	  think	  here	  of	  Simondon’s	  favourite	  example,	  that	  of	  the	  Guimbal	  
turbine.	  In	  this	  context,	  you	  have	  the	  complex	  ensemble	  of	  the	  hydroelectric	  power	  
plant,	  which	  performs	  the	  main	  function	  of	  transforming	  the	  energy	  of	  flowing	  water	  
to	   electricity.	   Within	   this	   ensemble,	   the	   water	   turbine	   is	   the	   central	   technical	  
individual,	  maintaining	  the	  material	  and	  energetic	  exchanges	  with	  the	  environment	  
(made	   up	   of	   flowing	   water	   on	   the	   one	   hand	   and	   electric	   grid	   on	   the	   other).	   The	  
efficient	  and	  synergetic	  functioning	  of	  this	  technical	  individual	  affords	  coherence	  and	  
reliability	  to	  the	  overall	  ensemble,	  and	  this	   is	  mainly	  due	  to	  its	  capacity	  to	  regulate	  
the	  inputs	  (flowing	  water)	  and	  outputs	  (electricity).	  
	  
If	   the	   technical	   individual	   can	   be	   said	   to	   be	   the	   site	   of	   self-­‐regulation,	   the	   more	  
complex	   technical	   ensemble	   is	   definitely	   the	   site	   of	   differentiation	   as	   it	   can	  
accommodate	   several	   technical	   individuals.	   We	   could	   attempt	   to	   provide	   a	   more	  
speculative	  example	  of	  a	   technical	  ensemble	  by	   look	  at	  hunter-­‐gatherer	  groups.	   In	  
this	   context,	   one	   can	   think	   of	   a	   primitive	   hunting	   party	   as	   a	   technical	   ensemble.	  
Humans	   and	   their	   technical	   prosthetics	   (weapons)	   would	   be	   the	   essential	  
component	   part	   of	   this	   ensemble.	   Integrating	   these	   elements	   leads	   to	   technical	  
ensembles	   such	   as	   hunting	   strategies.	   In	   this	   sense,	   depending	   of	   the	   prey,	   the	  
landscape,	   available	   weapons,	   number	   of	   hunters,	   etc.,	   different	   ensembles	   can	  
emerge.	   Simondon	   mostly	   describes	   technical	   ensembles	   of	   the	   industrial	   age,	  
whose	  function	  is	  to	  produce	  technical	  elements	  that	  can	  be	  used	  and	  integrated	  in	  
other	   ensembles.	   But	   one	   can	   look	   at	   other	   ensembles	   such	   as	   communication	  
systems	  that	  have	  the	   function	  of	  processing	   information	  flows	  between	  groups	  of	  
users.	  We	   can	   look	   at	   another	   speculative	   example	   in	   line	   with	   Lewis	  Mumford’s	  
work.	   For	   instance	   the	   technical	   ensemble	   of	   ancient	   writing	   as	   a	   technology	  
composed	  of	   technical	   elements	   such	  as	   clay	   tablets,	   an	  alphabet,	   a	   grammar	  and	  
technical	   individuals	   such	  as	   scribes.	  You	  can	   then	   think	  of	   temples	  and	  palaces	  as	  
technical	   ensemble	   organizing	   information	   flows	   in	   ancient	   societies	   such	   as	  
coordinating	   material	   economic	   flows	   or	   exerting	   political	   power.	   The	   inputs	   are	  
requests/commands	   from	   political	   and	   religious	   elites	   and	   the	   outputs	   are	  
instructions	  to	  be	  executed	  by	  the	  lower	  bureaucratic	  levels	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  society.	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One	  of	  Simondon’s	  favourite	  examples	  is	  the	  modern	  industrial	  factory	  as	  a	  technical	  
ensemble	  because	  it	  houses	  a	  variety	  of	  different	  technical	  individuals	  and	  organizes	  
their	  productive	  flows	  according	  to	  a	  predetermined	  plan.	  While	  technical	  elements	  
stand	   the	   test	   of	   time	   and	   transmit	   any	   improvements	   into	   the	   future36,	   both	  
technical	  individuals	  and	  ensembles	  are	  more	  precarious	  structures.	  	  
	  
In	   terms	   of	   the	   history	   of	   technical	   ensembles,	   Simondon	   often	   distinguishes	  
between	  periods	  of	  dynamic	  acceleration	  of	  technical	  invention	  followed	  by	  periods	  
of	   stagnation	   (Simondon,	   1980).	   In	   his	   perspective,	   technical	   evolution	   does	   not	  
follow	  a	  continuous	  path,	  as	   there	  are	  more	  dynamic	  periods	  are	  characterized	  by	  
sudden	   breaks	   with	   previous	   designs,	   followed	   by	   periods	   of	   stagnation	   revolving	  
around	   incremental	   improvements.	   The	   space	   of	   invention	   is	   truly	   a	   non-­‐linear	  
domain	  and	  an	  account	  of	   invention	  has	   to	   take	   the	   form	  of	  a	  history	  of	   technical	  
case	  studies.	  He	  elaborates	  on	  this	  topic	  in	  a	  series	  of	  lecture	  notes	  published	  under	  
the	  title	  Invention	  dans	  les	  Techniques	  (Simondon,	  2005),	  where	  he	  looks	  at	  technical	  
inventions	   in	   specific	   material,	   historic	   and	   social	   conditions.	   In	   the	   context	   of	  
ancient	   societies	   and	   the	   abundance	   of	   slave	   labour,	   technical	   objects	   were	  
fragmented	   and	   less	   sophisticated.	  Within	   this	   context,	   there	  was	   no	   pressure	   for	  
developing	  more	  sophisticated	  technical	  objects.	  Ancient	  technical	  ensembles	  were	  
thus	   more	   discontinuous,	   structured	   around	   harvest	   time,	   building	   sites	   of	   great	  
monuments,	  war,	  etc.	  In	  a	  certain	  sense,	  the	  abundant	  supply	  of	  slave	  labour	  acted	  
as	   a	   brake	   on	   technical	   invention	   as	   there	   was	   little	   pressure	   to	   develop	   new	  
technical	   objects,	   beyond	   the	   existing	   tool-­‐bearing	   slaves	   (Walbank,	   1969).	   It	   was	  
only	   in	   certain	   urban	   centres	   where	   more	   complex	   tools	   and	   instruments	   could	  
emerge.	  In	  this	  context,	  tools	  and	  human	  individuals	  could	  form	  a	  relative	  unity;	  and	  
the	  technical	  individual	  is	  in	  this	  case	  the	  figure	  of	  the	  artisan	  or	  the	  craftsman.	  Later	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36	  Simondon	  seems	   to	   say	   that,	   for	  a	   long	   time,	   technical	  elements	  were	   the	  most	  
important	  and	  efficient	  way	   to	   transmit	   information	   from	  one	  technical	  age	   to	   the	  
other.	  The	  skills	  of	  the	  artisan	  and	  the	  craftsman	  and	  the	  technical	  tradition	  of	  guilds	  
and	  workshops	  were	   contingent	   and	   dependent	   on	   the	   uncertainties	   of	   the	   social	  
interaction	   (wars,	   famines,	   etc.).	   It	   was	   the	   technicality	   of	   the	   elements	   (tools,	  
instruments)	   that	   was	   easier	   to	  maintain	   and	   transmit	   and	   also	   that	   which	   drove	  
technical	  evolution	  forward.	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on,	  medieval	  urban	  centres	  also	   fostered	  the	  development	  of	   technical	   individuals,	  
which	   could	   organize	   themselves	   in	  more	  durable	   technical	   ensembles	   (guilds	   and	  
workshops).	   Nevertheless,	   what	   Simondon	   seems	   to	   say	   is	   that	   for	   a	   long	   time	  
technical	  individuals	  and	  ensembles	  were	  precarious	  and	  contingent	  structures.	  Until	  
the	   industrial	   age	   humans	   were	   the	   dominant	   technical	   individuals.	   If	   for	   some	  
reason	   the	   human	   element	   would	   disappear	   (famine,	   war,	   epidemic)	   technical	  
ensembles	  would	  simply	  decay	  and	  collapse.	  Nevertheless,	  human	  beings	  performed	  
this	  function	  for	  as	  long	  as	  there	  was	  not	  other	  alternative:	  
	  
(…)	  the	  machine	  as	  technical	  individual	  becomes	  for	  a	  time	  man's	  adversary	  or	  
competitor,	   and	   the	   reason	   for	   this	   is	   that	   man	   centralized	   all	   technical	  
individuality	   in	  himself,	  at	  a	  time	  when	  only	  tools	  existed.	  The	  machine	  takes	  
the	   place	   of	   man,	   because	   man	   as	   tool-­‐bearer	   used	   to	   do	   a	   machine's	   job	  
(Simondon,	  1980,	  p.16).	  
	  
With	  the	  advent	  of	  industrial	  and	  information	  technology,	  humans	  are	  not	  the	  only	  
self-­‐regulating	  technical	   individuals.	  A	  more	  organized	  division	  of	  labour	  and	  higher	  
levels	   of	   standardization	   emerged	   out	   of	   the	   ever-­‐growing	   speed	   of	   the	   industrial	  
production	   process.	   In	   Simondon’s	   view,	   the	   advent	   of	   industrial	   technical	  
ensembles	   entails	   the	   possibility	   of	  more	   autonomous	   technical	   individuals.	   Quite	  
probably,	   the	   quest	   for	   a	   mechanized	   assembly	   line	   emerged	   by	   observing	   the	  
workers	  perform	  the	  same	  tasks	  over	  and	  over	  again.	  Even	  before	  the	  pack-­‐houses	  
of	   Cincinnati,	   assembly	   lines	   were	   slowly	   being	   developed	   in	   grain-­‐milling	   and	   in	  
biscuit	   manufacturing	   by	   the	   British	   Navy,	   in	   which	   the	   grain	   or	   the	   baking	   trays	  
passed	  through	  most	  of	   the	  process	  without	  ever	   touching	  human	  hands	   (Giedion,	  
1948,	   p.	   125).	   This	   is	   why	   Simondon	   sees	   the	   emergence	   of	   an	   asymmetrical	  
relationship	  between	  man	  and	  machine,	  which	  leads	  to	  the	  cultural	  understanding	  of	  
machines	   as	   alienating	   and	   threatening	   man’s	   authenticity	   (Massumi,	   2009).	  
Moreover,	   technical	   elements	   drastically	   increase	   their	   degree	   of	   standardization	  
and	   while	   the	   early	   industrial	   machines	   still	   lacked	   in	   self-­‐regulation,	   the	   general	  
tendency	  was	   clear.	  One	   classic	   example	   is	   the	   Jacquard	  mechanical	   loom	  built	   in	  
1805	  (DeLanda,	  1989,	  p.155).	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  loom,	  instead	  of	  humans	  controlling	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every	  step	  of	  the	  process,	  a	  set	  of	  punch	  cards	  effectively	  regulated	  the	  operation	  of	  
looming.	   So	   the	   industrial	   tool-­‐bearing	   machine	   displaces	   humans	   and	   gradually	  
replaces	   them	   in	   their	   function	   as	   technical	   individuals	   maintaining	   technical	  
ensembles.	  In	  the	  industrial	  age:	  
	  
Man	  separated	  from	  his	  role	  as	  technical	  individual,	  from	  what	  is	  the	  essential	  
work	   of	   the	   artisan,	   can	   become	   either	   the	   organizer	   of	   the	   ensemble	   of	  
technical	   individuals	   or	   a	   helper	   for	   technical	   individuals	   (Simondon,	   1980,	  
p.68).	  
	  
In	  any	  case,	  Simondon’s	  account	  hinges	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  humans	  are	  gradually	  taken	  
out	  of	  the	  loop.	  In	  the	  industrial	  age	  this	  tendency	  is	  clear	  in	  the	  constant	  movement	  
towards	   standardization	   and	   automation,	   whereby	   tasks	   previously	   performed	   by	  
human	   beings	   are	   gradually	   integrated	   into	   the	   functioning	   of	   self-­‐regulating	  
machines.	  According	  to	  Simondon,	  this	  is	  a	  consequence	  of	  what	  he	  calls	  a	  mentality	  
of	   output,	   which	   acts	   as	   a	   constant	   pressure	   for	   technical	   ensembles.	   Simondon	  
gives	   the	   example	   of	   transportation	   technologies,	   which	   once	   integrated	   into	  
society,	   create	   a	   permanent	   demand	   for	   greater	   speed	   of	   movement.	   New	   and	  
faster	  modes	  of	  transportation	  do	  not	  exhaust	  this	  need,	  to	  the	  contrary:	  
	  
(…)	   there	   is	   a	   continuous	   dynamic	   evident	   in	   that	   when	   a	   new	   mode	   of	  
transport	  is	  introduced	  in	  a	  community	  it	  leads	  to	  the	  developed	  of	  a	  demand	  
for	   speed,	   which	   promotes	   the	   development	   of	   a	   more	   efficient	   mode	   of	  
transport:	  the	  first	  mode	  creates	  the	  functions	  and	  it	  inserts	  it	  into	  the	  overall	  
dynamic	  of	  the	  community’’37	  (Simondon,	  2013,	  p.342).	  
	  
That	  is	  to	  say,	  with	  every	  new	  technical	  capability,	  there	  is	  an	  immediate	  demand	  for	  
increased	   throughputs	   and	   efficiency.	   In	   many	   ways,	   standardization	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37	  Original	   French	   text:	   il	   subsiste	   une	   continue	  dynamique	  qui	   consiste	   en	   ce	   que	  
l’introduction	  dans	  la	  communauté	  du	  premier	  mode	  de	  transport	  a	  développe	  une	  
exigence	  de	  rapidité	  qui	  sert	  a	  promouvoir	  avec	  force	  le	  second	  mode:	  le	  premier	  a	  
crée	  la	  fonction	  et	  l’a	  insérée	  dans	  l’ensemble	  des	  dynamisme	  de	  la	  communauté’’.	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automation	   in	   technical	   ensembles	   is	   the	   equivalent	   of	   the	   tendency	   towards	  
concretization	   in	   the	   case	   of	   technical	   artefacts.	   Nevertheless,	   Simondon	   belief	   is	  
that	   technological	   progress	   can’t	   be	   fully	   understood	   simply	   as	   an	   increase	   in	  
standardization	  and	  automation.	   To	   the	   contrary,	   technical	   progress	   relates	   to	   the	  
capacity	  to	  retain	  a	  ‘’margin	  of	  indetermination’’	  which	  is	  the	  ‘’machine’s	  sensitivity	  
to	  outside	  information’’	  (MOET,	  p.4).	  	  This	  is	  precisely	  the	  reason	  why	  Simondon	  is	  a	  
great	  admirer	  of	  the	  modern	  information	  machines	  and	  the	  electronic	  networks,	  ICT,	  
etc.	  For	  him,	  technical	   individuations	  allow	  for	  a	  new	  technical	  culture	  and	  a	  novel	  
relationship	   between	   humans	   and	  machines,	   which	   would	   go	   beyond	   any	   kind	   of	  
alienation	  suffered	  by	  the	  displacement	  of	  the	  industrial	  age:	  
	  
Far	   from	   being	   the	   supervisor	   of	   a	   squad	   of	   [technical]	   slaves,	   man	   is	   the	  
permanent	  organizer	  of	  a	  society	  of	  technical	  objects	  which	  need	  him	  as	  much	  
as	  musicians	  in	  an	  orchestra	  need	  a	  conductor.	  (…)	  This	  is	  how	  man	  functions	  
as	   permanent	   inventor	   and	   coordinator	   of	   the	   machines	   around	   him.	   He	   is	  
among	  the	  machines	  that	  work	  with	  him	  (Simondon,	  1980,	  p.4).	  
	  
This	   is	  a	  clear	  example	  of	  Simondon’s	  optimism	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  benefits	  of	  modern	  
information	   technology.	   Rather	   than	   being	   the	   alienated	   appendix	   of	   industrial	  
technical	   ensembles,	   man	   becomes	   the	   one	   who	   modulates	   the	   margin	   of	  
indetermination	  of	   the	   technical	  ensembles	  of	   the	   information	  age	   (ICT	  networks),	  
making	   them	  more	   ‘’adaptable	   to	   the	   greatest	   possible	   exchange	  of	   information’’.	  
For	  Simondon,	  the	  information	  machines	  of	  the	  20th	  century	  allow	  for	  a	  new	  type	  of	  
technical	   ensemble	   characterized	   by	   distributed	   network	   architectures,	   quite	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Conclusions	  
	  
In	   this	   chapter	   we	   sketched	   a	   different	   understanding	   of	   complex	   machines,	  
according	  to	  the	  philosophy	  of	  Gilbert	  Simondon.	   In	  his	  work,	  he	  offers	  a	  narrative	  
that	   takes	  us	   from	  physical	   to	  biological	   and	   social	   and	   finally	   to	   the	   technological	  
systems.	   Drawing	   heavily	   from	   cybernetics,	   technology	   is	   not	   something	   that	   is	  
added	   on	   top	   of	   human	   social	   interaction,	   but	   it	   is	   part	   of	   a	   broader	   process	   of	  
change.	  Simondon	  does	  not	  use	  dichotomies	  such	  humans	  versus	  non-­‐humans,	  but	  
looks	  at	  machines	   following	   the	  model	  of	  cybernetics,	  as	   some	  sort	  of	   information	  
processing	   system.	   Therefore,	   both	   technical	   artifacts	   and	   humans	   are	   simply	  
component	  parts	  complex	  machines.	  What	  is	  important	  for	  Simondon	  is	  the	  function	  
performed	  by	  a	  given	  machine	  particularly	  when	  he	  focuses	  on	  complex	  structures	  
such	   as	   technical	   ensemble38	  (de	   Vries,	   2008).	  Most	   technical	   ensembles	   have	   the	  
function	   to	   produce	   specific	   technical	   artifacts	   that	   can	   be	   used	   and	   integrated	   in	  
other	  ensembles.	  Other	   technical	  ensembles	   such	  as	   communication	   systems	  have	  
the	  function	  to	  process	  information	  between	  groups	  of	  users.	  	  
	  
What	   is	   particularly	   interesting	   about	   Simondon’s	   account	   of	   machines	   is	   his	  
description	   of	   how	   humans	   are	   no	   longer	   the	   main	   components	   of	   technical	  
ensembles.	   For	   most	   of	   technical	   history,	   humans	   have	   been	   the	   dominant	  
component	  parts,	  but	  the	  advent	  of	  industrial	  and	  information	  machines	  means	  that	  
human	   beings	   are	   no	   longer	   the	   main	   technical	   individuals.	   In	   the	   context	   of	  
Simondon’s	   philosophy	   of	   technology,	   the	   most	   striking	   development	   of	   the	   past	  
two	  centuries	  is	  the	  advent	  of	  non-­‐human	  self-­‐regulation,	  that	  is	  to	  say	  the	  increased	  
autonomy	   of	   machines	   relative	   to	   human	   beings.	   In	   this	   sense,	   he	   argues	   for	   a	  
reversal	  of	   the	  standard	  account	  of	  alienation.	   In	   fact,	   for	  him,	  humans	  have	  been	  
the	   dominant	   technical	   individuals	   for	   too	   long,	   a	   transitory	   solution	   until	   self-­‐
regulating	  machines	  could	  be	  built.	  	  Any	  task	  or	  process	  (either	  physical	  of	  cognitive)	  
that	   lends	   itself	   to	   formalization	   and	   automation	   will	   likely	   be	   transferred	   to	   a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38	  The	   function	  of	  a	   forge	   is	   to	   refine	  and	  process	  metals,	   the	   function	  of	  a	  mining	  
complex	  is	  to	  extract	  minerals;	  the	  function	  of	  a	  stock	  exchange	  data	  warehouse	  is	  to	  
house	  the	  servers	  allowing	  the	  aggregation	  and	  matching	  of	  financial	  flows,	  etc.	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machine	  (Brynjolfsson	  and	  McAfee,	  2014).	  This	  is	  precisely	  why	  Simondon	  focuses	  on	  
modern	  information	  technology,	  as	  he	  believes	  they	  represent	  an	  important	  turning	  
point,	  the	  displacement	  of	  the	  dominant	  role	  of	  man	  within	  technical	  ensembles:	  
	  
The	   machine	   is	   superior	   to	   the	   human	   individual	   in	   terms	   of	   automation,	  
because	  it	  is	  more	  precise	  in	  its	  teleological	  mechanism,	  and	  is	  more	  stable	  in	  
its	  characteristics39	  (Simondon,	  2013,	  p.347).	  
	  
For	   most	   of	   human	   history,	   technical	   ensembles	   were	   based	   on	   human	   beings	  
performing	   various	   functions,	   which	   led	   to	   our	   traditional	   understanding	   of	  
technology	   as	   a	   tool	   and	   humans	   as	   tool	   bearers.	   But	   as	   technical	   objects	   move	  
towards	  more	  and	  more	  complex	  ensembles,	  from	  workshops	  to	  factories	  and	  global	  
electronic	  networks,	  this	  traditional	  point	  of	  view	  is	  put	  into	  question	  (Mills,	  2011).	  
In	   the	   industrial	   age,	   this	   tendency	   is	   clearly	   at	   work	   in	   the	   impressive	   march	  
towards	   standardization,	   such	  as	   the	   case	  of	  modern	  assembly	   lines.	   Similarly,	   the	  
20th	   century	   has	   seen	   an	   equally	   impressive	   tendency	   towards	   higher	   levels	   of	  
automation,	   whereby	   many	   cognitive	   processes	   performed	   by	   human	   beings	   can	  
now	  be	  codified	  and	  performed	  by	  computing	  machines	   (Kurzweil,	   1990;	  Kurzweil,	  
2005;	  Brynjolfsson	  and	  McAfee,	  2014).	  
	  
As	   we	   will	   see,	   one	   can	   look	   at	   long	   historical	   evolution	   of	   specific	   financial	  
mechanisms	  utilized	  in	  the	  processing	  financial	  transactions.	  Ancient	  machines	  were	  
composed	  of	  scribes	  and	  their	  clay	  tablets,	  writing	  and	  executing	  financial	  contacts	  
for	  the	  future	  delivery	  of	  grain	  or	  slaves	  (Swan,	  2000).	  Later	  on,	  different	  ensembles	  
of	   humans	   and	   technical	   artefacts	   emerged	   in	  medieval	   Europe.	  Brokers	   and	   their	  
accounting	   books	   intermediated	   the	   transfer	   of	   financial	   contracts	   such	   as	   bills	   of	  
exchange.	   More	   recently,	   in	   most	   stock	   markets,	   financial	   transactions	   are	  
intermediated	  by	  trading	  platforms.	  All	  of	  these	  were	  essentially	  systems	  developed	  
for	  processing	  information	  flows	  taking	  certain	  inputs	  from	  a	  group	  of	  users	  that	  are	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39	  Original	  French	  text:	   ‘’La	  machine	  est	  un	  automate	  supérieur	  a	   l’individu	  humain	  
en	   tant	   qu’automate,	   parce	   qu’elle	   est	   plus	   précise	   dans	   ses	   mécanismes	  
téléologiques,	  et	  plus	  stable	  sans	  ses	  caractéristiques’’	  (ILFI,	  p.347).	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processed	  and	   lead	  to	  certain	  outputs,	  such	  as	   the	  exchange	  of	   financial	  assets	   for	  
money	  and,	  among	  other	  things,	  the	  dissemination	  of	  price	  data.	  The	  actual	  way	  in	  
which	  this	  is	  done	  evolves	  over	  time	  and	  depends	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  contracts	  that	  
are	  traded,	  the	  technical	  capabilities	  of	  the	  day,	  the	  demands	  of	  the	  community	  of	  
users,	  various	  political	  and	  historical	  contingencies,	  etc.	  As	  we	  will	  see,	  it	  is	  certainly	  
possible	  to	  describe	  a	  common	  technical	  lineage	  from	  the	  traders	  of	  medieval	  coffee	  
houses,	  to	  the	  brokers	  on	  the	  floors	  of	  modern	  exchanges	  right	  up	  to	  contemporary	  
electronic	   trading	   platforms.	  Whether	   they	   are	   paper-­‐based	   or	   instantiated	   on	  
electronic	  circuitry,	   the	  common	  tread	  for	  all	  of	   these	  transaction	  machines	   is	   that	  
they	   essentially	   perform	   a	   precise	   set	   of	   operations	   relative	   to	   the	   processing	   of	  
transactions.	   In	   the	   next	   chapter	   we	   will	   review	   Philip	   Mirowski’s	   computational	  
evolutionary	   economics,	   which	   offers	   a	   deeper	   understanding	   of	   the	   precise	  
operations	   and	   algorithmic	   designs	   of	   markets,	   allowing	   us	   to	   fully	   develop	   our	  
understanding	  of	  transaction	  machines.	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In	   the	   previous	   chapter	  we	   reviewed	   Simondon’s	   Philosophy	   of	   technology	   and	   his	  
account	  of	  complex	  machines,	  or	  technical	  ensembles.	  In	  this	  chapter	  we	  will	  turn	  to	  
Philip	   Mirowski’s	   evolutionary	   computational	   economics	   and	   his	   theory	   of	  
markomata,	   where	   markets	   are	   understood	   as	   machines	   for	   the	   processing	   of	  
transactions.	  In	  this	  context,	  Mirowski	  proposes	  the	  notion	  of	  markomata	  (markets	  +	  
automata)	   understood	   as	   forms	   of	   computation.	   For	   him,	   markomata	   function	  
according	   to	   algorithmic	   processes,	   by	   accepting	   a	   series	   of	   inputs	   (bids/asks)	   and	  
producing	  a	  set	  of	  outputs	   (prices	  and	  quantities).	  He	  suggests	  a	  different	   research	  
direction	  for	  economic	  theory,	  namely	  the	  exploration	  of	  the	  wide	  diversity	  of	  market	  
structures,	   rather	  than	  remaining	  fixated	  on	  the	  agency	  of	   individual	  agents.	   In	  the	  
context	  of	  his	   theory	  of	  markomata,	   this	   entails	  modelling	   the	  diversity	  of	  possible	  
markets	   structures,	   by	   using	   the	   theory	   of	   automata	   and	   a	   particular	   account	   of	  
evolution.	  Moreover,	  he	   looks	  as	   specific	  market	  designs	  as	   computational	   systems	  
evolving	   in	  an	  environment	  made	  up	  of	  different	  human	  societies	  and	  cultures.	  The	  
evolutionary	   units	   are	   the	   different	   market	   designs,	   while	   human	   societies	   would	  
have	   a	   similar	   function	   to	   environmental	   pressures.	   In	   this	   sense,	   according	   to	  
Mirowski,	   the	   theory	   of	  markomata	   opens	   up	   the	   possibility	   of	   a	   different	   type	   of	  
evolutionary	  economics,	  in	  that	  it	  describes	  both	  processes	  of	  variation	  and	  selection	  
as	  well	  as	  the	  mechanism	  for	  inheritance.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  markomata,	  reproduction	  is	  
achieved	  when	  a	  new	  design	  is	  invented	  and	  developed	  that	  simulates	  the	  operations	  
of	   more	   simple	   markomata.	   Variation	   is	   inherent	   as	   new	   designs	   of	   different	  
computational	   power,	   with	   different	   aims	   and	   rules	   constantly	   emerge.	   All	   of	   this	  
opens	  up	  economic	  theory	  to	  the	  study	  of	  the	  rich	  and	  evolving	  landscape	  of	  market	  
designs	   and	   moves	   away	   from	   the	   century	   old	   tendency	   to	   focus	   on	   utility	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3.1	  Mirowski	  and	  Unorthodox	  Economics	  
 
	  
We	   will	   dedicate	   this	   chapter	   to	   the	   work	   of	   Philip	   Mirowski,	   particularly	   his	  
computational	   evolutionary	   economics	   and	   his	   theory	   of	  markomata.	   One	  way	   to	  
approach	   his	   work	   is	   by	   positioning	   it	   in	   relation	   to	   certain	   heterodox	   economic	  
theories,	   such	   as	   evolutionary	   and	   bio/ecological	   economics,	   as	   well	   as	   by	  
highlighting	  the	  influence	  of	  cybernetics	  and	  the	  theory	  of	  computation.	  While	  he	  is	  
usually	   referenced	   in	   relation	   to	   his	   work	   on	   neoliberalism	   and	   the	   history	   of	  
economic	   thought,	   he	   dedicated	   his	   first	   major	   book	   More	   Heat	   than	   Light	  
(Mirowski,	  1989)	  to	  Thorstein	  Veblen	  and	  Nicholas	  Georgescu-­‐Roegen,	  calling	  them	  
‘’the	   most	   profound	   economic	   philosophers	   of	   the	   20th	   century’’.	   While	  
evolutionary	   economics	   has	   its	   roots	   in	   the	   likes	   of	   Thorstein	   Veblen	   and	   Joseph	  
Schumpeter,	   bio/ecological	   economics	   is	   hugely	   indebted	   to	   the	  work	   of	   Nicholas	  
Georgescu-­‐Roegen	  and	  Keneth	  Boulding,	  Both	  strands	  of	  economic	  theory	  find	  there	  
underpinnings	   in	   the	  assertion	   that	   the	   science	  of	  economics	  needs	   to	  open	  up	   to	  
other	  disciplines,	  with	  particular	   interest	   for	  ecology,	  biology,	  thermodynamics	  and	  
history,	  among	  others.	  	  	  
	  
For	  instance,	  bio/ecological	  economics	  represents	  a	  particularly	  insightful	  critique	  of	  
the	  economic	  orthodoxy,	  which	  has	  traditionally	  modelled	  the	  economic	  process	  as	  
the	   allocation	   of	   given	  means	   in	   order	   to	   satisfy	   given	   needs	   (Lionel	   Robbins).	   As	  
Georgescu-­‐Roegen	   argues,	   at	   the	   core	   of	   this	   microeconomics	   is	   a	   principle	   of	  
conservation	   (given	   means),	   a	   maximization	   rule	   (optimal	   satisfaction)	   and	   an	  
economic	   agent	   that	   is	   essentially	   self-­‐interested.	   In	   this	   static	  world,	   nothing	   can	  
ever	  change	  because	  everything	   is	  already	  given,	  fully	   individuated.	  This	  mechanics	  
of	  utility	  and	  self-­‐interest	  and	  the	  postulate	  of	  a	  static	  state	  of	  equilibrium	  seem	  to	  
leave	   no	   space	   for	   change	   and	   the	   emergence	   of	   novelty.	   The	   economy	   is	   thus	   a	  
‘’self-­‐contained	   and	   ahistorical	   process’’	   (Georgescu-­‐Roegen,	   1971,	   p.	   2).	   Thus	  
bio/ecological	   economics	   makes	   substantial	   use	   of	   notions	   of	   qualitative	   change,	  
understanding	   the	   economic	   process	   as	   an	   emergent	   phenomenon,	   or	   in	   other	  
words	   as	   a	   whole	   that	   is	   more	   than	   the	   sum	   of	   its	   parts.	   Similar	   to	   chemical	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compounds,	   which	   have	   properties	   not	   exhibited	   by	   its	   elements	   in	   isolation,	  
economic	  ‘compounds’	  like	  markets	  or	  firms	  are	  constantly	  undergoing	  a	  process	  of	  
qualitative	  change	  (Backhaus	  and	  Drechsler,	  2006).	  This	  perspective	  is	  quite	  different	  
from	  the	  standard	  account.	  As	  Herman	  Gossen	  argued	   in	  the	  19th	  century,	  humans	  
can	  act	  upon	  the	  environment	  only	  by	  causing	  motion,	  which	  reflected	  the	  influence	  
of	   filed	   of	   physics	   for	   economic	   theory	   (Gossen,	   1983,	   p.	   40).	   In	   this	   sense,	  
neoclassical	  economics	  cannot	  deal	  with	  irreversibility	  (Faber,	  2008,	  p.	  4)	  and	  relies	  
on	  a	  notion	  of	   linear	  reversible	  transformation	  (locomotion),	   in	  which	  there	  are	  no	  
emergent	   properties.	   In	   fact,	   the	   inability	   to	   deal	   with	   irreversibility	   is	   why	  
mainstream	  economics	  has	  been	   less	   successful	   in	   accounting	   for	   real	  novelty	   and	  
emergent	  properties	  (Dosi	  and	  Metcalfe,	  1991).	  	  
	  
While	   mainstream	   economics	   relies	   heavily	   on	   reversible	   principles,	   ecological	  
economics	  is	  tied	  to	  thermodynamics,	  which	  was	  arguably	  the	  first	  serious	  scientific	  
challenge	   to	   classical	   physics.	   Focusing	   on	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   2nd	   law	   of	  
thermodynamics,	   Georgescu-­‐Roegen	   developed	   his	   economic	   theory	   around	   the	  
concept	  of	  entropy.	  His	  famous	  statement	  that	  the	  ‘’entropy	  law	  is	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  
economy	   of	   life	   at	   all	   levels’’	   (Georgescu-­‐Roegen,	   1971,	   p.	   4)	   won	   him	   both	   his	  
notoriety	  and	  also	  led	  to	  his	  isolation	  within	  the	  academic	  community.	  Writing	  in	  the	  
turbulent	   1970’s,	   it	   became	   apparent	   to	   him	   that	   mainstream	   economic	   theory	  
could	  not	  provide	  an	  adequate	  solution	  for	  addressing	  the	  huge	  task	  of	  Third	  World	  
underdevelopment,	   depletion	   of	   natural	   resources,	   increasing	   pollution,	   etc.	  
(Georgescu-­‐Roegen	   et	   al.,	   1999).	   In	   his	   attempt	   to	   deal	   with	   these	   issues,	   he	  
recognized	   that	   the	  main	   barrier	  was	   economic	   theory’s	   reliance	   on	   an	   out-­‐dated	  
model	  of	  physics.	  In	  this	  sense,	  he	  advocated	  for	  the	  usefulness	  of	  thermodynamics	  
whose	   2nd	   law	   would	   offer	   a	   much	   more	   fruitful	   theoretical	   foundation	   for	  
economics.	   What	   was	   particularly	   appealing	   in	   this	   law	   was	   that	   it	   offered	   an	  
understanding	  of	  change	  that	  was	  irreversible	  and,	  as	  he	  put	  it,	  irrevocable.	  Contrary	  
to	  Newtonian	  mechanics,	  which	  understood	  change	  as	   locomotion,	  as	  a	   substance	  
that	  stays	  the	  same	  trough	  time	  and	  space,	  entropy	  allows	  for	  qualitative	  change	  in	  
which	  time	  and	  space	  are	  not	  independent	  variables.	  For	  if	  the	  entropy	  law	  operates	  
at	  all	  levels,	  then	  one	  can	  understand	  the	  economic	  process	  as	  a	  continual	  exchange	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between	  low	  and	  high	  entropy.	  No	  matter	  how	  important	  these	  questions	  might	  be,	  
energy	  exchange	  and	  entropic	  degradation	  cannot	   fully	  account	   for	   the	  complexity	  
of	  economic	  and	  social	  phenomena.	   It	  was	  Georgescu-­‐Roegen	  himself	   that	  warned	  
of	   the	   futility	   of	   trying	   to	   describe	   the	   economic	   process	   by	   a	   system	   of	  
thermodynamic	   equations	   (Georgescu-­‐Roegen,	   1975).	   In	   other	   words,	   there	   is	   no	  
point	   in	   replacing	   a	   mechanistic	   dogma	   with	   an	   energetic	   one.	   Nevertheless,	  
bio/ecological	   economics	   have	   had	   an	   important	   contribution	   in	   modeling	   the	  
relationship	   between	   the	   economy	   and	   the	   wider	   ecology,	   issue	   of	   sustainable	  
development,	  incorporating	  environmental	  aspects	  into	  a	  different	  understanding	  of	  
welfare	   (Costanza	   and	   O'Neill,	   1996).	   Moreover,	   Georgescu-­‐Roegen’s	   work	   has	  
proved	   influential	   for	   many	   economists	   including	   the	   likes	   of	   Philip	   Mirowski,	  
particularly	   in	   terms	   of	   highlighting	   the	   importance	   of	   having	   an	   interdisciplinary	  
perspective.	  As	  we	  noted	  earlier,	  Mirowski’s	  first	  major	  work,	  More	  Heat	  Than	  Light	  
(1989),	  was	  dedicated	   to	  Georgescu-­‐Roegen,	   and	   is	   a	  detailed	   analysis	   of	   how	   the	  
framework	   of	   19th	   century	   physics	   and	   was	   literally	   imported	   into	   neoclassical	  
economics.	  While	  Georgescu-­‐Roegen	  equated	  19th	  century	  physics	  with	  Newtonian	  
mechanics,	  Mirowski	   focuses	  on	   the	   impact	  of	   the	  1st	   law	  of	   thermodynamics,	   the	  
famous	  conservation	  principle.	   In	  this	  sense,	  he	  argues	  that	  neoclassical	  economics	  
did	   not	   solely	   rely	   on	   mechanics	   but	   also	   leveraged	   the	   early	   version	   of	  
thermodynamics,	  namely	  the	  so-­‐called	  energy	  physics	  of	  conservation:	  
	  
The	  physics	  of	  the	  day	  [19th	  century],	  much	  admired	  by	  economists,	  assigned	  a	  
central	   role	   to	   the	   conservation	   of	   energy.	   Potential	   energy	   could	   be	  
represented	  as	  a	  vector	  field,	  indicating	  the	  direction	  in	  which	  particles	  would	  
move	   unless	   constrained	   by	   other	   forces.	   The	   economic	   analogy	   treated	  
individuals	   as	   particles	   moving	   in	   commodity	   space,	   where	   the	   spatial	  
coordinates	  are	  quantities	  of	  different	  commodities	  (Ackerman,	  2002,	  p.129).	  
	  
Mirowski	   thus	   corrects	   Georgescu-­‐Roegen	   and	   reworks	   his	   account	   of	   the	  
relationship	  between	  physics	  and	  economics.	  The	  marginalist	  economists	  of	  the	  19th	  
century	  were	  very	  much	  attracted	  by	  notions	  of	  equilibrium,	  conservation	  of	  energy	  
(Pilkington	  and	  Mirowski,	  2013,	  p.341)	  motivated	  by	   the	  desire	   to	  attain	   the	   same	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scientific	   status	   as	   the	  natural	   sciences.	   It	   is	   not	   so	  much	   that	   economists	   ignored	  
thermodynamics,	   but	   that	   they	   adopted	  what	   suited	   them	  most,	   namely	   the	   very	  
important	  point	  about	  the	  conservation	  of	  energy.	  In	  a	  certain	  sense,	  they	  were	  very	  
selective	   with	   what	   they	   took	   both	   from	   physics	   and	  mathematics.	  Moreover,	   he	  
demonstrates	  how	  these	  theoretical	  imports	  were	  done	  without	  fully	  understanding	  
the	  mathematics	  behind	   it,	  which	  has	   consequences	   for	   economic	   theory,	   even	   to	  
this	  day.	  
	  
It	  would	  also	  be	  interesting	  to	  address	  the	  importance	  of	  evolutionary	  economics	  for	  
Mirowski’s	   work.	   Evolution	   first	   entered	   the	   realm	   of	   economics	   in	   1898	   with	  
Thorstein	   Veblen	   (Veblen,	   1898;	   Geoffrey	   Hodgson,	   1998)	   who	  was	   influenced	   by	  
the	   biology	   and	   sociology	   of	   his	   time,	   and	   was	   critical	   of	   the	   assumptions	   of	  
neoclassical	   economics.	   Moreover,	   he	   argued	   for	   the	   necessity	   of	   evolutionary	  
explanations	   for	   economic	   behaviour.	   Alfred	   Marshall	   is	   also	   sometimes	   credited	  
with	   being	   a	   proto-­‐evolutionary	   economist,	   but	   mostly	   because	   of	   his	   famous	  
statement	   that	   biology	   and	   not	   mechanics	   will	   turn	   out	   to	   be	   the	   Mecca	   of	  
economists	   (Hodgson,	   1993).	   More	   recently,	   it	   was	   Kenneth	   Boulding’s	   book	  
Evolutionary	   Economics	   (1981)	   that	   helped	   popularize	   the	   term	   (Hodgson	   2010).	  
Another	   crucial	   turning	   point	   towards	   and	   evolutionary	   theory	   of	   economics	   was	  
Nelson	  and	  Winter’s	  work	  An	  Evolutionary	  Theory	  of	  Economic	  Change	  (Nelson	  and	  
Winter,	  1982).	  Their	  work	  is	  still	  considered	  as	  the	  foremost	  reference	  for	  the	  field,	  
as	   they	   relied	   heavily	   on	   biological	   analogies	   and	   saw	   themselves	   as	   neo-­‐
Schumpeterian.	   What	   is	   intriguing	   is	   that	   Schumpeter	   himself	   rejected	   biological	  
analogies	   and	   only	   thought	   about	   evolution	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   a	   general	   process	   of	  
change,	   what	   he	   calls	   ‘’development’’	   in	   the	   context	   of	   his	   theory	   of	   creative	  
destruction	   (Schumpeter,	   1983;	   Metcalfe,	   1998;	   Shionoya	   and	   Nishizawa,	   2008).	  
Some	  of	  the	  more	  recent	  work	  in	  evolutionary	  economics	  has	  focused	  on	  a	  general	  
understanding	   of	   evolution,	   going	   beyond	   biology	   towards	   a	   broader	   perspective	  
(Hodgson	  1993,	  2003;	  Hodgson	  and	  Knudsen,	  2006a).	  It	  goes	  beyond	  the	  compounds	  
of	  biology	  towards	  the	  more	  general	  notion	  of	  Universal	  Darwinism,	  first	  introduced	  
by	  Dawkins	  (1983).	  Universal	  Darwinism	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  an	  account	  of	  the	  way	  
in	  which	   complex	   systems	   evolve,	   according	   to	   the	   process	   or	   variation-­‐selection-­‐
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retention40.	   But	   in	   each	   domain	   of	   applicability,	   the	   procedure	   or	   algorithm	   of	  
variation-­‐selection-­‐retention	   is	   deployed	   is	   very	   different	   ways.	   In	   this	   sense,	  
evolutionary	  economists	  such	  as	  Geoffrey	  Hodgson	  and	  Stanley	  Metcalfe	  (Hodgson,	  
2002)	  make	  an	  argument	  for	  a	  notion	  of	  evolutionary	  logic,	  which	  helps	  account	  for	  
change	   in	   all	   complex	   systems	   (equally	   applicable	   in	   biology,	   sociology	   or	  
economics):	  
	  
Nothing	  I	  have	  said	  is	  intrinsically	  a	  matter	  of	  biological	  analogy,	  it	  is	  a	  matter	  
of	  evolutionary	   logic.	  Evolutionary	  theory	   is	  a	  manner	  of	  reasoning	   in	   its	  own	  
right	  quite	  independently	  of	  the	  use	  made	  of	   it	  by	  biologists.	  They	  simply	  got	  
there	  first	  (Metcalfe,	  1998,	  p.36).	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  
Ulrich	  Witt	  is	  an	  evolutionary	  economist	  who	  has	  taken	  more	  nuanced	  view	  with	  his	  
‘’continuity	   hypothesis’’	   (Witt,	   2003).	   According	   to	   him,	   social	   and	   economic	  
evolution	  is	  very	  much	  embedded	  and	  constrained	  by	  biological	  evolution.	  He	  makes	  
clear	  that	  the	  processes	  by	  which	  evolution	  operates	  in	  nature	  and	  society	  are	  very	  
different.	   Moreover,	   he	   is	   very	   sceptical	   about	   the	   merits	   of	   using	   biological	  
analogies	   and	   trying	   to	   find	   the	   equivalent	   of	   genes	   in	   the	   world	   of	   business.	   He	  
considers	   the	   direct	   translation	   of	   natural	   selection	   into	   the	   economic	   realm	   as	  
metaphorical	   and	  with	   limited	   use	   (Witt,	   1999;	   Geoffrey	  Hodgson,	   2002;	   Geoffrey	  
Hodgson	   and	   Knudsen,	   2010)(Witt,	   1999,	   p.24).	   John	   Foster	   (1997)	   has	   also	  
proposed	  a	  critique	  of	  the	  use	  of	  Darwinian	  analogies,	  and	  suggests	  the	  adoption	  of	  
the	  theory	  of	  self-­‐organization	  as	  an	  alternative.	  Another	  approach	  that	  is	  intimately	  
tied	  with	  Universal	  Darwinism	  is	  the	  research	  done	  in	  Complexity	  Economics.	  One	  if	  
its	   best	   know	   proponents	   is	   Beinhocker,	   who	   rejects	   any	   accusation	   of	   analogical	  
thinking	  and	  argues	   that	  evolution	   is	   the	  execution	  of	   an	  algorithm,	  as	   continuous	  
unfolding	   of	   the	   process	   of	   variation-­‐selection-­‐retention.	   In	   Beinhocker’s	   account,	  
social	  and	  economic	  evolution	  is	  a:	  	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40	  One	  can	  also	  think	  here	  of	  the	  philosophy	  of	  Charles	  Sanders	  Peirce	  (1898),	  who	  
speculated	  that	  the	  laws	  of	  nature	  themselves	  were	  subject	  to	  evolution.	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(…)	   process	   of	   sifting	   from	   an	   enormous	   space	   of	   possibilities…There	   is	   no	  
foresight,	  no	  planning,	  no	  rationality,	  and	  no	  conscious	  design.	  There	  is	  just	  the	  
mindless	  grinding	  out	  of	  the	  algorithm	  (Beinhocker,	  2007,	  p.198).	  
	  
While	   it	   has	   provided	   numerous	   insights	   into	   the	   workings	   of	   the	   economy,	  
evolutionary	   economics	   has	   often	   been	   criticized	   for	   the	   use	   of	   analogies	   and	  
metaphors.	  For	  instance,	  Nelson	  and	  Winter’s	  reliance	  on	  routines	  as	  possible	  units	  
of	  selection	  has	  been	  the	  target	  of	  ample	  criticism	  (Geoffrey	  Hodgson,	  2003).	  Other	  
questions	  arise	  on	   the	   topic	  of	   reproduction	  and	   inheritance.	  Namely	   in	  what	  way	  
can	  it	  be	  said	  that	  firms	  transmits	  genetic	  material	  to	  the	  next	  generation?	  	  	  
	  
As	  we	  will	  see,	  while	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  say	  that	  Mirowski	  is	  an	  evolutionary	  economist,	  
he	  is	  however	  influenced	  by	  this	  body	  of	  literature.	  Rather	  than	  focusing	  on	  routines	  
or	   business	   plans	   as	   the	   unit	   of	   selection,	   Mirowski	   looks	   at	   the	   institutional	  
framework	   of	   markets	   as	   the	   units	   of	   evolution.	   In	   his	   account,	   markets	   evolve	  
through	   time	   under	   the	   selective	   pressure	   of	   human	   societies	   and	   their	   material,	  
historical	  and	  cultural	  specificities.	  We	  will	  elaborate	  on	  his	  perspective	   in	  the	  next	  
section,	   different	   to	  most	   ecological	   economists	   his	   understanding	   of	   evolution	   is	  
indebted	  to	  John	  von	  Neumann	  rather	  than	  Darwin.	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3.2	  John	  von	  Neumann’s	  Theory	  of	  Automata	  
	  
As	  will	   see,	  Mirowski’s	   theory	   of	  markets	   as	   computational	   systems	   draws	   heavily	  
from	   von	   Neumann’s	   theory	   of	   automata	   (Mirowski	   and	   Somefun,	   1998b),	  
positioning	  information	  theory	  and	  computation	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  a	  different	  theory	  
of	  evolution.	  John	  von	  Neumann	  was	  a	  well-­‐known	  pioneer	  in	  many	  scientific	  fields,	  
including	   applied	   mathematics,	   and	   is	   the	   founder	   of	   what	   today	   is	   called	   game	  
theory,	   which	   of	   course	   had	   a	   profound	   effect	   on	   20th	   century	   economics.	  
Consequently,	   he	   is	   also	   one	   of	   the	   central	   figures	   of	   Mirowski’s	   book	  Machine	  
Dreams	  (2002),	  as	  the	  genius	  whose	  impact	  on	  economics,	  and	  other	  fields,	  has	  not	  
yet	  been	  fully	  realized.	  For	  the	  purpose	  of	  our	  topic,	  he	  is	  interesting	  for	  this	  theory	  
of	  cellular	  automata	  and	   the	  universal	  constructor.	   In	  a	  paper	  published	  as	  part	  of	  
the	  Hixton	  Symposium	  held	  in	  Pasadena	  in	  1948,	  he	  describes	  the	  basic	  blueprint	  of	  
a	  machine	  capable	  of	  self-­‐reproduction	  (von	  Neumann,	  1951).	  In	  another	  paper	  from	  
1966	   called	   the	   Theory	   of	   Self-­‐Reproducing	   Automata	   (von	   Neumann	   and	   Burks,	  
1966)	  he	  spells	  out	  the	  details	  of	  self-­‐replicating	  automata	  including:	  	  
	  
The	  functional	  part	  of	  the	  automaton;	  a	  decoding	  section	  which	  actually	  takes	  
a	   tape,	   reads	   the	   instructions	   and	   builds	   the	   automaton;	   and	   a	   device	   that	  
takes	   a	   copy	   of	   this	   tape	   and	   inserts	   it	   into	   the	   new	   automaton	   (Istrail	   and	  
Marcus,	  2012,	  p.7)	  
	  
He	  also	  formulated	  an	  abstract	  model	  of	  this	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  cellular	  automaton,	  
following	   a	   suggestion	   by	   his	   colleague	   Stanislaw	   Ulam.	   It	   consisted	   of	   a	   two	  
dimensional	  structure	  made	  up	  of	  discrete	  cells.	   	   In	  the	  Theory	  of	  Self-­‐Reproducing	  
Automata,	  each	  cell	  has	  29	  possible	  states	  and	  a	  set	  of	  predefined	  rules	  for	  switching	  
between	  states.	  The	  states	  could	  only	  change	  at	  specific	  time	  interval,	  depending	  on	  
the	   cells	  own	   state	  and	   that	  of	   its	  neighbouring	   cells.	  After	  enough	   time	   intervals,	  
even	   the	   simplest	   rules	   can	   lead	   to	   more	   and	   more	   complex	   patterns.	   Cellular	  
Automata	  have	  been	  popularized	  in	  such	  applications	  such	  as	  The	  Game	  of	  Life,	  but	  
they	  have	  proved	  particularly	  useful	  for	  research	  in	  the	  areas	  of	  urban	  growth,	  land	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use,	  soil	  erosion,	  etc.	  While	  Von	  Neumann’s	  initial	  goal	  was	  to	  understand	  and	  study	  
the	   possibility	   of	   self-­‐replication	   in	   general,	   understood	   as	   the	   emergence	   of	  
increasingly	   more	   complex	   patterns	   from	   the	   iteration	   of	   relatively	   simple	   rules.	  
While	   gaining	   a	   complete	   understanding	   of	   replication	   in	   nature	   could	   be	   very	  
difficult,	   he	   believed	   that	   we	   might	   have	   a	   better	   chance	   of	   understanding	   self-­‐
replication	   in	   the	   case	   of	   computational	   automata	   (von	   Neumann,	   1951).	   In	   any	  
case,	   without	   being	   able	   to	   do	   justice	   to	   von	   Neumann’s	   ground	   breaking	  
contribution,	   it	   can	   be	   said	   that	   his	   theory	   of	   automata,	   founded	   on	   Shannon’s	  
concept	   of	   information	   and	   Turing’s	   notion	   of	   computation,	   was	   a	   way	   to	  
understand	  any	  ‘’information-­‐processing	  mechanism	  which	  exhibited	  self-­‐regulation	  
in	  interaction	  with	  the	  environment’’	  (Mirowski	  and	  Somefun,	  1998b).	  Moreover,	  it	  
represents	   a	   very	   interesting	   way	   to	   approach	   questions	   of	   complexity	   and	  
evolution.	   Lower-­‐level	   interactions	   lead	   to	   higher-­‐level	   patterns,	   which	   are	   more	  
complex	  than	  anything	  at	  the	  lower-­‐levels.	  	  	  
	  
John	   von	   Neumann	   invented	   the	   theory	   of	   automata	   not	   to	   provide	   a	  
pedagogical	   basis	   for	   ‘computer	   science’	   (which	   is	   the	  position	   it	   occupies	   in	  
contemporary	  textbooks),	  but	  rather	  to	  formalize	  a	  notion	  of	  evolution	  where	  
abstract	   logical	   entities,	   in	   the	   process	   of	   replicating	   copies	   of	   themselves,	  
might	   be	   able	   to	   produce	   offspring	   of	   greater	   computational	   capacity	   than	  
they	  themselves	  possessed	  (Mirowski,	  2007,	  p.230).	  
	  
Nevertheless,	   von	   Neumann	   did	   not	   leave	   us	   with	   a	   fully	   developed	   theory	   of	  
automata,	  as	  many	  important	  questions	  are	  still	  left	  unanswered	  such	  as:	  when	  can	  
it	   be	   said	   that	   one	   automaton	   produced	   another	  more	   evolved	   version	   of	   greater	  
computational	   complexity?	   (Mirowski,	   2002,	   p.536).	   For	   example,	   the	   finite	  
automata	   (also	   known	  as	  a	   finite	   state	  machine)	   can	  be	   seen	  as	   the	  basic	   layer	  of	  
abstract	  machines.	   It	   consists	  of	  an	  alphabet	  or	   inputs,	  a	   set	  of	   states,	  a	   transition	  
function,	  an	   initial	  state	  and	  a	  halting	  condition.	  This	  machine	  has	  no	  real	  memory	  
capacity,	  as	  it	  only	  reads	  a	  tape	  containing	  a	  string	  of	  symbols.	  It	  reads	  each	  symbol	  
and	  either	  accepts	  or	   rejects	   it,	   and	   is	   in	   this	   sense,	  a	   simple	   language	   recognition	  
device	  (Mirowski	  2007,	  p.25).	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In	   trying	   to	   adapt	   this	   perspective	   to	   his	   theory	   of	  markets,	  Mirowski	   draws	   from	  
Chomsky’s	  work	  on	  the	  hierarchy	  of	  generative	  languages41	  (Chomsky,	  1957).	  In	  this	  
sense,	   one	   can	   understand	   complexity	   in	   computation	   along	   Chomsky’s	   scale	   of	  
language	   recognition:	   finite	   automata	   (regular	   grammar),	   pushdown	   automata	  
(context-­‐free	   grammar),	   linear	   bounded	   memory	   automata	   (context	   sensitive	  
language),	   and,	   at	   the	   top	   of	   the	   hierarchy,	   the	   Turing	   machine	   (recursively	  




Recognizes	  languages	   Memory	   Markets	  
Finite	   Regular	   None	   Posted-­‐price	  
Pushdown	   Context-­‐free	   Pushdown	  stack	   Sealed	  bid	  
Linear	  bounded	   Context	  sensitive	   Finite	  tape	   Double	  auction	  
Turing	  Machine	   Recursively	  
enumerable	  
Infinite	  tape	   None	  
Figure	  2:	  Hierarchy	  of	  market	  complexity	  	  
(Mirowski,	  2007,	  p25)	  
	  
The	   table	   above	   illustrates	  Mirowski	   understating	   of	   the	   increasing	   complexity	   of	  
different	   ‘generations’	   of	   market	   designs.	   Firstly,	   a	   posted-­‐price	   market	   would	  
qualify	   as	   finite	   automata	   as	   it	   does	   not	   require	   memory,	   only	   the	   capacity	   to	  
recognize	  symbols	  and	  accept	  or	  reject.	  As	  Mirowski	  explains	  it:	  
	  
A	  single	  unit	  of	  the	  commodity	  is	  offered	  at	  a	  single	  price,	  where	  the	  alphabet	  
concerned	   is	   the	   rational	   numbers;	   order	   execution	   either	   matches	   that	  
number	  as	  bid	  by	  the	  purchaser,	  or	  is	  rejected	  (Mirowski,	  2007,	  p.25)	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41	  In	  his	  1955	  thesis	  and	  later	  in	  Syntactic	  Structures	  (1957),	  Noam	  Chomsky	  studied	  
the	   capacity	   for	   language	   acquisition	   in	   humans.	   His	   famous	   hierarchy	   of	   formal	  
grammars	  is	  a	  classification	  based	  on	  their	  generative	  power.	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The	   next	   layer	   of	   complexity	   would	   be	   sealed-­‐bid	   auction,	   which	   need	   memory	  
capacity	  in	  order	  to	  compare	  any	  new	  bid	  with	  previously	  recorded	  bids.	  In	  this	  type	  
of	  market,	  the	  seller	  has	  a	  minimum	  ask,	  and	  the	  machine	  would	  halt	  only	  when	  the	  
bids	  are	  higher	  than	  the	  minimum	  ask	  (Mirowski	  and	  Somefun,	  1998a).	  This	  second	  
design	   could	   be	   modelled	   as	   pushdown	   automata	   with	   two	   stacks,	   one	   for	   the	  
submitted	  bids	  and	  one	  for	  the	  minimum	  ask.	  	  Going	  up	  on	  the	  ladder	  of	  complexity,	  
a	   two-­‐sided	   auction	   requires	   even	  more	  memory	   capacity,	  which	   is	  why	  Mirowski	  
sees	  it	  as	  a	  good	  example	  of	  a	  linear	  bounded	  automata.	  Similar	  to	  a	  Turing	  Machine,	  
the	   linear	   bounded	   automata	   can	   read	   the	   symbols	   on	   the	   tape	   and	  write	   on	   the	  
cells,	   but	   it	   differs	   in	   that	   it	   the	   tape	   is	   not	   infinite	   (Mirowski,	   2007).	   Elsewhere,	  
Mirowski	   shows	   how	   it	   is	   possible	   to	  model	   a	   double-­‐sided	   auction	   as	   pushdown	  
automata	  with	  3	  or	  4	  stacks	  (Mirowski,	  2002,	  1998).	  
	  
While	   this	   initial	   approach	   is	   very	   interesting,	   the	   auction	   algorithm	   by	   which	  
transaction	   can	   be	   matched	   is	   only	   one	   of	   the	   many	   functions	   performed	   by	  
markets.	  As	  Mirowski	  admits,	  even	  the	  most	  simple	  fixed-­‐price	  posted-­‐offer	  market	  
performs	   a	   number	   of	   different	   functions,	   in	   addition	   to	   matching.	   This	   would	  
include	   record	   keeping,	   price	   dissemination,	   etc.	   	   In	   other	   words,	   constructing	   a	  
more	  complete	  model	  of	  such	  a	  market	  would	  entail	  a	  more	  detailed	  understanding	  
of	   the	   way	   different	   market	   functions	   evolve.	   Consequently,	   the	   theory	   of	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3.3	  Market	  Ecology	  
	  
One	  of	  Mirowki’s	  most	  interesting	  assertions	  is	  that	  markets	  are	  systems	  exhibiting	  a	  
substantial	  diversity	  of	  possible	  designs.	  In	  this	  context,	  an	  auction	  refers	  to	  the	  way	  
in	  which	  the	  matching	  function	  of	  the	  market	   is	  performed.	  Most	  accounts	  tend	  to	  
reference	   the	   initial	  emergence	  of	  auctions	   in	  ancient	  Babylon,	   in	   relation	   to	   slave	  
trade	   (Swan,	   2000).	   Throughout	   history,	   different	   matching	  mechanisms	   emerged	  
for	   the	   purpose	   of	   transacting	   slaves,	   tulips,	   physical	   commodities,	   art	  works,	   and	  
are	   still	   an	   important	   part	   of	   contemporary	   commerce,	   such	   as	   the	   web-­‐based	  
platform	   eBay.	   In	   all	   of	   these	   cases,	   the	   auction	   mechanism	   is	   crucial	   because	   it	  
provides	  the	  algorithmic	  blueprint	  for	  the	  matching	  of	  buyers	  or	  sellers.	  Because	  of	  
the	  diversity	  of	  aims	  and	  goals	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  users	  of	  a	  markomata,	  but	  also	  the	  
number	   of	   possible	   commodities	   for	   sale,	   the	   history	   of	   auction	   design	   comprises	  
many	   possible	   technical	   solutions.	   Mirowski	   follows	   the	   work	   of	   Wurman	   and	  
Wellman	   (Wurman	   et	   al.,	   2001)	   in	   providing	   the	   initial	   distinction	   between	   two	  
separate	  branches:	  the	  single-­‐sided	  and	  the	  two-­‐sided	  auction	  
	  
	  
Figure	  3:	  Classification	  of	  classic	  auction	  types	  	  
(Wurman	  et	  al.,	  2001	  
	  
In	  the	  first	  branch,	  only	  sellers	  or	  buyers	  can	  submit	  quotes	  (bids	  or	  offers),	  while	  in	  
the	   second	   version	  all	   parties	   can	   switch	  between	  buy	  and	   sell	  mode.	   Subsequent	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branches	   can	   be	   added	   by	   distinguishing	   between	   open-­‐outcry	   or	   sealed-­‐bid	  
auctions.	  In	  the	  first	  version,	  all	  bids	  or	  offers	  are	  public	  from	  the	  start,	  while	  in	  the	  
second	  they	  are	  revealed	  only	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  auction	  (Schneider,	  2003).	  Further	  
classifications	   are	   possible	   depending	   on	   the	   direction	   of	   the	   bids	   such	   as	   the	  
ascending	  English	  auction	  or	   the	  descending	  Dutch	  auction.	  While	   the	  open	  outcry	  
continuous	   double	   auction	   of	   the	   New	   York	   Stock	   Exchange	   have	   captured	   our	  
imagination,	  we	  can	  also	  think	  about	  the	  single	  bid	  open-­‐outcry	  auctions	  used	  in	  the	  
case	  of	  tulips	  or	  works	  of	  art.	  The	  sealed-­‐bid	  single-­‐sided	  auction	  limits	  the	  identities	  
of	  participants	  and	  the	  transparency	  of	  price	  setting.	  More	  recently,	  in	  modern	  stock	  
markets,	   continuous	  double	  auctions	  provide	  pre	  and	  post-­‐trade	   transparency	  and	  
are	  more	  suited	  for	  liquid	  assets.	  A	  Dutch	  auction	  is	  best	  suited	  for	  quickly	  clearing	  
the	  market	  while	  the	  modern	  continuous	  double	  auction	  allows	  buyers	  and	  sellers	  to	  
submit	   bids	   at	   the	   same	   time,	   and	   seriously	   limits	   opportunities	   for	   arbitrage	  
(Mirowski,	   2007,	   p.228).	  Different	   auction	  designs	  have	  evolved	   for	  differ	   types	  of	  
commodities.	  For	  instance,	  the	  English	  open-­‐outcry	  auction	  is	  particularly	  useful	  for	  
selling	   collectable	   items,	   while	   the	   Dutch	   version	   is	   better	   suited	   for	   perishable	  
items,	  as	  it	  can	  quickly	  clear	  the	  market.	  	  
	  
Thus	  Wurman	  and	  Wellman	   show	  us	   that	  by	  using	   just	   a	   few	  parameters	  one	   can	  
construct	  a	  relatively	  complex	  taxonomy.	  Moreover,	  Friedman	  and	  Rust	  (1993,	  p.8)	  
argue	   that	   beyond	   single/double	   sided	   and	   open-­‐outcry/sealed	   bid,	   one	   can	   also	  
think	   about	   direct/reverse,	   ascending/descending,	   unitary/multiple	   units,	  
discriminatory/uniform	   payment,	   divisible/indivisible	   bids.	   This	   more	   complex	  
taxonomy	  allows	  for	  a	  finer	  classification	  of	  auction	  models.	  	  The	  single-­‐side	  auction	  
can	  be	   split	   into	  direct	   or	   reverse,	   depending	  on	  who	  puts	   the	   goods	   for	   sale	   and	  
how	   the	   offers	   are	   received.	   In	   a	   single-­‐side	   direct	   auction,	   the	   seller	   presents	  
information	  and	  receives	  bids	   from	  potential	  buyers.	  Depending	  on	  payment	  rules,	  
one	  can	  distinguish	  between	  first-­‐price	  sealed-­‐bid	  auctions	  (FPSB)	  and	  second-­‐price	  
sealed-­‐bid	   (SPSB	   or	   Vickrey).	   In	   both	   cases,	   the	  winner	   is	   the	   one	  who	  makes	   the	  
highest	   offer,	   but	   in	   the	   SPSB	   (Vickrey)	   version,	   the	   winner	   only	   has	   to	   pay	   the	  
second	   highest	   bid.	   Further	   parameterizations	   cam	   be	   developed	   depending	   on	  
whether	   the	  good	  on	  offer	   is	  unique	  or	   composed	  on	  homogenous	  units,	  whether	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the	  bids	  are	  divisible	  or	   indivisible,	  etc.	  (Douglas	  D.	  Davis	  and	  Holt,	  1993).	  Having	  a	  
more	  detailed	  taxonomy	  of	  possible	  market	  auctions	  or	  matching	  mechanisms,	  leads	  
to	   the	   possibility	   of	  more	   granular	   analysis	   of	  market	   structures.	  What	  makes	   the	  
continuous	  double	   auction	  particularly	   efficient	   is	   the	   integration	  between	  bid/ask	  
and	   buy/sell	   (market	   theory	   evolve	   and	   markets	   to).	   In	   this	   regards,	   substantial	  
research	   has	   been	   done	   in	   analysing	   the	   market	   structure	   of	   the	   so-­‐called	  
synchronized	  double	  auction	  (Rust	  et	  al.,	  1993).	  In	  this	  format,	  the	  two	  steps	  are	  not	  
integrated,	   so	   a	   bid	  or	   ask	   is	   not	   instantly	   converted	   into	   a	   buy	  or	   a	   sell.	   In	   other	  
words,	  some	  market	  participants	  can	  develop	  parasitic	  strategies	  (Friedman,	  2007).	  
This	  highlights	  the	  fact	  that	  different	  market	  designs	  can	  favour	  specific	  participants.	  
Moreover,	   it	   shows	   that	   apparently	   insignificant	   details	   regarding	   the	  matching	   or	  
auction	  design	  can	  have	  significant	  impact	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  wider	  power	  dynamics	  of	  
the	  market.	  	  
	  
In	  any	  case,	  rather	  than	  reducing	  the	  homogeneity	  of	  market	  structures	  and	  auction	  
design	  to	  one	  single	  Market,	   the	  role	  of	  economics	  should	  be	  to	  study	  this	  diverse	  
ecology	  with	  particular	  interest	  for	  its	  historical	  evolution.	  Mirowski	  points	  out	  that	  
the	   contemporary	   study	   of	   markets	   largely	   lacks	   such	   a	   taxonomy.	   Once	   such	   a	  
natural	  history	  of	  markets	  is	  available,	   it	  will	  represent	  the	  final	  piece	  of	  the	  puzzle	  
for	  what	  he	  calls	  a	  computational	  evolutionary	  economics.	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3.4	  Experiments,	  Market	  Microstructure	  and	  Zero	  Intelligence	  	  
	  
	  
A	   series	   of	   innovative	   research	   programs	   at	   the	   crossroads	   of	   economics	   and	  
computer	   science	   have	   helped	   shape	  Mirowski’s	   theory	   of	  markets.	   Among	   these,	  
the	   most	   important	   are	   operations	   research,	   agent-­‐based	   modelling,	   market	  
microstructure	   as	  well	   as	   experimental	   economics	   and	   the	   research	   done	   on	   zero	  
intelligence	   agents.	   In	   a	   recent	   lecture	   series	   at	   the	   Institute	   for	   New	   Economic	  
Thinking	  (INET),	  Mirowski	  and	  Edward	  Nik-­‐Khah	  offered	  a	  summary	  of	  these	  research	  
agendas	  as	  well	  as	  detailed	  explanation	  of	  their	   impact	  on	  the	  core	  of	  orthodoxy42.	  
For	   the	   purpose	   of	   this	   thesis,	   we	   will	   focus	   initially	   on	   the	   so-­‐called	   market	  
microstructure	  literature.	  This	  is	  a	  study	  of	  how	  different	  market	  rules	  influence	  the	  
price	  formation	  process,	  looking	  at	  issues	  of	  information	  asymmetries,	  transparency,	  
transactions	   costs,	   liquidity,	   efficiency,	   welfare,	   etc.	   (O'Hara,	   1995;	   Madhavan,	  
2000).	  This	  body	  of	  research	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  reaction	  to	  the	  introduction	  of	  ICT	  into	  
financial	   markets	   led	   to	   a	   series	   of	   new	   developments	   such	   as	   electronic	   and	  
algorithmic	  trading,	  but	  also	  to	  the	  large	  electronic	  platforms	  and	  novel	  forms	  of	  e-­‐
commerce	   auctions.	   Moreover,	   questions	   of	   transactions	   costs,	   information	  
transparency	  and	  bid-­‐ask	  spreads	  are	  cast	  in	  a	  new	  light	  when	  one	  has	  to	  build	  the	  
infrastructure	  of	  a	  new	  electronic	  market	  from	  scratch	  (Mirowski,	  2007,	  p.217).	  For	  
instance,	  when	  designing	  the	  rules	  and	  details	  of	  a	  new	  trading	  platform,	  questions	  
of	   efficient	   allocation	   and	   Pareto	   optimality	   become	   secondary	   at	   most.	   What	   is	  
important	  is	  to	  satisfy	  the	  needs	  of	  different	  groups	  of	  participants,	  brokers,	  dealers,	  
institutional	  investors,	  high-­‐frequency	  traders,	  etc.	  In	  other	  words,	  a	  successful	  and	  
efficient	   market	   design	   allows	   each	   participant	   to	   get	   what	   he	   came	   for	   at	   a	  
reasonable	  cost	  (Lee,	  1998;	  Lee,	  2011).	  	  	  
	  
The	  algorithmic	  nature	  of	  markets	  has	   also	   come	   to	   the	   fore	  because	  of	   the	  work	  
done	  in	  fields	  such	  as	  Artificial	  Intelligence	  and	  Game	  Theory.	  	  In	  both	  cases,	  the	  goal	  
was	   to	   model	   economic	   agents	   as	   computer	   programs,	   and	   only	   later	   did	   these	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42	  Forthcoming	  Mirowski,	   P.,	   Nik-­‐Khah,	   E.	   (2016)	   The	   Knowledge	  We	   Have	   Lost	   In	  
Information.	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	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programs	   become	   sub-­‐routines	   of	   a	   more	   complex	   algorithm,	   modelling	   entire	  
markets.	   Outside	   of	   the	   real	   world	   of	   trading	   platforms,	   Experimental	   Economics	  
essentially	   started	   as	   the	   study	   of	   how	   resources	   are	   allocated	   under	   different	  
market	   formats.	  One	  early	  pioneer	  was	  Vernon	  Smith,	  who	  experimented	  with	  the	  
market	   structure	   of	   the	   New	   York	   Stock	   Exchange	   (NYSE),	   the	   continuous	   double	  
auction	   matching	   mechanism,	   in	   the	   1950s.	   	   He	   intended	   to	   study	   the	   allocation	  
characteristics	   of	   this	   format	   and	   through	   his	   experiments,	   revealed	   that	   the	  
continuous	   double	   auction	   rules	   were	   superior	   to	   other	   market	   rules	   in	   terms	   of	  
convergence	   to	   equilibrium.	   His	   landmark	   work	   An	   Experimental	   Study	   of	  
Competitive	   Market	   Behavior	   (Smith,	   1962)	   highlights	   the	   capacity	   of	   market	  
algorithms,	   such	  as	   the	  NYSE	  matching	  mechanism,	   to	   rapidly	   lead	   to	  convergence	  
even	   in	   the	   case	   of	   relatively	   uninformed	   agents.	   Smith	  was	   also	   curious	   to	   see	   if	  
other	  market	   structures	  would	  produce	   rapid	   convergence,	  but	  his	   conclusion	  was	  
that	   the	   double	   auction	   was	   the	   only	   format	   that	   provided	   theses	   ‘’superior	  
outcomes’’	   (Mirowski,	   2007,	  p.212).	  More	   importantly,	   his	   experiments	   led	  him	   to	  
state	  his	  famous	  Hayek	  hypothesis:	  
	  
Strict	   privacy	   together	   with	   the	   trading	   rules	   of	   a	   market	   institution	   are	  
sufficient	  to	  produce	  competitive	  market	  outcomes	  at	  or	  near	  100%	  efficiency	  
(Vernon	  Smith,	  1991,	  p.223).	  
	  
This	   famous	   hypothesis	   is	   particularly	   interesting	   as	   it	   suggests	   that	  markets	  work	  
independently	  of	  the	  cognitive	  capacities	  of	  interacting	  agents.	  So	  the	  superiority	  of	  
the	  double	  auction	  was	  not	  really	  dependent	  on	  the	  degree	  of	  rationality	  of	  market	  
participants	   but	   on	   the	   very	   structure	   of	   the	   market,	   its	   institutional	   set-­‐up,	   its	  
formal	  algorithmic	  rules.	  This	  line	  of	  research	  was	  further	  developed	  in	  the	  work	  of	  
Dan	  Gode	  and	  Shylam	  Sunder’s	  work	  (Gode	  and	  Sunder,	  1993).	  Their	  approach	  was	  
to	  compare	  the	  two-­‐sided	  market	  structure	  in	  two	  different	  situations,	  with	  human	  
subjects	   and	   then	   with	   algorithmic	   agents	   called	   zero-­‐intelligence	   agents,	   which	  
were	   effectively	   random-­‐number	   generators.	   These	   ‘brainless’	   agents	  were	   bits	   of	  
software	  that	  produced	  random	  bids	  or	  asks	  within	  the	  limits	  of	  their	  assigned	  price	  
levels.	  They	  also	  modelled	  the	  same	  process	  with	  more	  ‘evolved’	  agents,	  which	  had	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an	  additional	  budget	  constraint	  (Mirowski,	  2002,	  p.	  553).	  The	  first	  ‘brainless’	  version	  
of	  computerized	  traders	  did	  not	   lead	  to	  convergence	  but	  the	  second	  more	  evolved	  
versions	   did	   reach	   so-­‐called	   allocative	   efficiency.	  What	  was	   even	  more	   fascinating	  
was	  the	  fact	  that	  these	  second	  algorithmic	  agents	  produced	  nearly	   identical	  results	  
to	  experiments	  performed	  with	  human	  agents.	  This	  last	  point,	  ultimately	  led	  them	  to	  
focus	  more	  on	  the	  algorithmic	  blueprint	  of	  markets	  and	  not	  on	  the	  psychological	  and	  
cognitive	  state	  of	  the	  interacting	  agents	  (Mirowski,	  2007,	  p.216).	  Nevertheless,	  they	  
never	  really	  took	  the	  research	  to	  its	  ultimate	  conclusions:	  
	  
The	   terror	  before	  which	  G&S	   [Gode	  &	  Sunder]	   stood	   transfixed	  was	  not	   that	  
economists	  would	  begin	  to	  confuse	  human	  beings	  with	  their	  bits	  of	  code	  (was	  
it?),	  but	  rather	  that	  it	  was	  all	  too	  easy	  to	  draw	  some	  devastating	  morals	  from	  
their	   exercise	   about	   the	   utter	   futility	   of	  more	   than	   a	   century	   of	   neoclassical	  
economic	  theory	  (Mirowski,	  2002,	  p.	  553).	  
	  
In	   any	   case,	   they	   continued	   to	   experiment	  with	  market	   structures,	   deconstructing	  
the	  continuous	  double	  auction,	  ending	  up	  with	  a	  nested	  hierarchy	  of	  market	  rules.	  
The	  basic	  layer	  was	  a	  Null	  market	  that	  matched	  zero-­‐intelligence	  agents	  in	  a	  random	  
way.	  The	  next	  level	  was	  a	  sealed-­‐bid	  format,	  which	  was	  actually	  the	  more	  basic	  Null	  
market	   with	   the	   additional	   of	   a	   second	   rule	   regarding	   price	   priority.	   This	   can	   be	  
further	  enhanced	  by	  a	  call	  auction	  that	  periodically	  matched	  bids	  and	  asks,	  followed	  
by	  a	  one	  round	  double	  auction	  (Mirowski	  and	  Somefun,	  1998).	  What	   is	  essential	   is	  
that	  they	  demonstrate	  an	  increase	  in	  Marshallian	  efficiency	  from	  one	  generation	  to	  
the	  next	  (Mirowski,	  2002,	  p.559).	  Building	  on	  Gode	  and	  Sunder’s	  work,	  Mirowski	  and	  
Somefun’s	  1998	  paper	  describes	  the	  outlines	  of	  a	  hierarchy	  of	  markets,	  ranked	  along	  
Chomsky’s	   computational	   hierarchy.	   They	   start	  with	   the	   so-­‐called	  Null	  market	   and	  
demonstrate	  how	  it	  can	  be	  modelled	  as	  finite	  automata.	  This	  would	  be	  a	  very	  simple	  
machine	   that	  would	   answer	   yes	   or	   no	   if	   a	   bid	   or	   an	   ask	  was	   submitted	   and	   ‘’will	  
arbitrarily	  halt	  or	   read	   the	  next	  available	   input’’	   (Mirowski	  and	  Somefun,	  1998).	   In	  
order	  to	  move	  to	  the	  next	  generation,	  one	  needs	  a	  more	  advanced	  halting	  condition	  
and	  more	  memory	  capacity.	  For	  example	  the	  sealed	  bid	  auction	  can	  be	  modelled	  as	  
pushdown	   automata	  with	   two	   reading	   heads.	   In	   this	   case,	   the	   halting	   condition	   is	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accomplished	   when	   a	   bid	   is	   greater	   or	   equal	   to	   the	   value	   of	   the	   ask.	   While	   this	  
second	   markomata	   is	   more	   computationally	   ‘evolved’	   than	   the	   ‘Null’	   market,	   it	  
cannot	   sustain	   the	   complexity	   of	   a	   double	   auction.	   In	   this	   case,	   a	   four-­‐head	  
pushdown	  automata	  is	  needed.	  The	  machine	  must	  record	  both	  the	  highest	  bid	  and	  
the	  highest	  asks	  and	  compared	  them	  to	  new	  bids	  and	  asks.	  This	  actually	  means	  that	  
the	   double	   auction	   represents	   a	   further	   evolution	   from	   the	   point	   of	   view	   of	  
computational	  capacity.	  So	  far,	  the	  history	  of	  markets	  has	  largely	  been	  dominated	  by	  
fixed-­‐price	   posted-­‐offer	  markets	   of	   lower	   computational	   complexity	   but	  with	   high	  
reliability	   in	   converging	   supply	   and	   demand.	   In	   certain	   environments,	   such	   as	  
financial	  markets,	  a	  sealed-­‐bid	  or	  continuous	  double	  auctions	  of	  higher	  computation	  
complexity	  can	  emerge.	  	  There	  is	  also	  an	  element	  of	  irreversibility	  at	  play	  in	  all	  of	  this	  
as	   the	  world	  of	  markomata	   is	  hierarchical.	  Also,	  as	  demonstrated	  by	  Mirowski	  and	  
Somefun	   some	   markomata	   can	   simulate	   the	   functioning	   of	   others,	   but	   not	   vice-­‐
versa.	  For	  instance,	  the	  double	  auction	  can	  mimic	  the	  sealed	  bid	  auction	  because	  of	  
increased	  memory	  capacity.	  
	  
DA	  [Double	  Auctions]	  is	  formally	  a	  "descendant"	  of	  the	  sealed	  bid	  market,	  and	  
can	  therefore	  handle	  more	  complex	  information	  processing	  tasks.	  This	  formal	  
result	   can	   then	   be	   brought	   to	   bear	   in	   the	   future	   on	   a	   "natural	   history"	   of	  
markets,	  to	  research	  the	  possible	  ways	  in	  which	  these	  particular	  market	  forms	  
have	  evolved	  relative	  to	  one	  another	  (Mirowski,	  2007,	  p.23)	  
	  
As	  we	  will	   see,	  what	   probably	   seemed	   secondary	   for	   Gode	  &	   Sunder,	   namely	   the	  
evolutionary	  tendency	  of	  market	  forms,	  achieves	  centre	  stage	   in	  Mirowski’s	  theory	  
of	  markets.	   In	   his	   perspective,	   the	  double	   auction	   is	  more	   superior	   because	   it	   has	  
greater	   computational	   capacity	   than	   the	   lower	   strata,	   and	   can	   cope	   with	   higher	  
levels	   of	   complexity.	   In	   his	   view,	   this	   is	   the	   ultimate	   vindication	   to	   John	   von	  
Neumann’s	  theory	  of	  automata,	  namely	  that	  lower-­‐level	  interaction	  between	  simple	  
automata	   can	   lead	   to	   more	   complex	   structures.	   Secondly,	   this	   process	   partially	  
undermines	  the	  neoclassical	  attempt	  to	  subsume	  all	  markets	  to	  one	  single	  Market.	  
To	   the	   contrary,	   experimental	   economics	   open	   up	   the	   possibility	   o	   the	   study	   of	  
different	  market	  forms	  of	  different	  complexity	  and	  very	  different	  set	  of	  goals.	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3.5	  Mirowski’s	  Markomata	  
	  
In	  Machine	  Dreams	   (2002),	  Mirowski	   attempts	   to	   rewrite	   the	   history	   of	   economic	  
theory	   as	   a	   continuation	   of	   his	   earlier	   work	  More	   Heat	   Than	   Light	   (1989),	   which	  
focused	  on	   the	   second	  part	  of	   the	  19th	   century.	  Between	   these	   two	  books,	  he	  has	  
become	   one	   of	   the	   most	   interesting	   historians	   of	   economic	   thought.	   One	   of	   the	  
central	   ideas	   of	   this	   book	   is	   that	   economists	   have	   always	   dreamed	   of	   reaching	   a	  
similar	   degree	   of	   scientific	   rigor	   to	   the	   natural	   sciences,	   but	   have	   always	   been	  
selective	   in	   terms	  of	  what	   they	   adopted	   from	   these	  more	  precise	   sciences.	   In	   this	  
sense,	   the	   marginalism	   of	   the	   19th	   century	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   a	   more	   or	   less	  
mathematically	  elaborate	  example	  of	  this	  machine	  dream,	  based	  on	  the	  adoption	  of	  
classical	   thermodynamics	   and	   the	   field	   metaphor	   (Mirowski,	   2002,	   p.517).	   As	  
Mirowski	  points	  out	  (Pilkington	  and	  Mirowski,	  2013),	  the	  second	  book	  was	  in	  some	  
ways	   a	   reaction	   to	   the	   critiques	   generated	   by	   the	   first	   one.	   For	   instance,	   some	  
(Walker,	   1991;	   Cohen,	   1992;	  Hands,	   1992)	   have	   argued	   that	   although	   there	  might	  
haven	   been	   appropriations	   from	   physics	   in	   the	   19th	   century,	   economic	   theory	   has	  
matured	  since	  then	  and	  energetic	  metaphors	  are	  not	  longer	  relevant.	  In	  responding	  
to	  some	  of	   these	  critics,	  Machine	  Dreams	   represent	  an	   impressive	  tour	  de	  force	   in	  
intellectual	   history,	   arguing	   that	   the	   same	   process	   happened	   in	   the	   20th	   century,	  
although	  with	   different	  metaphors.	  He	   thus	   identifies	   a	   turning	   point	   in	   economic	  
theory	  as	  the	  transition	  from	  the	  reliance	  on	  energetic	  metaphors	  to	  the	  adoption	  of	  
the	   language	   of	   computation	   and	   the	   framework	   of	   cybernetics	   and	   information	  
theory.	  	  
	  
(…)	   whereas	   once	   upon	   a	   time	   market	   equilibrium	   had	   been	   thought	   to	  
resemble	   a	   ball	   rolling	   to	   the	   bottom	   of	   a	   bowl,	   now	   it	   signifies	   something	  
altogether	   different,	   something	   more	   like	   the	   economic	   agent	   as	   an	  
information	   processor	   coming	   to	   ‘halt’	   at	   the	   end	   of	   a	   computation’’	  
(Mirowski,	  1994)	  
	  
That	  is	  to	  say,	  the	  advent	  of	  the	  computer	  in	  the	  20th	  century	  engendered	  a	  gradual	  
transformation	  of	  economic	  theory.	  From	  the	  early	  days	  of	  the	  Cowles	  Commission	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and	  game	  theory,	  to	  the	  theory	  of	  rational	  expectations,	  Nash	  equilibriums	  and	  the	  
work	   of	   the	   Santa	   Fe	   Institute,	   cyborgs	   have	  been	   slowly,	   but	   surely,	   entering	   the	  
world	  of	  economics.	  One	  of	  the	  most	  striking	  results	  of	  this	  progression	  is	  the	  switch	  
in	   emphasis	   from	   the	   economy	   as	   the	   allocation	   of	   scarce	   resources,	   to	   an	  
understanding	   of	   the	   economy	   as	   an	   information	   processor.	   Consequently,	   the	  
computer	   metaphor	   has	   also	   influence	   broader	   political	   ideologies	   such	   as	  
neoliberalism,	   as	   the	  market	   can	   now	  be	   seen	   as	   a	   far	  more	   superior	   information	  
processor	   than	   any	   individual	   or	   any	  bureaucracy.	   	   But	   as	   argued	  by	  Mirowski,	   an	  
informational	  understanding	  of	  markets	  also	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  undermine	  most	  of	  
economic	  orthodoxy.	  This	  is	  because	  it	  renders	  the	  energetic	  metaphor	  of	  the	  field,	  
the	   backbone	   of	   neoclassical	   economics,	   obsolete,	   as	   well	   as	   deemphasizing	   the	  
importance	   of	   notions	   such	   as	   the	   utility	   function	   and	   the	   maximizing	   agent.	  
(Mirowski	  and	  Nik-­‐Khah,	  2016).	  
	  
In	   fact,	   the	  displacement	  of	   the	  dominance	  of	  physics	   in	   the	  economics	  profession	  
could	  be	  seen	  as	   the	  very	  condition	  of	  possibility	   for	  a	  computational	  evolutionary	  
economics.	  Mirowski	  thus	  argues	  that	  the	  future	  of	  economics	  will	  depend	  more	  on	  
the	  sciences	  of	  computation	  and	  evolutionary	  biology	  (Mirowski	  and	  Somefun,	  1998,	  
p.6).	   The	   core	   of	   this	   displacement	   is	   not	   just	   about	   finding	   better	   functional	  
analogies,	  but	   it	   represents	  a	  deeper	   shift	   in	   the	  very	  object	  of	   scientific	   research.	  
Rather	   than	   remaining	   fixated	   on	   the	   agency	   of	   individual	   agents,	   economics	   will	  
have	   to	   embark	   on	   a	   novel	   research	   program,	   the	   understanding	   of	   the	   wide	  
diversity	  of	  market	   forms	   (Mirowski,	   2007,	   p.211).	   	   But	  how	  does	  one	   reconfigure	  
the	   focus	   of	   economic	   theory	   on	   markets,	   rather	   than	   economic	   agents?	   	   In	  
Mirowski’s	  case,	  this	  entails	  the	  modelling	  of	  diverse	  markets	  structures	  by	  using	  the	  
theory	   of	   automata	   and	   subsequently	   organizing	   them	   according	   to	   a	   theory	   of	  
evolution.	   	  He	  thus	  coins	  the	  term	  markomata	  (markets	  +	  automata),	  which	  allows	  
him	  look	  at	  the	  ‘diverse	  ecology	  of	  markets	  differentiated	  according	  to	  their	  formal	  
computational	   structures’’	   (Mirowski,	   2010,	   p.13).	   In	   a	   computational	   view	   of	  
markets,	   markomata	   work	   just	   like	   any	   other	   algorithmic	   process,	   by	   accepting	   a	  
series	   of	   inputs	   (bids/asks)	   and	  producing	   a	   set	   of	   outputs	   (prices	   and	  quantities).	  
And	   just	   like	  most	   other	   things,	   there	   is	   not	   necessarily	   one	   perfect	   design	   for	   all	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possible	  market	  functions.	  One	  of	  the	  most	  interesting	  displacements	  of	  Mirowski’s	  
theory	   of	   markomata	   is	   relinquishing	   of	   any	   grand	   vision	   of	   the	   Market	   (with	   a	  
capital	   M).	   Consistent	   with	   both	   our	   discussion	   of	   Social	   Studies	   of	   Finance	   and	  
assemblage	  theory,	  Mirowski	  argues	  for	  the	  futility	  of	  thinking	  in	  terms	  of	  an	  eternal	  
essence	  of	  the	  Market.	  	  
	  
‘’	  (…)	  there	  are	  numerous	  diverse	  forms	  of	  rules	  and	  behavior	  which	  could	  be	  
used	   to	   facilitate	   trade.	   Hence	   what	   we	   would	   call	   an	   ‘economy’	   is	   really	   a	  
patchwork	   of	   many	   market	   forms,	   imperfectly	   interlinked	   and	   integrated’’	  
(Mirowski,	  1994).	  	  
	  
Mirowski	  thus	  argues	  for	  an	  account	  of	  markets	  as	  a	  diverse	  ecology	  of	  automata,	  as	  
a	   far	   more	   appropriate	   perspective	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	   present	   explosion	   of	  
electronic	  trading	  platforms,	  e-­‐commerce,	  algorithmic	  trading,	  etc.	  Consequently,	  he	  
suggested	   a	   repositioning	   of	   economic	   research	   towards	   the	   ’laws’	   of	   market	  
evolution	   rather	   than	   reduce	   the	   market	   to	   the	   microeconomics	   of	   the	  
representative	  rational	  agent.	  In	  fact,	  a	  computational	  view	  of	  markets,	  based	  on	  the	  
theory	  of	  automata,	  necessarily	   reduces	  the	   importance	  of	   the	  cognitive	  capacities	  
of	  economic	  agents,	  while	  giving	  primacy	  to	  the	  way	  in	  which	  signals	  are	  transmitted	  
and	  processed	  (Mirowski	  and	  Somefun,	  1998a).	  As	  Mirowski	  himself	  says,	  it	  is	  more	  
a	   question	   of	   syntax	   than	   semantics,	   the	   way	   in	   which	   agents	   interact	   is	   more	  
important	  than	  the	  intention	  of	  the	  interacting	  agents.	  One	  can	  think	  of	  markets	  as	  
networks,	  as	   institutions	  or	  as	  technical	  systems,	  but	  they	  can	  very	  well	  be	  seen	  as	  
formal	  automata	  (a	  set	  or	  rules)	  performing	  a	  series	  of	  market	  functions.	  
	  
He	  warns	  us	  against	  the	  danger	  of	  reifying	  the	  market	  and	  treating	  it	  like	  a	  Platonic	  
form	  or	  as	  an	  unproblematic	  convergence	  of	  supply	  and	  demand	  curves.	  Thanks	  to	  
various	   developments	   within	   economics,	   including	   computational	   economics,	  
experimental	   economics,	   microstructure	   research,	   we	   now	   have	   a	   more	   detailed	  
understanding	  of	  how	  markets	  actually	  work.	  As	   stated	  above,	   the	  wide	  variety	  of	  
markets	  comes	   from	  the	  way	   in	  which	  they	   fulfil	  various	   functions	   including:	  order	  
matching,	   routing,	   execution,	   clearing	   &	   settlement,	   computing	   prices,	   record	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keeping	  and	  information	  dissemination,	  etc.	  Depending	  on	  how	  these	  functions	  are	  
performed,	   markets	   can	   be	   very	   different	   structures,	   with	   varying	   degrees	   of	  
efficiencies	  and	  different	  sets	  of	  possible	  outcomes:	  
	  
There	  is	  no	  ur-­‐model	  or	  uber-­‐machine	  to	  which	  the	  blooming,	  buzzing	  
profusion	  of	  markets	  can	  be	  reduced	  (Mirowski,	  2007,	  p.	  224)	  
	  
In	   fact,	   the	   recent	   development	   of	   e-­‐commerce	   supports	   Mirowski’s	   theory	   of	  
markomata	  as	  an	  ecology	  of	  computational	   forms.	  Market	  diversity	   is	  not	  simply	  a	  
premise	   of	   the	   theory	   of	  markomata,	   but	   a	   historical	   given,	   as	   there	   have	   always	  
been	  a	  variety	  of	  market	  forms	  going	  back	  to	  the	  dawn	  of	  human	  societies.	  Instead	  
of	   following	   the	   neo-­‐classical	   tradition	   and	   positing	   a	   single	   market	   throughout	  
human	   history,	  Mirowski’s	   approach	   is	   deeply	   rooted	   in	   the	   empirical	   plurality	   of	  
markets,	  with	   their	   ‘’varying	   capacities	   and	   complexities’’	   (Mirowski,	   2002,	   p.540).	  
There	   is	   not	   one	  Market,	   objectively	   present	   in	   front	   of	   us	   at	   all	   times,	   and	   static	  
throughout	  history.	  What	  actually	  exists	  is	  a	  plurality	  of	  markets	  performing	  various	  
functions,	  matching	  buyers	  and	  sellers	   in	  different	  goods,	   commodities	  and	  assets.	  
Different	  markets	   can	   have	   different	   auction	  mechanisms,	   different	  matching	   and	  
clearing	  solutions,	  and	  different	  ways	  to	  settle	  transactions.	  Moreover,	  depending	  of	  
market	   microstructure,	   markets	   can	   strategically	   favour	   certain	   participants	   over	  
others;	  they	  can	  have	  different	  degrees	  of	  efficiency	  and	  can	  be	  more	  or	  less	  robust	  
to	  external/internal	  shocks.	  	  
	  
In	  any	  case,	  a	  computational	  understanding	  of	  markets	  fits	  well	  with	  a	  definition	  of	  a	  
market	   as	   a	   ‘’set	   of	   rules	   which	   facilitate	   the	   conduct	   of	   exchange	   and	   the	  
conveyance	   of	   information	   between	   buyers	   and	   sellers’’	   (Mirowski	   and	   Somefun,	  
1998,	   p.13).	   This	   functional	   perspective	   is	   far	   removed	   from	   the	   standard	   goals	  of	  
efficient	  allocation	  or	  Pareto	  optimality.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  computational	  view	  of	  
markets	  suggests	  that	  thinking	  in	  terms	  of	  different	  degrees	  of	  efficiency,	  pertaining	  
to	   different	   markomata,	   is	   a	   more	   accurate	   picture	   of	   real	   markets	   than	   simply	  
presuming	  that	  the	  Market	  is	  efficient.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  study	  of	  markomata	  
could	  very	  well	   indicate	  other	  market	  goals	  beyond	  allocation,	  such	  as	  the	  efficient	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matching	  of	  trade	  requests,	  or	  the	  immediate	  dissemination	  of	  price	  information.	  All	  
of	   these	   are	   very	   important	   questions	   for	   the	   future	   of	   economics	   and	   the	  
functioning	   of	   real	   markets.	   In	   a	   certain	   sense,	   inviting	   economists	   to	   study	   the	  
‘’machines	   that	   facilitate	   our	   attempts	   to	   trade’’	   rather	   than	   building	   reductionist	  
models	  of	  the	  complex	  behaviour	  of	  human	  individuals:	  
	  
Let’s	   model	   these	   irreducibly	   social	   phenomena	   as	   software	   machines,	   and	  
proudly	  confess	  that	  we	  (in	  our	  capacity	  as	  economists)	  are	  not	  yet	  equipped	  
to	   model	   real	   human	   beings	   in	   all	   their	   fascinating	   ontological	   and	  
epistemological	  diversity	  and	  perversity	  (Mirowski,	  1994)	  
	  
As	  we	  will	   see	   in	   the	  next	   section,	  he	  also	  proposes	  an	  evolutionary	   trajectory	   for	  
markomata,	  emerging	  in	  an	  environment	  made	  up	  of	  different	  human	  societies	  and	  
cultures.	   In	   this	   context,	   the	   evolutionary	   units	   are	   the	   different	   market	   designs,	  
while	   human	   societies	   would	   be	   the	   environmental	   pressures	   responsible	   for	   the	  
processes	  of	  variation,	  selection	  of	  retention.	  Moreover,	  according	  to	  Mirowski,	  the	  
theory	  of	  markomata	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  different	  type	  of	  evolutionary	  economics,	   in	  
that	  it	  describes	  both	  processes	  of	  variation	  and	  selection	  as	  well	  as	  the	  mechanism	  
for	   inheritance.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   markomata,	   reproduction	   is	   achieved	   when	   one	  
markomata	  manages	  to	  simulate	  the	  working	  of	  another	  markomata	  within	  its	  own	  
functioning.	   Variation	   is	   inherent	   as	   new	   markomata	   of	   different	   computational	  
power,	   with	   different	   goals	   and	   rules	   are	   constantly	   being	   designed.	   Human	  
societies/cultures	   ultimately	   select	   specific	   markomata,	   due	   to	   their	   capacity	   to	  
process	   transactions	   and	   produce	   prices	   and	   more	   importantly,	   their	   capacity	   to	  
‘’successfully	   emulate	   other	   relevant	   market	   calculations	   emanating	   from	   other	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3.6	  Markets	  as	  Evolving	  Computations	  
	  
As	  we	  have	   seen,	  Mirowski’s	   approach	   is	   to	  understand	  markets	  as	   computational	  
systems	  performing	  a	  series	  of	  functions	  relative	  to	  a	  group	  of	  users.	  	  In	  this	  sense,	  
markets	   are	   highly	   complex	   technical	   systems	   and	   deserve	   the	   same	   kind	   of	  
attention	  form	  social	  scientists	  as	  nuclear	  reactors,	  particle	  colliders	  or	  the	  Internet.	  
To	  a	   certain	  extent,	   this	  adds	   to	   the	  already	  on-­‐going	  deconstruction	  of	   the	  black-­‐
box	  of	  finance,	  aligning	  itself	  with	  the	  work	  done	  by	  the	  social	  studies	  of	  finance,	  in	  
terms	   of	   the	   sociology,	   anthropology	   or	   history	   of	   financial	  markets	   (Knorr-­‐Cetina	  
and	  Bruegger,	  2002;	  Knorr-­‐Cetina	  and	  Preda,	  2006;	  MacKenzie,	  2006;	  Morrison	  and	  
Wilhelm,	   2007;	   Matthew	   Watson,	   2007;	   MacKenzie	   et	   al.,	   2008;	   Ho,	   2009;	  
MacKenzie,	   2009b;	   Esposito,	   2011).	   Mirowski’s	   computational	   evolutionary	  
economics	   arguably	   goes	   much	   further	   in	   acknowledging	   the	   crucial	   role	   of	  
technology	   and	   computation	   in	   understanding	   market	   dynamics.	   Rather	   than	  
remaining	   fixated	   on	   the	   agency	   of	   individual	   agents,	  Mirowski	   argues	   for	   a	   novel	  
research	  program,	   the	  understanding	  of	   the	  wide	  diversity	  of	  markets	   founded	  on	  
the	   theory	   of	   automata.	   In	   Mirowski’s	   project	   for	   a	   computational	   evolutionary	  
economics,	  the	  multitude	  of	  functions	  performed	  by	  markomata	  would	  be	  subject	  to	  
specific	   formalizations.	   Depending	   on	   design	   complexity,	   a	   number	   of	   different	  
algorithms	   are	   required	   in	   order	   to	   fully	   account	   for	   the	   workings	   of	   a	   particular	  
market.	   Simple	   market	   structures	   would	   be	   easier	   to	   model,	   such	   as	   the	   order	  
execution	  function	  of	  a	  posted	  (fixed	  price)	  market,	  the	  framework	  of	  modern	  retail	  
supermarkets.	   Simple	   as	   this	  markomata	  may	   be	   (requires	   no	  memory),	   all	   of	   the	  
other	  functions	  require	  their	  own	  tailored	  formalizations.	  Thus,	  any	  real	  life	  market	  
is	   complex	   system	   encompassing	   many	   automata	   of	   ‘’various	   degrees	   of	  
computational	   capacity’’.	   Even	   the	   most	   common	   posted	   price	   markomata	   could	  
reach	   very	   high	   levels	   of	   computational	   complexity,	   not	   to	   mention	   a	   sealed-­‐bid	  
market	  or	  a	  continuous	  double	  auction43.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  beyond	  the	  basic	  design	  
of	   fixed-­‐price	   posted	   offer,	   one	   can	   formalize	   a	   sealed-­‐bid	   auction,	   which	   require	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43	  More	  elaborate	  definitions	  of	  each	  class	  of	  automaton	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Mirowski	  
(2002,	  pp.	  88–92)(Mirowski,	  2002,	  p.	  571)	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memory	   capacity	   as	   each	   submitted	   bid	   has	   to	   be	   compared	   to	   previous	   ones.	   	   A	  
double	  auction	  requires	  even	  more	  capacity,	  as	  various	  sequences	  of	  both	  bids	  and	  
asks	   need	   to	   be	   compared	   and	   matched,	   the	   equivalent	   of	   a	   linear	   bounded	  
automaton	   (Mirowski,	   2007,	   p.226).	   Moreover,	   Mirowski	   uses	   the	   cost	   of	  
computation	  as	  an	  explanation	  for	  the	  traditional	  success	  of	  posted-­‐offer	  fixed	  price	  
markets	  (lower	  computational	  costs)	  and	  the	  relative	  rare	  occurrence	  of	  continuous	  
double	   auction	   matching	   mechanisms	   (higher	   computational	   costs),	   despite	   the	  
higher	   efficiencies	   exhibited	   by	   the	   latter.	   As	   we	   have	   seen,	   he	   uses	   Chomsky’s	  
hierarchy	  of	  complexity	  in	  order	  to	  explain	  this	  evolution	  from	  lower	  level	  to	  higher-­‐
level	  markomata,	  as	  well	  as	   the	   reason	  why	  all	  of	   them	  still	  persist	   in	  our	  modern	  
day	  economies.	  	  
	  
It	   would	   appear	   that	   markomata	   capable	   of	   advanced	   simulation	   arise	  
chronologically	   later	   than	   their	   simpler	   relatively	   self-­‐contained	  predecessors	  
(Mirowski,	  2007,	  p.227).	  
	  
The	  population	  of	  possible	  markomata	  are	  thus	  organized	  according	  to	  a	  hierarchical	  
system	   of	   computation	   complexity,	   with	   each	   new	   markomata	   being	   able	   to	  
simulate	  the	  functioning	  of	   lower	   level	  markomata.	  Reproduction	  occurs	  when	  one	  
markomata	   succeeds	   in	   reproducing	   the	   operations	   of	   other	   markomata	  
‘’incorporating	  a	  simulation	  of	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  specific	  market	  format	  into	  their	  
own,	  different	  market	  format’’	  (Mirowski	  and	  Somefun,	  1998,	  p.21).	  Whether	  or	  not	  
there	   is	   a	   time	   arrow	   in	   this	   trajectory,	   history	   shows	   us	   the	   subsequent	  
development	  of	  more	  and	  more	  computationally	  complex	  markomata.	  	  The	  fact	  that	  
markets	  don’t	  emerge	   in	  a	  vacuum	   is	  a	  question	  of	  common	  sense,	  but	   it	   requires	  
some	   intellectual	   effort	   to	   understand	   that	   markomata	   actually	   evolve	   within	   an	  
ecology	   of	   human	  beings,	   technological	   artefacts	   and	   the	  wider	   environment.	   It	   is	  
this	  wider	  environment	  that	  acts	  as	  selective	  pressures	  on	  the	  diverse	  population	  of	  
markomata	  and	  leads	  to	  the	  selection	  of	  specific	  localized	  designs.	  	  
	  
Some	  markomata	  become	  established	  in	  certain	  limited	  areas	  (such	  as	  double	  
auctions	  in	  finance)	  because	  they	  are	  perceived	  to	  bundle	  an	  array	  of	  functions	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deemed	  particularly	   suited	   to	   the	  community	  constituted	   to	  promote	  certain	  
objectives	   (futures	   and	   options,	   arbitrage,	   rapid	   market	   clearing)	   whereas	  
others	  become	  more	  evenly	  distributed	  across	  the	   landscape	  (such	  as	  posted	  
price)	  due	  to	  their	  relative	  robustness	  to	  a	  wide	  array	  of	  situations	  (Mirowski,	  
2007,	  p.237).	  
	  
One	   interesting	   selection	   pressure	   is	   the	   increase	   of	   transaction	   volumes,	   which	  
poses	   new	   demands	   and	   challenges	   to	   market	   structure.	   As	   we	   will	   see	   in	   a	  
subsequent	   chapter,	   the	  history	  of	  most	   stock	  exchanges	   from	   the	  19th	   century	   to	  
the	   present	   would	   reinforce	   such	   a	   statement	   (Friedman,	   2007).	   The	   history	   of	  
exchanges	  shows	  us	  that	  given	  certain	  conditions,	  buyers	  will	  tend	  to	  favour	  markets	  
with	   a	   lot	   of	   sellers	   and	   vice-­‐versa.	   More	   recently,	   the	   rise	   of	   automation	   and	  
electronic	  trading	  has	  ushered	   in	  a	  new	  era	   in	  the	  research	  and	  design	  of	  markets.	  
This	   means	   that	   question	   regarding	   markets	   become	   and	   engineering	   questions	  
rather	  than	  an	  issue	  of	  philosophy	  or	  ontology.	  When	  one	  has	  to	  design	  new	  trading	  
platforms	  for	  scratch,	  the	  whole	  inventory	  of	  neoclassical	  economics	  will	  be	  of	  little	  
help.	  	  	  
	  
For	  as	  programmers	  are	  hired	   to	  automate	  markets,	   they	  will	  be	  brought	  up	  
abruptly	  against	  the	  fact	  that	  small	  differences	  in	  market	  algorithms	  make	  big	  
differences	  in	  market	  outcomes;	  and,	  furthermore,	  that	  one	  cannot	  load	  all	  the	  
computational	   capacity	   onto	   the	   artificial	   agents	   and	   none	   onto	   the	  
environment	   within	   which	   they	   are	   presumed	   to	   operate’’(Mirowski,	   2002,	  
p.567)	  
	  
In	  any	  case,	   the	  advent	  of	  electronic	  automated	  markets	  opens	  up	  the	  question	  of	  
invention	  and	  production	  of	  novelty.	  The	  design	  of	  the	  market	  matching	  algorithms,	  
i.e	   the	   auction	   process,	   is	   crucial.	   Thus,	   moving	   away	   from	   dogma	   of	   efficient	  
allocation,	  markets	  must	  be	  analysed	  by	  looking	  at	  how	  the	  perform	  specific	  market	  
functions.	   As	   there	   is	   not	   necessarily	   one	   perfect	   design	   for	   all	   possible	   market	  
functions,	   the	   wide	   variety	   of	   markets	   comes	   from	   the	   way	   in	   which	   they	   fulfil	  
various	   functions:	   order	   matching,	   routing,	   execution,	   clearing	   and	   settlement,	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computing	   prices,	   record	   keeping	   and	   information	   dissemination,	   etc.	   Success	   in	  
efficiently	   implementing	   these	   functions	   is	   no	   trivial	   thing.	   The	   continuous	  
production	  of	  prices	  and	  their	  dissemination	  is	  a	  sign	  that	  a	  particular	  markomata	  is	  
working,	  i.e.	  maintaining	  the	  continuous	  flow	  of	  transactions.	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Conclusions	  
	  
In	   the	   previous	   chapter	   we	   explored	   Simondon’s	   general	   understanding	   of	  
technology,	   inspired	   of	   cybernetics,	   information	   theory	   and	   computer	   science.	  
Drawing	   from	   the	   same	   lineage,	   Mirowski	   looks	   at	   markets	   in	   particular	   as	  
technological	  systems	  that	   ‘’facilitate	  the	  conduct	  of	  exchange	  and	  the	  conveyance	  
of	  information	  between	  buyers	  and	  sellers’’	  (Mirowski	  and	  Somefun,	  1998,	  p.13).	  	  To	  
this	  aim,	  we	  reviewed	  his	  computational	  and	  evolutionary	  economics	  and	  his	  theory	  
of	  markomata,	  where	  he	  argues	  for	  the	  possibility	  of	  formalizing	  markets	  in	  general	  
as	  particular	  types	  of	  algorithms	  (Mirowski,	  2010).	  In	  this	  account,	  markomata	  work	  
just	  like	  any	  other	  algorithmic	  process,	  by	  accepting	  a	  series	  of	  inputs	  (bids/asks)	  and	  
producing	   a	   set	   of	   outputs	   (prices	   and	   quantities).	   Rather	   than	   fixating	   on	   the	  
rational	   optimization	   of	   individual	   agents,	   Mirowski’s	   unorthodox	   approach	  
highlights	  novel	  possibilities	   for	  economic	   research,	   such	  as	   the	   study	  of	   the	  great	  
diversity	  of	  market	   forms.	  The	  evolutionary	  units	  are	   the	  different	  market	  designs,	  
while	   human	   societies	  would	   be	  more	   like	   environmental	   pressures.	   But	  Mirowski	  
insists	   that	   this	   evolutionary	   perspective	   is	   not	   Darwinian	   but	   comes	   from	   von	  
Neumann’s	   theory	   of	   automata	   and	   Chomsky’s	   understanding	   of	   computational	  
hierarchy.	  For	  a	  long	  time,	  fixed-­‐price	  posted-­‐offer	  markets,	  of	  lower	  computational	  
complexity	   but	   with	   high	   reliability	   and	   resilience,	   have	   dominated	   economic	  
exchange.	   In	   certain	  environments,	   sealed-­‐bid	  auctions	   (government	   infrastructure	  
projects),	  Dutch	   auctions	   (selling	   tulip	   bulbs)	   or	   continuous	  double	   auctions	   (stock	  
exchanges)	   emerge	   above	   this	   basic	   level	   of	   markets.	   It	   might	   seem	   strange	   to	  
understand	   markets	   as	   a	   diverse	   ecology	   of	   automata.	   But	   it	   is	   a	   far	   more	  
appropriate	  perspective	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  present	  explosion	  of	  electronic	  trading	  
platforms,	   e-­‐commerce,	   algorithmic	   trading,	   etc.	   In	   any	   case,	   it	   is	   obvious	   that	  
Mirowski’s	  theory	  of	  markomata	  offers	  a	  solid	  foundation	  for	  our	  understanding	  of	  
transaction	  machines.	   His	  work	   is	   a	   brilliant	   attempt	   at	   combining	   computational,	  
evolutionary	  and	   institutional	  economics,	  which	  allows	  one	  to	   think	  about	  markets	  
as	  machines	  evolving	  under	  the	  selective	  pressures	  of	  human	  society.	  	  
	  
We	  have	  offered	  a	  definition	  of	  transaction	  machines	  in	  the	  introduction,	  namely	  as	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those	  socio-­‐technical	  systems	  performing	  certain	  functions	  that	  maintain	  the	  flow	  of	  
financial	   transactions,	   i.e.	   the	   infrastructure	   of	   financial	  markets.	   In	   terms	   of	   their	  
most	  basic	  formal	  understanding,	  these	  machines	  receive	  a	  certain	  number	  of	  inputs	  
(trade	   requests/orders),	   process	   them	   according	   to	   a	   set	   of	   rules	   and	   procedures	  
(algorithms)	  and	  provide	  certain	  outputs.	  Both	  Simondon’s	  philosophy	  of	  technology	  
and	   Mirowski’s	   computational	   evolutionary	   economics	   allow	   us	   further	   elaborate	  
our	  initial	  definition	  and	  clarify	  our	  overall	  approach:	  
	  
• Transaction	  machines	  are	  socio-­‐technical	  systems.	  They	  emerge	  in	  the	  context	  
of	  human	  social	   interaction	  and	  exchange.	  For	   the	  purpose	  of	   this	   thesis,	  we	  
focus	   on	   transaction	  machines	   that	   perform	   certain	   functions	   (matching	   and	  
clearing)	  relative	  to	  the	  exchange	  of	  financial	  securities.	  
• They	   comprise	   a	   specific	   set	   of	   rules	   and	   procedures	   (algorithms)	   and	   a	  
physical	  hardware	  on	  which	  to	  execute	  them.	  	  Whether	  they	  are	  paper	  based	  
or	   instantiated	   on	   electronic	   circuitry,	   executed	   by	   human	   individuals	   or	  
computers,	   the	   common	   tread	   for	   all	   of	   these	   transaction	   machines	   is	   that	  
they	   essentially	   perform	   a	   precise	   set	   of	   tasks	   relative	   to	   the	   processing	   of	  
financial	  flows.	  	  
• The	   thesis	   focuses	   on	   those	   transaction	   machines	   that	   act	   as	   the	   crucial	  
infrastructure	   of	   financial	   markets,	   that	   is	   to	   say,	   the	   basic	   operations	   that	  
make	  financial	  markets	  function	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  
• Change	   occurs	   when	   new	   transaction	   machines	   are	   developed,	   with	   more	  
efficient	  and	  complex	  designs.	  In	  this	  sense,	  more	  evolved	  versions	  incorporate	  
the	   operations	   of	   previous	   ones	   while	   also	   adding	   novel	   functionalities.	  
Moreover,	   there	   is	   an	   evolutionary	   trajectory	   that	   leads	   to	   more	   complex	  
transaction	  machines,	  which	  are	  also	  more	  computationally	  expensive.	  
• Transaction	  machines	  continue	  to	  evolve	  under	  the	  demands	  and	  needs	  of	  its	  
users,	   new	   technological	   innovations,	   regulatory	   changes,	   as	   well	   as	   the	  
introduction	  of	  more	  complex	  financial	  securities.	  
• In	   time,	   these	   constraints	   and	   pressures	   lead	   to	   higher	   levels	   of	   automation	  
and	   standardization.	   The	   ‘hardware’	   of	   transaction	   machine	   moves	   from	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human-­‐based	  manual	  processes	  to	  ICT-­‐based	  platforms.	  Human	  beings	  are	  no	  
longer	  the	  dominant	  technical	  individuals	  process	  the	  transactional	  flows	  
• The	  control	  of	  transaction	  machines	  is	  a	  crucial	  aspect	  of	  the	  power	  dynamics	  
in	   financial	  markets,	  understood	   in	   terms	  of	   the	  ability	   to	  maintain,	  organize	  
and	  process	  the	  flow	  of	  financial	  transactions.	  	  
	  
In	   the	   subsequent	   chapters	   we	   will	   apply	   the	   theoretical	   framework	   to	   several	  
historical	  examples	  in	  order	  to	  track	  the	  evolution	  of	  specific	  transaction	  machines.	  
The	  ultimate	  aim	   is	   to	   show	  how	   this	   perspective	   can	  be	  used	   to	  offer	   a	  different	  
understanding	  of	  the	  history	  of	  financial	  markets	  and	  shed	  a	  different	  light	  on	  their	  
contemporary	  transformations.	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PART	  II:	  HISTORY	  
	  





This	  chapter	  describes	  the	  gradual	  development	  of	  transaction	  machines	  in	  medieval	  
Europe.	  We	  start	  by	  looking	  at	  the	  rebirth	  of	  the	  European	  economy,	  with	  the	  growth	  
of	  agricultural,	  trade	  and	  urban	  life	  allowing	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  group	  of	  specialized	  
commercial	   and	   financial	   intermediaries.	   We	   focus	   particularly	   on	   the	   case	   of	  
Florentine	  merchant-­‐banking	  partnerships,	  involved	  both	  in	  banking	  and	  commercial	  
enterprises.	   These	  were	   international	   companies	  managed	   by	   a	  managing	   partner	  
through	  his	  holding	  company	  using	  techniques	  such	  as	  current	  accounts	  and	  double-­‐
entry	  bookkeeping.	  In	  time,	  a	  need	  arose	  for	  more	  efficient	  transactional	  mechanisms	  
developed	  specifically	  for	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  growing	  world	  of	  finance	  and	  commerce.	  
We	   describe	   the	   development	   of	   two	   different	   types	   of	   transaction	   machines,	   a	  
matching	   machine	   and	   a	   clearing	   machine.	   Both	   of	   them	   developed	   in	   order	   to	  
service	   the	   needs	   of	   international	   merchant-­‐bankers	   and	   their	   complex	   web	   of	  
transactions.	  The	  first	  matching	  machines	  developed	  around	  the	  activity	  of	  brokers	  
and	  their	  specific	  matching	  algorithms.	  The	  city	  of	  Bruges	  and	  then	  Antwerp	  were	  the	  
first	  to	  establish	  a	  Bourse,	  affording	  the	  aggregation	  of	  a	  larger	  number	  of	  brokers,	  
performing	  matching	  in	  a	  more	  centralized	  way.	  Later,	  the	  Amsterdam	  Exchange	  was	  
a	  more	  concretized	  machine	  composed	  of	  some	  300	  licensed	  brokers.	  In	  this	  context,	  
brokers	  developed	  a	  number	  of	  different	  matching	  algorithms,	   such	  as	   single-­‐sided	  
auctions	   in	   both	   a	   sealed-­‐bid	   and	   open	   outcry	   format.	   With	   the	   increase	   in	  
transaction	   volumes,	   merchant-­‐bankers	   also	   needed	   to	   reduce	   and	   compress	   the	  
complex	  web	  of	   exposures	   accrued	  amongst	   themselves.	  At	   this	   point	  we	   focus	   on	  
the	  clearing	  machine	  as	  it	  developed	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  clearing	  fairs	  of	  Champagne	  
and	   Piacenza.	  We	   describe	   the	   overall	  mechanism,	   using	   bilateral	   and	  multilateral	  
clearing,	   comprising	   both	   cycles	   and	   chains.	   While	   they	   represented	   a	   substantial	  
increase	  in	  transactional	  efficiency,	  these	  machines	  were	  essentially	  based	  on	  human	  
beings	  and	  required	  extensive	  amounts	  of	  manual	  labor.	  	  Finally,	  we	  show	  how	  these	  
medieval	   transition	  machines	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  the	  basic	  building	  blocks	   for	  the	  more	  
‘evolved’	   modern	   versions	   such	   as	   the	   London	   Stock	   Exchange	   and	   the	   London	  
Clearinghouse.	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4.1	  Towns	  and	  Markets	  	  
	  	  
	  
This	  chapter	  begins	  our	  historical	  narrative	  with	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  last	  millennium,	  
a	  period	  of	  great	  turmoil	  and	  opportunity	  for	  the	  western	  societies.	  It	  was	  a	  time	  of	  
general	  delirium,	  of	  a	  very	  special	  kind	  of	  dis-­‐individuation,	  the	  gradual	  break-­‐up	  of	  
the	  once	  mighty	  Carolingian	  empire.	  	  As	  Éric	  Aliez	  puts	  it,	  the	  year	  1033	  was	  the	  year	  
of	   general	   disarray,	   the	   so-­‐called	   ‘’Parousia	  of	   the	   Last	  Day’’	   (Alliez,	   1996,	  p.	   141).	  
The	  social	  institutions	  based	  on	  agriculture,	  religion	  and	  warfare	  that	  had	  dominated	  
for	   centuries,	   were	   now	   undergoing	   tremendous	   change.	   If	   we	   follow	   Aliez’s	  
hypothesis	   to	  the	  end,	  a	  contamination	  occurs	  when	  the	  military-­‐religious	  colossus	  
of	   Charlemagne	   enters	   into	   contact	   with	   the	   highly	   developed	   urban	   centres	   of	  
Islamic	  world.	  Sometimes	  between	  the	  9th	  and	  10th	  centuries,	  change	  was	  underway,	  
and	  its	  main	  effect	  was	  the	  shakedown	  of	  the	  established	  social	  and	  economic	  order:	  
	  
(…)	  Catholic	  Europe	  moved	  from	  stagnation	  at	  the	  lowest	  level	  to	  a	  social	  and	  
economic	  mobility	  full	  of	  dangers	  but	  open	  to	  hope	  (Lopez,	  1971,	  p.	  31)	  	  
	  
Perhaps	  the	  one	  who	  has	  provided	  us	  with	  the	  most	  detailed	  account	  of	  this	  gradual	  
transformation	   is	   Fernand	   Braudel	   in	   his	   Capitalism	   and	   Material	   Life	   1400-­‐1800	  
(Braudel,	   1975)	   and	   Capitalism	   and	   Civilization	   15th-­‐18th	   Century	   (Braudel	   et	   al.,	  
1981;	  Braudel,	  1982;	  Braudel,	  1984).	  His	  account	  of	  the	  development	  of	  capitalism,	  
is	  very	  interesting,	  particularly	  in	  terms	  of	  his	  interest	  for	  the	  early	  commercial	  city-­‐
states,	  Venice,	  Genoa,	  Antwerp	  and	  Amsterdam,	  etc.	  What	  is	  sticking	  in	  these	  cases	  
is	   that	  all	  of	   these	  proto-­‐capitalist	  powerhouses	  gradually	  developed	  as	  a	   result	  of	  
the	  connection,	  conjugation	  and	  resolution	  of	  several	  flows	  of	  technological	  objects,	  
goods,	  and	  people.	  	  
	  
Then	   in	   the	   late	   eleventh	   century	   there	   was	   an	   outburst	   of	   energy	   and	  
confidence	  seen	  before	  only	   in	  Periclean	  Athens	   (…)	  Change	  was	  everywhere	  
(…)	  by	  1100,	  cities,	  merchants,	  and	  cloth	  manufacturing	  were	  suddenly	  in	  rapid	  
growth	  (Franklin,	  2001,	  p.	  14).	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Andrew	  Watson’s	  1974	  article	  on	  the	  Arab	  agricultural	  revolution	  and	  its	  impact	  on	  
the	  European	  economy	  is	  particularly	  useful	  in	  understanding	  this	  gradual	  rebirth	  of	  
socio-­‐economic	   life.	   In	   that	   text,	  Watson	   argues	   for	   the	  decisive	   influence	  of	  Arab	  
agricultural	   innovations,	   as	   something	   that	   impacted	   heavily	   on	   the	   entire	  
Mediterranean.	  Watson’s	  interest	  goes	  towards	  the	  introduction	  of	  new	  crops,	  new	  
techniques,	   farming	   manuals	   and	   the	   modes	   of	   organization	   that	   come	   with	   it	  
(Andrew	   M.	   Watson,	   1974;	   Decker,	   2009).	   While	   the	   actual	   magnitude	   of	   this	  
revolution	   is	   still	   debated	   by	   economic	   historians,	   it	   is	   clear	   that	   the	   gradual	  
development	   of	   tools	   and	   techniques	   had	   a	   direct	   impact	   on	   the	   European	  
continent.	   This	  makes	   sense	   in	   as	  much	   as	   the	  Mediterranean	  must	   be	   seen	   as	   a	  
porous	  space	  between	  Christian	  Europe	  and	  the	  Muslim	  Levant,	  a	  space	  of	  mutual	  
contamination,	   which	   certainly	   had	   some	   impact	   on	   the	   so-­‐called	   European	  
Medieval	   Agricultural	   Revolution	   of	   the	   11th	   century.	   The	   innovation	   of	   open	   field	  
agriculture	  based	  on	  the	  heavy	  plough	  and	  crop	  rotation,	  and	  the	  way	  in	  which	  new	  
tools	  and	  techniques	  came	  together	   in	  a	  different	  way	   (McCloskey,	  1991;	  Gies	  and	  
Gies,	   1995;	   Alliez,	   1996,	   p.	   152;	   Richardson,	   2005).	   In	   Braudel’s	   account,	   the	  
expansion	  of	  material	   life	   is	   linked	  to	  the	  great	  agricultural	  boom	  at	  the	  eve	  of	  the	  
last	  millennium.	  Urban	  centres,	  which	  had	  been	  in	  degradation	  since	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  
Roman	  Empire,	  began	  to	  regain	  their	   functionality,	   their	   former	  glory.	  This	  process	  
was	   related	   to	   an	   increase	   in	   population,	  which	   in	   turn	  meant	   a	   concentration	   of	  
labour	   that	   resulted	   in	   the	   improvement	   of	   the	   land,	   the	   multiplication	   of	   tools,	  
ameliorations	  of	  techniques	  and	  the	  stimulation	  of	  agricultural	  and	  non-­‐agricultural	  
activities	   (Lopez,	   1971,	   p.	   30).	   	   Thus,	   medieval	   Europe	   became	   a	   puzzle	   of	   small	  
markets	   and	   fairs,	   which	   gradually	   developed	   into	   regional	   markets,	   reaching	   its	  
peak	  in	  in	  the	  golden	  age	  of	  the	  fairs	  of	  Champagne	  (Braudel,	  1982).	  As	  trade	  routes	  
began	  to	  converge	  on	  a	  geographic	  location,	  a	  new	  commercial	  hub	  would	  emerge,	  
such	   as	   Venice,	   Genoa,	   Antwerp	   or	   Amsterdam	   in	   later	   periods.	  Manuel	   DeLanda	  
understands	   these	   commercial	   cities	   as	   attractors	   for	   regional	   and	   continental	  
commercial	  flows	  (DeLanda,	  1997).	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As	  we	  will	  see,	  this	   impressive	  rebirth	  of	  material	   life	  and	  commerce	  would	  sustain	  
not	  just	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  commercial	  capitalism	  but	  also	  that	  of	  financial	  markets,	  
with	   more	   sophisticated	   transactional	   capabilities.	   We	   will	   dedicate	   the	   next	  
chapters	   to	   the	  emergence	  of	   specialist	   financial	   intermediaries	   such	  as	   the	   Italian	  
merchant-­‐bankers	   and	   their	   advanced	   transaction	   technologies	   (double-­‐entry	  
bookkeeping	  and	  bills	   of	   exchange).	   It	  will	   also	  be	   interesting	   to	   see	  how	   financial	  
flows	   will	   gradually	   converge	   towards	   the	   commercial	   cities	   of	   Northern	   Europe,	  




	   	  
	   106	  
4.2	  Merchants	  and	  Double-­‐Entry	  Bookkeeping	  	  
	  
	  
In	   his	   1889	   doctoral	   dissertation,	   published	   as	   The	   History	   of	   Commercial	  
Partnerships	  in	  the	  Middle	  Ages	  (Weber	  and	  Kaelber,	  2002),	  Max	  Weber	  studied	  the	  
development	   of	   medieval	   contractual	   law	   and	   of	   various	   types	   of	   commercial	  
partnerships.	  	  He	  saw	  these	  forms	  of	  organization	  as	  the	  seeds	  of	  a	  new	  social	  order,	  
as	   possible	   building	   blocks	   for	   modernity	   and	   capitalism.	   Small	   ventures	   were	  
manageable	   by	   single	   merchants	   but	   large-­‐scale	   trade	   needed	   specific	   financial	  
arrangements	  that	  could	  raise	  necessary	  capital	  and	  also	  evaluate	  the	  potential	  loss	  
and	   profits.	   As	   we	   have	   seen,	   the	   medieval	   Agricultural	   Revolution	   was	   strongly	  
influenced	   by	   contacts	   with	   the	   Levant.	   Similarly,	   the	   medieval	   Commercial	  
Revolution	   was	   also	   a	   process	   that	   borrowed	   practices	   and	   techniques	   from	   the	  
Byzantine	  Empire	  and	   Islam	   in	  particular.	  According	   to	   Lopez	  and	  Raymond	   (1955)	  
one	   of	   the	  most	   important	   commercial	   innovations,	   the	   Italian	   commenda	   had	   its	  
origins	   in	   contracts	   such	  as	   the	  Roman	   ‘’societas’’,	   the	  Byzantine	   ‘’chreokoinonia’’,	  
and	   the	  Muslim	   ‘’qirad’’	   (Udovitch,	  1962;	  Pryor,	  1977).	  The	  commenda	  was	  a	   legal	  
contract	  by	  which	  a	  group	  of	  merchants	  would	  pool	  capital	  to	  one	  venture	  organized	  
by	  an	  agent-­‐manager,	  who	  upon	  completion	  would	  return	  the	  initial	  investment	  plus	  
a	  share	  of	  the	  profits.	   In	  the	  case	  of	  a	   loss,	   the	  agent-­‐manager	  would	   lose	  only	  his	  
effort	  and	  labour	  while	  the	  investors	  lost	  their	  whole	  investment	  (their	  principal).	  In	  
fact,	  no	  other	   form	  of	   liability	  was	  possible	  under	   the	  commenda	   (Udovitch,	  1962,	  
p.198).	  The	  way	  in	  which	  it	  was	  set	  up	  was	  for	  a	  sedentary	  investor	  ‘’commendator’’	  
to	   entrust	   his	   capital	   to	   the	   hands	   of	   a	   travelling	   merchant	   ‘’tractator’’.	   The	  
‘’tractator’’	   might	   also	   add	   capital	   of	   his	   own	   but	   his	   main	   contribution	   was	   his	  
effort.	   Upon	   completion	   of	   the	   venture,	   he	   would	   return	   in	   order	   to	   divide	   the	  
profits,	   but	  he	   could	   also	   send	   the	   sum	  without	   returning	   to	   the	  homeport	  of	   the	  
investor.	   Usually,	   the	   ‘‘commendator’’	  would	   receive	  ¾	   of	   the	   profits	   and	   bear	   all	  
liability	   for	   the	   loss,	  while	   the	   ‘‘tractator’’	  would	  gain	  ¼	  of	   the	  profits	  but	  bear	  no	  
liability	  (Pryor,	  1977,	  p.6).	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An	   even	   more	   interesting	   innovation	   was	   the	   Florentine	   merchant-­‐banking	  
partnership	  comprising	  many	  different	  business	  ventures	  spread	  across	  geographies.	  
As	   we	   already	   noted,	   Max	   Weber	   recognized	   the	   importance	   of	   medieval	  
partnerships	  and	  saw	  them	  as	  one	  of	   the	  driving	   forces	  behind	  modern	  capitalism.	  
One	  of	  the	  crucial	  novelties	  introduced	  by	  the	  partnership	  system	  was	  double-­‐entry	  
bookkeeping	   technique,	   which	   allowed	   for	   more	   efficient	   ways	   of	   organizing	   a	  
business.	  It	  was	  a	  new	  way	  of	  organizing	  incomes	  and	  expenditures	  and	  gain	  a	  clear	  
picture	  of	  the	  profitability	  of	  an	  enterprise44.	  
	  
Formerly	   noncomparable	   objects	   are	   made	   commensurable:	   apples	   and	  
oranges	   find	   a	   common	   denominator	   in	   monetary	   price.	   Commensurability	  
makes	   it	   feasible	   to	   compare	   and	   evaluate	   alternatives	   (…)	   In	   an	   account,	  
outcomes	   can	   be	   reduced	   to	   a	   single	   numeraire,	   money,	   and	   their	   relative	  
profitability	  assessed	  (Carruthers	  and	  Espeland,	  1991,	  p.58).	  
	  
Once	   this	   technique	   is	   in	   place,	   the	   pursuit	   of	   profit	   and	   accumulation	   of	   capital	  
becomes	   feasible	   and	   it	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   a	   triumph	   of	   rationality	   consistent	   with	  
Weber’s	   account	   of	  modernity	   (1930).	  Werner	   Sombart	   (1902)	   also	   saw	  medieval	  
accounting	  techniques	  as	  the	  very	  foundations	  of	  modern	  capitalism,	  understanding	  
double-­‐entry	  bookkeeping	  as	  absolutely	  essential	  in	  valuing	  something	  like	  capital	  in	  
the	   first	   place.	   In	   addition	   to	  Weber	   and	   Sombart,	   Schumpeter	   (1976)	   also	   saw	   a	  
close	  connection	  between,	  accounting,	  rationality	  and	  capitalism.	  Profit	  could	  for	  the	  
first	   time	   take	   a	   precise	   quantitative	   form,	   calculated	   in	   monetary	   terms.	   The	  
argument	  is	  based	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  double-­‐entry	  bookkeeping	  ‘’makes	  it	  possible	  for	  
capitalists	   to	   evaluate	   rationally	   the	   consequences	   of	   their	   past	   decisions’’	  
(Carruthers	  and	  Espeland,	  1991,	  p.32).	  
	  
Many	  historians	  have	  downplayed	  the	  actual	  impact	  of	  the	  technique	  (Yamey,	  1964)	  
or	  demonstrated	  that	  it	  was	  not	  fully	  developed	  and	  used	  until	  the	  late	  Middle	  Ages	  
(Ryan,	   2014).	   More	   recently,	   questions	   were	   raised	   about	   the	   origin	   of	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44	  The	  system	  is	  particularly	  useful	   in	  terms	  of	  error	  correction	  as	  credit	  and	  debits	  
need	  to	  match	  for	  every	  account.	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technique,	  whether	  it	  emerged	  in	  the	  world	  of	  trade	  or	  in	  the	  domain	  of	  banking	  and	  
finance.	   In	   our	   current	   understanding,	   double-­‐entry	   bookkeeping	   is	   a	   system	   of	  
accounting	   whereby	   every	   transaction	   has	   two	   entries	   in	   two	   separate	   accounts.	  
Part	   of	   Yamey’s	   position	   was	   that	   unless	   the	   balancing	   of	   accounts	   occurred	  
regulatory,	   then	   the	   systems	   would	   not	   offer	   any	   major	   improvement	   relative	   to	  
single-­‐entry	   bookkeeping.	   Because	   he	   could	   not	   find	   any	   evidence	   of	   regular	  
balancing,	   Yamey	   concluded	   that	   the	   system	  was	  mostly	   used	   to	   keep	   records	   of	  
business	   activity	   and	   not	   really	   used	   to	   calculate	   profits	   and	   capital.	   This	   last	  
perspective	   is	  consistent	  with	  one	  of	   the	   first	  written	  explanations	  of	  double-­‐entry	  
bookkeeping	  dating	  back	  to	  the	  medieval	  mathematician	  Luca	  Pacioli,	  when	  in	  1494	  
he	  was	  praising	  the	  merits	  of	  the	  technique:	  
	  
This	  is	  very	  useful,	  because	  it	  would	  be	  impossible	  to	  conduct	  business	  without	  
due	  order	  of	  recording,	  for	  without	  rest,	  merchants	  would	  always	  be	   in	  great	  
mental	  trouble	  (Quoted	  in	  Carruthers	  and	  Espeland,	  1991,	  26).	  
	  	  
While	  double-­‐entry	  bookkeeping	  was	  certainly	  used	  before	  his	  time,	  Pacioli’s	  treatise	  
offers	  the	  first	  detailed	  algorithmic	  description	  of	  how	  to	  maintain	  the	  order	  in	  ones	  
business	   affairs.	   While	   this	   might	   seem	   like	   a	   simple	   operation,	   the	   method	   of	  
recording	   every	   transaction	   twice	   in	   a	   tabular	   manner,	   both	   as	   a	   debit	   and	   as	   a	  
credit,	   was	   a	   significant	   innovation	   for	   that	   time.	   All	   business	   counterparties	   had	  
their	  own	  current	  account	   in	   the	  book.	  Balancing	  the	  accounts	  would	  allow	  one	  to	  
gain	   a	   lot	   more	   clarity	   on	   what	   is	   owed	   and/or	   what	   is	   due	   with	   respect	   to	   its	  
business	   partners,	   the	   State,	   suppliers,	   customers,	   etc.	   	   In	   this	   sense,	   the	   balance	  
between	  debits	  and	  credits	  represents	  profits	  or	  losses.	  But	  this	  accounting	  method	  
is	   also	   crucial	   in	   the	   case	   of	   auditing	   the	   operations	   of	   an	   enterprise,	   which	   was	  
particularly	   important	   in	   the	   Middle	   Ages	   when	   merchants	   were	   under	   the	  
supervision	  of	  the	  Church,	  the	  State	  and	  guilds.	  	  
	  
Alan	   Sangster	   (2015)	   has	   recently	   argued	   that	   one	   should	   look	   for	   the	   origins	   of	  
double-­‐entry	  bookkeeping	  with	  the	  bankers	  of	  medieval	  Italy,	  rather	  than	  the	  likes	  of	  
(Zerbi,	   1952)	   (Littleton,	   1933)	   who	   see	   its	   origins	   within	   the	   world	   of	   trade.	   He	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argues	   that	   it	   was	   a	   lot	   more	   important	   for	   bankers	   to	   know	   precisely	   what	   the	  
balance	  was	  between	  debtors	  and	  creditors,	  as	   it	  was	  a	  ‘’fundamental	  for	  survival’’	  
(the	  Genesis	  of	  Double	  Entry	  Bookkeeping	  Alan	   Sangster).	  Moreover,	   double-­‐entry	  
bookkeeping	  was	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  initially	  used	  by	  bankers	  because	  certain	  political	  
and	   religious	   authorities	   demanded	   a	   clear	   audit	   trail.	   One	   can	   think	   here	   of	   the	  
prohibition	   of	   usury,	   enforced	   by	   the	   Catholic	   Church,	   but	   more	   importantly	   the	  
requirements	   of	   guilds	   responsible	   for	   resolving	   business	   disputes	   and	   accounting	  
mismatches.	   By	   analyzing	   the	   ‘’libri	   de	   cassa’’	   of	   Florentine	   bankers,	   Sangster	  
concludes	  that	  it	  was	  in	  this	  context	  that	  double-­‐entry	  bookkeeping	  first	  emerged:	  
	  
The	   process	   of	   double	   entry	   was	   born	   when	   the	   decision	   was	   taken	   by	   a	  
banker	  to	  allow	  transferences	  between	  the	  accounts	  of	  his	  customers	  without	  
involving	  movement	  of	  cash,	  a	  process	  facilitated	  by	  including	  the	  accounts	  for	  
all	  debtors	  and	  all	  creditors	  in	  one	  book	  (Sangster,	  2015,	  p.14).	  
	  
He	  also	  argues	   that	   the	   terminology	   (‘’die	  dare’’	   and	   ‘’die	  avere’’)	  used	   in	   the	  12th	  
and	  13th	  centuries	  bookkeeping	  was	  specific	  to	  the	  activities	  of	  bankers.	  One	  of	  the	  
reason	  why	  historians	  have	  focused	  more	  on	  the	  accounting	  practices	  of	  merchants	  
was	   that,	   for	   a	   long	   time,	   bankers	   used	   a	  mixed	   form	   of	   single-­‐entry	   and	   double-­‐
entry	   bookkeeping	   in	   order	   to	   hide	   the	   charging	   of	   interest	   and	   evade	   the	  
interdiction	  of	  usury.	  	  	  
	  
In	   any	   case,	   rather	   than	   focusing	   too	  much	   either	   on	   bankers	   or	   merchants,	   it	   is	  
possible	  to	  understand	  the	  emergence	  of	  double-­‐entry	  bookkeeping	  precisely	  at	  the	  
confluence	  of	  these	  two	  groups.	  	  In	  a	  series	  of	  recent	  articles,	  John	  Padgett	  and	  Paul	  
McLean	  (2006;	  2009;	  2011)	  have	  constructed	  a	  detailed	  picture	  of	  the	  emergence	  of	  
merchant-­‐banking	  partnership	  in	  medieval	  Florence.	   	  They	  begin	  by	  arguing	  for	  the	  
importance	  and	  impact	  of	  the	  Ciompi	  Revolt	  (1378-­‐1382),	  which	  was	  a	  considerable	  
upheaval	  of	  Florentine	  society.	  But	  what	  matters	  for	  them	  is	  the	  way	  in	  which	  power	  
relations	  were	  restructured	  after	  the	  revolt,	  such	  as	  the	  change	  in	  status	  and	  rights	  
of	  bankers.	  Before	   the	  revolt,	   the	  guild	  system	  effectively	   limited	   the	  expansion	  of	  
banking	   beyond	   Florence.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   merchant	   families	   were	   heavily	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involved	   in	   international	   trade.	   The	   other	   difference	   consisted	   in	   the	   fact	   that	  
banking	   was	   organized	   along	   master-­‐apprentice	   contractual	   relationships	   while	  
merchant	  companies	  were	  built	  on	  family	  ties.	  The	  aftermath	  of	  the	  revolt	  saw	  the	  
blending	  of	  these	  two	  groups	  both	  by	  the	  bankers	  taking	  public	  office	  and	  through	  
marriages:	  	  
 
The	   result	  was	   a	  modularized	   hybrid—short-­‐term	   contracts	  with	   both	   family	  
and	  nonfamily	  branch	  managers—in	  other	  words,	  the	  partnership	  system.	  (…)	  
this	   new	   organizational	   form	   led	   Florentine	   businessmen	   to	   new	   ways	   for	  
companies	   to	   relate	   to	   each	   other	   in	   the	  market,	   through	   current	   accounts,	  
credit,	  and	  double-­‐entry	  bookkeeping	  (Padgett	  and	  McLean	  2006,	  p.	  1472).	  
	  
These	  new	  Florentine	  merchant-­‐banking	  partnerships	  were	  involved	  both	  in	  banking	  
and	   commercial	   enterprises,	   establishing	   branches	  with	   both	   family	  members	   and	  
external	   partners	   across	   Europe.	   They	  were	   in	   effect	   European-­‐wide	   transactional	  
networks	   managed	   by	   the	   managing	   partner	   through	   his	   holding	   company	   and	  
supervised	   using	   techniques	   such	   as	   current	   accounts	   and	   double-­‐entry	  
bookkeeping.	   An	   analysis	   of	   the	   Datini45	  holding	   company	   reveals	   the	   impressive	  
complexity	  of	  merchant-­‐banking	  partnerships	  (Padgett	  and	  McLean,	  2006,	  p.	  1476).	  
But	   the	   stability	   of	   theses	   networks	   could	   only	   be	   achieved	   if	   supervision	   was	  
possible	   from	   the	   centre.	   In	   this	   sense,	  double-­‐entry	  bookkeeping	  was	  essential	   in	  
giving	  the	  managing	  partner	  a	  clear	  picture	  of	  the	  transactional	  flows	  between	  with	  
his	  many	  partners.	  	  
	  
Formally,	  ongoing	   relations	  of	  business	   credit	  were	   recorded	  primarily	   in	   the	  
bookkeeping	   device	   of	   current	   accounts,	   tabulated	   in	   bilateral	   format.	  
Extensive	  and	  deep	  credit	  relations	  among	  Florentine	  merchant-­‐bankers	  were	  
the	  primary	  reason	  for	  the	  century-­‐long	  dominance	  of	  international	  finance	  in	  
Europe	  by	  Florence	  (Padgett	  and	  McLean,	  2006,	  p.1467).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45	  Francesco	  Datini	  was	   at	   the	   centre	  of	   a	  merchant-­‐banking	  partnership,	  which	   in	  
the	   14th	   century	   comprised	  many	  branches	   from	   London	   to	  Barcelona,	  Genoa	   and	  
Florence	  (Padgett	  and	  McLean,	  2006).	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The	   importance	   of	   these	   partnerships	   should	   not	   be	   ignored.	   In	   fact,	   Fernand	  
Braudel	   emphasized	   the	   difference	   between	   merchant-­‐bankers	   and	   the	   other	   of	  
groups	   comprising	   medieval	   urban	   life.	   While	   shopkeepers,	   craftsmen,	  
moneychangers,	   etc.	  where	   all	   locked	   in	   their	   profession,	  merchant-­‐bankers	  had	  a	  
very	  unique	  position.	   Through	   their	  management	  of	   capital	   flows,	   they	  had	  partial	  
exposure	  to	  all	  of	  these	  fields.	  They	  would	  invest	  in	  different	  domains,	  pertaining	  to	  
the	  economic	  climate	  (grain,	  spices,	  wool,	  cloth,	  iron,	  etc.)	  (Braudel,	  1982).	  While	  the	  
system	  of	   double-­‐entry	  bookkeeping	   allowed	  merchant-­‐bankers	   to	  better	   organize	  
their	   internal	   partnership	   dealings,	   it	   also	   provided	   the	   basic	   technique	   for	   the	  
expansion	   of	   inter-­‐partnership	   credit	   provision	   (Padgett	   and	  McLean,	   2011).	   Local	  
markets	  and	  regional	  fairs	  had	  their	  own	  intermediaries	  that	  facilitated	  transactions	  
but	   international	   trade	   and	   finance	  was	   largely	   the	  monopoly	   of	   these	   specialized	  
merchants	   (de	  Roover,	  1948).	  The	  function	  performed	  by	  the	  merchant	  was	  a	  very	  
important	   one,	   connecting	   flows	   of	   production	   to	   various	   opportunities	   of	  
consumption.	  Local	  markets	  could	  only	  produce,	  consume	  and	  distribute	  goods	  in	  a	  
certain	  area	  but	  medieval	  merchants	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  an	  international	  transactional	  
network.	   As	   international	   merchant-­‐bankers	   converge	   towards	   certain	   urban	  
centres,	  these	  in	  turn	  became	  financial	  and	  commercial	  hubs	  (such	  as	  Venice,	  Genoa,	  
Bruges,	   Antwerp,	  Amsterdam).	   	  Moreover,	   as	   transaction	   volumes	   grew,	   they	   also	  
began	  to	  utilize	  more	  sophisticated	  mechanisms	  in	  order	  to	  transact	  more	  efficiently.	  
We	  are	  of	  course	  talking	  about	  the	  bourses	  or	  exchanges	  and	  the	  medieval	  clearing	  
fairs,	  which	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  transaction	  machines	  specifically	  adapted	  for	  the	  needs	  
of	  this	  sophisticate	  set	  of	  users.	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4.3	  Matching:	  Brokers	  and	  Bourses	  
	  
As	  we	  have	  seen,	  merchant-­‐bankers	  gradually	  developed	  complex	  trading	  networks.	  
Consequently,	  this	  group	  required	  equally	  sophisticated	  mechanisms	  allowing	  them	  
to	   transact	   more	   efficiently.	   The	   rest	   of	   the	   chapter	   will	   focus	   on	   two	   types	   of	  
transaction	  machines	   (matching	   and	   clearing)	   that	   emerged	   on	   order	   to	  meet	   the	  
needs	  of	  this	  commercial	  and	  financial	  community	  of	  users.	  	  
A	   soon	   as	   the	   centre	   of	   gravity	   of	   trade	   moved	   from	   regional	   markets	   to	   large	  
commercial	   cities,	   the	   function	   of	   intermediation	   was	   taken	   over	   by	   brokers	  
(Bairoch,	  1988).	   In	  fact,	  of	  the	  reasons	  that	  commercial	   flows	  converged	  towards	  a	  
certain	  town	  was	  the	  presence	  of	  brokers	  who	  could	  perform	  matching	  (Boerner	  and	  
Quint,	  2010).	   In	  a	  certain	  sense,	  merchants	  could	  only	  take	  the	  risk	  of	   leaving	  their	  
hometown	  and	  travel	  to	  other	  cities	  if	  they	  were	  pretty	  sure	  they	  could	  always	  find	  
someone	  willing	   to	   take	   the	   other	   side	   of	   the	   trade	   (Verlinden,	   1971).	  Without	   a	  
specialized	   function	   that	   could	   maintain	   markets	   in	   different	   goods,	   merchants	  
would	  be	  less	  likely	  to	  bear	  the	  risk	  of	  transporting	  goods	  from	  one	  city	  to	  another	  
(costs	  of	  searching,	  bargaining,	  etc.).	  In	  other	  words,	  as	  trade	  volumes	  grew,	  bilateral	  
search	   and	   bargaining	   gives	   way	   to	   organized	   brokerage	   institutions.	   Therefore,	  
Boerner	   and	   Quint	   have	   shown,	   medieval	   ‘’towns	   implemented	   brokerage	   as	   an	  
efficient	   matchmaking	   institution	   in	   a	   two-­‐sided	   market	   problem’’	   (Boerner	   and	  
Quint,	  2010,	  p.3).	  Brokers	  mostly	  matched	  foreign	  sellers	  and	  local	  buyers;	  because	  
foreign	   sellers	   had	   little	   knowledge	   of	   the	   local	   demand	   side	   so	   they	   would	   they	  
were	  more	  inclined	  to	  use	  the	  services	  of	  brokers.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  foreign	  buyers	  
would	  not	  necessarily	  need	  brokers	  because	  they	  could	  easily	  find	  the	  local	  sell	  side,	  
as	   in	   most	   medieval	   cities	   local	   sellers	   would	   tend	   to	   converge	   around	   certain	  
districts	   (e.g.	   Saville	   Row	   in	   London).	   In	   as	  much	   as	   brokers	   allowed	   all	   parties	   to	  
avoid	  the	  costs	  of	  searching	  for	  counterparties	  and	  agreeing	  on	  a	  price,	  they	  would	  
effectively	   step	  between	   the	  buyer	  and	   the	   seller.	  At	   the	   same	   time,	  as	   trade	  was	  
essential	  for	  the	  growth	  of	  towns,	  brokers	  were	  subject	  to	  very	  strict	  regulation:	  
(…)	  the	  broker	  could	  not	  tell	  a	  buyer	  the	  price	  the	  same	  seller	  had	  charged	  in	  
an	   earlier	   deal.	   The	   broker	   was	   also	   not	   allowed	   to	   inform	   the	   buyer	   if	   the	  
	   113	  
seller	  was	  in	  a	  hurry	  to	  sell	  his	  goods,	  nor	  tell	  the	  seller	  if	  the	  potential	  buyer	  
was	  rich	  or	  poor	  (Boerner	  and	  Quint,	  2010	  p2).	  	  
Depending	   on	   local	   regulations	   and	   the	   way	   in	   which	   they	   were	   compensated,	  
brokers	   could	  be	  more	   accommodating	   towards	   sellers	   or	   buyers.	   By	   far	   the	  most	  
dominant	  matching	  mechanism	  was	  one	  which	  certified	  a	  limited	  number	  of	  brokers	  
who	  could	  act	  only	  as	  matchmakers	  (Boerner	  and	  Quint,	  2010).	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  they	  
could	   only	   match	   buyers	   and	   sellers	   and	   were	   not	   allowed	   to	   perform	   market	  
making	   (buying	   and	   selling	   goods	   on	   their	   own	   behalf)46.	   In	   some	   cases,	   foreign	  
merchants	  were	  forced	  to	  use	  local	  brokers	  while	  in	  others	  they	  were	  not	  required	  
to	   do	   so.	   In	   any	   case,	   as	   shown	   by	   Boerner	   and	   Quint,	   the	   urban	   landscape	   of	  
Medieval	   Europe	   generated	   a	   wide	   diversity	   of	   different	   matching	   mechanisms.	  
While	  merchants	  were	  channelling	  commercial	  flows	  towards	  certain	  towns,	  brokers	  
were	   implementing	   and	   executing	   what	   we	   have	   called	   a	   matching	   machine,	  
bringing	  buyers	  and	  sellers	  together.	  While	  the	  famous	  historian	  Raymond	  de	  Roover	  
(1948)	  considered	  the	  exchange	  of	  medieval	  financial	  products	  as	  the	  quasi	  of	  Italian	  
merchant-­‐bankers,	   recent	   research	   by	   Kathryn	   Reyerson	   (2002)	   has	   argued	   that	  
brokers	  were	  also	  very	  much	  involved	  in	  matching	  financial	  products	  such	  as	  bills	  of	  
exchange.	   In	  this	  sense,	  we	  can	  understand	  broking	  as	  a	  matching	  mechanism	  that	  
developed	  for	  wholesale	  commercial	  trade	  but	  which	  was	  also	  adopted	  for	  financial	  
instruments	   such	   as	   bills	   of	   exchange	   and,	   as	   we	   will	   see,	   bonds	   and	   ultimately	  
stocks.	  	  
Components	   Algorithms	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(direct	  matchmaking)	  
Figure	  4:	  Composition	  of	  bilateral	  matching	  machines	  
The	   table	   above	   tries	   to	   unpack	   the	   most	   basic	   medieval	   matching	   machine,	  
constructed	  around	   the	  activity	  of	   individual	  brokers.	  The	   function	  of	   this	  machine	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46	  There	  were	  a	  small	  number	  of	  regulations	  that	  did	  allow	  brokers	  to	  deal	  on	  their	  
own	  behalf	  but	   it	  did	  create	  conflicts	  such	  as	   those	  between	  the	  Hanseatic	  League	  
and	  the	  city	  of	  Bruges	  (Boerner	  Quint,	  2010,	  p.9).	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was,	   for	   instance,	   to	   connect	   a	   foreign	   seller	   to	   a	   local	   buyer.	  As	  we	   already	   said,	  
most	  regulation	  did	  not	  allow	  for	  brokers	  to	  deal	  on	  their	  own	  behalf.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  
the	  mechanism	  could	  only	  execute	  a	  transaction	  if	  there	  was	  a	  direct	  match	  between	  
the	   offer	   of	   the	   seller	   and	   the	   bid	   of	   the	   buyer.	  We	   could	   call	   this	   mechanism	   a	  
bilateral	  matching	  machine;	  a	  simple	  algorithm	  whereby	  a	  bid	  and	  an	  offer	  coincided	  
and	   could	   be	   matched	   or	   it	   would	   not	   (therefore	   perhaps	   requiring	   several	  
iterations).	  While	  this	  might	  seem	  like	  a	  relatively	  primitive	  transaction	  machine,	   it	  
was	   perfectly	   adapted	   to	   the	   needs	   of	   foreign	   sellers	   traveling	   through	   medieval	  
cities.	   As	   long	   as	   the	   transactional	   needs	   were	   limited	   there	   was	   not	   need	   for	  
developing	  a	  more	  complex	  matching	  machine.	  	  
Nevertheless,	   with	   the	   growth	   of	   medieval	   commerce	   and	   finance,	   it	   was	   only	   a	  
matter	   of	   time	   before	   a	   new	   and	   more	   evolved	   matching	   machine	   would	   be	  
constructed.	   In	   his	   Bruges,	   Cradle	   of	   Capitalism	   1280-­‐1390	   (2005)	   James	   Murray	  
offers	  a	  detailed	  description	  of	  the	  sophisticated	  transactional	  networks	  of	  medieval	  
Bruges	  and	  its	  money	  market.	  	  This	  was	  a	  consequence	  of	  a	  critical	  mass	  of	  brokers	  
and	  also	  the	  presence	  of	  Italian	  merchant-­‐bankers	  and	  moneychangers	  who	  settled	  
in	   Bruges	   in	   the	   14th	   and	   15th	   century.	   As	   the	   center	   of	   gravity	   of	   European	   trade	  
migrated	   to	   Northern	   Europe,	   more	   and	   more	   Italian	   merchant-­‐bankers	   set	   up	  
offices	   (factories)	   in	  Bruges	  where	   they	   traded	   in	   the	   ‘Place	  de	   la	  Bourse’.	  Around	  
1516,	   most	   of	   them	   eventually	   left	   Bruges	   and	   moved	   to	   Antwerp,	   which	   had	  
experienced	   a	   series	   of	   floods	   expanding	   its	   harbor	   and	   allowing	   it	   to	   become	   a	  
major	  commercial	  city	  (Swan,	  2000,	  p.141).	  As	  the	  Italian	  merchant-­‐bankers	  moved	  
to	   Antwerp,	   a	   new	   bourse	   was	   established	   din	   1531	   bringing	   together	   a	   larger	  
number	   of	   brokers.	   Interestingly	   enough,	   Antwerp	   saw	   for	   the	   first	   time	   a	  
differentiation	  between	  those	  that	  traded	  in	  commodities	  and	  those	  that	  traded	  in	  
financial	  contracts	  such	  public	  bonds	  and	  bills	  of	  exchange	  (Michie,	  2006).	  	  
As	   explained	   by	   Fernand	   Braudel,	   after	   the	   sack	   of	   Antwerp	   in	   1576,	   Amsterdam	  
became	   the	  new	  dominant	   commercial	   hub	   as	  well	   as	   also	   the	  dominant	   financial	  
center	   of	   the	   continent.	   One	   of	   the	   reasons	   for	   its	   attractiveness	   was	   the	  
establishment	   of	   the	   public	   Exchange	   Bank	   of	   Amsterdam	   in	   1609,	   allowing	  
merchants	   to	  easily	  engage	   in	  pan-­‐European	  monetary	   transactions.	   In	   addition	   to	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this,	  Amsterdam	  saw	  another	  crucial	  innovation,	  namely	  the	  establishment	  of	  Dutch	  
East	   India	   Company	   in	   1602,	   one	   of	   the	   first	   joint	   stock	   companies.	   While	   short	  
distance	  trade	  could	  be	  managed	  by	  individual	  merchants	  or	  by	  a	  small	  partnership,	  
the	  long	  distance	  trade	  with	  Asia	  was	  a	  much	  more	  complex	  challenge.	  Participating	  
in	  the	  spice	  trade	  could	  be	  very	  profitable	  but	  also	  very	  risky.	  In	  order	  to	  manage	  the	  
complexity	   of	   global	   trade,	   the	   Dutch	   East	   India	   Company	   issued	   a	   substantial	  
number	   of	   stocks	   from	   the	   public,	   raising	   a	   staggering	   6.45	   million	   guilders	  
(Ferguson,	  2008,	  p.127).	  In	  a	  certain	  sense,	  the	  guarantee	  for	  the	  loan	  was	  a	  share	  in	  
the	   ownership	   of	   the	   company	   and	   the	   promise	   of	   payback.	   The	   company	   was	  
initially	  supposed	  to	  last	  only	  21	  years,	  and	  investors	  were	  only	  entitled	  to	  withdraw	  
their	  money	  after	  10	  years.	  As	  the	  first	  journeys	  were	  not	  particularly	  successful,	  the	  
option	  to	  withdraw	  the	  initial	  investment	  after	  10	  years	  was	  postponed	  in	  1612.	  This	  
uncertainty	  about	  the	  future	  value	  of	  the	  shares	  triggered	  the	  beginning	  of	  trading	  
(Michie,	  2006,	  p.28).	  This	  led	  to	  many	  investors	  wanting	  to	  exit	  their	  investment,	  i.e.	  
to	  sell	  their	  shares.	  Therefore,	  a	  new	  matching	  machine	  for	  shares	  was	  constructed	  
around	  brokers	  called	  ‘’rescounters’’,	  who	  would	  match	  the	  transfer	  of	  these	  shares.	  
Someone	  who	  had	  too	  much	  risk	  on	  his	  or	  her	  hands	  could	  offload	  it	  to	  a	  speculator	  
who	  was	  willing	  to	  take	  it,	  at	  a	  discount.	  	  Trading	  in	  theses	  shares	  expanded	  and	  as	  
early	  as	  1607,	  as	  much	  as	  a	   third	  of	   the	   shares	  was	  no	   longer	   in	   the	  hands	  of	   the	  
original	   owners.	  Up	  until	   1608,	   financial	   transactions	  were	   executed	   in	   the	   streets	  
(Fergusson,	   2008,	   p.131).	   Then	   a	   new	   Bourse	   was	   built	   and	   was	   in	   fact	   the	   first	  
modern	   exchange,	   housing	   some	   300	   officially	   certified	   brokers	   (Marsilio,	  
Forthcoming	   2015,	   p.12).	   In	   addition	   to	   that,	   there	   was	   a	   second-­‐tier	   community	  
who	   unofficially	   performed	   similar	   financial	   transactions,	   but	   located	   in	   the	   city’s	  
coffee	  houses	  (Fergusson,	  2008).	  
While	   the	   Amsterdam	   Exchange	   provided	   a	   more	   consolidated	   transaction	  
environment,	  matching	  machines	  was	   still	  based	  on	   the	   simple	  bilateral	  algorithm,	  
managed	   by	   individual	   brokers	   (Bochove,	   2013).	   Trades	   were	   arranged	   separately	  
between	  seller	  and	  the	  broker	  or	  between	  buyers	  and	  the	  broker	  on	  the	  other	  side.	  
This	  mechanism	   could	  pose	   serious	  problems	  of	   information	   asymmetry,	   as	   it	  was	  
hard	   to	   attract	   buyers	   or	   seller	  while	   it	  was	   clear	   that	   brokers	   had	   a	   considerable	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informational	  advantage	   (Bochove	   et	  al.,	   2012,	  p.3).	  This	   simple	  bilateral	  matching	  
machine	   was	   not	   adequate	   for	  more	   illiquid	   assets	   such	   as	   financial	   securities.	   In	  
order	   to	   solve	   some	   of	   these	   problems,	   a	   new	   and	   more	   evolved	   transaction	  
machines	   was	   developed.	   One	   such	   machine	   was	   developed	   using	   the	   so-­‐called	  
Anglo-­‐Dutch47	  auction	   algorithm,	  particularly	   for	   the	   sale	   or	   resale	   of	   public	   bonds	  
and	   shares.	   This	  was	   a	   single-­‐sided	  open	  outcry	  model,	  whereby	   every	  participant	  
could	  see	  what	  other	  people	  are	  bidding	  in	  a	  transparent	  manner.	  This	  of	  course	  had	  
the	   advantage	   of	   attracting	   more	   interest	   and	   thereby	   sustaining	   a	   more	   liquid	  
market.	   This	   mechanism	   was	   initially	   developed	   for	   real-­‐estate	   assets	   or	   certain	  
commodities	   and	   it	   was	   essentially	   a	   combination	   between	   the	   ascending	   English	  
auction	  and	  the	  descending	  Dutch	  auction.	  The	  issue	  with	  the	  English	  auction	  is	  that	  
it	   poses	   a	   disadvantage	   to	   weak	   bidders	   while	   the	   Dutch	   auction	   is	   not	   able	   to	  
aggregate	  a	  large	  number	  of	  bidders.	  As	  it	  was	  performed,	  the	  Anglo-­‐Dutch	  auction	  
entailed	  a	   first	  ascending	   round,	  which	  would	  start	  with	  a	  minimum	  value	  and	   the	  
highest	  bidder	  would	  win.	  But	  he	  would	  not	  be	  granted	  the	  asset	  straight	  away,	  but	  
would	  get	  a	  premium	  for	  wining	  the	  first	  round.	  The	  second	  round	  was	  a	  descending	  
auction.	  It	  would	  start	  with	  a	  higher	  bid	  than	  the	  first	  round	  wining	  bid,	  and	  would	  
descend	   form	  there.	   If	   someone	  posted	  a	  higher	  bid	   than	   the	  one	   recorded	   in	   the	  
first	   round	  then	  they	  would	  win	  the	  asset	  and	  the	  winner	  of	   the	   first	   round	  would	  
only	   keep	   the	   premium.	   If	   nobody	   made	   any	   bids	   in	   the	   second	   round,	   the	   first	  
round	   winner	   would	   take	   both	   the	   asset	   and	   the	   premium.	   We	   can	   call	   this	   a	  
multilateral	  matching	  machine,	  whose	  great	  advantage	  was	  that	  it	  could	  consolidate	  
the	   liquidity	   of	   a	   number	   of	   different	   bidders	   and	   find	   a	  match	  with	   an	   individual	  
seller.	   The	   transparency	   of	   the	   algorithm	   means	   that	   bidders	   had	   no	   issues	   in	  
engaging	  with	  the	  process.	  This	  more	  complex	  and	  evolved	  machine	  was	  also	  more	  
computationally	   expensive	   in	   Mirowski’s	   sense	   of	   the	   word,	   and	   thus	   harder	   to	  
maintain.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  this	  type	  of	  machine	  became	  feasible	  only	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  
selling	   more	   illiquid	   assets	   such	   as	   certain	   financial	   securities.	   As	   argued	   by	  
Christiaan	  van	  Bochove,	   Lard	  Boerner	  and	  Daniel	  Quint	   (Bochove	  et	  al.,	   2012),	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47	  Within	   Mirowski’s	   taxonomy,	   this	   is	   an	   open	   outcry	   single-­‐sided	   auction,	   both	  
descending	  and	  ascending.	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Anglo-­‐Dutch	   mechanism	   was	   very	   successful	   in	   maintaining	   a	   liquid	   market	   for	  
financial	  securities	  and	  was	  still	  used	  in	  the	  late	  in	  the	  19th	  century.	  
Components	   Algorithms	  












Figure	  5:	  Composition	  of	  medieval	  multilateral	  matching	  machine	  
Amsterdam	  thus	  saw	  the	  development	  of	  the	  first	  modern	  financial	  market	  and,	  as	  
explained	   in	  the	  table	  above,	   the	  first	  evolution	  of	  a	  transaction	  machine	  from	  the	  
more	   simple	   bilateral	   mechanism	   to	   the	  more	   complex	   Anglo-­‐Dutch	   auction.	   This	  
could	   be	   seen	   as	   a	   consequence	   of	   the	   social	   and	   economic	   environment	   of	   the	  
Dutch	  Republic	  in	  the	  17th	  and	  18th	  centuries.	  As	  Christiaan	  van	  Bochove	  (2013)	  has	  
shown,	   while	   the	   Amsterdam	   financial	   market	   was	   very	   innovative	   it	   was	   a	  
particularly	  illiquid	  market,	  specifically	  for	  public	  bonds	  and	  stocks.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  
matching	  machine	  of	  the	  Amsterdam	  Exchange	  was	  very	  much	  a	  product	  of	  this	  less	  
liquid	   market,	   as	   an	   adaptation	   to	   environmental	   conditions	   (liquidity,	   trading	  
volumes	  and	  overall	  size	  of	  the	  market).	  	  
	  
Innovative	   as	   it	  was,	  we	  will	   not	   focus	   too	  much	   on	   Amsterdam	  but	   dedicate	   the	  
next	   chapter	   to	   the	   development	   of	   an	   even	   more	   complex	   matching	   machine,	  
namely	  the	  double-­‐sided	  auctions	  on	  the	  floors	  of	   the	  London	  and	  New	  York	  stock	  
exchanges.	   These	   exchanges	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   descendants	   of	   the	   Amsterdam	  
Exchange,	  but	  they	  also	  provided	  the	  framework	  for	  a	  further	  evolution	  of	  matching	  
machines.	  As	  long	  as	  trading	  volumes	  were	  relatively	  low,	  there	  was	  no	  real	  need	  or	  
pressure	   to	  build	  continuous	  double-­‐sided	  auctions,	  as	  participants	  did	  not	   require	  
continuous	  access	  to	  liquidity.	  It	  was	  only	  later,	  in	  the	  modern	  exchanges	  of	  London	  
and	   New	   York,	   that	   financial	   markets	   were	   liquid	   enough	   in	   order	   to	   sustain	   and	  
warrant	  more	   computationally	   expensive	   transaction	  machines.	  Moreover,	  we	  will	  
also	   look	  at	   the	  gradual	  displacement	  of	  human	  brokers	  as	   the	  sole	  holders	  of	   the	  
monopoly	   of	   matching	   buyers	   and	   sellers.	   The	   introduction	   of	   the	   telegraph,	   the	  
stock	   ticker,	   the	   telephone	  and	  eventually	   the	   computer,	  will	   see	   the	  migration	  of	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the	  matching	  function	  from	  human	  hands	  to	  electronic	  platforms.	  These	  topics	  will	  
be	  covered	  in	  Chapter	  6.	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4.4	  Clearing	  Fairs	  and	  Bills	  of	  Exchange	  
	  
We	  have	  already	  described	  the	  impressive	  growth	  of	  commerce	  in	  medieval	  Europe	  
and	   the	   establishment	   of	   broking	   as	   a	  matching	  machine	   in	   order	   to	   facilitate	   the	  
trading	  of	  financial	  instruments.	  Their	  increasing	  use	  of	  financial	  instruments	  also	  led	  
to	   the	   accumulation	   of	   substantial	   levels	   of	   mutual	   exposures	   between	   market	  
participants.	   This	   led	   to	   the	   need	   for	   another	   type	   of	   transaction	   machine	  
performing	  the	  function	  of	  clearing.	  This	  afforded	  the	  reduction	  of	  offsetting	  debts	  
(Boerner	  and	  Ritschl,	  2009).	  As	  Italian	  merchant-­‐bankers	  were	  the	  main	  participants	  
in	  medieval	  financial	  markets,	  we	  will	  firstly	  review	  their	  use	  of	  bills	  of	  exchange	  and	  
then	  we	  will	   look	  at	  the	  transaction	  machines	  developed	  to	  clear	  their	  overlapping	  
web	  of	  debts.	  	  	  
	  
The	   bill	   of	   exchange	   was	   one	   of	   the	   great	   innovations	   of	   medieval	   commercial	  
capitalism.	   It	  was	  a	   financial	   instrument	   that	  effectively	  guaranteed	  the	   transfer	  of	  
an	  amount	  of	  money	  from	  the	  drawer	  to	  the	  drawee.	  In	  a	  sense,	  the	  bill	  of	  exchange	  
was	   a	   solution	   for	   overcoming	   the	   basic	   obstacles	   of	   12th	   Century	  Mediterranean	  
commerce.	  It	  had	  the	  potential	  to	  eliminate	  payments	  in	  metal	  coins,	  while	  allowing	  
for	  the	  transfer	  of	  debts	  and	  reduced	  the	  need	  for	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  settlement.	  
	  
It	  was	  an	  accepted	  means	  of	  payment,	  it	  reduced	  the	  risk	  of	  robbery	  associate	  with	  
handling	   large	   quantities	   of	   coins,	   and	   it	   provided	   an	   easy	   system	   for	   contract	  
enforcement.	   	   One	   can	   think	   about	   medieval	   trade	   as	   consisting	   of	   a	   basic	   form	  
arbitrage,	  in	  which	  a	  merchant	  would	  sell	  some	  goods	  in	  a	  certain	  market	  and	  then	  
use	   the	  money	   to	   buy	  other	   goods	   and	   sell	   them	  again	   in	   another	  market.	   In	   this	  
sense,	  the	  merchant	  was	  always	  conditioned	  by	  his	  next	  port	  of	  entry,	  by	  the	  goods	  
put	   up	   for	   sale	   there	   and	   by	   his	   subsequent	   trading	   opportunities.	   The	   bill	   of	  
exchange	  was	  developed	  precisely	  In	  order	  to	  reduce	  the	  risk	  and	  the	  inefficiencies	  
of	   such	  a	  model	   (Kindleberger,	  1984,	  p.65).	  This	   financial	   instrument	   involved	   four	  
participants,	  a	  debtor	  and	  a	  creditor	  in	  one	  town,	  and	  a	  subsequent	  payer	  and	  payee	  
in	  another	  town	  (Abulafia,	  2011,	  p.65).	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To	  illustrate	  the	  bilateral	  case,	  if	  A	  in	  Florence	  bought	  goods	  from	  B	  in	  Bruges,	  
he	   would	   often	   pay	   for	   them	   by	   buying	   a	   bill	   of	   exchange	   drawn	   by	   C	   in	  
Florence,	   or	   perhaps	   another	   Tuscan	   town,	   who	   had	   sold	   goods	   to	   D	   in	  
Flanders.	   C	   draws	   a	   bill	   on	   D	   and	   collects	   his	   money	   by	   selling	   it	   for	   local	  
currency	  to	  A,	  usually	  indirectly	  through	  an	  exchange	  dealer.	  A	  sends	  the	  bill	  to	  
B	   in	   payment	   for	   his	   goods,	   and	   B	   collects	   from	   D	   when	   the	   bill	   matures	  
(Kindleberger,	  1984,	  p.40).	  	  
	  
To	  put	  it	  differently,	  the	  bill	  of	  exchange	  moves	  around	  from	  D	  to	  C,	  then	  from	  A	  to	  
B,	  and	   finally	   returns	  back	   to	  D	  when	   it	  matures.	  Goods	  are	  exchanged	  between	  B	  
and	   A	   and	   between	   C	   and	   D.	   Money	   moves	   from	   A	   to	   C,	   then	   to	   D	   and	   B.	   The	  
essential	  element	  that	  boosted	  trade	  was	  that	  D	  was	  allowed	  to	  acquire	  goods	  from	  
C	  without	  having	  to	  pay	  for	  them	  on	  the	  spot.	  C	  would	  enter	  into	  such	  a	  transaction	  
because	  he	  could	  easily	  redeem	  the	  bill	  for	  money	  from	  someone	  like	  A,	  who	  could	  
in	  turn	  exchange	  the	  bill	  for	  certain	  goods	  from	  B	  who	  could	  ultimately	  be	  paid	  by	  D	  
when	  the	  bill	  matured.	  	  
	  
Figure	  6:	  Example	  of	  medieval	  bill	  of	  exchange	  
	  
The	   bill	   allowed	   for	   long	   distance	   trade	   without	   having	   to	   physically	   move	   large	  
quantities	   of	   coins	   and	  was	   thus	   a	   substitute	   for	  money	   (Greif,	   2002;	  Greif,	   2006)	  
(Greif	  2002,	  2006)(Boerner	  and	  Hatfield,	  2014).	  Before	  the	  use	  of	  bills	  of	  exchange,	  a	  
merchant	  could	  only	  trade	  if	  he	  was	  liquid	  on	  the	  spot,	  but	  now	  he	  could	  negotiate	  
future	   payment	   dates	   depending	   on	   his	   future	   expected	   liquidity	   (Usher,	   1943)	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(Boerner	  and	  Ritschl,	  2006).	  In	  the	  end,	  bills	  of	  exchange	  were	  an	  advance	  of	  money	  
to	  the	  seller	  that	  would	  be	  repaid	  at	  a	  latter	  date	  in	  a	  different	  place	  (Roover,	  1948).	  
	  
As	   they	   developed	   in	   medieval	   times,	   wholesale	   commercial	   and	   financial	  
transactions	  were	   primarily	   the	  monopoly	   of	  merchant-­‐bankers.	   As	   trade	   volumes	  
increased,	  merchant-­‐bankers	   began	   to	   focus	  more	   on	   dealing	   in	   bills	   of	   exchange	  
rather	  than	  commodities	  (Abulafia,	  2011,	  p.65).	  The	  very	  nature	  of	  bills	  of	  exchange	  
meant	   that	   there	  was	  a	   substantial	   time	  difference	  between	   the	  moment	  when	  of	  
negotiation	  and	   the	  ultimate	   settlement.	   In	  other	  words,	  merchant-­‐bankers	  would	  
accumulate	   large	   exposures	   between	   them48.	   That	   is	   to	   say,	   the	  more	   one	  would	  
engage	  in	  trading	  bills	  of	  exchange,	  the	  higher	  the	  risk	  of	  counterparty	  default.	  What	  
the	  merchant-­‐bankers	   needed	  was	   a	  mechanism	   for	   reducing	   the	   complex	  web	  of	  
counterparty	  exposure	  and	  the	  cumbersome	  task	  of	  settlement.	  The	  regional	  fairs	  of	  
Champagne	   represented	   one	   such	   solution.	   At	   the	   end	   of	   each	   fair	   there	   was	   a	  
pressing	   need	   to	   settle	   liabilities,	   so	  merchant-­‐bankers	   would	  meet	   in	   designated	  
places	  to	  settle	  bills	  of	  exchange	  and	  rebalance	  their	  positions	  (Boerner	  and	  Hatfield,	  
2014).	  Clearing	  bills	  of	  exchange	  quickly	  became	  an	  established	  practiced	  of	  the	  fairs	  
in	  Champagne,	  but	  was	   also	  practices	   in	   the	   fairs	   in	  Besancon,	  Piacenza	  and	  Novi,	  
which	  effectively	  became	  clearinghouses	  for	  European	  financial	  markets.	  
	  
According	   to	  David	  Abulafia,	  medieval	   fairs	   can	  be	   traced	  back	   to	   the	  Merovingian	  
fairs	  in	  the	  seventh-­‐century	  (Abulafia,	  2011,	  p.67).	  In	  the	  12th	  and	  13th	  centuries,	  the	  
famous	   fairs	   of	   Champagne	   were	   in	   effect	   the	   major	   commercial	   hubs	   of	   the	  
continent,	  particularly	  due	  to	  the	  protection	  offered	  the	  Duke	  of	  Burgundy.	  The	  fairs	  
were	   organized	   all	   year	   long	   in	   the	   towns	   of	   Troyes,	   Provins,	   Lagny	   and	   Bar-­‐sur-­‐
Aube,	  which	  were	  principal	  crossroads	  of	  European	  trade	  routes.	  For	  each	  fair,	  there	  
were	  a	  number	  of	  days	  for	  trading	  cloth	  and	  then	  leather	  and	  goods	  sold	  by	  weight;	  
finally	   there	   were	   fixed	   number	   of	   six	   to	   eight	   8	   days	   for	   clearing	   and	   final	  
settlement	  of	  transactions	  (Usher,	  1943,	  pp.	  118-­‐19)	  (Kindleberger,	  1984,	  p.36).	  The	  
fairs	   of	   Champagne	  were	   in	   fact	   an	   annual	   cycle	   starting	   on	   the	   2nd	   of	   January	   in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48	  Counterparty	   credit	   risk	   refers	   to	   the	   uncertainty	   of	   a	   transaction	   counterparty	  
defaulting	  on	  their	  obligations.	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Lagny,	  then	  in	  Bar-­‐sur-­‐Aube	  in	  March,	  followed	  by	  the	  May	  fair	  in	  Provins,	  a	  summer	  
fair	  in	  Troyes,	  followed	  again	  by	  a	  fair	  in	  Provins;	  the	  clearing	  year	  ended	  just	  before	  
Christmas	  with	  the	  ‘cold’	  fair,	  again	  in	  Troyes.	  Each	  fair	  lasted	  about	  50	  days	  and	  was	  
perhaps	   the	   first	   centralized	   venue	   for	   commercial	   and	   financial	   transactions	  
(Abulafia,	  2011,	  p.68).	   In	   fact,	   the	   fairs	  had	  a	  golden	  age	   from	  1260	   to	  1350	  when	  
they	  were	   in	   effect	   the	  dominant	   commercial	   and	   financial	   hubs	  of	   Europe.	  While	  
the	   early	   Champagne	   fairs	  were	   largely	   commercial	  markets,	   after	   1260	   they	   also	  
became	   the	   dominant	   centres	   for	   trading	   and	   clearing	   bills	   of	   exchange	   (Marsilio,	  
2014,	  p.6).	  	  
	  
The	  annual	  cycle	  of	  the	  fairs	  allowed	  for	  the	  easy	  movement	  of	  large	  sums	  of	  money	  
and	   goods	   between	   the	   various	   towns	   and	   regions	   of	   Europe.	   As	   counterparty	  
exposures	  became	  more	  complex,	   there	  was	  an	   increasing	  need	   to	  clear	  offsetting	  
transactions.	  We	  will	   focus	  on	   the	   clearing	  mechanism	  as	   it	  was	  performed	   in	   the	  
Genovese	  fairs	  of	  Piacenza	  where	  the	  decentralized	  clearing	  mechanism	  for	  bills	  of	  
exchange	   (‘’rescontre’’,	   ‘’skontrieren’’	   or	   ‘’virement	   des	   parties’’)	  was	   particularly	  
sophisticated	   (Boerner	   and	   Hatfield,	   2010).	   In	   fact,	   Boerner	   and	   Hatfield	   have	  
provided	   a	   detailed	   description	   of	   the	   clearing	   algorithms	   of	   the	   fairs	  where	   each	  
participant	  kept	  an	  accounting	  book	  called	   ‘’scartafaccio’’,	   recording	  of	  both	  debits	  
and	   credits,	   the	   ‘‘vostro’’	   and	   the	   ‘’nostro’’.	   Any	   unbalanced	   positions	   could	   be	  
carried	   along	   to	   the	   next	   fair	   and	   reintroduced	   into	   the	   next	   clearing	   cycle.	   In	   as	  
much	  as	  a	  fair	  could	  last	  for	  many	  weeks,	  the	  actual	  clearing	  was	  performed	  in	  the	  
last	   few	  days	   of	   the	   fair.	   Each	   cycle	   lasted	  up	   to	   8	   days,	   but	   could	   be	   extended	   if	  
needed.	   The	  participant	  merchant-­‐bankers	  were	   called	   ‘’trattanti’’	   and	   they	  would	  
gather	  each	  day	   in	  the	  residence	  of	   the	   ‘‘consul’’.	  The	  would	  have	  to	   follow	  a	  very	  
strict	  calendar	  from	  drawing	  up	  a	  first	  provisional	  balance	  to	  the	  final	  swap	  of	  bills	  of	  
exchange	  representing	  the	  netting	  of	  their	  positions.	  	  
	  
The	  usual	  clearing	  process	  was	  quite	  complex	  comprising	  large	  number	  of	  merchant-­‐
bankers,	  some	  50-­‐60	  in	  Besancon	  and	  up	  to	  110	  in	  Piacenza	  (Boerner	  and	  Hatfield,	  
2010,	   p.7).	   The	   first	   step	   was	   the	   confirmation	   and	   registration	   of	   debts.	   Then	  
participants	  would	  start	  the	  clearing	  process	  often	  mediated	  by	  a	  broker,	  but	  usually	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in	  a	  decentralized	  way.	  The	  clearing	  algorithm	  started	  with	  the	  canceling	  of	  bilateral	  
obligations.	   If	   merchant	   A	   owed	   an	   amount	   to	   merchant	   B	   who	   also	   had	   and	  
opposite	   exposure	   to	  merchant	  A,	   then	   they	   could	  mutually	   offset	   their	   positions.	  
When	  all	  such	  possibilities	  were	  exhausted,	  whoever	  still	  had	  unbalanced	  positions	  
would	  need	  to	  engage	  in	  multilateral	  clearing,	  through	  chains	  and	  clearing	  cycles.	  In	  
a	   clearing	   chain,	   if	  A	  owed	  B	  and	  B	  owed	  C,	   then	  B	  would	   reduce	  his	  exposure	  by	  
creating	   a	   new	   debt	   relationship	   between	   C	   and	   A.	   Clearing	   cycles	   could	   be	  
performed	   when	   A	   owed	   B	   and	   B	   owed	   C	   who	   again	   owed	   something	   to	   A.	   The	  
minimum	  amount	  owed	  between	  all	  of	  them	  could	  be	  offset	  and	  cleared	  from	  their	  
books.	   	   These	   clearing	   algorithms	   could	   be	   repeated	   several	   times,	   using	   both	  
bilateral	   and	   multilateral	   clearing,	   until	   everyone	   had	   reached	   a	   net	   position.	  
Whatever	  was	  left	  at	  the	  end	  of	  this	  procedure,	  would	  either	  be	  paid	  in	  cash	  or	  new	  
bills	  would	  be	  put	  forward	  to	  the	  next	  fair	  (Boerner	  and	  Hatfield,	  2010,	  p.9).	  
	  
The	  medieval	   fairs	   can	   thus	  be	   seen	  as	   the	  environment	   for	   the	  development	  of	  a	  
complex	  transaction	  machine.	  The	  clearing	  machine	  comprised	  two	  separate	  stages,	  
namely	   the	   simple	   bilateral	   version	   and	   the	   more	   complex	   multilateral	   designs.	  	  
Similar	   to	   the	   evolution	   of	   matching	   machines,	   the	   simple	   bilateral	   clearing	  
procedure	  was	  used	  first	  as	   it	  was	  easier	  to	  execute.	  Once	  all	   the	  bilateral	  clearing	  
was	  exhausted,	   they	  would	  switch	   to	   the	  more	  difficult	  multilateral	   clearing.	  Using	  
two	   different	   algorithms	   (chains	   or	   cycles),	   this	   more	   complex	   clearing	   machine	  
allowed	  for	  the	  compression	  of	  offsetting	  balances	  between	  at	  least	  three	  different	  
merchant-­‐bankers.	  	  
Components	   Algorithms	  
	  








(clearing	  chains	  and	  cycles)	  
Figure	  7:	  Composition	  of	  medieval	  multilateral	  clearing	  machine	  
As	  explained	  by	  Boerner	  and	  Hatfield,	  evidence	  form	  the	  1632	  Frankfurt	  fair	  shows	  
that	   this	   clearing	   machine	   was	   particularly	   successful,	   as	   99.3%	   of	   transaction	  
volumes	  were	  cleared	  by	  the	  reduction	  of	  offsetting	  exposures.	  Looking	  at	  the	  ledger	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of	  Frankfurt	  merchant-­‐banker	  Johan	  Bodek,	  it	  is	  surprising	  to	  see	  that	  he	  transacted	  
in	   the	  value	  of	  135000	   florins	  with	  only	  4000	   florins	  actually	  paid	   in	  cash	   (Boerner	  
and	   Hatfield,	   2010	   p.15).	   This	   impressive	   performance	   was	   clearly	   due	   to	   the	  
capacity	   of	   the	   multilateral	   clearing	   machine	   to	   bring	   together	   several	   offsetting	  
balances	   and	   net	   them	   out.	   While	   more	   difficult	   to	   execute	   and	   more	  
computationally	  expensive	  in	  Mirowski’s	  parlance,	  the	  benefits	  of	  this	  machine	  were	  
substantially	  in	  reducing	  the	  need	  for	  actual	  cash	  settlements	  between	  participants.	  
	  
According	   to	   Fernand	   Braudel,	   the	   early	   fairs	   of	   Champagne	   declined	   in	   the	   14th	  
century,	  this	  triggered	  gradual	  move	  towards	  Southern	  Europe.	  By	  this	  time,	  Italian	  
merchant-­‐bankers	   were	   mainly	   focusing	   on	   financial	   transactions	   (Marsilio,	  
Forthcoming	  2014,	  p.3).	  The	  dominance	  of	   the	  Geneva	  fairs	  was	  short	   lived	  mainly	  
due	  to	  the	   intervention	  of	  the	  king	  of	  France,	  who	  prohibited	  French	  merchants	  to	  
participate	   in	   the	  Geneva	   fairs.	   There	  were	   subsequent	  political	   interventions	   that	  
lead	   to	   the	  exclusion	  of	  Genovese	  merchants	   from	  the	  Lyon	   fairs	  and	   in	  1535,	   the	  
Genovese	  senate	  voted	  to	  establish	  a	  rival	  fair	  in	  Besancon	  under	  the	  protection	  of	  
emperor	  Charles	  V.	  The	   Italian	  merchant-­‐bankers	  eventually	  moved	   south	   towards	  
Piacenza	  in	  1579,	  where	  the	  fair	  were	  still	  called	  Besancon	  and	  it	  soon	  re-­‐established	  
itself	   as	   the	   main	   financial	   hub	   (Kindleberger,	   1984,	   p.36).	   The	   flourishing	   of	   the	  
Piacenza	   fairs	   lasted	   until	   1621	  when	   there	  was	   a	   split	   between	   Italian	  merchant-­‐
bankers.	   The	   Genovese	  moved	   to	   Novi	   while	   the	   Tuscans	   and	   the	   Lombards	   kept	  
meeting	   in	   Piacenza.	   The	  disturbances	   caused	  by	   the	   100	   years	  war,	   coupled	  with	  
the	  later	  move	  of	  European	  trade	  towards	  the	  Atlantic,	  triggered	  the	  decline	  of	  the	  
Italian	  fairs	   in	  the	   late	  15th	  century.	  Nevertheless,	  even	   in	  these	  circumstances,	  the	  
overall	  volumes	  were	  still	  impressive	  (Kindleberger,	  1984,	  p.37).	  	  
	  
The	   complex	   clearing	  machine	   of	   the	   fairs	   dominated	  medieval	   financial	   markets,	  
and	  there	  is	  strong	  evidence	  that	  it	  was	  still	  in	  use	  well	  into	  the	  18th	  century	  (Boerner	  
and	   Hatfield,	   2010).	   As	   long	   as	   participants	   were	   dealing	   with	   well-­‐known	  
counterparties,	   they	   would	   prefer	   the	   clearing	   machine	   of	   the	   fairs	   (Boerner	   and	  
Hatfield,	  2010,	  p.24).	  	  As	  we	  will	  see,	  the	  multilateral	  clearing	  mechanism	  of	  the	  fairs	  
will	   experience	   a	   further	   evolution	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	   modern	   clearinghouses.	   As	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trading	  volumes	   increased,	   financial	   intermediaries	  were	   forced	  to	  develop	  a	  more	  
centralized	  clearing	  machine	  in	  order	  to	  reduce	  counterparty	  risk.	   In	  Chapter	  6,	  we	  
will	  track	  the	  evolution	  of	  clearing	  machines,	  for	  payments	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  London	  
Clearing	  Club,	  for	  stocks	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  London	  and	  New	  York	  Clearinghouses	  and	  
for	  derivatives	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Chicago	  Board	  of	  Trade.	  	  
/	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Conclusions	  
	  
In	   this	  chapter	  we	  followed	  Fernand	  Braudel’s	  description	  of	  medieval	  Europe	  as	  a	  
puzzle	   of	   small	  markets	   and	   fairs,	   regional	  markets,	   the	   great	   fairs	   of	   Champagne	  
and	   the	   large	   commercial	   cities	   such	  as	  Venice,	  Genova,	  Antwerp	  and	  Bruges.	   The	  
expansion	   of	   material	   life	   and	   markets	   provided	   opportunities	   for	   specialized	  
commercial	  and	  financial	   intermediaries.	  Florentine	  merchant-­‐banking	  partnerships	  
were	  involved	  both	  in	  banking	  and	  commercial	  enterprises	  and	  became	  the	  nodes	  of	  
European-­‐wide	  transactional	  networks.	  As	  medieval	  finance	  became	  more	  complex,	  
new	  ways	  to	  organize	  transactional	  flows	  emerged.	  	  In	  this	  sense,	  we	  described	  the	  
development	  of	  two	  different	  transactional	  infrastructures,	  a	  matching	  machine	  and	  
a	   clearing	   machine.	   Both	   of	   them	   developed	   in	   order	   to	   service	   the	   needs	   of	  
merchant-­‐bankers,	  facilitating	  the	  exchange	  of	  certain	  financial	  instruments	  (such	  as	  
bills	  of	  exchange,	  shares,	  bonds).	  	  
	  
The	  functioning	  of	  the	  more	  simple	  bilateral	  matching	  machines	  relied	  on	  individual	  
brokers	  and	  their	  ability	  to	  match	  offers	  with	  bids.	  What	  started	  as	  mechanism	  for	  
matching	   commercial	   flows,	   also	   expanded	   to	   the	   transaction	   of	   financial	  
instruments	  The	  city	  of	  Bruges	  and	  then	  Antwerp	  were	  the	  first	  to	  establish	  a	  bourse,	  
housing	  a	  larger	  number	  of	  brokers,	  performing	  matching	  in	  a	  more	  concerted	  way.	  
The	  Amsterdam	  Exchange	  was	  a	  collective	  matching	  machine	  composed	  of	  some	  300	  
certified	  brokers.	   In	   response	  to	  the	  relative	   lack	  of	   liquidity	  and	  transparency,	   the	  
Amsterdam	  brokers	  developed	  a	  more	  efficient	  matching	  mechanism.	  This	  entailed	  
the	  execution	  of	  more	  complex	  single-­‐sided	  auctions	  in	  an	  open	  outcry	  format,	  the	  
so-­‐called	  Anglo-­‐Dutch	   auction.	   The	  mechanism	  entailed	   two	   rounds	   of	   bidding,	   an	  
English	   auction	   followed	  by	   a	  Dutch	   auction,	   allowing	   for	   the	   aggregation	   of	   large	  
number	  of	  bids	  while	  also	  affording	  more	  transparency.	  	  
	  
We	  have	  also	  described	  the	  first	  attempts	  to	  build	  a	  clearing	  machine	  in	  the	  context	  
of	  trading	  positions	  accrued	  in	  bills	  of	  exchange.	  The	  very	  nature	  of	  bills	  of	  exchange	  
meant	   that	   there	  was	  a	   substantial	   time	  difference	  between	   the	  moment	  when	  of	  
negotiation	  and	   the	  ultimate	   settlement.	   In	  other	  words,	  merchant-­‐bankers	  would	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accumulate	   large	   exposures	   resulting	   in	   considerable	   credit	   counterparty	   risk.	  
Merchant-­‐bankers	  needed	  a	  mechanism	  for	  clearing	  this	  counterparty	  exposure	  and	  
reduce	  the	  complex	  web	  of	  debts.	  The	  inputs	  of	  the	  machine	  were	  already	  executed	  
transactions	  and	  the	  output	  was	  the	  netting	  of	  offsetting	  debts.	  The	  benefits	  of	  using	  
such	  a	  machine	  were	  considerable,	  particularly	  as	  volumes	  increased.	  We	  focused	  on	  
clearing	   as	   it	   was	   performed	   in	   the	   Genovese	   fairs	   of	   Piacenza,	   starting	   by	   using	  
bilateral	   clearing	   followed	   by	   a	   multilateral	   clearing	   mechanism,	   using	   clearing	  
chains	  and	  cycles.	   The	  process	   could	   last	  up	   to	  eight	  days	  using	  both	  bilateral	   and	  
multilateral	  clearing,	  until	  everyone	  was	  close	  to	  or	  reached	  a	  net	  position.	  	  
	  
For	   both	  matching	   and	   clearing	  we	   thus	   observe	   a	   certain	   evolutionary	   trajectory	  
from	   bilateral	   to	   multilateral	   designs,	   from	   simple	   to	   more	   complex	   and	  
computationally	  expensive	  mechanisms.	  While	  the	  building	  blocks	  of	  these	  machines	  
developed	   in	   different	   locations	   throughout	   medieval	   Europe	   there	   was	   a	   clear	  
tendency	   for	   the	   convergence	   of	   the	   both	   the	  matching	   and	   clearing	   functions	  
towards	   the	   larger	   commercial	   cities,	   which	   thus	   acted	   as	   transactional	   hubs.	   In	  
time,	   London	  provided	   the	   suitable	  environment	   for	   the	  development	  of	  matching	  
with	  double-­‐sided	  auctions	  within	   the	   context	  of	   London	  Stock	   Exchange,	   but	   also	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This	  chapter	  describes	  the	  evolution	  of	  matching	  machines	  as	  they	  developed	  in	  the	  
case	  of	  modern	  stock	  exchanges.	  We	  first	   look	  at	  the	  London	  Stock	  Exchange	  (LSE),	  
where	   the	   maintenance	   of	   a	   continuous	   double	   auction	   was	   the	   responsibility	   of	  
jobbers.	  We	  then	  review	  the	  founding	  of	  the	  New	  York	  Stock	  Exchange	  (NYSE)	  and	  its	  
development	   in	   the	   19th	   century.	   After	   several	   institutional	   and	   technological	  
mutations,	   such	   as	   the	   incorporation	   of	   the	   telegraph,	   the	   stock	   ticker	   and	   the	  
merger	  with	  the	  Open	  Board,	  NYSE	  became	  the	  dominant	  transaction	  machine	  for	  US	  
stock	  markets.	  The	  double	  auction	  was	  a	  centralized	  matching	  design	  as	  liquidity	  was	  
aggregated	  around	  the	  specialists	  on	  the	  floor	  of	  the	  exchange	  tasked	  with	  matching	  
order	   flow	   and	  maintaining	   a	   fair	   and	   orderly	  market.	  We	   then	   look	   at	   the	  major	  
transformations	   brought	   about	   by	   the	   adoption	   of	  modern	   information	   technology	  
and	  the	  regulatory	  requirements	  for	  more	  transparency.	   In	  this	  context,	  we	  address	  
the	  development	  of	  new	  trading	  platforms	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  20th	  century.	  ECNs	  such	  
as	   Instinet,	   AZX,	   Globex	   or	   Tradepoint	   and	   their	   electronic	   order	   book	   technology	  
represented	  a	  leap	  forward	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  efficient	  aggregation	  and	  matching	  order	  
flow.	  We	   also	   review	   the	   gradual	   development	   of	   the	  NYSE	  Hybrid	  Market,	  where	  
investors	   have	   a	   choice	   between	   immediate	   automated	   matching	   or	   routing	   the	  
order	  for	  manual	  execution	  on	  the	  floor.	  Deployed	  in	  2006,	  this	  new	  design	  replicates	  
both	  the	  matching	  done	  on	  the	  traditional	  trading	  floor	  or	  on	  the	  more	  sophisticated	  
electronic	   platforms,	   while	   the	   reverse	   is	   not	   possible.	   The	   NYSE	   Hybrid	   Market	  
represents	   a	   new	   more	   concrete	   design,	   as	   it	   integrates	   a	   number	   of	   different	  
elements,	   such	   as	   the	   specialist	   trading	   floor,	   the	   SuperDOT,	   Direct+	   and	   the	  
Archipelago	   ECN,	   while	   affording	   novel	   functionalities	   in	   terms	   of	   providing	   more	  
tailored	   execution	   to	   a	   wide	   set	   of	   investors.	   Thus	   we	   highlight	   the	   continuous	  
evolution	   of	   matching	   machines	   under	   the	   pressures	   and	   constraints	   of	   various	  
constituencies	  of	  users.	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5.1	  The	  London	  Stock	  Exchange	  
	  
The	  matching	  machine	   constructed	   in	  Amsterdam	   in	   the	   16th-­‐17th	   centuries	  would	  
eventually	   be	   adopted	   and	   further	   developed	   in	   London.	   While	   the	   Amsterdam	  
Exchange	  was	  a	  central	  marketplace,	  it	  was	  still	  very	  much	  dominated	  by	  individual	  
brokers	  running	  what	  we	  have	  called	  a	  multilateral	  matching	  machine	  (most	  brokers	  
could	   accept	   busy	   and	   sell	   order	   form	   a	   multitude	   of	   investors).	   In	   London,	   the	  
development	   of	   the	   stock	   market	   was	   gradual,	   with	   a	   relatively	   small	   number	   of	  
active	  stockbrokers,	  about	  50	  people	  in	  1712	  (Michie,	  2006,	  p.30).	  As	  long	  as	  people	  
did	  not	  require	  continuous	  access	  to	  liquidity,	  there	  was	  no	  real	  need	  or	  pressure	  to	  
construct	   a	  more	   complex	  machine.	  Moreover,	   the	   18th	   century	   saw	   a	   number	   of	  
speculative	  bubbles,	  particularly	  between	  1717	  and	  1720,	  which	  affected	  the	  growth	  
of	   the	   market 49 .	   Nevertheless,	   London	   gradually	   became	   the	   most	   important	  
financial	  centre	   in	  Europe.	  This	  was	  partially	  due	   to	   the	  expansion	  of	  British	  public	  
debt,	  which	  tripled	  from	  1790	  to	  1815,	  and	  an	  influx	  of	  bankers	  and	  merchants	  from	  
the	   continent	   (Michie,	   2006,	   p.51).	   Before	   the	   opening	   of	   the	   London	   Stock	  
Exchange,	   the	   early	   stockbroking	   community	   assembled	   in	   the	   Royal	   Exchange	  
intermediating	  transactions	  for	  shares	  in	  the	  small	  number	  of	  joint	  stock	  companies.	  
In	   1762,	   the	   London	   Stock	   Exchange	   was	   founded	   as	   a	   club	   comprising	   150	  
stockbrokers,	  based	  at	  Jonathan’s	  coffee	  house	  (King,	  1947).	  As	  more	  members	  and	  
investors	  were	   attracted	   to	   the	   opportunities	   afforded	   by	   the	   stock	  market,	   there	  
was	   a	   need	   for	   a	   more	   efficient	   mechanism	   for	   processing	   transactions.	   From	   an	  
institutional	   perspective,	   the	   brokers	   organized	   themselves	   as	   a	   club,	   with	   a	  
subscription	   fee	   and	   common	   rules	   of	   governance,	   as	   the	   question	   of	   trust	   and	  
market	  discipline	  was	  essential,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  need	  to	  exclude	  participants	  with	  low	  
credit-­‐worthiness.	   The	   establishment	   of	   an	   ordered	   administrative	   framework	  
allowed	  for	  the	  stabilization	  of	  the	  London	  Stock	  Exchange,	  whose	  membership	  grew	  
from	  363	  in	  1802	  to	  5,567	  by	  1905	  (Michie,	  2006,	  p.53).	  	  
	  
The	   London	   Stock	   Exchange	   experienced	   tremendous	   growth	   in	   its	   first	   two	  
centuries,	   aggregating	   capital	   from	   a	   diverse	   pool	   of	   investors,	   both	   British	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49	  The	  famous	  South	  The	  Sea	  Bubble.	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international.	  In	  as	  much	  as	  investors	  were	  committing	  their	  money	  towards	  shares,	  
there	   was	   an	   immediate	   need	   to	   also	   be	   able	   to	   exist	   investments	   quickly	   and	  
efficiently.	   That	   is	   to	   say,	   contrary	   to	   consumers	   of	   posted	   offer	  markets	   such	   as	  
those	   for	   retail	   goods,	   investors	   in	   shares	   required	   more	   flexibility	   in	   terms	   of	  
executing	   transactions.	   The	   problem	   then	   was	   to	   provide	   investors	   with	   a	  
transactional	   infrastructure	   affording	   the	   possibility	   to	   both	   buy	   and	   sell	   stocks	   at	  
any	   given	   time	   during	   the	   trading	   day,	   that	   is	   to	   say	   a	   continuous	   double-­‐sided	  
auction.	   It	   was	   precisely	   this	   requirement	   that	   differentiates	   any	   stock	   exchange	  
from	  other	  single-­‐sided	  auctions	  or	  posted	  offer	  fixed-­‐price	  markets.	  While	  we	  have	  
referred	  to	  the	  members	  of	  the	  exchange	  as	  stockbrokers,	  the	  system	  of	  the	  London	  
Stock	   Exchange	   developed	   quite	   a	   complex	   organizational	   structure.	   In	   order	   to	  
satisfy	  the	  requirement	  for	  a	  transparent	  and	  continuous	  double	  auction	  design	  the	  
exchange	  implemented	  a	  division	  of	  labour	  between	  those	  who	  aggregate	  order	  flow	  
and	   those	   who	   manage	   the	   matching	   mechanism.	   The	   first	   category	   was	  
represented	   by	   brokers	   who	   acted	   as	   agents	   for	   the	   investing	   public.	   The	   second	  
group	   is	   that	  of	   the	   jobbers,	   specializing	   in	  matching	  orders	   for	  particular	   types	  of	  
stocks.	  While	  brokers	  would	  continually	  interact	  with	  outside	  investors,	  the	  jobbers	  
could	   only	   receive	  orders	   from	   the	  brokers	   on	   the	   floor	   of	   the	   exchange.	  Another	  
difference	  with	  the	  situation	  in	  Amsterdam	  lies	   in	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  London	  brokers	  
were	   generalists,	   acting	   as	   a	   conduit	   between	   investors	   and	   the	   market,	   while	  
jobbers	  had	  to	  specialise	  in	  a	  limited	  number	  of	  shares.	  	  While	  brokers	  were	  tasked	  
with	  aggregating	  order	  flow,	  jobbers	  were	  primarily	  tasked	  with	  matching	  incoming	  
buy	  or	  sell	  orders.	  Jobbers	  were	  in	  effect	  a:	  
	  
(…)	  body	  of	  men	  trained	  to	  judge	  supply	  and	  demand,	  who	  are	  willing	  to	  buy	  
stock	   to	  hold	  until	   the	  next	  buyer	  comes	   in	  or	   to	  sell	   short	  of	   stock	  until	   the	  
next	  seller	  comes	  in	  (King,	  1947,	  p.6).	  
	  
Jobbers	   would	   have	   to	   come	   in	   before	   the	   opening	   of	   the	   market	   and	   position	  
themselves	  at	  their	  ‘pitches’,	  usually	  around	  the	  pillars	  of	  the	  floor.	  Once	  there,	  they	  
would	   set	   up	   their	   boards,	   quoting	   bids	   and	   offers	   in	   the	   shares	   they	   were	  
responsible	  for	  (Morgan	  and	  Thomas,	  1969,	  p.261).	  Jobbers	  where	  thus	  required	  to	  
	   131	  
provide	   a	   continuous	   double-­‐sided	   market	   for	   all	   of	   the	   brokers	   on	   the	   floor	  
(Maguire	  et	  al.,	  1954,	  p.5).	  But	  precisely	  because	  of	  this,	  they	  also	  needed	  to	  be	  able	  
to	   change	   their	   quotes,	   being	   able	   to	   adapt	   to	  market	   trends.	   In	   a	   certain	   sense,	  
jobbers	  were	  not	   interested	   in	  the	  actual	  prices,	  as	  their	  quotes	  depended	  only	  on	  
the	   relative	   predominance	   of	   buyers	   or	   sellers	   in	   their	   respective	   stocks.	   If	   sellers	  
dominated,	   jobbers	   would	   have	   to	   lower	   quotes	   until	   buyers	   would	   be	   attracted.	  
Similarly,	   when	   buyers	   were	   predominant,	   the	   same	   jobbers	   would	   increase	   their	  
quotes	   so	   as	   to	   encourage	   sellers.	   In	   other	   words,	   the	   jobbing	   community	   was	  
responsible	  for	  maintain	  a	  certain	  level	  of	  liquidity,	  that	  is	  to	  say	  to	  keep	  the	  market	  
‘alive’:	  
	  
Stock	   Exchange	   is	   in	   reality	   comparable	   to	   a	   delicate	   scientific	   instrument	  
faithfully	  and	  automatically	  recording	  every	  impulse	  from	  the	  slightest	  tremor	  
to	  the	  most	  violent	  upheaval	  (Maguire	  et	  al.,	  1954,	  p.9).	  
	  
These	  tremors	  and	  upheavals	  were	  transmitted	  trough	  the	   intermediary	  of	  brokers	  
serving	   their	   clients,	   that	   is	   to	   say	   the	  public	  outside	  of	   the	  walls	  of	   the	  exchange.	  
While	  brokers	  would	  earn	  commissions	  on	  every	  executed	  trade,	  jobbers	  could	  only	  
earn	  the	  spread	  between	  the	  bid	  and	  the	  offer,	   if	   they	  were	   lucky	  and	  skilled.	  This	  
type	  of	  compensation	  was	  called	  the	  ‘turn’	  referencing	  the	  ability	  of	  jobbers	  to	  adapt	  
to	   changing	   market	   conditions	   (King,	   1947,	   p.39).	   The	   problem	   was	   that	   jobbers	  
would	  not	  no	   in	   advance	  whether	   a	  broker	  was	   a	  buyer	  of	   a	   seller.	  Depending	  on	  
market	   conditions	   he	  would	   quote	   a	  more	   or	   less	   tight	   spread.	   For	   example,	   in	   a	  
deep	  liquid	  market,	  the	  spread	  would	  be	  tighter	  referencing	  the	  abundance	  of	  both	  
buyers	   and	   sellers.	   Conversely,	   a	   less	   liquid	  market	  would	   necessarily	   entail	  much	  
wider	   spreads,	   referencing	   the	   risk	   jobbers	   faced	   in	   holding	   on	   to	   inventories	   of	  
stocks.	   The	   functioning	   of	   the	   market	   was	   dependent	   on	   jobbers	   being	   able	   to	  
constantly	   rebalance	   their	   position;	   keeping	   an	   account	   of	   incoming	   buy	   and	   sell	  
orders,	  adapting	  to	  changing	  trends.	  This	  is	  precisely	  why	  it	  was	  common	  to	  refer	  to	  
activity	  of	  jobbers	  as	  ‘keeping	  the	  book’.	  In	  some	  ways,	  just	  like	  medieval	  merchants	  
needed	  to	  organize	  their	  debits	  and	  credits,	  so	  too	  did	  jobbers	  need	  to	  keep	  track	  of	  
buy	  and	  sell	  orders.	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We	   could	   say	   that	   the	   London	   jobbers	   were	   in	   fact	   part	   of	   a	   new	   transaction	  
machine	  by	  performing	  matching	  and	  facilitating	  the	  execution	  of	  incoming	  request	  
from	   brokers.	   The	   ‘hardware’	   of	   the	  machine	   comprised	   the	   jobbers	   and	   brokers	  
themselves,	  their	  books	  and	  paper	  trails.	  The	  functioning	  of	  the	  machine	  followed	  a	  
set	  of	  simple	  rules.	  The	  core	  of	  the	  mechanism	  was	  the	  maintenance	  of	  two	  separate	  
set	   of	   quotations,	   the	   buy	   and	   sell.	   Differently	   to	   a	   posted	   offer	   or	   a	   single-­‐sided	  
market,	  where	  you	  either	  star	  with	  a	  fixed	  price	  or	  you	  can	  modify	  it	  afterwards,	  the	  
two-­‐sided	  market	  provides	  a	  sell	  price	  (‘offer’	  or	  ‘ask’),	  which	  is	  always	  higher	  than	  
the	  buy	  price	   (‘bid’).	  Any	  buy	  order	   that	  matches	   the	  sell	  quote	  and	  any	  sell	  order	  
that	  matches	  the	  jobber’s	  buy	  quote	  will	  be	  executed.	  The	  spread	  changes	  according	  
to	  the	  liquidity	  of	  the	  respective	  stock	  and	  the	  balance	  between	  bids	  and	  offers.	   In	  
other	  words,	   the	  actual	  price	   is	  not	  relevant	   for	   the	  workings	  of	   the	  machine,	  only	  
the	  volatility,	  that	  is	  to	  say	  the	  rate	  and	  direction	  in	  which	  quotes	  move.	  Taking	  all	  of	  
this	   into	  consideration,	   the	  most	   important	   function	  of	   this	  double-­‐sided	  matching	  
machine	  was	  to	  provide	  a	  continuously	  liquid	  market	  for	  listed	  stocks:	  
	  
(…)	   the	  primary	   task	  of	   the	  Stock	  Exchange	   is	   to	  maintain	  a	  market.	   	   (…)	   it	   is	  
essential	  to	  maintain	  a	  market	  in	  which	  it	  is	  at	  all	  times	  possible	  to	  buy	  and	  sell	  
freely	  and	  without	  delay	  (Maguire	  et	  al.,	  1954,	  p.9).	  
	  
We	  will	  develop	  this	  further	  in	  our	  discussion	  of	  the	  New	  York	  Stock	  Exchange,	  but	  it	  
is	  clear	  that	  providing	  a	  continuous	  double	  auction	  was	  the	  most	  important	  function	  
of	   the	   jobbing	   community	   of	   the	   London	   Stock	   Exchange.	   Consequently,	   with	   the	  
increase	   in	   trading	   volumes	   and	   the	   number	   of	   participants,	   this	   more	  
computationally	  expensive	  matching	  machine	  became	  both	  necessary	  and	  feasible.	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5.2	  The	  New	  York	  Stock	  Exchange	  
	  
	  
As	  Braudel	  demonstrates,	  throughout	  the	  Middle	  Ages,	  seafaring	  was	  fastest	  way	  of	  
moving	  goods,	  people,	  money	  and	   information.	  While	   initially	   scattered	  across	   the	  
continent,	  commercial	  and	  financial	  flows	  began	  to	  converge	  around	  a	  small	  number	  
of	  commercial	  hubs	  (Venice,	  Genoa,	  Amsterdam).	  Those	  same	  locations	  provided	  the	  
perfect	   environment	   for	   the	   development	   of	   more	   sophisticated	   transaction	  
machines.	  The	  industrial	  revolution	  had	  a	  crucial	   impact	  on	  this	  process,	  the	  steam	  
engine,	  the	  railroad	  and	  especially	  the	  telegraph	  all	  made	  their	  mark	  on	  19th	  century	  
financial	   markets	   (Preda,	   2009).	   In	   as	   much	   as	   a	   primary	   function	   of	   matching	  
machines	  is	  to	  aggregate	  and	  match	  a	  multitude	  of	  trade	  request,	  the	  development	  
of	  more	   efficient	   communication	   technologies	   can	   surely	   be	   seen	   as	   an	   important	  
catalyst	  for	  financial	  innovation.	  	  
	  
In	   this	   sense,	   it	   might	   be	   useful	   to	   understand	   the	   way	   in	   which	   communication	  
technology	  conditioned	  the	  development	  of	  these	  complex	  machines.	  For	   instance,	  
the	   first	   telegraph	   network	   was	   optical,	   which	   it	   had	   a	   lot	   of	   limitations,	   due	   to	  
weather	   conditions	   in	   the	   British	   Isles	   and	   it	   was	   also	   not	   particularly	   efficient	   at	  
night	  (Standage,	  1999,	  p.21).	  The	  subsequent	  generation	  was	  the	  electric	  telegraph,	  
which	  was	  in	  fact	  the	  product	  of	  an	  exaptation	  in	  as	  much	  as	  electricity	  was	  initially	  
developed	  as	  cheaper	  energy	  source	  and	  not	  so	  much	  as	  a	  tool	  for	  communicating	  
(Mokyr,	   1990).	   A	   whole	   series	   of	   inventors	   from	   S.T.	   van	   Soemmering	   to	  William	  
Cooke	  gradually	  perfected	  the	  telegraph.	  In	  1844	  Samuel	  Morse	  transmitted	  the	  first	  
telegraph	   message	   from	   Washington	   to	   Baltimore.	   This	   very	   simple	   principle,	   of	  
sending	  electric	  pulses	  through	  a	  medium,	  is	  still	  the	  basic	  blueprint	  of	  modern	  ICT	  
technology.	  One	  of	  the	  early	  pioneers	  of	  financial	  infrastructure	  is	  Baron	  Paul	  Julius	  
von	  Reuter.	  	  He	  first	  started	  a	  news	  agency	  in	  1840s	  using	  carrier	  pigeons	  to	  transmit	  
business-­‐relevant	   information	   between	   Brussels	   and	   Aix-­‐la-­‐Chapelle.	   Reuters	   grew	  
his	  network	  of	  correspondents	   through	  which	  he	  could	  collect	   the	   latest	  prices	   for	  
stocks	  and	  bonds	  and	  redistributed	  them	  to	  his	  subscribers.	  When	  electric	  telegraph	  
networks	   began	   to	   link	   cities	   in	   Europe,	   he	   integrated	   this	   new	   medium	   into	   his	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business	  and	  eventually	  moved	  to	  London	  in	  1851	  (Standage,	  1999,	  p.	  151).	  Before	  
the	   advent	   of	   the	   telegraph,	   relationship	   building	   and	   reputation	   were	   crucial	   in	  
establishing	  commercial	  and	   financial	  networks	   (from	  the	  Medici	   to	   the	  Rothschild	  
family).	  Up	   until	   the	  middle	   of	   the	   19th	   century	   it	  was	   very	   hard	   to	   extend	   theses	  
networks	  outside	  of	  certain	  circles	  of	  trust,	  but	  this	  was	  changing	  with	  the	  advent	  of	  
the	  telegraph.	  The	  cotton	  trade	  between	  the	  US	  and	  Europe	   is	  a	  prime	  example	  of	  
this	  overhaul.	  Merchants,	  such	  as	  the	  Liverpool	  cotton	  traders,	  were	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  
a	  long	  intermediation	  chain	  dominating	  trade	  across	  the	  Atlantic.	  Their	  main	  activity	  
was	   market	   making,	   matching	   buyers	   and	   sellers,	   but	   also	   certifying	   goods,	   and	  
extracting	   rents	   from	   information	   asymmetries.	   They	   had	   huge	   operations,	  
maintaining	  warehouses	  and	  credit	   lines,	  effectively	  underwriting	  the	  whole	  cotton	  
trade	  (Morrison	  and	  Wilhelm,	  2007,	  p.158).	  But	  everything	  began	  to	  change	  in	  1866	  
with	  the	  deployment	  of	  the	  transatlantic	  telegraph	  cable,	  an	  event	  that	  transformed	  
trade	  relations	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  Atlantic.	  Manufacturers	  in	  Europe	  could	  now	  buy	  
cotton	  on	  cable	  as	  it	  where,	  reducing	  the	  previous	  level	  of	  intermediation.	  It	  is	  safe	  
to	  say	   that	  commercial	   relationships	  were	  being	  seriously	  altered	  by	   the	  advent	  of	  
this	  new	  technology	  that	  integrated	  previously	  unconnected	  realities.	  	  
	  
The	   same	   forces	   that	   led	   to	   dramatic	   changes	   in	   the	   world	   of	   commerce,	   also	  
affected	   financial	   markets.	  We	   will	   now	   look	   at	   evolution	   of	   the	   New	   York	   Stock	  
Exchange	   (NYSE),	   a	   highly	   complex	   machine	   performing	   the	   function	   of	   market	  
matching.	   One	   can	   trace	   the	   roots	   of	   this	   institution	   to	   the	   1792	   Buttonwood	  
Agreement,	  whereby	  24	  brokers	  agreed	  to	  trade	  securities	  only	  with	  each	  other	  and	  
at	  fixed	  commission	  of	  0.25%:	  
	  
We	  the	  Subscribers,	  Brokers	  for	  the	  Purchase	  and	  Sale	  of	  the	  Public	  Stock,	  do	  
hereby	  solemnly	  promise	  and	  pledge	  ourselves	  to	  each	  other,	  that	  we	  will	  not	  
buy	  or	  sell	  from	  this	  day	  for	  any	  person	  whatsoever,	  any	  kind	  of	  Public	  Stock,	  
at	  a	  less	  rate	  than	  one	  quarter	  percent	  Commission	  on	  the	  Specie	  value	  of	  and	  
that	  we	  will	  give	  preference	  to	  each	  other	  in	  our	  Negotiations	  (Teweles	  et	  al.,	  
1992,	  p.97).	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This	  oath	  was	  formally	  institutionalized	  in	  1817	  when	  the	  group	  took	  up	  the	  name	  of	  
the	  New	  York	  Stock	  &	  Exchange	  Board.	  The	  institutional	  framework	  went	  beyond	  the	  
fixed	  commission	  charged	  to	  outsiders.	  For	  example,	  NYSE	  members	  would	  be	  fined	  
10$	  for	  ‘’assaulting’’	  each	  other	  with	  paper	  darts	  and	  5$	  for	  smoking	  a	  cigar	  on	  the	  
floor	   of	   the	   exchange	   (Markham,	   p.	   288).	   But	   what	   is	   essential	   was	   the	   tiered	  
hierarchical	   structure,	  which	  meant	   that	   the	   insiders	  had	  a	  huge	  advantage	   to	  any	  
outsiders,	  namely	  they	  had	  direct	  access	  to	  liquidity.	  Up	  until	  this	  point	  in	  time,	  a	  call	  
market	   mechanism	   was	   used,	   whereby	   the	   so-­‐called	   Regular	   Board	   of	   the	   NYSE	  
performed	   two	   trading	   session	   one	   in	   the	  morning	   and	   one	   later	   in	   the	   day.	   The	  
President	  would	  begin	  by	  reading	  out	  loud	  the	  list	  of	  stocks	  and	  the	  brokers	  would	  
then	  trade	  each	  security	  one	  by	  one.	  For	  as	  long	  as	  trading	  volumes	  were	  relatively	  
low,	   this	   procedure	  was	  more	   than	   able	   to	  match	   incoming	  orders.	   An	   alternative	  
system	  was	   set	   up	   in	   1864	   by	   a	   group	   of	   competitors,	   the	   so-­‐called	   Open	   Board,	  
which	  had	  lower	  membership	  requirements	  (membership	  of	  the	  NYSE	  was	  as	  high	  as	  
$8,000).	   Whereas	   the	   more	   traditional	   NYSE	   Regular	   Board	   traded	   two	   separate	  
sessions	   a	   day,	   the	   Open	   Board	   operated	   continuous	   trading	   during	   the	   day.	  
Moreover,	  while	  the	  sessions	  of	  the	  NYSE	  Regular	  Board	  were	  not	  public,	  the	  Open	  
Board	   was	   constantly	   permeable	   to	   outsiders.	   This	   two-­‐tiered	   framework	   posed	  
considerable	  challenges:	  
	  
The	  existence	  of	  two	  markets	  in	  the	  same	  building—one	  continuous,	  the	  other	  
discontinuous—contributed	   to	  multiple	  prices	  and	   to	  parallel,	  heterogeneous	  
time	  structures.	  The	  technology	  obscured	  any	  direct	  relationship	  between	  the	  
published	  price	  data	  and	  the	   interaction	  side	  of	   financial	   transactions	   (Preda,	  
2009,	  p.125)	  
	  
Consequently,	   the	   1869	   merger	   between	   NYSE	   and	   the	   Open	   Board	   Exchange	  
brought	  together	  the	  two	  separate	  pools	  of	  liquidity.	  Moreover,	  this	  merger	  also	  led	  
to	   what	   we	   could	   call	   a	   contamination	   as	   the	   new	   exchange	   adopted	   the	   Open	  
Board’s	  model	   for	   continuous	   trading.	   Instead	  of	  having	   two	  auctions	  every	  day,	  a	  
new	   algorithm	   was	   put	   in	   place	   in	   1871,	   with	   matching	   performed	   continuously	  
between	   10am	   and	   2	   pm	   by	   designated	   intermediaries	   (Lhabitant	   and	   Gregoriou,	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2008,	   p.288).	   Because	   of	   time	   discrepancies	   between	   ever-­‐larger	   trading	   orders,	  
continuous	   trading	   required	   a	   solution	   similar	   to	   the	   London	   jobbers,	   an	  
intermediary	  who	   could	   act	   as	   the	   seller	   for	   every	   buyer	   and	   the	   buyer	   for	   every	  
seller.	   This	   led	   to	   the	   establishment	  of	   the	   specialist	   and	  his	   post,	   centralizing	   the	  
matching	  his	  designated	  shares.	  Effectively,	  those	  brokers	  who	  tended	  to	  trade	  in	  a	  
certain	  security	  became	  specialists	  in	  that	  stock	  and	  were	  expected	  to	  maintain	  a	  fair	  
and	  orderly	  market.	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Figure	  8:	  Evolution	  of	  centralized	  matching	  machines	  
The	  table	  above	  explains	  how	  the	  LSE	  and	  NYSE,	  and	  their	  continuous	  double-­‐sided	  
algorithm,	   represent	   another	   evolutionary	   step	   in	   the	   trajectory	   of	   matching	  
machines.	  The	  simple	  bilateral	  matching	  machine	  would	  work	  only	  if	  the	  bid	  and	  the	  
offer	   coincided	   while	   the	   multilateral	   machine,	   based	   on	   the	   single-­‐sided	   Anglo-­‐
Dutch	   auction,	   could	   match	   a	   number	   of	   bidders	   with	   a	   single	   seller.	   Under	   the	  
pressure	   of	   higher	   volumes	   and	   requirement	   for	   superior	   execution,	   modern	  
exchanges	   developed	   more	   sophisticated	   matching	   machines.	   Different	   to	   these	  
earlier	   designs,	   the	   continuous	   double	   auction	   aggregated	   all	   bids	   and	   offers	   in	   a	  
central	  matching	  machine,	  organized	  around	   individual	  specialists	  and	  their	  trading	  
books.	   In	  this	  sense,	  the	  human	  specialist	  was	  the	  essential	  component	  part	  of	  the	  
machine	  tasked	  with	  matching	  of	  buys	  to	  sells,	  insuring	  a	  fair	  and	  orderly	  market	  in	  
the	   shares	   they	  were	   responsible	   for.	  On	   the	   one	   hand,	   specialists	  would	   execute	  
orders	   entrusted	   to	  him	  by	   floor	  brokers,	   for	  whom	  he	   acted	   as	   an	   agent.	  On	   the	  
other	  hand,	  he	  also	  acted	  as	  a	  principal,	  dealing	  on	  his	  own	  account:	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Whenever	  there	  are	  public	  buyers	  but	  no	  public	  sellers,	  or	  public	  sellers	  but	  no	  
public	   buyers,	   he	   is	   expected,	  within	   reasonable	   limits,	   to	   buy	   or	   sell	   for	   his	  
own	  account	  in	  order	  to	  decrease	  price	  differences	  between	  transactions	  and	  
to	  add	  depth	  to	  the	  market	  (Wolfson	  and	  Russo,	  1970,	  p.707).	  	  
	  
This	  second	  aspect	  is	  linked	  to	  the	  specialists’	  obligation	  to	  provide	  both	  buy	  and	  sell	  
quotes	  throughout	  the	  trading	  day.	  In	  this	  sense,	  he	  would	  inevitably	  end	  up	  holding	  
on	  to	  stock	  inventories	  and	  dealing	  on	  his	  own	  account	  in	  certain	  situations.	  But	  this	  
also	  means	  that	  the	  specialist	  was	  a	  monopolistic	  ‘’price	  administrator’’	  and	  thus	  his	  
trading	   activity	   had	   to	   be	   closely	   supervised	   by	   the	   exchange.	   Specialists	   were	  
allowed	  to	  deal	  on	  their	  own	  account	  only	   if	  "reasonably	  necessary	  to	  permit	  such	  
specialists	  to	  maintain	  a	  fair	  and	  orderly	  market’’	  (Wolfson	  and	  Russo,	  1970,	  p.718).	  
What	   we	   are	   describing	   here	   is	   the	   overlap	   between	   matching	   orders	   and	  
maintaining	  a	  market,	  also	  called	  market	  making,	  which	  was	  absolutely	  necessary	  in	  
order	  to	  have	  a	  continuous	  double-­‐sided	  matching	  machine.	  	  
	  
In	  addition	  to	  the	  evolution	  of	  matching	  algorithms,	  what	  we	  call	  the	  ‘hardware’	  of	  
matching	   machines	   also	   transformed	   dramatically	   under	   the	   pressures	   and	  
constrains	  of	   technological	   innovation.	   In	   the	  19th	   century,	  brokers	   and	   clients	   still	  
used	   letters	  on	  a	   large	  scale,	   leading	  to	  huge	   latencies	   in	   the	  transmission	  of	  data,	  
sometimes	  up	  to	  twelve	  days	  (Preda,	  2009,	  p.121).	  On	  the	  whole,	  the	  actual	  process	  
of	  trading	  was	  quite	  disorganized.	  Brokers	  employed	  messenger	  boys	  who	  were	  the	  
backbone	   of	   a	   pen	   and	   pencil	   network	   for	   communicating	   price	   data.	   A	   growing	  
market	  brought	  with	   it	   growing	   levels	   of	   noise	   and	   confusion,	   such	   that	   in	   1867	  a	  
telegraph	  operator	  by	  the	  name	  of	  Edward	  Calahan	  was	  struck	  by	  inefficiency	  of	  the	  
system	  
	  
[He]	   thought	   that	  much	  of	   this	  noise	  and	  confusion	  might	  be	  dispensed	  with	  
(…)	  and	  that	  the	  prices	  might	  be	  furnished	  through	  some	  system	  of	  telegraphy	  
which	  would	  not	  require	  the	  employment	  of	  skilled	  operators	  (Standage,	  1999,	  
p.	  176).	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As	   Alex	   Preda	   (2009)	   describes	   it,	   Calahan	  went	   on	   to	   develop	   a	   stock	   ticker	   that	  
could	  produce	  a	  printed	  record	  of	  prices	  in	  a	  continuous	  manner.	  The	  advent	  of	  the	  
stock	   ticker	   was	   about	   to	   change	   financial	   markets,	   as	   it	   connected	   the	   broker’s	  
offices	  directly	  to	  the	  trading	  floor	  by	  offering	   ‘’the	  beating	  of	  the	  financial	  pulse’’.	  
The	  stock	  ticker	  was	  based	  on	  the	  printing	  telegraph	  and	  price	  data	  was	  printed	  on	  
the	  ticker	  tape.	  Instead	  of	  a	  whole	  group	  of	  people	  using	  pencils,	  paper	  and	  running	  
around	   Manhattan,	   the	   stock	   ticker	   integrated	   all	   of	   that	   in	   a	   machine	   and	   its	  
operator.	  Similar	  to	  the	  way	  in	  which	  contemporary	  Bloomberg	  subscribers	  get	  real-­‐
time	   access	   to	   global	   financial	   markets,	   stock	   tickers	   could	   be	   rented	   from	  
information	   intermediaries	   such	   as	  Western	   Union.	   Interestingly	   enough,	   Calahan	  
had	  worked	   as	   a	  messenger	   boy	   himself	   and	   thus	   understanding	   the	   necessity	   of	  
quelling	  the	  noise	  and	  the	  confusion	  of	   the	  stock	  exchange.	   In	  a	  certain	  sense,	   the	  
main	  impact	  was	  not	  simply	  about	  disseminating	  information	  outside	  of	  the	  walls	  of	  
the	   exchange,	   but	   in	   restructuring	   information	   flows	   and	   channeling	   them	   while	  
offering	   continuous	   and	   reliable	   price	   data.	   The	   advent	   of	   the	   stock	   ticker,	   the	  
telegraph	  and	  the	  telephone	  streamlined	  the	  flow	  of	  information	  from	  investors	  and	  
brokerage	   houses	   to	   the	   floor	   of	   the	   exchange.	   	   What	   was	   previously	   the	  
responsibility	   of	   runners	   and	   clerks	   would	   gradually	   be	   transferred	   to	   these	  
machines.	  	  
	  
This	  overlap	  of	  functions	  and	  the	  increased	  economic	  importance	  of	  NYSE	  also	  led	  to	  
more	   intense	   regulatory	   scrutiny,	   in	   particular	   from	   the	   Securities	   and	   Exchange	  
Commission	   (SEC).	   	   As	   early	   as	   1938,	   questions	   were	   raised	   about	   the	   complex	  
overlap	   of	   functions	   embodied	   by	   the	   floor	   specialists	   and	   the	   consequences	   for	  
pricing.	   But	   throughout	   the	   early	   20th	   century,	   reforms	   largely	   amounted	   to	  more	  
regulatory	   scrutiny	   and	   supervision,	   particular	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   minimum	   capital	  
requirements	   for	   being	   an	   approved	   specialist	   (in	   1939	   this	   stood	   as	   $10,000)	  
(Wolfson	  and	  Russo,	  1970,	  p.707).	   In	   fact,	   the	   framework	  of	  US	   stock	  markets	  will	  
remain	   largely	   unchanged	   until	   the	   second	   part	   of	   the	   20th	   century,	   when	   a	  
confluence	   of	   regulation	   and	   the	   advent	   of	   ICT	   technology	   led	   to	   a	   new	  wave	   of	  
innovation.	  We	  will	  address	  this	  in	  the	  next	  section	  on	  electronic	  trading	  and	  further	  
on	  in	  the	  chapter	  on	  High-­‐Frequency	  Trading	  (HFT).	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5.3	  Development	  of	  ECNs	  	  
	  
	  
As	  we	  have	  seen,	  the	  NYSE	  inherited	  a	  well-­‐defined	  institutional	  framework	  from	  its	  
evolution	  in	  the	  19th	  century.	  As	  it	  stood	  in	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  20th	  century,	  the	  
human	   specialists	   still	   dominated	   the	   order	  matching	   process	   on	   the	   floor	   of	   the	  
exchange.	  	  Change	  had	  only	  been	  allowed	  in	  as	  much	  as	  long	  as	  it	  did	  not	  threaten	  
the	  existence	  of	  the	  specialists	  on	  the	  floor.	  But	  interestingly	  enough,	  innovation	  was	  
already	   at	   hand	   outside	   of	   the	   walls	   of	   the	   NYSE,	   and	   it	   came	   form	   the	   most	  
unexpected	  sources.	  The	  period	  1968-­‐69	  has	  many	  important	  connotations	  in	  recent	  
political	  history,	  but	  it	  was	  also	  a	  crucial	  period	  in	  the	  development	  of	  contemporary	  
financial	  markets.	  The	  end	  of	  the	  1960s	  witnessed	  a	  surge	  in	  trading	  volumes,	  both	  
from	  retail	  individual	  investors	  and	  more	  importantly	  due	  to	  the	  increased	  activity	  of	  
institutional	   investors	   (pension	   funds,	   insurance	   companies,	   mutual	   funds,	   etc.).	  
While	   institutional	   volumes	   stood	   at	   $49bn	   in	   1967,	   they	   had	   reached	   $80bn	   in	  
1969,	  just	  two	  years	  later	  (see	  the	  Specialist	  System).	  
	  
The	  tremendous	  growth	  of	  institutional	  participation	  in	  the	  markets	  places	  an	  
increasing	  burden	  on	  the	  specialist's	  capacity	  as	  dealer	  to	  meet	  the	  demands	  
created	  by	  such	  large	  transactions	  (Wolfson	  and	  Russo,	  1970,	  p.	  741).	  	  
	  
While	   the	   specialist	   system	   had	   proved	   resilient	   for	   more	   than	   a	   century,	   the	  
growing	   volumes	   of	   trading	   and	   increased	  pressure	   from	   regulators	  would	   change	  
everything.	   In	   fact,	   the	   so-­‐called	   1968	   paperwork	   crisis	   proved	   to	   be	   a	   defining	  
moment	  in	  the	  adoption	  of	  modern	  technology	  by	  the	  world	  of	  finance.	  The	  problem	  
was	  that	   the	  surge	   in	  volumes	  at	   the	  end	  of	   the	  1960s	  had	   lead	  to	  a	  never-­‐ending	  
trail	  of	  paperwork.	  The	  NYSE	  exchange	  began	  closing	  one	  day	  a	  week	  to	  allow	  firms	  
to	   catch	   up	   on	   their	   paper	   work.	   Another	   issue	   was	   a	   growing	   mistrust	   by	   the	  
regulators	  with	  the	  long	  chain	  of	  intermediation	  that	  was	  prone	  to	  supernatural	  rent	  
extraction	   ((Pardo-­‐Guerra	   et	   al.,	   2012,	   p.7).	   The	   need	   for	   institutional	   investors	   to	  
trade	  larger	  blocks	  of	  shares	  and	  the	  possibility	  of	  matching	  these	  trades	  without	  the	  
intermediary	  of	  a	  human	  specialist	  was	  at	  the	  hart	  of	  financial	  innovation.	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The	   first	   sign	   of	   change	   came	   in	   1968	  with	   NASDAQ,	   an	   initiative	   of	   the	   National	  
Association	  of	  Securities	  Dealers	  (NASD)	  to	  establish	  an	  electronic	  quotation	  system,	  
in	  which	  trades	  were	  made	  over	  the	  phone	  through	  designated	  market	  makers	  but	  
prices	  were	  displayed	  using	  computers.	  Another	  step	  forward	  in	  this	  direction	  came	  
in	  1969	  with	  the	  deployment	  of	  Instinet,	  the	  first	  Electronic	  Communication	  Network	  
(ECN).	  Jerome	  Pustilnik	  and	  Herbert	  Behrens	  founded	  the	  company	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  
competing	  with	   traditional	   venues	   by	   sidestepping	   their	  monopoly	   on	   aggregating	  
and	   processing	   financial	   information.	   Institutional	   investors	   could	   trade	   blocks	   of	  
shares	   between	   them	   without	   the	   need	   for	   intermediary	   specialists.	   	   Instinet’s	  
subscribers	   were	   connected	   through	   terminals	   to	   a	   time-­‐shared	   computer	   in	  
Watertown,	   Massachusetts	   using	   limit	   order	   book	   technology.	   Subscribers	   would	  
submit	  bids	  and	  offers	  that	  would	  be	  matched	  according	  to	  the	  closing	  price	  of	  the	  
NYSE	  market.	  Although	  the	  adoption	  was	  slow	  in	  the	  1970s,	  the	  firm	  grew	  rapidly	  in	  
the	  1980s	  followed	  by	  other	  ECNs	  such	  as	  Delta,	  AZX,	  Archipelago,	  Island,	  etc.	  Much	  
later,	  in	  1983,	  NASDAQ	  introduced	  the	  Computer	  Assisted	  Execution	  System	  (CAES),	  
and	  the	  Small	  Order	  Execution	  System	  (SOES)	  in	  1984	  (Leinweber,	  2009,	  p.	  66).	  
	  
Within	   the	   sociology	  of	   finance,	   the	  work	  of	   Fabien	  Muniesa	  on	   the	  Arizona	  Stock	  
Exchange	   (AZX)	   is	  paradigmatic	   in	  understanding	   the	  automation	  and	  the	  adoption	  
of	   Information	   and	   Communication	   Technology	   (ICT)	   within	   financial	   markets	  
(Muniesa,	   2011;	   Muniesa,	   2014).	   Similar	   to	   other	   ECNs,	   the	   AZX	   was	   seen	   as	   an	  
attempt	  to	  override	  traditional	  exchange	  venues	  and	  techniques	  and	  posed	  serious	  
legal	   questions,	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   difficulty	   to	   decide	   of	   these	   new	  platforms	  where	  
distinction	  brokers,	  dealers	  or	  exchanges.	  In	  terms	  of	  defining	  what	  is	  an	  exchange,	  
the	  AZX	  was	  pivotal	  in	  forcing	  the	  move	  from	  a	  traditional	  club-­‐like	  understanding	  to	  
a	   algorithmic	   definition	   of	   a	   matching	   mechanism	   for	   financial	   transactions	  
(Muniesa,	  2007,	  p.6).	  The	  company	  started	   in	  1990,	  when	  Steven	  Wunsch	  founded	  
Wunsch	  Auction	  Systems	  in	  New	  York	  and	  it	  latter	  changed	  name	  to	  AZX	  and	  moved	  
its	   operations	   to	   Phoenix,	   Arizona.	   This	   new	   platform	   offered	   an	   alternative	   and	  
cheaper	   way	   to	   trade	   stocks	   listed	   on	   NYSE	   and	   NASDAQ.	   Among	   its	   many	  
innovations,	  AZX	  was	  a	  an	  electronic	  call	  market,	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  where	  all	  orders	  are	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aggregated	   at	   the	   same	   time	   as	   opposed	   to	   a	   continuous	   auction	   market	   where	  
orders	  are	  matched	  as	  soon	  as	  possible	  (Muniesa,	  2007,	  p.15).	  Wunsch	  had	  already	  
experimented	  with	  the	  matching	  design	  called	  ‘’sunshine	  trading’’	  while	  working	  at	  
Kidder	   Peabody	   in	   the	   1980s.	   As	   we	   have	   said,	   the	   aim	   was	   to	   concentrate	   all	  
available	   liquidity	  at	  one	  point	   in	  time,	  that	   is	  to	  say	  calling	  the	  market	  to	  meet	  up	  
and	   transact	   at	  midday.	   Although	  Wunsch’s	   intention	  was	   to	   design	   a	  mechanism	  
which	  would	  bring	  stability	  to	  the	  process	  of	  matching,	  ‘’sunshine	  trading’’	  was	  seen	  
by	  many	  brokers	  and	  exchanges	  as	  an	  irregular	  attempt	  to	  fragmenting	  liquidity,	  as	  
well	  as	  enriching	  on	  their	  privileges.	  In	  any	  case,	  what	  was	  unique	  about	  the	  AZX	  was	  
the	  existence	  of	   two	  order	  books.	  The	   first	  one	  called	   the	   ‘’open	  book’’	  used	   time	  
priority	  as	  matching	  criteria	  with	  all	  orders	  being	  publicly	  displayed.	  The	  second	  one	  
called	  the	  ‘’reserve	  book’’	  had	  hidden	  orders	  that	  were	  executed	  according	  to	  price	  
priority.	  Time	  priority	  was	  given	  to	  those	  who	  would	  display	  their	  orders	  publicly,	  in	  
that	   way	   limiting	   more	   aggressive	   pricing	   practices	   (Muniesa,	   2007,	   p.18).	   As	  
innovative	  as	  AZX	  was,	  it	  was	  forced	  to	  close	  down	  in	  2002	  due	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  adoption	  
and	  decreasing	  market	   volumes.	   But	  what	   is	   important	   is	   that	  AZX	   legitimized	   the	  
possibility	  of	  an	  exchange	  embodied	  in	  a	  matching	  algorithm	  running	  on	  a	  computer,	  
effectively	  replacing	  the	  system	  of	  floor	  brokers	  and	  specialists	  of	  the	  NYSE	  floor.	  
	  
Another	   turning	   point	   in	   the	   evolution	   towards	   fully	   automated	   financial	   markets	  
was	   the	   Island	  Exchange	   (1995-­‐2002).	   Island	  was	   synonymous	  with	  a	  decisive	  new	  
development	  that	  changed	  the	  world	  of	  stock	  trading,	  as	  it	  was	  the	  first	  to	  provide	  
fully	  automated	   trading,	  very	   low	   fees,	   liquidity	   rebates	  and	  most	   importantly,	   the	  
now	   standard	   service	   of	   colocation	   (MacKenzie	   and	   Pablo	   Pardo-­‐Guerra,	   2014).	  
Similar	   to	   other	   ECNs,	   Island	   developed	   as	   an	   innovative	   ‘appendix’	   to	   the	  
established	   venues	   such	   as	   NYSE	   and	   NASDAQ.	   As	   we	   have	   seen,	   NASDAQ	   was	  
dominated	   by	   voice	   broking	   until	   1984	   when	   the	   Small	   order	   Execution	   System	  
(SOES)	  was	  introduced	  which	  allowed	  for	  the	  electronic	  processing	  of	  smaller	  orders.	  
Initially	  designed	   for	  NASDAQ	  brokers,	  SOES	  started	   to	  be	  used	  by	  a	  new	  group	  of	  
intra-­‐day	  traders	  called	   ‘’SOES	  bandits’’	   (MacKenzie	  and	  Pardo-­‐Guerra,	  2014,	  p.13).	  
Because	  the	  SEC	  required	  the	  broker-­‐dealers	  to	  accept	  any	  electronic	  order	  coming	  
from	   SOES,	   the	   new	   ‘’bandits’’	   were	   making	   profits	   by	   arbitraging	   inefficiencies	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between	   the	   different	   NASDAQ	   participants.	   Island	   evolved	   out	   of	   several	  
innovations	  of	  an	  entrepreneurial	  software	  architect,	  Josh	  Levine.	  His	  first	  attempts,	  
FREDY	   and	   MonsterKey,	   allowed	   traders	   to	   enter	   orders	   into	   SOES	   with	   as	   few	  
keystrokes	   as	   possible.	   Later	   on,	   he	   developed	   Watcher,	   a	   particularly	   efficient	  
trading	   system	   allowing	   for	  market	  monitoring	   and	   facilitating	   trader	   response	   to	  
market	   changes.	   Initially,	   Watcher	   could	   be	   used	   to	   trade	   with	   NASDAQ	   broker-­‐
dealers	   via	   SOES.	   But	   quite	   quickly,	   Levine	   noticed	   that	   there	   were	   ample	  
opportunity	   for	   Watcher	   users	   to	   trade	   with	   each	   other	   (Mackenzie	   and	   Pardo-­‐
Guerra,	   2014,	   p.17).	   Consequently,	   Island	   effectively	   emerged	   as	   a	   new	  matching	  
machine	  when	  Watcher	  users	  were	  allowed	   to	   trade	  with	  each	  other	  avoiding	   the	  
intermediation	  of	  NASDAQ	  broker-­‐dealers.	  Higher	  execution	  speeds	  and	  automation	  
facilitated	  the	  birth	  of	  this	  new	  machine,	  reducing	  the	  level	  of	  intermediation	  of	  the	  
NASDAQ	  broker-­‐dealers	  and	  providing	  a	  cheaper	  and	  more	  efficient	  pool	  of	  liquidity.	  
As	   we	   have	   already	   said,	   Island	   was	   a	   particularly	   advanced	   piece	   of	   technology,	  
which	   coupled	   with	   colocation	   allowed	   for	   automated	   market	   making.	   Island’s	  
distinctive	  architecture	  allowed	  market	  makers	   to	  move	  quickly	  and	  not	  be	  caught	  
by	   the	   market.	   This	   low	   risk	   environment	   was	   absolutely	   necessary	   for	   Island’s	  
success	   and	   led	   to	   a	   kind	   of	   symbiotic	   relationship	   with	   electronic/automated	  
market	  makers	  who	  could	  thrive	  in	  such	  an	  environment.	  All	  of	  this	  coupled	  with	  the	  
introduction	  of	   liquidity	   rebates	  and	  colocation	   led	   to	  and	   incredible	  growth	  story.	  
By	  2002,	  Island	  had	  a	  9.6%	  share	  of	  NASDAQ	  volumes	  rivaling	  another	  ECN,	  Instinet	  
(Biais	  et	  al.,	  2003,	  p.6).	  	  
	  
One	  must	  understand	  the	  development	  of	  alternative	  trading	  platforms	  not	  simply	  in	  
terms	   of	   technological	   innovations	   but	   also	   through	   the	   lens	   of	   regulation,	   which	  
fostered	  competition	  and	  transparency	  (Lee,	  1998).	  The	  first	  regulatory	  response	  to	  
ECNs	   was	   a	   1969	   Concept	   Release	   from	   the	   Securities	   and	   Exchange	   Commission	  
(SEC)	   proposing	   regulation	   of	   automated	   electronic	   markets.	   Rule	   15c2-­‐10	   was	   a	  
direct	   consequence	  of	   ECNs	   this	   new	  hybrid	   species,	   a	   strange	   crossover	   between	  
and	  exchange	  and	  a	  broker-­‐dealer	   (Domowitz	  and	  Lee,	  2001).	  While	   Instinet,	  Delta	  
and	   the	   AZX	   shared	   many	   similarities;	   they	   also	   exhibited	   different	   operational	  
structures	  and	  can	  thus	  be	  seen	  as	  different	  types	  of	  matching	  machines:	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Instinet	  was	  an	  automated	  continuous	  double	  auction	  based	  on	  a	   limit	  order	  
book	  for	  equities.	  The	  Delta	  system	  is	  oriented	  towards	  continuous	  trading	  in	  
government	   options.	   In	   stark	   contrast,	   the	   AZX	   is	   based	   on	   a	   computerized	  
periodic	  Walrasian	  auction	  model,	  with	  varying	  levels	  of	  pre-­‐trade	  information	  
depending	  on	  user	  choices	  (Domowitz	  and	  Lee,	  2001,	  p.13).	  
	  
The	  SEC	  had	  traditionally	  defined	  a	  dealer	  as	  anyone	  engaged	  in	  buying	  and	  selling	  
securities	  for	  his	  own	  account,	  through	  a	  broker.	  Consequently,	  a	  broker	  was	  defined	  
as	  any	  person	  engaged	  in	  the	  business	  of	  effecting	  transactions	  in	  securities	  for	  the	  
account	  of	  others.	  The	  crucial	  difference	  between	  these	  two	  types	  of	  financial	  actors	  
and	   an	   exchange	   was	   the	   centralization	   of	   trading	   and	   the	   capacity	   to	   list	   new	  
stocks.	   While	   AZX	   used	   a	   centralized	   system	   for	   aggregating	   and	   execute	   orders,	  
which	  qualified	  it	  as	  an	  exchange,	  Delta	  and	  Instinet	  where	  deemed	  not	  to	  have	  the	  
same	   characteristics	   and	  were	   not	   required	   to	   register	   as	   an	   exchange	   (Domowitz	  
and	   Lee,	   2001,	   p14).	   Subsequently,	   the	   SEC	  passed	   the	  Regulation	  of	   the	  National	  
Market	   System	   (Reg	   NMS)	   in	   1974,	   which	   required	   increased	   transparency	   and	  
connection	   between	   markets	   (Pardo-­‐Guerra	   et	   al.,	   2012,	   p.9).	   Finally,	   the	   Inter-­‐
market	  Trading	  System	  (ITS)	  allowed	  participants	  on	  one	  market	  to	  route	  the	  order	  
to	   another	  market	   when	   a	   better	   price	   was	   displayed.	   In	   1999,	   a	   new	   regulatory	  
framework	   for	   Automated	   Trading	   Systems	   (ATS)	   allowed	   alternative	   trading	  
systems	   to	   register	   as	   a	   broker,	   or	   register	   as	   an	   exchange,	   or	   operate	   as	  
unregulated	  ATS	  (Gyurko,	  2011).	  This	  finally	  solved	  the	  new	  problem	  posed	  by	  ECNs	  
in	   as	  much	   as	   they	   looked	   like	   an	   exchange	   but	  were	   in	   fact	   a	   dealer	   (Freedman,	  
2006).	  Another	  important	  step	  was	  the	  repeal	  of	  Rule	  390	  on	  May	  8,	  2000.	  The	  rule	  
was	   supposed	   to	   disallow	   the	   trading	   of	   stock	   listed	   prior	   to	   1979	   outside	   of	   the	  
NYSE	  exchange.	  Although	  NYSE	  argued	  that	  this	  was	  designed	  in	  order	  to	  safeguard	  
liquidity	   in	   those	   stocks,	   the	   rule	   applied	   to	  30%	  of	   listings,	   accounting	   for	  50%	  of	  
volume	   (Kim,	   2007,	   p.43).	   Abandoning	   this	   restrictive	   measure	   allowed	   ECNs	   to	  
match	  orders	  in	  all	  US	  listed	  stocks.	  In	  addition,	  in	  2001	  the	  SEC	  imposed	  the	  switch	  
from	   traditional	   sixteenths	   ($.0625)	   to	   penny	   spreads	   ($.01),	   reducing	   transaction	  
costs	   for	   smaller	   investors	   and,	   in	   a	   sense,	   force	   the	   adoption	   of	   more	   efficient	  
	   144	  
electronic	  systems.	  This	  was	  further	  reinforced	  by	  the	  2005	  introduction	  of	  rule	  610,	  
granting	   equal	   access	   to	   all	   markets	   by	   all	   players	   and	   rule	   611,	   demanding	   that	  
orders	   should	   trade	   at	   the	   best	   possible	   price	   (Pardo-­‐Guerra	   et	   al.,	   2012,	   p.12).	  
Therefore,	   the	   regulatory	   push	   for	   more	   transparence	   and	   the	   adoption	   of	  
information	  technology	  ultimately	  led	  to	  a	  more	  level	  playing	  field	  in	  the	  business	  of	  
aggregating	  and	  matching	  order	  flow.	  Eventually,	  some	  of	  the	  ECNs	  developed	  large	  
market	  shares	  overtaking	  NYSE	  and	  NASDAQ	  as	  the	  main	  aggregators	  of	  order	  flow	  
in	  the	  US	  stock	  markets.	  This	  increase	  in	  competition	  from	  alternative	  trading	  venues	  
triggered	  a	  wave	  of	  acquisitions	  with	  NASDAQ	  acquiring	   Instinet	   in	  2005	  and	  NYSE	  
merging	  with	  the	  Archipelago	  Exchange	  in	  2006.	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5.5	  London,	  Paris	  and	  Chicago	  
	  
	  
From	  New	  York	  to	  London	  and	  from	  Paris	  to	  Frankfurt,	  the	  function	  of	  matching	  the	  
trading	  of	   stocks	  was	  a	   sacred	  monopoly	  of	  humans	  specialists	   located	   in	  a	  clearly	  
demarcated	   space,	   the	   only	   legitimate	   venue	   of	   ‘’collective	   calculation’’	   (Muniesa,	  
2003;	  Muniesa	  and	  Callon,	  2003).	  For	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  chapter	  we	  have	  focused	  
only	  on	  the	  centralized	  forms	  of	  matching,	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  the	  publicly	  regulated	  forms	  
of	  exchange50.	  	  It	  is	  in	  this	  context	  that	  we	  have	  followed	  the	  impressive	  evolution	  of	  
matching	  machines	  in	  the	  context	  of	  US	  stock	  markets,	  moving	  towards	  higher	  levels	  
of	  efficiency	  and	  technological	  sophistication	  form	  the	  early	  introduction	  of	  the	  stock	  
ticker	   to	   contemporary	   electronic	   trading	  platforms	   such	   as	   ECNs.	   The	  post	  World	  
War	   II	   period	  was	  particularly	   important	   in	   this	   regard,	   due	   to	   the	   introduction	  of	  
computer	   technology	   into	  economic	  and	   social	   spheres	   (Mirowski,	  2002).	  The	  new	  
possibilities	  afforded	  by	  information	  and	  communication	  technologies	  were	  already	  
apparent	  in	  the	  1960s,	  namely	  that	  
	  
(…)	   in	   a	   fully	   automated	   system	   the	   specialists	   function	   must	   also	   be	  
automated.	  This	  means	  the	  system	  must	  be	  programmed	  to	  maintain	  orderly	  
markets	  without	  the	  intercession	  of	  the	  human	  element	  (Youngblood,	  1969)	  
	  
Moreover,	   as	   early	   as	   1971	   Fischer	   Black	   argued	   for	   the	   full	   automation	   of	   stock	  
exchanges	   arguing	   that	   the	   pricing	   mechanism	   could	   be	   reduced	   to	   the	   logical	  
process	  of	  a	  network	  of	  computers	  (Black,	  1971).	  What	  up	  until	  then	  was	  executed	  
by	   human-­‐based	   ‘hardware’	   could	   now	   be	   translated	   into	   almost	   fully	   automated	  
computer	  operations.	  Radical	  as	  it	  was,	  the	  technological	  innovation	  of	  the	  last	  three	  
decades	  took	  some	  time	  to	  some	  time	  to	  overcome	  the	  resistance	  of	  the	  floor-­‐based	  
human	  specialists.	  We	  have	  seen	  this	  process	  unfold	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  NYSE	  and	  US	  
stock	  markets,	  but	   it	   is	  also	  useful	  to	  quickly	  summaries	  this	  process	   in	  the	  case	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50	  We	  will	  address	  the	  issue	  of	  Over-­‐The-­‐Counter	  (OTC)	  markets	  in	  the	  last	  chapter	  of	  
the	  thesis,	  but	  only	  for	  the	  case	  of	  complex	  derivatives	  such	  as	  swaps.	  This	  is	  mainly	  
because	   for	   both	   stocks	   and	   simple	   derivatives	   such	   as	   futures	   and	   options,	   their	  
modern	  evolution	  has	  revolved	  around	  the	  public	  exchange	  model.	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European	   stock	  markets.	   For	   instance,	   the	   London	   Stock	   Exchange	   has	   earned	   its	  
name	  as	  one	  of	  the	  oldest	  venues	  for	  aggregating	  the	  trading	  in	  shares.	  Historically,	  
it	  has	  been	  the	  site	  where	  liquidity	  providers	  and	  liquidity	  removers	  would	  meet	  to	  
match	   their	   positions.	   Moreover,	   by	   the	   20th	   century	   it	   had	   become	   a	   highly	  
exclusivist	  ‘’natural	  monopoly’’	  (Lee,	  1998),	  as	  matching	  order	  flow	  was	  the	  exclusive	  
privilege	  of	  jobbers	  and	  stockbrokers.	  While	  the	  telegraph,	  the	  stock	  ticker	  and	  the	  
telephone	  had	  put	  up	  serious	  challenges	   to	   this	  design,	   the	  human	  components	  of	  
these	  machines	  still	  dominated	  well	  into	  the	  second	  part	  of	  the	  20th	  century	  (Pardo-­‐
Guerra,	  2010;	  Pardo-­‐Guerra,	  2012).	  Nevertheless,	  the	  same	  conditions	  and	  pressures	  
that	  led	  to	  the	  electronic	  revolution	  in	  US	  stock	  markets	  were	  eventually	  replicated	  
in	   the	   case	   of	   the	   LSE.	   According	   to	   Pardo-­‐Guerra,	   the	   British	   stock	   exchange	  
gradually	   exhibited	   the	   same	   trend	   towards	   automation	   and	   adoption	   of	   ICT	  
technologies,	   initially	   through	   the	  development	  of	   the	  systems	  such	  as	   the	  Market	  
Price	   Display	   Service.	   While	   technology	   provided	   the	   means,	   they	   main	   bone	   of	  
contention	   was	   the	   opaque	   fixed	   commission	   model	   of	   the	   London	   brokerage	  
industry.	   In	   an	   attempt	   to	   sidestep	   the	   traditional	   brokerage	   houses,	   a	   group	   of	  
merchant	   banks	   (Issuing	   Houses	   Association)	   developed	   an	   electronic	   platform	   in	  
1973,	   the	   so-­‐called	   Automated	   Real-­‐Time	   Investments	   Exchange	   Limited	   (ARIEL),	  
based	  on	  the	  American	  Instinet	  model.	  While	  this	  posed	  an	  early	  challenge	  to	  the	  old	  
structure	  of	  the	  exchange,	  it	  was	  not	  until	  1986	  when	  regulatory	  reforms,	  commonly	  
known	  as	   the	  Big	  Bang,	   led	   to	   a	   radical	   change	  of	  market	   structure	   (Attard,	   1994;	  
Attard,	  2000).	  This	  entailed	  the	  end	  of	  fixed	  commissions	  for	  brokers,	  the	  elimination	  
of	   the	   distinction	   between	   jobbers	   and	   brokers,	   and	   opening	   the	   possibility	   of	  
electronic	  trading	  platforms	  (Pardo-­‐Guerra,	  2010).	  Following	  on	  from	  this,	  one	  of	  the	  
first	  attempts	  for	  an	  alternative	  venue	  was	  Tradepoint,	  which	  launched	  in	  1995	  and	  
was	   later	  acquired	  by	  SWX	  Swiss	  Exchange	   in	  2000	  and	  renamed	  virt-­‐x.	   Just	  as	   the	  
US-­‐based	   ECN	   platforms,	   Tradepoint	   used	   an	   electronic	   order	   book	   system.	  More	  
importantly,	   it	   allowed	   the	   opening	   up	   of	   the	   process	   of	  matching	   outside	   of	   the	  
walls	  of	  the	  LSE.	  In	  fact,	  Tradepoint	  forced	  the	  LSE	  to	  develop	  SEAQ,	  an	  automated	  
quotation	   system	   based	   on	   the	   NASDAQ	   model.	   Later	   innovation	   such	   as	   Baikal	  
Global	  or	  Turquoise	  can	  represent	  the	  final	  transition	  towards	  automated	  electronic	  
trading	  in	  London.	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Across	  the	  channel,	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  Paris	  Bourse	  would	  also	  follow	  a	  similar	  path	  
to	   the	   LSE.	   The	   importance	   of	   the	   French	   stock	   exchange	   goes	   back	   to	   the	   19th	  
century,	   when	   according	   to	   an	   urban	   myth	   it	   influenced	   the	   thinking	   of	   one	   of	  
founders	  of	  neoclassical	  economics,	  Leon	  Walras	  (Muniesa,	  2003).	  But	  the	  origins	  of	  
the	  exchange	  date	  to	  the	  18th	  century	  when	  in	  1724	  a	  room	  called	  the	  ‘‘Parquet’’	  in	  a	  
building	   on	   the	   Rue	   Vivienne	   was	   designated	   as	   the	   legitimate	   venue	   for	   the	  
exchange	  of	  securities	   (Michie,	  2006,	  p.39).	   In	  this	  context,	   the	  aim	  of	  government	  
intervention	  was	  not	  to	  encourage	  trading	  such	  as	  in	  Amsterdam	  but	  to	  control	  and	  
restrict	   it.	   As	   Michie	   (2006)	   describes	   it,	   unlike	   the	   continuous	   double	   auction	  
machine	  developed	  in	  New	  York	  and	  London,	  the	  Paris	  Bourse	  functioning	  according	  
to	  call	  market	  algorithm.	  This	  is	  known	  as	  ‘’tâtonnement’’,	  a	  mechanism	  allowing	  the	  
discovery	  of	  a	  market-­‐clearing	  price	  in	  several	  stages.	  An	  employee	  of	  the	  exchange	  
would	   quote	   and	   opening	   price,	   and	   then	   brokers	   would	   signal	   their	   buy	   or	   sell	  
intentions.	   If	   the	   case	   of	   a	   mismatch,	   new	   call	   auctions	   could	   be	   repeated	   until	  
matching	  was	  achieved.	  As	  we	  already	  noted,	   the	  market	  was	  not	   continuous,	  but	  
there	   were	   separate	   trading	   session	   throughout	   the	   day	   (Kregel,	   2007,	   p.149).	  
Brokers	   (‘’agents	  de	  change’’)	  were	  regulated	  similarly	  to	  the	  UK,	   in	  the	  sense	  that	  
they	  were	  not	  trading	  on	  their	  own	  behalf,	  but	  only	  transmitting	  market	  orders	  from	  
their	  clients.	  Up	  until	  the	  20th	  century,	  the	  Paris	  Bourse	  handled	  mostly	  government	  
bonds	  and	  railway	  shares,	  whereas	  a	  parallel	  market	  was	  trading	  in	  foreign	  shares	  as	  
well	  as	  buying	  and	  selling	  for	  future	  delivery.	  Gradually,	  banking	  houses	  based	  their	  
operations	   around	   the	   building	   of	   the	   Paris	   Bourse	   and	   connected	   their	   provincial	  
networks,	   effectively	   creating	   a	   centralized	   financial	   system	   (Michie,	   2006,	   p.94).	  
While	   the	  Anglo-­‐Saxon	  model	  was	   revolved	   around	   brokerage	   houses	   and	   broker-­‐
dealer	   banks,	   the	   French	   market	   relied	   on	   the	   absolute	   monopoly	   of	   exchange	  
agents	   (‘’agents	   de	   change’’)	  who	  were	   the	   licensed	   deal	   in	   securities.	   This	  model	  
effectively	  meant	  that	  the	  matching	  mechanism	  of	  the	  exchange	  was	  the	  privilege	  of	  
a	  number	  of	  personal	   interests	   (Muniesa,	  2003).	  Despite	  having	  a	  different	  market	  
structure	   from	   the	   NYSE	   and	   LSE,	   Hautcoeur	   and	   Riva	   has	   shown	   that	   the	   Paris	  
Bourse	  was	  nevertheless	  a	  very	  efficient	  transaction	  machine	  (Hautcoeur,	  2012).	   In	  
fact,	  despite	  all	  their	  differences,	  the	  history	  of	  the	  automation	  of	  the	  Paris	  Bourse	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bears	   similarities	   to	  what	  happened	   in	  New	  York	  and	  London.	  Fabian	  Muniesa	  has	  
offered	   a	   detailed	   account	   of	   the	   complex	   process	   by	   which	   the	   stock	   exchange	  
moved	  to	  an	  electronic	  automated	  system,	  how	  it	  changed	  but	  also	  how	  it	  preserved	  
certain	   aspects	   of	   the	   original	   structure.	   This	   was	   a	   difficult	   journey	   as	   the	  
established	  brokers	  were	  for	  a	  long	  time	  reluctant	  to	  adopt	  any	  technical	  innovation	  
that	  would	   infringe	   on	   their	   special	   privileges.	   Just	   like	   in	   London,	   the	   investment	  
banks	  were	  particularly	   interested	   in	  the	  disintermediation	  of	  the	  monopoly	  of	  the	  
brokers.	  While	  the	  brokers	  wanted	  to	  keep	  a	  tight	  grip	  on	  the	  matching	  process,	  and	  
in	  particular	  to	  their	  fixed	  commissions.	  The	  deadlock	  between	  the	  French	  banks	  and	  
brokers	   was	   finally	   broken	   when	   the	   Paris	   Bourse	   began	   to	   lose	  market	   share	   to	  
London.	  As	  the	  more	  advanced	  systems	  in	  London	  were	  drawing	  volumes	  away	  from	  
Paris,	  an	  urgent	  process	  of	  automation	  began	  that	  finally	  ended	  in	  1989	  with	  the	  CAC	  
(‘’Cotation	   assistée	   en	   continu’’)	   system,	   modeled	   after	   the	   Toronto	   Exchange	  
(Muniesa,	  2003).	  
	  
This	   tendency	   towards	  automation	  and	   the	  adoption	  of	  electronic	   technology,	  was	  
not	  restricted	  to	  stock	  markets	  but	  also	  within	  derivatives	  markets.	  Following	  from	  
the	   previous	   analysis	   of	   the	   automation	   of	   share	   trading	   in	   the	   US,	   it	   is	   useful	   to	  
review	   a	   similar	   process	   involving	   the	   US	   futures	   and	   options	   markets	   based	   in	  
Chicago.	   Ever	   since	   the	   1970s,	   Chicago	  was	   a	   hotbed	  of	   innovation,	   particularly	   in	  
the	  area	  of	  financial	  derivatives	  (Kummer	  and	  Pauletto,	  2012).	  On	  May	  16,	  1972	  the	  
Chicago	  Mercantile	  Exchange	   (CME)	   launched	  of	   the	   IMM	   (International	  Monetary	  
Market),	  a	  currency	   futures	  market	   (Melamed,	  1988)	   (Hasbrouck	  et	  al.,	  1993).	  This	  
can	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  the	  passing	  the	  threshold	  towards	  new	  financial	  capacities	  and	  
the	  opening	  up	  of	  a	  wide	  space	  for	  financial	  innovation.	  In	  this	  sense,	  ever	  since	  the	  
1970s,	   Chicago	   built	   a	   preeminent	   position	   in	   the	   international	   futures	  market.	   In	  
this	  context,	  trading	  solely	  in	  the	  human-­‐based	  open-­‐outcry	  pits	  proved	  to	  severely	  
limiting	  for	  future	  growth.	  When	  the	  Chicago	  pits	  were	  open	  it	  was	  night	  in	  Asia,	  so	  
there	  was	  a	   real	  need	   for	  24	  hour	   trading	  system	  (MacKenzie,	  2015).	  The	  problem	  
with	   introducing	   an	   electronic	   platform	   was	   the	   fierce	   resistance	   from	   the	   pit	  
traders.	   The	   membership	   of	   the	   CME	   would	   only	   accept	   it	   if	   it	   wasn’t	   directly	  
competing	  with	  their	  own	  business.	  The	  first	  electronic	  derivatives	  trading	  platform,	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Globex,	  entered	  into	  development	  in	  1987	  as	  a	  joint	  venture	  with	  Reuters,	  and	  was	  
officially	  launched	  in	  1992.	  It	  was	  effectively	  the	  first	  electronic	  platform	  specifically	  
designed	  for	  trading	  futures	  contracts.	  It	  initially	  traded	  only	  CME	  futures	  contracts,	  
in	  German	  marks	  and	   Japanese	  yen	  but	  was	   then	  extended	  to	  Swiss	   francs,	  British	  
pounds,	   etc.	   After	   one	   year,	   systematic	   trading	   was	   possible	   for	   equity	   futures	  
leading	   to	   in	   impressive	   growth	   of	   volumes,	   1.2	   million/day	   contacts	   in	   2002	  
(Aldridge,	  2010,	  p.12).	  	  Initially,	  it	  only	  traded	  at	  night,	  but	  then	  it	  was	  permitted	  to	  
trade	  during	  the	  day	  but	  only	  in	  contacts	  that	  were	  not	  traded	  in	  the	  pits.	  This	  in	  turn	  
led	   to	   further	  contractual	   innovation	  such	  as	   the	  E-­‐Mini,	  a	   security	  developed	  as	  a	  
complement	   to	   the	   pit	   traded	   S&P	   500	   future.	   In	   fact,	   the	   E-­‐Mini	   was	   quickly	  
adopted	  as	  it	  allowed	  traders	  to	  profit	  from	  arbitrage	  opportunities	  between	  Globex	  
and	  the	  pits	  (MacKenzie,	  2015,	  p.22).	  The	  use	  of	  Globex	  terminals,	  which	  had	  a	  first	  
in	   first	   out	  matching	   algorithm,	   and	   very	   fast	   arbitrage	   opportunities,	   meant	   that	  
execution	   speed	   was	   essential.	   Europe	   soon	   followed	   Chicago’s	   example	   with	  
Deutsche	  Terminbörse	  in	  Frankfurt,	  LIFFE	  Connect,	  and	  MATIF	  in	  Paris.	  In	  any	  case,	  it	  
was	   the	  huge	  success	  of	  Globex	   that	  allowed	  the	  CME	  to	  merge	  with	   its	   long	   time	  
rival	  the	  Chicago	  Board	  of	  Trade	  (CBOT)	  to	  form	  the	  CME	  Group	  in	  2007,	  becoming	  
the	   largest	   matching	   machines	   for	   futures	   contracts.	   In	   conclusion,	   Globex	   was	   a	  
crucial	  moment	   in	  the	  history	  of	  financial	  markets,	   fostering	  the	  transition	  towards	  
electronic	  trading	  of	  derivative	  contracts	  but	  it	  was	  only	  in	  2015	  that	  CME	  decided	  to	  
close	  most	  of	  its	  open	  outcry	  trading	  floors	  (the	  pits)	  leaving	  open	  only	  those	  for	  S&P	  
500	   futures	   and	   options.	   This	   final	   decision	   came	   as	   the	   volumes	   traded	   in	   open	  
outcry	   by	   human	   market	   makers	   reached	   an	   all	   time	   low	   if	   1%	   of	   daily	   futures	  
transactions.	  
	  
Finally,	  the	  development	  of	  electronic	  trading	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Chicago	  derivatives	  
markets	  is	  similar	  the	  transition	  of	  stock	  exchanges	  both	  in	  Europe	  and	  the	  US	  (Scott	  
and	  Barrett,	  2000).	  Under	  the	  pressures	  of	  information	  technology,	  the	  demand	  for	  
lower	  trading	  costs,	  the	  regulatory	  push	  for	  transparency	  and	  automation,	  we	  have	  
seen	   the	   gradual	   evolution	   towards	   more	   complex	   matching	   machines,	   based	   on	  
automated	  electronic	  platforms.	  We	  also	  elaborated	  on	  the	  gradual	  displacement	  of	  
humans	  within	  the	  workings	  of	  matching	  machines.	  Initially	  through	  the	  stock	  ticker,	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the	   telegraph	   and	   the	   telephone	   and	   ultimately	   through	   the	   computer,	   we	   saw	   a	  
continuous	  expansion	  of	  automation	  and	  standardization	  whereby	  function	  such	  as	  
the	  matching	  of	  orders,	   the	  dissemination	  of	   trade	  data,	   etc.	   are	  all	   performed	  by	  
computer	   technology.	   As	   Pardo-­‐Guerra	   (2013a)	   has	   argued,	   this	   process	   does	   not	  
entail	   the	  disappearance	  of	   humans	   form	   the	   functioning	  of	  markets,	   but	   leads	   to	  
the	   rise	   of	   financial	   engineers	   understood	   broadly	   (software	   developers,	   risk	  
analysts,	  quants	  etc.).	  Similar	  to	  the	  way	  in	  which	  Simondon	  thought	  about	  modern	  
technology,	  humans	  are	  no	   longer	   the	  dominant	   component	  of	   complex	  machines	  
but	  become	  maintainers	  and	  managers	  of	  machines.	  As	  long	  as	  it	  was	  impossible	  to	  
build	   data	   warehouses,	   servers,	   matching	   engines	   and	   electronic	   order	   books,	   a	  
function	   such	   as	   the	   matching	   of	   order	   flows	   was	   the	   monopoly	   of	   human	  
individuals.	  The	  technological	  innovations	  of	  the	  late	  20th	  and	  early	  21st	  century	  have	  
changed	  all	  of	  this	  and	  set	  the	  stage	  for	  our	  contemporary	  financial	  markets.	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5.4	  NYSE	  and	  the	  Hybrid	  Market	  
	  
As	  we	  have	  seen,	  the	  development	  of	  alternative	  matching	  machines	  such	  as	  ECNs	  
had	  a	  significant	  impact	  on	  the	  incumbent	  exchanges.	  For	  instance,	  NYSE	  introduced	  
the	   first	   electronic	   order	   routing	   system	   Designated	   Order	   Turnaround	   (DOT)	   in	  
1976,	  which	  was	  designed	   to	   assist	   human	   specialist	   on	   the	   floor	   of	   the	   exchange	  
(Leinweber,	   2009,	   p.	   68).	  DOT	  and	   subsequently	   SuperDOT,	  were	   effectively	   order	  
routing	   systems	   connecting	   members	   of	   the	   exchange	   directly	   with	   the	   specialist	  
post	  on	  the	  floor	  without	  having	  to	  go	  through	  brokers.	  While	  at	  first	  glance	  it	  might	  
seem	   that	  NYSE	  was	  willing	  adopter	  of	  new	   technology,	   it	  was	  only	  doing	   so	   in	  as	  
much	  as	  it	  did	  not	  radically	  disrupt	  the	  institutional	  arrangements	  inherited	  from	  the	  
19th	  century.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  the	  transformation	  of	  NYSE	  was	  a	  long	  and	  arduous	  
process,	   involving	   technological	   and	   regulatory	   pressure	   as	   well	   as	   increased	  
competition	   form	   electronic	   trading	   platforms	   (Zimmermann,	   2008;	   Zimmermann,	  
2011).	  The	  push	  for	  automation	  and	  efficiency	  (Pardo-­‐Guerra	  et	  al.,	  2012)	  produced	  
a	  level	  playing	  field	  allowing	  more	  nimble	  electronic	  platforms	  to	  gain	  market	  share	  
at	  the	  expense	  of	  the	  established	  exchanges.	  This	  is	  already	  a	  secular	  tendency	  that	  
was	  apparent	  when	  the	  19th	  century	  bucket	  shops	  attempted	  to	  take	  business	  away	  
from	  the	  bigger	  brokers	  by	  gaining	  access	  to	  stock	  ticker	  technology.	  In	  the	  late	  20th	  
and	   early	   21st	   centuries,	   the	   technological	   novelty	   of	   alternative	   trading	   platforms	  
such	  as	  ECNs	  disrupted	  the	  exchange/broker/dealer	  distinctions	  and	  revolutionized	  
the	  specialist	  system	  of	  the	  NYSE.	  It	  is	  useful	  at	  this	  point	  to	  review	  the	  normal	  day-­‐
today	   operation	   of	   the	   NYSE	   as	   it	   stood	   in	   the	   early	   1990s	   and	   its	   subsequent	  
transition	  towards	  a	  hybrid	  system.	  Despite	  the	  innovation	  brought	  about	  ECNs	  like	  
Instinet,	  Delta	  and	  AZX,	   the	  aggregation	  of	  order	   flow	  on	  NYSE	  was	  still	  performed	  
through	  the	  coordination	  of	  specialists	  and	  floor	  brokers.	  Order	  matching	  in	  a	  given	  
stock	   was	   processed	   at	   the	   assigned	   specialist	   posts	   (Hasbrouck,	   1993,	   p.4).	   The	  
specialist	   and	   his	   clerks	   were	   always	   at	   the	   post,	   managing	   order	   flow	   and	   the	  
display	  panels	  (a	  trading	  post	  would	  have	  some	  18-­‐22	  panels)	  ensuring	  a	  continuous	  
market	  in	  a	  certain	  number	  of	  stocks.	  Floor	  brokers	  are	  in	  constant	  contact	  with	  their	  
firms	   through	   telephone	  booths	  positioned	  near	   the	  walls.	   They	  were	   conduits	   for	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order	   flow,	   receiving	   information	   from	  the	   firm’s	   trading	  desk	  and	  channeling	   it	   to	  
the	  specialist’s	  post.	  Despite	  the	  level	  of	  technical	  automation	  the	  majority	  of	  trades	  
were	  still	  not	  executed	  automatically	  but	  were	  entered	  into	  the	  system	  or	  approved	  
by	  the	  specialist.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  NYSE	  specialist	  was	  still	  integrating	  a	  whole	  series	  
of	   functions	   including	   ‘’auctioneer,	   catalyst,	   agent	   and	   principal’’	   (Wolfson	   and	  
Russo,	  1970).	  	  	  
	  
Nevertheless,	   the	   adoption	   of	   DOT	   and	   SuperDOT	  would	   severely	   limit	   the	   use	   of	  
floor	   brokers,	   as	   it	   allowed	   the	   submission	   of	   orders	   directly	   to	   the	   specialist’s	  
Display	  Book	  at	  his	  post.	  Consequently,	  human	  floor	  brokers	  would	  only	  handle	  the	  
more	   sensitive	   orders,	   usually	   in	   less	   liquid	   shares	   or	   for	   bigger	   block	   trades.	   This	  
trend	   towards	   automation	  was	   further	   reinforced	   by	   the	   development	   of	   Direct+,	  
which	  provided	  an	  automated	  execution	  options	   that	  circumvented	   the	  specialists.	  	  
First	  rolled	  out	   in	  October	  2000,	  the	  Direct+	  system	  provided	  automated	  execution	  
for	  market	  orders	  below	  1,099	   shares.	   	   The	   scope	  of	   this	   system	  was	  expanded	   in	  
2004	  with	  the	  elimination	  of	  any	  limits	  on	  the	  size	  and	  type	  of	  orders	  that	  could	  be	  
submitted	  for	  automated	  execution.	  Whereas	   in	  the	  case	  of	  DOT	  or	  SuperDOT,	  the	  
final	   execution	   was	   still	   done	   by	   the	   specialist	   on	   the	   floor,	   with	   Direct+	   it	   was	  
possible	  for	  smaller	  orders	  to	  be	  matched	  automatically.	  Finally,	  the	  acquisition	  of	  an	  
ECN,	  the	  Archipelago	  Exchange,	  in	  March	  2006	  cemented	  the	  radical	  transformation	  
of	   NYSE	   from	   a	   floor-­‐based	   system	   to	   the	   hybrid	   market	   it	   operates	   to	   this	   day	  
(Fabozzi,	  2008,	  p.140).	  Building	  on	   the	   technology	  and	  automated	  matching	  or	   the	  
Archipelago	  Exchange	  and	  its	  SuperDot	  and	  Dirtect+	  systems,	  the	  NYSE	  launched	  its	  
Hybrid	  Market	  in	  2006.	  In	  this	  new	  design,	  clients	  could	  send	  orders	  directly	  to	  the	  
floor	  or	  simply	  opt	  for	  electronic	  execution.	  
	  
The	   NYSE	   Hybrid	   Market	   offers	   customers	   the	   choice	   between	   the	   auction	  
system	  with	  the	  opportunity	  for	  price	  improvement	  provided	  by	  the	  specialist	  
system	   and	   very	   fast	   automated	   trade	   execution	   provided	   by	   the	   electronic	  
system	  (Fabozzi,	  2008,	  p.141).	  
	  
As	   the	   previous	   system,	   the	   Hybrid	  Market	   operates	   a	   continuous	   double	   auction	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during	  the	  trading	  day	  and	  a	  call	  action	  for	  the	  opening	  and	  the	  close	  of	  the	  market.	  
The	   optionality	   of	   having	   both	   fast	   electronic	   execution	   (for	   all	   orders	   below	   1	  
million	  shares)	  and	  the	  possibility	  of	  better	  pricing	  means	  that	  the	  Hybrid	  System	  is	  
able	   to	   service	   the	   needs	   to	   a	   diverse	   set	   of	  market	   participants	   (some	   investors	  
value	   immediate	   execution	   while	   others	   require	   optimal	   pricing	   of	   their	   orders)	  
(Fabozzi,	  2008).	   	  As	   stated	  at	   the	   time	  by	   the	  NYSE	  Chief	  Technology	  Officer	  Steve	  
Rubinow51,	   the	   adoption	   of	   the	   Hybrid	   System	  will	   lead	   to	   execution	   times	   going	  
down	  from	  9	  to	  0.3	  seconds,	  aligning	  NYSE	  with	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  industry52.	  
In	  any	  case,	  all	  of	  this	  had	  a	  major	  impact	  on	  the	  human	  specialists	  and	  brokers	  on	  
the	   floor	   of	   the	   exchange.	   As	   Hendershott	   and	  Moulton	   (2007),	   have	   shown,	   the	  
percentage	  of	  NYSE	  order	  flow	  processed	  by	  the	  specialists	  and	  the	  brokers	  on	  the	  
floor	  steadily	  declined	  from	  70%	  in	  1991,	  50%	  in	  1999	  to	  about	  10%	  in	  2006	  (Harris	  
and	  Hasbrouck,	  1996;	  Sofianos	  and	  Werner,	  2000;	  Fabozzi,	  2008).	  With	  the	  decline	  in	  
order	  flow,	  the	  number	  of	  specialist	  firms	  also	  followed	  suit.	  The	  possibility	  of	  having	  
most	  orders	  matched	  automatically,	  means	  that	  specialists	  and	  floor	  brokers	  lost	  the	  
so-­‐called	   last-­‐mover	   advantage	   and	   there	   is	   less	   scope	   and	   need	   for	   manual	  
execution	   (Hendershott	   et	   al.,	   2010).	  With	   the	  adoption	  of	   SuperDOT,	  Direct+	   and	  
finally	   the	   Hybrid	   Market,	   the	   human	   specialists	   and	   brokers	   on	   the	   floor	   were	  
gradually	  relegated	  to	  a	  more	  marginal	  role	   in	  the	  process	  of	  matching	  order	  floor.	  
From	   some	   40-­‐specialist	   firms	   operating	   in	   the	   1990s	   there	   has	   been	   a	   continual	  
decline	   to	   18	   firms	   in	   2001	   and	   to	   as	   little	   as	   five	   firms	   as	   of	   2007.	   While	   the	  
adoption	  of	  the	  Hybrid	  System	  has	  been	  beneficial	  for	  the	  NYSE	  market,	  by	  reducing	  
the	   cost	   of	   trading	   and	   achieving	   superior	   execution	   speeds	   (Storkenmaier	   and	  
Riordan,	  2009),	  it	  also	  consecrated	  the	  decline	  of	  the	  human	  specialists	  and	  brokers.	  
This	  does	  mean	  that	  humans	  are	  no	   longer	   involved	   in	   the	  matching	  of	  order	   flow	  
but	  simply	  means	  that	  they	  do	  not	  have	  a	  monopoly	  over	  the	  function.	  Drawing	  from	  
Simondon,	  we	   could	   say	   that	   human	   specialists	   dominated	   the	  matching	   of	   order	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51	  http://www.computerworld.com/article/2554166/app-­‐development/nyse-­‐
launches-­‐new-­‐hybrid-­‐trading-­‐system.html	  
52	  This	  would	   also	   allow	   the	  NYSE	   to	   register	   as	   a	   fast	  market	   under	   the	   new	  Reg	  
NMS	  regulatory	  framework,	  essential	  criteria	  in	  terms	  of	  being	  able	  to	  compete	  with	  
the	  other	  electronic	  trading	  platforms	  (Hendershott,	  2010).	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flow	  for	  as	  long	  as	  there	  were	  no	  machines	  capable	  of	  performing	  the	  same	  function:	  
Man	  has	  played	  the	  role	  of	  technical	  individual	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  he	  looks	  on	  
the	   machine-­‐as-­‐technical-­‐individual	   as	   if	   it	   were	   a	   man	   and	   occupying	   the	  
position	  of	  a	  man,	  whereas	  in	  actual	  fact	  it	  was	  man	  who	  provisionally	  took	  the	  
place	   of	   the	   machine	   before	   real	   technical	   individuals	   could	   be	   made	  
(Simondon,	  1980,	  p.97).	  
One	   could	   look	   at	   matching	   algorithms	   and	   electronic	   order	   books	   as	   simply	  
replacing	  human	  specialists	  and	  their	  actual	  paper	  books.	  But	  one	  mustn’t	  see	  this	  as	  
a	   fight	  or	  a	  contest	  between	  man	  and	  machine.	   In	   terms	  of	   the	  matching	  of	  order	  
flow,	  we	  have	  tried	  to	  think	  about	  modern	  exchanges	  as	  complex	  machines	  centered	  
on	   human	   specialists	   as	   the	   dominant	   technical	   component.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   NYSE,	  
human	   specialists	   would	   receive	   inputs	   from	   investors,	   process	   and	   match	   order	  
flow	   and	   transmit	   certain	   outputs,	   such	   as	   executed	   prices	   and	   quantities.	   The	  
function	   itself	   can	   be	   performed	   humans	   and	   their	   paper	   books,	   by	   matching	  
algorithms	  such	  as	   in	  the	  case	  of	  ECNs,	  or	  by	  humans	  and	  machines	  such	  as	   in	  the	  
case	  of	  the	  NYSE	  Hybrid	  Market.	  Viewed	  from	  the	  outside,	  the	  matching	  machine	  is	  
the	  same,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  performs	  the	  function	  of	  matching	  order	  flow.	  The	  mix	  
between	  human	  or	  electronic	  is	  an	  important	  aspect,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  actual	  matching	  
algorithm	   employed	   (continuous	   double	   auction),	   as	   they	   lead	   to	   qualitatively	  
different	   outputs.	   While	   some	   investors	   want	   immediate	   execution	   others	   want	  
their	  trades	  to	  be	  executed	  at	  the	  best	  possible	  price.	  In	  this	  sense,	  some	  investors	  
will	  opt	   for	   their	  order	   to	  be	  executed	  on	  an	  alternative	  electronic	  platform,	  while	  
others	  would	  chose	  to	  send	  their	  order	  to	  the	  floor	  of	  NYSE.	  In	  any	  case,	  at	  the	  end	  
of	  the	  day	  all	  of	  the	  different	  matching	  designs	  perform	  the	  same	  basic	  function	  of	  
matching	  order	  flow.	  There	  is	  no	  alienation	  of	  loss	  of	  authenticity	  involved	  in	  any	  of	  
this.	  	  To	  the	  contrary,	  the	  hybrid	  system	  deployed	  by	  NYSE	  since	  2006	  could	  be	  seen	  
as	   a	   further	   evolutionary	   step	   in	   terms	   of	   matching	   machines.	   We	   have	   defined	  
evolution	   (both	   in	   reference	   to	   Simondon	   and	  Mirowski)	   as	   the	   development	   of	   a	  
new	  design	  that	  can	  simulate	  the	  functioning	  of	  previous	  designs.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  
Hybrid	   Market	   can	   easily	   simulate	   the	   matching	   done	   either	   on	   the	   traditional	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trading	  floor	  or	  on	  more	  sophisticated	  electronic	  platforms,	  while	  the	  reverse	  is	  not	  
possible.	  Moreover,	   this	   new	  matching	  machines	   integrated	  a	  number	  of	  different	  
elements,	   such	   as	   the	   specialist	   trading	   floor,	   the	   SuperDOT,	   Direct+	   and	   the	  
Archipelago	   ECN	   and	   afforded	   novel	   functionalities	   in	   terms	   of	   providing	   more	  
tailored	  execution	   to	   a	  wide	   set	  of	   investors.	   This	   evolutionary	   step	  does	  not	   fully	  
eliminate	   the	   role	  of	  humans.	   In	   fact,	   it	  has	  been	  recently	  argued	   that	  even	   in	   the	  
NYSE	  Hybrid	  Market,	   the	   role	   of	   specialist	   is	   essential	   in	   providing	   liquidity	   in	   less	  
liquid	  stocks	  and	  in	  times	  of	  greater	  volatility	  (Fabozzi,	  2008,	  p.127).	  As	  we	  will	  see	  in	  
the	  next	  chapter,	  the	  NYSE	  Hybrid	  Market	   is	  perhaps	  superior	  to	  the	  other	  existing	  
designs	  in	  terms	  being	  a	  more	  stable	  liquidity	  pool	  in	  times	  of	  market	  stress	  (Beunza	  
and	  Millo,	  2015).	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Conclusions	  
	  
This	  chapter	   followed	  the	  evolutionary	   trajectory	  of	  matching	  machines	   in	  modern	  
times.	  We	   first	   looked	   at	   the	   founding	   of	   the	   LSE	   in	   the	   18th	   century,	   where	   the	  
maintenance	   of	   a	   continuous	   double	   auction	   machine	   was	   the	   responsibility	   of	  
jobbers.	  We	  also	  focused	  on	  the	  NYSE	  and	  its	  development	  in	  the	  19th	  century	  where	  
specialists	  were	  tasked	  with	  maintaining	  a	  similar	  double	  call	  auction	  for	  shares.	  The	  
advent	  of	   the	   telegraph	  and	   the	   stock	   ticker	   led	   to	   the	  growth	  of	   trading	  volumes	  
(Friedman	   and	   Rust,	   1993)	   leading	   to	   the	   emergence	   of	   alternative	   machting	  
machines	   such	   as	   the	   Open	   Board,	   which	   provided	   a	   continous	   rather	   than	   a	   call	  
auction.	   The	   competition,	   conflict	   and	  ultimate	  merger	  of	   the	  NYSE	  Regular	  Board	  
and	  the	  new	  Open	  Board	  shows	  us	  that	  the	  evolution	  of	  transaction	  machines	  is	  not	  
just	  a	   technical	  question	  of	  developing	  more	  efficient	  designs	  but	   is	  also	  a	  political	  
question,	   that	   of	   maintaining	   control	   of	   the	   order	   flow.	   Thus	   after	   several	  
political/institutional	   and	   technological	   mutations,	   the	   matching	   machine	   of	   the	  
NYSE,	  based	  on	  continuous	  double	  auctions,	  became	  the	  dominant	  hub	  for	  US	  share	  
trading.	  	  To	  recapitulate,	  we	  also	  provided	  an	  outline	  of	  the	  evolutionary	  steps	  of	  the	  
matching	  machine	  from	  the	  medieval	  bilateral	  matching,	  to	  the	  multilateral	  design	  in	  
Amsterdam,	  leading	  to	  the	  centralized	  matching	  performed	  by	  the	  specialist	  on	  the	  
floor	  of	  the	  NYSE.	  
Components	   Algorithms	  
	  




Bilateral	  matching	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(direct	  matchmaking)	  
Shares	   Bourses	  Exchanges	  
Multilateral	  matching	  
(Anglo-­‐Dutch	  auctions)	  
Shares	   Exchanges	  (LSE,	  NYSE)	  
Centralized	  matching	  
(continuous	  double	  auction)	  
Figure	  9:	  Evolution	  of	  matching	  machines	  
Following	   both	   our	   overall	   theoretical	   framework	   and	   the	   historical	   narrative,	   it	   is	  
clear	   that	   each	   new	   generation	   of	  matching	  machines	   is	  more	   complex	   and	  more	  
computationally	  expensive.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  each	  design	  is	  more	  efficient	  in	  terms	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of	   processing	   higher	   volumes	   of	   transactions	   from	   an	   increased	   number	   of	  
participants.	  In	  addition	  to	  addressing	  the	  evolution	  of	  matching	  algorithms	  we	  also	  
looked	   at	   the	   gradual	   transformation	   of	   what	   we	   called	   the	   ‘hardware’	   of	   these	  
machines.	   The	   matching	   machine	   developed	   on	   the	   floors	   of	   modern	   stock	  
exchanges	  was	   radically	   transformed	  at	   the	  end	  of	   the	  20th	   century.	   Together,	   the	  
regulatory	  pressures	  for	  more	  transparency	  and	  the	  new	  ICT	  technology	  favored	  the	  
development	  of	  new	  electronic	  platforms	  exhibiting	  higher	  levels	  of	  automation	  and	  
efficiency.	   	   Therefore,	   electronic	   order	   books	   gradually	   replaced	   the	   specialists	   on	  
the	   floor,	   and	   rather	   than	   relying	   on	   the	   labor	   of	   human	   specialists,	   ECNs	   such	   as	  
Instinet,	  AZX,	  Island	  and	  Globex	  enabled	  electronic	  automated	  trading.	  	  
We	   also	   reviewed	   the	   more	   recent	   mutations	   of	   matching	   machines,	   namely	   the	  
NYSE	  Hybrid	  Market,	  where	  investors	  have	  a	  choice	  between	  immediate	  automated	  
matching	  of	  routing	  the	  order	  for	  execution	  on	  the	  floor.	  Deployed	  in	  2006,	  this	  new	  
design	  can	  easily	  replicate	  the	  matching	  done	  either	  on	  the	  traditional	  trading	  floor	  
or	  on	  the	  newer	  electronic	  platforms.	  The	  NYSE	  Hybrid	  Market	  can	  thus	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  
further	  evolution	  towards	  a	  more	  concretized	  machine	  as	  it	  integrates	  a	  number	  of	  
different	   elements,	   such	   as	   the	   specialist	   trading	   floor,	   the	   SuperDOT,	  Direct+	   and	  
the	   Archipelago	   ECN	   and	   affords	   novel	   functionalities	   in	   terms	   of	   providing	  more	  
tailored	  execution	  to	  a	  wide	  set	  of	  investors.	  	  
In	   conclusion,	   electronic	   order	   books	   and	   matching	   engines	   have	   allowed	   for	  
matching	   to	   be	   done	   without	   much	   human	   intervention,	   anonymously	   and	   with	  
considerably	  lower	  costs.	  But	  the	  automation	  of	  matching	  directly	  impacted	  the	  way	  
in	  which	  market	  making	  is	  performed,	  i.e.	  the	  provision	  of	  liquidity	  in	  the	  order	  book.	  	  
We	  will	   address	   this	   topic	   in	  Chapter	  7,	  where	  we	  will	   focus	  on	   the	   topic	  of	  High-­‐
Frequency	   Trading	   (HFT)	   within	   the	   context	   of	   contemporary	   electronic	   market	  
making.	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This	   chapter	   builds	   on	   the	   previous	   account	   of	   medieval	   clearing	   machines	   and	  
elaborates	   on	   their	   modern	   evolution.	   We	   start	   by	   looking	   at	   the	   banking	  
clearinghouses	  developed	  in	  London	  and	  New	  York	  as	  a	  continuation	  of	  the	  clearing	  
practices	  of	  medieval	  merchant-­‐bankers.	  Similarly	  to	  the	  medieval	  clearing	  fairs,	  the	  
London	   Clearinghouse	   performed	   multilateral	   clearing	   allowing	   banks	   to	   compute	  
their	  mutual	  debts	  and	  compress	  the	  settlement	  of	  bank	  checks.	  We	  also	  show	  how	  
the	  clearing	  of	  bank	  payments	  eventually	  developed	  into	  a	  mutual	  safety	  mechanism	  
against	  bank	  panics.	  Furthermore,	  we	  follow	  the	  migration	  of	  multilateral	  clearing	  to	  
the	  stock	  markets,	  such	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  London	  Stock	  Exchange	  Clearinghouse.	  
We	  also	  review	  the	  adoption	  of	  multilateral	  clearing	  by	  the	  New	  York	  Stock	  Exchange	  
with	  the	  establishment	  of	  its	  own	  clearinghouse	  in	  the	  19th	  century.	  The	  introduction	  
of	   multilateral	   clearing	   had	   a	   huge	   impact	   in	   terms	   of	   reducing	   counterparty	   risk	  
through	  the	  netting	  of	  offsetting	  exposure.	  We	  also	  discuss	  the	  clearing	  of	  derivatives	  
such	  as	  forwards	  and	  futures,	  by	  focusing	  on	  the	  less	  known	  example	  of	  the	  Dojima	  
Rice	   Exchange.	   The	   crucial	   breakthrough	   is	   achieved	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	   futures	  
market	   of	   Chicago	   where	   we	   focus	   on	   the	   evolution	   towards	   central	   clearing.	  
Established	  in	  1883,	  the	  Board	  of	  Trade	  Clearing	  Corporation	  (BOTCC)	  initially	  served	  
as	   a	   multilateral	   clearing	   facility.	   A	   few	   decades	   later,	   the	   Board	   established	   the	  
BOTCC	   as	   the	   only	   counterparty	   taking	   responsibility	   for	   the	   portfolio	   of	   any	  
defaulting	  member,	  thus	  becoming	  a	  Central	  Counterparty	  (CCP),	  the	  buyer	  to	  every	  
seller	  and	  the	  seller	  to	  every	  buyer.	  In	  this	  context,	  we	  also	  propose	  an	  evolutionary	  
trajectory	   from	   bilateral	   to	   multilateral	   and	   finally	   central	   clearing.	   Each	   new	  
generation	   of	   clearing	   machines	   is	   more	   complex	   and	   responds	   to	   the	   growing	  
demands	   and	   needs	   of	   its	   users.	   Similar	   to	   the	   matching	   function,	   the	   history	   of	  
clearing	  exhibits	  a	  tendency	  towards	  automation	  and	  the	  gradual	  transition	  from	  a	  
human-­‐based	   pen	   and	   pencil	   infrastructure	   to	   modern	   electronic	   platforms.	   We	  
conclude	   by	   providing	   an	   overview	   of	   the	   functioning	   of	   central	   clearing	   through	  
CCPs,	  the	  benefits	  afforded	  by	  the	  clearing	  of	  derivatives	  and	  also	  the	  contemporary	  
adoption	  of	  ICT	  and	  development	  of	  automated	  real-­‐time	  clearing	  systems.	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6.1	  Bank	  Clearing	  in	  London	  and	  New	  York	  
	  
With	  the	  increase	  in	  complexity	  of	  financial	  markets,	  both	  the	  clearing	  of	  stocks	  and	  
monetary	   payments	   began	   to	   be	   more	   and	   more	   concentrated	   and	   consolidated	  
around	   ‘’natural	   monopoly’’	   type	   structures53	  (Pirrong,	   2009;	   Lee,	   2011;	   Pirrong,	  
2011).	   In	   the	   early	   modern	   period	   (17-­‐18th	   century),	   just	   as	   the	   order	   matching	  
function	   eventually	   migrated	   from	   Amsterdam	   to	   London,	   so	   did	   the	   clearing	  
function	   find	   its	   new	  center	  of	   gravity	   in	   London.	   	  Although	  a	  proto-­‐clearinghouse	  
can	   be	   found	   in	   Lyon	   around	   1630,	   it	  was	   the	   growing	   financial	   centre	   of	   London	  
who	  will	  see	  the	  development	  of	  an	  efficient	  banking	  clearinghouse	  (Norman,	  2011).	  
In	  1773,	  the	  London	  banks,	  instead	  of	  clearing	  their	  accounts	  bilaterally,	  decided	  to	  
consolidate	  the	  clearing	  activity	  into	  a	  ‘’clearing	  club’’	  situated	  in	  a	  room	  in	  Five	  Bells	  
tavern	  on	  Lombard	  Street	  (Kindleberger,	  1984,	  p.78).	  The	  club	  was	  a	  way	  for	  London	  
bankers	  to	  start	  devising	  a	  system	  in	  which	  they	  could	  exchange	  all	  of	  their	  checks	  at	  
one	  place	  and	  at	  one	  time.	  This	  temporal	  compression	  reduced	  the	  sums	  on	  money	  
necessary	  to	  cover	  all	  of	  their	  reciprocal	  settlements	  (Camp,	  1892).	  
	  
The	   clearing	   procedure	   was	   very	   similar	   to	   the	   procedure	   known	   from	   the	  
clearing	  fairs.	  Each	  morning	  during	  the	  week	  the	  representatives	  of	  the	  banks	  
met	   and	   presented	   the	   financial	   obligations.	   During	   the	   day	   the	  
representatives	   had	   time	   to	   verify	   the	   debts.	   In	   case	   the	   obligations	   were	  
approved,	   the	   representatives	   offset	   their	   credits	   and	   debts.	   The	   remaining	  
open	  positions	  had	  to	  be	  paid	  in	  cash	  (Boerner	  and	  Hatfield,	  2010,	  p.14).	  
The	  first	  record	  of	  this	  type	  of	  financial	  institution	  dates	  back	  to	  1773	  when	  a	  charge	  
for	   using	   the	   clearing	   room	   appears	   on	   the	   books	   of	   Martin	   &	   Co.	   The	   nascent	  
clearing	  club	   turned	   into	  a	  clearinghouse	   in	  1775,	  when	  the	  representatives	  of	   the	  
member	  banks	  moved	  into	  a	  new	  building	  on	  Lombard	  Street	  (Norman,	  2011).	  As	  in	  
the	   case	   of	   the	   clearing	   mechanism	   of	   the	   medieval	   fairs,	   the	   output	   was	   the	  
reduction	   of	   the	   actual	   amount	   of	   money	   used	   for	   settling	   transaction	   (Cannon,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53	  A	   natural	   monopoly	   situation	   is	   one	   where	   certain	   service	   is	   more	   efficiently	  
provided	  by	  a	  single	  entity	  rather	  than	  through	  open	  competition.	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1910).	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  London	  Clearinghouse,	  the	  clearing	  mechanism	  was	  based	  
on	  two	  sets	  of	  books	  that	  contained	  columns	  with	  the	  name	  of	  all	  the	  other	  clearing	  
members.	  Each	  bank	  had	  one	  book	   that	  consolidated	   the	  amounts	   to	  be	   received,	  
handled	  by	  an	  outclearer,	  while	  another	  book	  with	  the	  some	  to	  be	  paid	  was	  at	  the	  
clearinghouse	   handled	   by	   an	   inclearer	   (Cannon,	   1900).	   	   The	   clearinghouse	   room	  
itself	   housed	   about	   30	   clerks	   (inclearers),	   positioned	   in	   alphabetical	   order	  with	   an	  
open	  box	  besides	  them	  and	  the	  name	  of	  the	  firm	  above	  their	  heads	  (Babbage,	  1856).	  
As	   James	   Cannon	   described	   it,	   the	   role	   of	   the	   outclearer	   would	   start	   early	   in	   the	  
morning,	  when	  he	  would	  gather	  all	  of	  the	  various	  bank	  cheques	  drawn	  on	  the	  other	  
clearing	  member	  banks.	   Then	  he	  would	  make	  his	  way	   to	   the	   clearinghouse	  where	  
between	   10	   and	   11	   am,	   he	  would	   go	   around	   the	   desks	   of	   the	   various	   banks	   and	  
deposit	  his	  charges	  to	  the	  inclearers.	  At	  16	  pm	  the	  boxes	  are	  removed	  and	  each	  clerk	  
calculates	   his	   debits	   towards	   the	   other	   banks.	   The	   task	   of	   the	   inclearers	   is	   to	  
compute	  all	  of	  the	  charges	  and	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  the	  totals	  match,	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  the	  
‘’in’’	  of	  any	  bank	  must	  be	  consistent	  with	  the	  ‘’out’’	  of	  the	  other	  clearing	  member:	  
	  
Should	  the	  totals	  not	  agree,	  the	  clerks	  sings	  out	  in	  a	  loud	  voice	  the	  name	  of	  the	  
bank	  with	  whose	  total	  he	  differs,	  and	  the	  representative	  of	  that	  bank	  is	  obliged	  
to	   go	   to	   the	   desk	   of	   the	   complainant	   and	   take	  with	   him	   his	   ‘outbooks’.	   The	  
items	  are	  then	  run	  over	  and	  the	  mistake	  detected	  and	  rectified	  (Cannon,	  1900,	  
p.325).	  	  
	  
Following	  the	  vocabulary	  of	  Callon	  and	  Muniesa,	  the	  whole	  process	  was	  a	  complex	  
collective	  calculation	  of	  the	  exact	  exposures	  between	  all	  the	  other	  banks.	  This	   is	  of	  
course	  similar	  to	  the	  clearing	  practices	  of	  medieval	  merchants,	  as	  the	  use	  of	  double-­‐
entry	  bookkeeping	  allowed	  them	  to	  balance	  debits	  and	  credits	  with	  their	  respective	  
counterparties.	  The	  most	  efficient	  way	  to	  balance	  the	  books	  was	  for	  a	  critical	  mass	  
of	  merchants	  to	  meet	  in	  special	  locations,	  such	  as	  the	  Clearing	  Fairs	  of	  Champagne,	  
and	   offset	   their	   counterparty	   exposure.	   Similar	   to	   that,	   the	   London	   Clearinghouse	  
allowed	  banks	  to	  compare	  their	  books,	  that	  is	  to	  say	  their	  mutual	  debts	  and	  credits,	  
in	   other	   words	   an	   advanced	   transaction	   machine	   for	   the	   clearing	   of	   offsetting	  
balances	   between	   member	   banks.	   The	   inputs	   were	   the	   charges	   of	   all	   the	   banks,	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which	   would	   then	   be	   processed	   according	   to	   the	   algorithm	   describes	   above.	   The	  
final	   output	  was	   the	   compression	   of	   offsetting	   exposures,	  which	  would	   drastically	  
limit	   the	   actual	   cash	   settlements	   between	   banks.	   This	   was	   the	   highpoint	   of	   the	  
clearing	  mechanism	  was	  at	   the	  end	  of	   the	  day	  when,	  between	  16	  pm	  and	  17	  pm,	  
final	  settlement	  was	  performed.	  At	  17	  pm	  each	  clerk	  pays	  their	  due	  amounts	  to	  the	  
clearinghouse	  inspector	  and	  receives	  a	  ticket	  in	  exchange.	  	  
	  
The	   noise,	  which	   seems	   to	   betoken	   cessation	   of	  work,	   is	   really	   a	   cloak,	   as	   it	  
where,	  to	  the	  busiest	  time	  of	  the	  whole	  day,	  for	  a	  settlement	  must	  be	  made	  of	  
all	  the	  transactions,	  and	  the	  clerks	  are	  agreeing	  their	  different	  totals	  and	  casts,	  
checking	  amounts	  (Cannon,	  1900,	  p.329).	  
	  
What	  might	   seem	   like	  a	   ‘’noisy’’	   chaos	   for	  outsiders	  was	   in	   fact	   a	   very	  efficient	  of	  
mechanism	   for	   the	   compression	   of	   debts.	   All	   clerks	   where	   in	   a	   race	   to	   agree	   the	  
netting	   and	  quickly	   correct	   any	  errors,	   thereby	  preventing	   the	  eruption	  of	   a	  much	  
louder	  disturbance,	  the	  breakdown	  of	  the	  payment	  system	  as	  such	  (Noyes,	  1893).	  	  
	  
The	   transaction	   machine	   first	   developed	   for	   bank	   clearing	   in	   London	   would	  
eventually	   finds	   its	  way	  to	  the	  new	  world.	  From	  the	  War	  of	   Independence	  up	  until	  
the	   early	   19th	   century,	  US	   banks	  were	   chartered	   either	   by	   the	   individual	   States	   or	  
Congress.	  This	  situation	  changed	  dramatically	  with	  the	  free-­‐banking	  law	  of	  New	  York	  
enacted	   on	   the	   18th	   of	   April	   1838.	   This	   new	   regulatory	   framework	   led	   to	   the	  
multiplication	   of	   banking	   licenses,	   with	   every	   institution	   being	   independent	   and	  
having	  to	  rely	  only	  on	  itself	  and	  its	  customers	  for	  functioning	  (Cannon,	  1900).	  	  As	  the	  
number	   of	  New	  York	   banks	   increased	   from	  24	   to	   60	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	   1840s,	   the	  
settlement	  of	  balances	  between	  banks	  was	  put	  under	  sever	  stress.	  The	  whole	  system	  
was	   running	   with	   considerable	   inefficiencies	   and	   risk.	   Each	   bank	   was	   keeping	   a	  
different	   ledger	   for	   every	   other	   bank,	   and	  was	   settling	   balances	   bilaterally.	   All	   off	  
this,	   coupled	   with	   the	   physical	   distance	   between	   the	   banks,	   proved	   to	   be	  
unsustainable	  as	  the	  number	  of	  banks	  grew.	  Before	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  clearing	  
mechanism,	   each	   bank	   would	   send	   their	   porters	   on	   the	   ‘’bank	   circuit’’,	   wasting	  
considerable	  time	  and	  causing	  delays	  as	  porters	  from	  several	  different	  banks	  would	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end	  up	  in	  queues	  delaying	  the	  overall	  settlement	  process	  (Cannon,	  1900,	  p.128).	  For	  
this	  very	  reason	  a	  daily	  settlement	  was	  not	  possible,	  and	  eventually	  Friday	  morning	  
was	   set	   as	   a	   fixed	   settlement	   date.	   The	   problem	  with	   this	  weekly	   settlement	  was	  
that	  it	  would	  allow	  for	  debtor	  banks	  to	  abuse	  the	  system,	  while	  creditor	  banks	  could	  
often	  be	  operating	  close	  to	  their	  limit.	  Because	  of	  that,	  daily	  clearing	  was	  gradually	  
introduced	  with	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  New	  York	  Clearing	  Association	  on	  the	  11th	  
of	   October	   1853,	   a	   separate	   institutions	   to	   house	   and	  maintain	   daily	   clearing	   and	  
settlement.	   The	   association	   comprised	   all	   52	   New	   York	   banks	   at	   that	   time.	   Non-­‐
member	  banks	  could	  also	  clear	  through	  the	  member	  banks,	  but	  the	  later	  were	  fully	  
liable	  for	  the	  transaction	  (Cannon,	  1900,	  p.151).	  	  
	  
Information	  about	  the	  New	  York	  Clearinghouse	  is	  relatively	  abundant	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  
that	   the	   New	   York	   Clearing	   Association	  maintained	   a	   complete	   record	   of	   its	   daily	  
transactions	   since	   inception,	   as	   well	   as	   a	   weekly	   report	   on	   the	   solvency	   of	   each	  
member	  bank	  (Camp,	  1892).	  The	  clearing	  mechanism	  itself	  was	  similar	  to	  the	  one	  in	  
London.	   Each	   bank	   had	   to	   types	   of	   operators	   the	   delivery	   clerk	   or	   porter	   and	   the	  
settling	   clerk.	   The	   first	   type	   of	   clerk	   delivered	   packages	   while	   the	   second	   would	  
receive	  orders	  from	  the	  curriers	  of	  the	  other	  banks.	  The	  whole	  process	  would	  start	  
at	  10	  am,	  with	  both	  the	  settling	  and	  the	  delivery	  clerks	  taking	  up	  their	  positions	  at	  
the	  desk.	  At	  10	  am	  on	   the	  dot,	   the	   clearinghouse	  manager	  would	   start	  of	   clearing	  
process,	   and	   each	   delivery	   clerk	   moves	   to	   his	   right,	   depositing	   his	   charges	   and	  
receiving	  receipts	  from	  the	  other	  banks	  settling	  clerk.	  Gradually,	  each	  delivery	  clerk	  
deposits	  his	  banks	  packages	  to	  all	  the	  other	  bank	  desks,	  completing	  the	  operation	  in	  
about	  10	  minutes.	  At	  that	  point,	  the	  settling	  clerks	  have	  to	  sum	  up	  all	  of	  the	  amounts	  
and	  make	  out	  tickets	  containing	  the	  credit	  and	  debit	  situation	  to	  the	  proof	  clerks.	  	  In	  
a	  few	  hours,	  each	  respective	  bank	  is	  aware	  of	  the	  amounts	  they	  have	  to	  pay	  or	  are	  
due	  to	  be	  paid	  to	  them	  by	  the	  clearinghouse.	  The	  collective	  computation	  performed	  
by	   the	   delivery,	   settling	   and	   proof	   clerks	   end	   at	   10.30	   am,	   without	   any	   money	  
exchanging	  hands.	  	  After	  the	  clearing	  process,	  the	  next	  step	  is	  the	  completion	  of	  the	  
settlement	  of	  payments.	  A	  crucial	  point	  here	  is	  that	  debtor	  banks	  have	  to	  make	  the	  
payments	  first.	  Before	  13.30	  pm,	  each	  debtor	  bank	  makes	  the	  required	  payments	  to	  
the	  clearinghouse	  and	  only	  after	  that	  can	  the	  creditor	  banks	  receive	  their	  balances	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(Cannon,	   1900,	   p.188).	   Payments	   were	   made	   through	   a	   Bank	   of	   America	   backed	  
certificate,	   which	   was	   the	   official	   deposit	   bank	   of	   the	   Clearinghouse	   Association	  
(Statistics	   clearing	   houses	   1839	  p.31).	   The	   success	   of	   this	   clearing	  mechanism	  was	  
evident	   and	   by	   1893	   there	   were	   clearinghouses	   in	   57	   cities	   in	   the	   United	   States	  
clearing	   a	   total	   of:	   ‘’$61,017,839,067	   and	   yet	   the	   transaction	   of	   this	   enormous	  
volume	   of	   business	   was	   accomplished	   with	   the	   use	   of	   $4,881,777,289	   in	  money’’	  
(Hepburn,	  1893,	  p.376).	  
	  
The	  whole	  clearing	  process	  was	  an	   incredibly	  precise	  and	  highly	   regulated	  activity.	  
The	   clearing	   community	   was	   by	   definition	   very	   conservative	   and	   risk	   adverse,	  
evidenced	   by	   the	   very	   strict	   membership	   requirements	   of	   the	   early	   New	   York	  
Clearinghouse.	   	   In	  the	  first	   few	  years	  of	  operation,	  no	  more	  than	  eight	  banks	  were	  
forced	   out	   because	   of	   their	   inability	   to	   meet	   the	   stringent	   requirements	   of	   the	  
clearinghouse.	  Unsound	  business	  practices	   could	  have	  been	  concealed	   in	   the	  past,	  
but	  with	  the	  advent	  of	  multilateral	  clearing,	  more	  transparency	  and	  better	  business	  
practices	  were	  introduced	  (Camp,	  1892,	  p.687).	  Other	  events	  proved	  hazardous	  for	  
the	   business	   of	   the	   clearinghouse	   such	   as	   the	   presidential	   election	   of	   1860,	   or	  
subsequent	  bank	  failures	  in	  1884	  and	  in	  1890.	  Whenever	  a	  member	  bank’s	  solvency	  
was	  in	  question,	  the	  clearinghouse	  committee	  would	  swiftly	  call	  for	  an	  investigation	  
to	   ascertain	   the	   stability	   and	   viability	   of	   the	   institution.	   Thus	   the	   clearinghouse	  
mechanism	  had	  allowed	  for	  an	  increase	  in	  transactional	  efficiency	  but	  also	  regulated	  
the	  behaviour	  of	  member	  banks.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  the	  frequent	  banking	  panics	  of	  the	  
19th	  century,	  the	  mechanism	  proved	  to	  be	  a	  ‘’tower	  of	  strength	  in	  times	  of	  financial	  
distress’’	  (Camp,	  1892,	  p.686).	  What	  started	  as	  a	  solution	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  clearing	  
bank	   transactions	  developed	   into	  a	  mutual	   safety	  mechanism	   that	  would	  prove	   its	  
effectiveness	  particularly	  in	  times	  of	  panic.	  For	  instance,	  the	  panic	  of	  1907	  revealed	  
that	   institutions	   such	   as	   the	   New	   York	   City	   trusts,	   which	   were	   not	  members	   of	   a	  
clearinghouse,	  had	  been	  subject	  to	  larger	  levels	  of	  withdrawals	  than	  banks	  that	  were	  
members	  of	  a	  clearinghouse.	  In	  as	  much	  as	  banking	  became	  a	  more	  tightly	  coupled	  
system,	   every	   individual	   failure	   affected	   the	   whole	   system	   as	   the	   ‘’the	   banking	  
community	   is	  an	  organic	  whole,	  no	  member	  of	  which	  can	  suffer	  without	  detriment	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to	  the	  body’’	  (Young,	  1910,	  p.134).	   In	  this	  sense,	  the	  clearing	  mechanism	  acted	  as	  a	  
stabilizer	  for	  the	  banking	  community,	  maintaining	  a	  robust	  payments	  system.	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6.2	  Clearing	  the	  Stock	  Market	  
	  
	  
As	  we	  have	  already	  said,	  clearing	  of	  reciprocal	  stock	  positions	  was	  a	  normal	  activity	  
for	   trading	   participants	   in	   early-­‐modern	   financial	   centers.	   The	   Amsterdam	   Stock	  
Exchange	   already	   had	   special	   clearing	   days	   in	   the	   1650s	   and	   London	   in	   the	   1740s	  
(Boerner	  and	  Hatfield,	  2010,	  p.13).	  In	  the	  previous	  sections	  we	  focused	  on	  how	  bank	  
clearing	  managed	  to	  successfully	  reduce	  cash	  payments,	  to	  as	  little	  as	  4-­‐5%	  of	  actual	  
transactions	   (Noyes,	   1893,	   p.254),	   the	   adoption	   of	   the	   clearing	  mechanism	   had	   a	  
similar	  effect	   in	   the	  case	  of	  clearing	  stock	  exchange	   transactions.	  The	   first	  modern	  
clearinghouses	  for	  stocks	  was	  set	  up	  in	  Frankfurt	  in	  1867,	  Berlin	  in	  I869,	  Hamburg	  in	  
I870,	  Vienna	  in	  1873	  and	  London	  in	  1876	  (Norman,	  2011).	  	  
	  
London,	  as	  the	  major	  financial	  centre	  of	  the	  19th	  century,	  also	  saw	  the	  establishment	  
and	  development	  of	   a	   stock	  exchange	   clearinghouse.	   In	   the	  1870s,	   three	  different	  
institutions	  dominated	  London’s	  financial	  centre:	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  and	  the	  other	  
banks,	   the	   Lloyds	   of	   London	   insurance	   market	   (primarily	   focused	   on	   maritime	  
insurance	   and	   trade	   finance)	   and	   the	   London	   Stock	   Exchange	   (Wheeler,	   1913;	  
Wincott,	  1947;	  Morgan	  and	  Thomas,	  1969).	  Over	  the	  course	  of	  a	  trading	  day	  brokers	  
were	   likely	   to	   accumulate	   substantial	   volumes	   of	   transactions	   on	   their	   books.	   As	  
volumes	  increased,	  it	  became	  harder	  and	  harder	  to	  settle	  these	  on	  a	  bilateral	  basis.	  
The	  Stock	  Exchange	  Clearinghouse	  emerged	  as	  a	  solution	  for	  reducing	  the	  number	  of	  
settlements	   by	   moving	   from	   separate	   bilateral	   settlements	   to	   having	   one	   single	  
settlement	   with	   all	   counterparties	   (Noyes,	   1893,	   p.247).	   Similar	   to	   the	   bank	  
clearinghouse,	   the	   Stock	   Exchange	   Clearinghouse	   could	   organize	   and	   direct	   all	  
participants	   towards	   a	   more	   efficient	   compression	   of	   transactions.	   	   Without	   the	  
existence	   of	   a	   clearing	  mechanism,	   they	  would	   have	   to	   settle	   their	   balances	   with	  
each	   other	   on	   a	   bilateral	   basis.	   So	   instead	   of	   having	   a	   large	   number	   of	   single	  
settlements,	  the	  clearing	  mechanism	  would	  direct	  each	  member	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  
net	   out,	   as	   much	   as	   possible,	   their	   offsetting	   balances.	   The	   clearing	   machine	   for	  
stocks	  was	  similar	  to	  the	  design	  of	  the	  London	  Clearinghouse	  used	  for	  bank	  checks.	  
Moreover,	  while	  the	  stock	  exchange	  clearinghouse	  started	  to	  attract	  more	  members,	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this	  reduced	  the	  number	  of	  actual	  monetary	  transactions	  even	  more.	  Each	  member	  
provides	  a	   statement	  of	  what	  he	  has	   to	   receive	  and	  what	  he	  has	   to	  deliver	   to	   the	  
other	  members.	  The	  managers	  of	  the	  clearinghouse	  then	  compare	  and	  verify	  these	  
statements	  
	  
Those	  who	   have	   to	   receive	   on	   balance	   are	   put	   on	   one	   side,	   and	   those	  who	  
have	  to	  deliver	  on	  the	  other,	  and	  a	  direction	  is	  given	  as	  to	  the	  distribution	  of	  
the	  deliveries,	   the	  aim	  of	   course	  being	   to	  make	   them	   from	  as	   few	   to	  as	   few	  
members	  as	  possible	  (Noyes,	  1893,	  p.247)	  
	  
As	  the	  LSE	  Clearinghouse	  settled	  every	  fortnight,	  this	  coincided	  with	  the	  busiest	  days	  
for	  the	  banking	  clearinghouse	  as	  well.	  Interestingly,	  the	  two	  clearinghouses	  became	  
connected	   and	   their	   efficient	   functioning	  was	  mutually	   beneficial.	  While	   the	   Stock	  
Exchange	   Clearinghouse	   would	   compress	   the	   trading	   of	   stocks	   and	   sustain	   larger	  
volumes	  of	  intraday	  trading,	  the	  London	  Clearinghouse	  allowed	  the	  compression	  of	  
monetary	   settlements.	   The	   functional	   synergies	   between	   the	   two	   clearing	  
mechanisms	   meant	   that	   a	   significantly	   larger	   number	   of	   stock	   transactions	   and	  
monetary	  payments	  could	  be	  accomplished,	  with	  only	  small	  amounts	  of	  stocks	  and	  
cash	   actually	   changing	   hands.	  We	   could	   understand	   this	   as	   taking	   drag	   out	   of	   the	  
system,	  as	  any	  offsetting	  balances	  (i.e.	  unnecessary	  or	  redundant)	  would	  simply	  be	  
compressed	   on	   the	   books	   between	   clearinghouse	  members	   without	   any	   need	   for	  
actual	   settlement.	  We	  could	   thus	  say	   that	  both	   the	  banking	  and	   the	  stock	  clearing	  
house	   two	  clearinghouses	  were	  becoming	  more	  concretized,	  as	  previously	   isolated	  
bilateral	   transaction	   could	   now	   be	   integrated	   through	   multilateral	   clearing	   and	  
compressed.	  Both	   the	  early	  London	  Clearinghouse	  and	  the	  London	  Stock	  Exchange	  
Clearinghouse	  were	  associations	  of	  clearing	  members	  whose	  role	  was	  to	  ‘’direct	  the	  
delivery	  and	  payment	  for	  balances	  of	  stock’’	   (Noyes,	  1893,	  p.248),	  but	  who	  had	  no	  
responsibility	   for	   the	   ultimate	   settlement	   of	   transactions.	   The	   clearing	   algorithm	  
would	   separate	   those	  who	  had	   to	   receive	   from	   those	  who	  had	   to	   deliver	   and	   net	  
their	   offsetting	   exposures.	   Efficient	   as	   it	   was,	   it	   was	   ultimately	   up	   to	   the	   clearing	  
members	   to	   participate	   in	   the	   clearing	   process.	   As	   this	   was	   a	   relatively	   costly	  
operation,	   clearing	   members	   would	   only	   participate	   if	   the	   benefits	   were	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considerable.	   For	   instance,	   not	   all	   of	   the	   brokers	   of	   the	   London	   Stock	   Exchange	  
participated	  in	  the	  clearinghouse	  association	  and	  even	  those	  that	  participate	  did	  not	  
do	  so	   for	  all	   traded	  stocks.	   In	   fact,	  as	  we	  already	  noted,	   financial	  markets	  need	   to	  
reach	   a	   certain	   level	   of	   complexity	   of	   trading	   volumes	   in	   order	   to	   warrant	   the	  
adoption	  of	  more	  complex	  and	  expensive	  transactional	  machines.	  
	  
Across	  the	  Atlantic,	  the	  Philadelphia	  Stock	  Exchange	  and	  the	  Consolidated	  Exchange	  
pioneered	  multilateral	  clearing	  as	  early	  as	  1886	  and	  was	  soon	  also	  adopted	  by	   the	  
New	   York	   Stock	   Exchange	   (NYSE).	   	   Recent	   research	   on	   the	   history	   of	   the	   NYSE	  
Clearinghouse	  has	  highlighted	  the	  positive	  impact	  of	  multilateral	  clearing	  in	  terms	  of	  
reducing	  counterparty	  risk,	  narrowing	  bid-­‐ask	  spreads,	  netting	  offsetting	  exposures	  
and	   leading	   to	   more	   efficient	   settlement	   processes	   (Reed,	   2011).	   Prior	   to	   the	  
introduction	   of	   a	   multilateral	   clearing	   mechanism,	   the	   NYSE	   operated	   bilateral	  
clearing	  and	   settlement	  arrangements.	   That	   is	   to	   say,	   for	  each	   transaction	  brokers	  
were	  obliged	  to	  directly	  exchange	  (send	  and	  receive)	  checks	  and	  shares.	  In	  addition	  
to	  this,	  NYSE	  employed	  a	  so-­‐called	  T+1	  settlement	  cycle,	  which	  meant	  that	  brokers	  
had	   to	   settle	   (deliver	   the	   checks	   and/or	   shares)	   by	   the	   next	   day	   at	   2:15	   pm	  
(Bernstein	  et	  al.,	  2014).	  With	  the	  increase	  in	  the	  number	  of	  transactions,	  it	  became	  
difficult	   to	  settle	  all	   trades	  by	   the	  next	  day.	  Therefore	   it	  became	  common	  practice	  
for	  banks	   to	  extend	  overnight	   loans	   to	  brokers,	   in	  order	   to	  allow	  them	  to	  keep	  up	  
with	   the	   pace	   of	   transactions.	   In	   the	   context	   of	   a	   financial	   panic,	   the	   overall	  
reduction	  in	  credit	  resulted	  in	  substantial	  brokerage	  failures.	  For	  instance,	  the	  panic	  
of	  1873	   led	   to	   the	   failure	  of	  54	  brokers	   (Bernstein	  et	   al.,	   2014;	  Eames,	  1894).	   The	  
subsequent	  financial	  panics	  of	  the	  late	  19th	  century	  and	  the	  pressure	  from	  the	  New	  
York	  banks	   led	   to	   the	   introduction	  of	  a	  multilateral	   clearing	  mechanism	   (McSherry	  
and	  Berry,	  2013;	  McSherry	  et	  al.,	  2013).	  
	  
The	   NYSE	   clearinghouse	   started	   operating	   on	  May	   16th	   1892	   and	   its	   membership	  
comprised	   some	   340	   brokers,	   clearing	   just	   four	   stocks	   (Noyes,	   1893,	   p.261).	  
Nevertheless,	  because	  of	  the	  benefits	  of	  compression,	  it	  soon	  became	  more	  popular	  
and	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  year,	  membership	  had	  reached	  427	  brokers.	  According	  to	  early	  
accounts,	  the	  introduction	  of	  multilateral	  clearing	  substantially	  reduced	  the	  need	  for	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bank	  loans	  for	  up	  to	  65%	  and	  also	  saw	  substantial	  reduction	  in	  the	  number	  of	  stocks	  
that	  needed	  to	  effectively	  change	  hands	  (Bernstein	  et	  al.,	  2014)	  (Pratt,	  1909).	  	  While	  
beneficial	  for	  the	  overall	  workings	  of	  the	  NYSE,	  many	  clerks	  working	  in	  the	  brokerage	  
houses	   opposed	   the	   new	   system.	   This	  was	  mainly	   because	   the	  mechanism	  meant	  
they	  had	  nothing	  to	  do	  earlier	   in	   the	  day,	  but	  would	  have	  to	  work	   longer	  hours	   to	  
facilitate	  clearing	  and	  settlement,	  sometimes	  all	  night.	  Despite	  these	  difficulties,	  the	  
advantages	  of	   the	  new	  system	  were	  soon	  apparent	   in	   reducing	   the	  actual	  physical	  
exchange	  between	  brokers.	  Just	  as	  monetary	  payments	  could	  not	  be	  brought	  back	  to	  
a	   time	   when	   transactions	   were	   executed	   with	   bags	   of	   silver	   and	   cold	   coins,	   the	  
bilateral	   clearing	   and	   settlement	   of	   stocks	   now	   seemed	   out-­‐dated	   and	   overly	  
cumbersome.	  Another	  important	  aspect	  of	  multilateral,	  was	  that	  the	  identity	  of	  the	  
trading	   parties	   was	   not	   important,	   as	   the	   clearing	   mechanism	   was	   almost	   an	  
automated	   computation	   reducing	   everybody’s	   exposure	   (debits	   or	   credits)	   to	   the	  
clearinghouse:	  
	  
(…)	   the	   brokers	   between	   whom	   given	   amounts	   of	   stock	   are	   to	   be	   actually	  
exchanged	   are	   named	   arbitrarily	   by	   the	   clearing-­‐house	  manager.	   Any	   broker	  
having	   500	   shares	   of	   St.	   Paul	   to	   deliver	  may	   be	   directed	   to	   deliver	   it	   to	   the	  
broker	  presenting	  the	  above	  sheet.	  He	  may	  have	  had	  no	  personal	  transaction	  
with	  the	  broker	  assigned	  to	  him;	  that	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  no	  concern.	  The	  clearing-­‐
house	   deals	   with	   exchanges,	   not	   with	   bargains	   -­‐	   with	   balances,	   not	   with	  
persons	  (Noyes,	  1893,	  p.264).	  
	  
In	  this	  sense,	  the	  NYSE	  clearinghouse	  was	  a	  complex	  transaction	  machine,	  producing	  
a	   clear	   picture	   of	   balances	   and	   managing	   the	   efficient	   compression	   of	   offsetting	  
exposures.	  As	  trading	  volumes	  increased	  those	  brokerage	  firms,	  that	  had	  offices	  near	  
the	  NYSE	  building	  and	  a	  large	  contingent	  of	  clerks,	  dominated	  both	  the	  matching	  and	  
clearing	   of	   shares.	   Moreover,	   the	   clearinghouse	   imposed	   relatively	   strict	  
requirements	  on	  membership	  and	   ‘’members	  had	   to	  pay	  2	  1⁄2	  cents	  per	  each	  100	  
shares	  cleared’’	  (Reed,	  2011,	  p.5).	  Gradually	  a	   limited	  number	  of	  clearing	  members	  
emerged;	   which	   would	   could	   clear	   in	   their	   own	   name	   or	   for	   some	   exchange	  
members	  who	  did	  not	  want	  or	  could	  not	  afford	  to	  be	  participate	  in	  clearing	  directly.	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Nevertheless,	  even	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  19th	  century	  it	  was	  apparent	  that	  the	  next	  step	  
in	   the	   evolution	   of	   clearing	   would	   be	   for	   the	   clearinghouse	   to	   transition	   from	   an	  
association	   directing	   the	   clearing	   of	   its	   members	   to	   a	   standalone	   third	   party	  
performing	  centralized	  clearing	  on	  a	  daily	  basis.	  Such	  a	  transaction	  machine	  could	  in	  
theory	   receive	   trading	   information	   from	   the	   Stock	  Exchange	  and	  perform	  clearing,	  
effectively	   becoming	   the	   buyer	   to	   every	   seller	   and	   the	   seller	   to	   every	   buyer.	   This	  
would	  effectively	  act	  as:	  	  
	  
(…)	   an	   imperium	   in	   imperio	   in	   the	   Stock	   Exchange,	   to	  which	   the	   privilege	   of	  
admission	   would	   be	   jealously	   guarded,	   and	   the	   members	   of	   which	   would	  
virtually	  insure	  one	  another	  (Noyes,	  1893,	  p.	  264).	  
	  
As	   long	   as	   clearing	  was	   performed	  between	   a	   limited	  number	  of	   participants	  who	  
knew	   and	   trusted	   each	   other,	   there	  was	   no	   immediate	   need	   to	   establish	   a	   utility	  
type	   institution.	  Moreover,	   the	   thorny	   issue	   of	   centralized	   clearing	   of	   transaction	  
required	  the	  development	  of	  a	  new	  design	  that	  could	  also	  manage	  the	  credit	  risk	  of	  
the	  various	  clearing	  members.	  This	  is	  perfectly	  compatible	  with	  our	  understanding	  of	  
the	   evolution	   of	   transaction	   machines.	   Once	   a	   new	   and	   more	   efficient	   clearing	  
mechanism	  was	  developed	   for	  bank	   check	  payments,	   it	  was	  only	  a	  matter	  of	   time	  
until	   it	  was	  adopted	  for	  other	  transactions	  (e.g.	  stocks	  and	  later	  for	  derivatives).	  As	  
we	  will	  see,	  the	  evolution	  towards	  central	  clearing	  was	  painfully	  slow	  in	  the	  case	  of	  
stocks	   but	   it	   was	   much	   faster	   in	   the	   case	   of	   derivatives,	   where	   the	   efficient	  
management	   of	   counterparty	   risk	   was	   a	   much	   more	   important	   issue.	   The	   crucial	  
difference	  was	  that	  in	  the	  case	  of	  derivatives	  such	  as	  futures	  and	  options,	  the	  risk	  of	  
a	   counterparty	   defaulting	  was	  much	  more	   acute.	   Thus,	   as	  we	  will	   see,	   derivatives	  
markets	  will	  be	  the	  first	  to	  adopt	  a	  more	  complex	  centralized	  clearing	  mechanisms.	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6.3	  Clearing	  Derivatives	  
	  
	  
Derivatives	   are	   a	   very	   special	   type	  of	   financial	   instrument,	   a	   contract	  whose	   value	  
depends	  on	  the	  future	  evolution	  of	  an	  underlying	  asset	  (commodities,	  shares,	  bonds,	  
currencies,	  interest	  rates,	  etc).	  By	  using	  a	  derivative,	  one	  can	  participate	  in	  a	  certain	  
market	   without	   actually	   owing	   the	   underlying	   asset.	   A	   derivative	   thus	   offers	   a	  
superior	  degree	  of	   freedom	   (optionality),	   affording	  exposure	   to	   the	   fluctuations	   in	  
value	   of	   the	   underlying	   assets.	   This	   optionality	   relates	   to	   the	   dual	   function	   of	  
derivatives,	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  hedging	  against	  future	  price	  fluctuations	  but	  also	  being	  
able	  to	  speculate	  of	  these	  future	  states	  of	  the	  world	  (Ayache,	  2010;	  Esposito,	  2011).	  
While	  we	  tend	  to	  focus	  on	  modern	  financial	  derivatives,	  some	  of	  the	  basic	  blueprints	  
of	  these	  instruments	  can	  be	  traced	  back	  to	  ancient	  times.	  Following	  Edward	  Swan54,	  
one	   could	   speculate	   that	   they	   are	   some	   of	   the	   oldest	   forms	   of	   written	   contracts.	  
Drawing	  from	  his	  account,	  one	  could	  outline	  the	  basic	  building	  blocks	  of	  a	  derivative	  
contract:	   ‘’A	   usually	   dated	   written	   agreement;	   a	   descriptions	   of	   the	   parties;	   a	  
description	  of	   the	  asset	   to	  be	  transferred;	   the	  price	  of	   the	  transaction;	   the	  date	  of	  
performance;	   a	   list	   and	   description	   of	  witnesses’’	   (Edward	   Swan,	   2000,	   p.297).	   To	  
see	  how	  old	  these	  ‘technologies’	  actually	  are,	  it	  is	  interesting	  to	  mention	  the	  48th	  law	  
of	   the	   Code	   of	   Hammurabi	   from	   1750	   BC	   describing	   a	   certain	   type	   of	   derivative	  
written	  on	  grain	  as	  the	  underlying	  asset:	  
	  
If	   any	   one	   owe	   a	   debt	   for	   a	   loan,	   and	   a	   storm	   prostrates	   the	   grain,	   or	   the	  
harvest	  fail,	  or	  the	  grain	  does	  not	  grow	  for	  lack	  of	  water;	  in	  that	  year	  he	  need	  
not	  give	  his	  creditor	  any	  grain,	  he	  washes	  his	  debt-­‐tablet	  in	  water	  and	  pays	  no	  
rent	  for	  the	  year	  (Kumer,	  2012,	  p2).	  
As	   some	  have	   argued	   this	   can	   be	   translated	   as	   a	  modern	   put	   option,	   as	   a	  way	   of	  
hedging/insuring	  against	  a	   future	  event.	   If	   the	  harvest	   is	  successful,	   the	  option	  can	  
expire,	  but	  if	  it	  fails,	  the	  owner	  of	  the	  contract	  can	  refuse	  to	  make	  any	  payments.	  In	  
Mesopotamia,	   similar	   contracts	   could	  be	  made	   for	   the	   future	  delivery	  of	   slaves	  or	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54	  Edward	  Swan	  has	  recently	  produced	  a	  comprehensive	  history	  of	  derivatives	  from	  
Ancient	  Mesopotamia	  to	  the	  pits	  of	  Chicago	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sesame	   seeds	   from	   the	   Indus	   Valley	   (Kumer,	   2012,	   p.6).	   A	   regular	   supply	   of	  
agricultural	   products	   was	   essential	   for	   the	   growing	   population	   of	   ancient	  
Mesopotamian	   cities,	   thus	   the	  need	  of	   forward	  and	  option	   contracts	  on	  grain	   and	  
slaves.	  Later	  on,	  medieval	  contracts	  such	  as	  the	  Italian	  commenda	  could	  also	  be	  seen	  
as	  a	  financial	  derivative.	  Antwerp	  was	  also	  a	  hotbed	  for	  financial	   innovations,	  were	  
contracts	   for	   differences	   could	   be	   written	   between	   the	   spot	   price	   and	   the	   future	  
delivery	  price	  (Kumer,	  2012,	  p.5).	  Perhaps	  on	  the	  most	  famous	  derivatives	  markets	  
was	   the	   Amsterdam	   futures	   market	   for	   tulips,	   which	   lead	   to	   the	   now	   famous	  
Tulipmania	   1636-­‐37	   (Fergusson,	   2008).	   For	   all	   of	   Amsterdam	   and	   London’s	  
sophistication	   in	   the	  realm	  of	   finance,	   it	  was	  France	  that	  produced	  one	  of	   the	   first	  
modern	   treaties	   on	   derivatives.	   Trading	   in	   futures	   and	   forwards	   based	   on	  
government	  bonds	  flourished	  in	  Paris	  in	  the	  1820s,	  a	  phenomenon	  that	  attracted	  the	  
attention	  of	  Proudhon	  (1857)	  (Weber,	  2008).	  
	  
Futures	  and	  forwards55	  are	  contracts	  guaranteeing	  the	  delivery	  of	  a	  certain	  asset	  at	  a	  
certain	  price	  within	  a	  specific	  time	  period.	  Options	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  give	  the	  buyer	  
the	   right	   but	   not	   the	   obligation	   to	   deliver	   the	   asset	   at	   expiration.	   Derivatives	  
emerged	   primarily	   by	   tracking	   or	   offering	   exposure	   to	   price	   changes	   in	   certain	  
commodities	   (grain,	   rice,	   steel,	   gold,	   etc.)	   and	   for	  most	  of	  history	  were	   transacted	  
Over-­‐The-­‐Counter	  (OTC),	  that	  is	  to	  say	  not	  within	  a	  public	  forum.	  In	  this,	  sense,	  the	  
development	   of	   public	   exchanges	   organizing	   the	   trading	   of	   such	   financial	  
instruments	   can	  be	   seen	  as	   a	  major	  event	   in	   the	  history	  of	   financial	  markets.	  One	  
early	   example	   of	   this	   was	   the	   Dojima	   Rice	   Exchange	   (Moss	   and	   Kintgen,	   2009).	  
Established	   in	   1730	   it	   was	   possibly	   the	   first	   public	   forum	   for	   the	   transaction	   and	  
clearing	   of	   commodity	   futures.	   While	   for	   most	   of	   financial	   history,	   derivative	  
contracts	   were	   negotiated	   and	   handled	   bilaterally,	   the	   Dojima	   Rice	   exchange	  was	  
the	   first	   public	   exchange	   performing	   the	   matching	   of	   derivative	   contracts,	  
particularly	   forwards	   and	   futures	   on	   rice	   warehouse	   certificates.	   Interestingly	  
enough,	   this	   exchange	   had	   all	   of	   the	   characteristics	   exhibited	   by	   modern	   futures	  
exchange,	  but	  emerged	  a	  century	  before	  any	  western	  equivalent	  (Schaede,	  1989).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55	  Futures	  are	  simply	  forward	  contracts	  that	  are	  traded	  on	  an	  open	  exchange.	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As	  Ulricke	  Schaede	  (1989;	  1998)	  describes	  it,	  the	  Dojima	  Rice	  Exchange	  was	  the	  most	  
complex	   financial	   institutions	   of	   the	   Togugawa-­‐period	   Japan	   and	   probably	   in	   the	  
whole	  world	  at	   that	   time.	  The	  exchange	  was	   situated	   in	   the	  commercial	  district	  of	  
Osaka,	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  rice	  trade,	  which	  the	  main	  resource	  dominating	  the	  Japanese	  
economy.	   Osaka	   was	   located	   at	   the	   crossroads	   of	   the	  main	   roads	   connecting	   the	  
West	   and	   East	   of	   the	   country,	   but	   because	   transporting	   rice	   over	   land	   was	  
expensive,	  the	  feudal	  lords	  built	  warehouses	  in	  Osaka	  and	  would	  transport	  rice	  over	  
water	   (there	   were	   124	   such	   warehouses	   in	   1730).	   Each	   feudal	   warehouse	   had	   a	  
manager	   and	   a	   money	   raiser	   (accountant)	   who	   kept	   the	   books	   and	   organize	   rice	  
auctions	   issuing	   rice	   bills.	   As	   the	   feudal	   lords	   had	   expenditures	   over	   the	   whole	  
course	   of	   the	   year,	   they	   needed	   to	   phase	   out	   the	   income	   from	   rice	   harvests.	  
Consequently,	   the	   feudal	   warehouses	   would	   obtain	   money	   (silver)	   from	  
moneychangers	   in	   Osaka	   by	   giving	   them	   rice	   bills	   in	   exchange.	   Whereas	   most	   of	  
Japan	  was	  trading	  rice	  in	  small	  spot	  markets,	  Dojima	  slowly	  developed	  a	  derivatives	  
market	  through	  the	  secondary	  trading	  of	  rice	  bills.	  The	  crucial	  innovation	  came	  when	  
rice	  bills	  were	  written	  not	   just	  on	  the	  rice	   in	  storage	  at	  the	  warehouse,	  but	  on	  the	  
rice	  that	  was	  yet	  to	  be	  harvested	  (futures	  contracts).	  As	  volumes	  of	  futures	  contracts	  
increased,	  there	  were	  110,000	  bales	  of	  rice	  outstanding	  for	  only	  30,000	  actual	  bales	  
of	   rice	   in	   existence	   (Kumer,	   2012,	   p.9).	   The	   Dojima	   Rice	   Exchange	   was	   thus	   a	  
matching	  machine	  organized	  around	  two	  groups	  of	  participants,	  rice	  traders	  and	  rice	  
brokers	  (Schaede,	  1998).	  The	  first	  group	  comprising	  500	  individuals	  had	  the	  privilege	  
of	   taking	   part	   in	   the	   rice	   bill	   auctions	   at	   the	   warehouse.	   The	   second	   group	  
comprising	   some	   800	   individuals	   could	   trade	   bills	   on	   the	   secondary	   market.	   The	  
questions	  of	  default	  or	  credit	  counterparty	  risks	  were	  solved	  through	  a	  very	  simple	  
and	   efficient	   clearinghouse	   system.	   Clearers	   developed	   out	   of	   the	  moneychangers	  
who	  were	  keeping	  deposits	  from	  rice	  merchants	  and	  exchanging	  rice	  bills	  for	  money.	  
All	   participants	   in	   the	   market	   would	   entrust	   the	   actual	   settlement	   of	   their	  
transactions	  to	  the	  moneychangers.	  Consequently,	  the	  Dojima	  Rice	  Exchange	  had	  a	  
very	  complex	  institutional	  structure,	  with	  specific	  fixed	  trading	  periods	  between	  the	  
various	   traders	   who	   were	   licensed	   members.	   Rice	   was	   standardized	   in	   terms	   of	  
quality	  and	  quantity	  and	  all	  trades	  had	  to	  go	  through	  a	  decentralized	  clearing	  system	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that	  offered	  credit	  lines	  and	  protection	  against	  default	  (Norman,	  2011).	  Whereas	  the	  
Dojima	   Rice	   Exchange	   developed	   both	   a	   trading	   and	   clearing	   machines	   for	   rice	  
futures,	   it	   was	   the	   French	   port	   city	   of	   Le	   Havre,	   which	   marked	   the	   decisive	  
breakthrough	   in	   the	  western	  world.	   In	   1882,	  merchants	   in	   Le	   Havre	  were	   trading	  
futures	  contracts	  on	  coffee	  and	  cotton	  and	  the	  Caisse	  de	  Liquidation	  des	  Affaires	  en	  
Marchandises	  was	  acting	  as	  a	  clearinghouse	  for	  those	  contracts.	  Setting	  an	  example	  
for	   all	   modern	   clearinghouses,	   the	   Caisse	   would	   register	   the	   counterparties	   and	  
collect	  deposit	  margins	  as	  a	  guarantee	  for	  the	  contracts	  (Norman,	  2011).	  Le	  Havre’s	  
example	  was	   adopted	   in	  Paris	  with	   its	   Caisse	  de	   Liquidation	   in	  1887	  and	   London’s	  
Produce	  Clearing	  House	  in	  1888.	  	  
	  
While	   the	   commodities	   exchange	   and	   clearinghouse	   of	   Le	   Havre	   received	   less	  
attention,	  the	  grain	  exchange	  of	  Chicago	  is	  still	  credited	  by	  many	  as	  the	  birthplace	  of	  
modern	  derivatives	  trading	  and	  clearing.	  As	  most	  farmers	  would	  try	  to	  sell	  their	  grain	  
at	   harvest	   time,	   this	   would	   lead	   to	   large	   oversupplies	   in	   the	   autumn	   and	   major	  
shortages	   in	  the	  spring.	  Consequently,	  prices	  would	  fall	  dramatically	   in	  the	  autumn	  
and	  rise	   in	  the	  spring	  (CME,	  2001).	  The	  Chicago	  Board	  of	  Trade	  (CBOT)	  emerged	   in	  
that	  context	  as	  an	  association	  of	  82	  merchants	  founded	  in	  1848	  in	  order	  to	  regulate	  
the	   grain	   trade	   and	   ensure	   a	   smoother	   supply	   of	   grain.	   In	   addition	   to	   trading	   the	  
actual	   commodity,	   the	   exchange	   quickly	   developed	   a	   market	   for	   financial	  
instruments	   deriving	   their	   value	   from	   the	   price	   of	   grain,	   namely	   forwards	   and	  
futures56.	  The	  matching	  mechanism	  of	  this	  market	  was	  organized	  in	  trading	  pits	  in	  an	  
open-­‐outcry	   fashion,	   not	   that	   dissimilar	   from	   the	   architecture	   of	   NYSE.	   The	   CBOT	  
also	  established	  a	  special	  department	  in	  1858	  in	  order	  to	  classify	  grain	  into	  different	  
grades,	   a	   necessary	   step	   in	   order	   to	   have	   fungible	   futures	   contracts	   and	   a	  
standardized	   futures	   market	   (Swan,	   2000,	   p.218).	   This	   becomes	   evident	   once	   we	  
imagine	   the	  most	  basic	   situation	   involving	  a	   future	  contract	   comprising,	   lets	   say,	  a	  
producer	  and	  a	  manufacturer.	  The	  producer	  enters	  a	  futures	  contract	  by	  agreeing	  to	  
sell	  1	  tone	  of	  grain	  in	  6	  months	  at	  $1000.	  If	  in	  3	  months	  time	  the	  price	  increases	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56	  The	   ‘’Board’’	   as	   its	   called,	   is	   to	   this	   day	   the	   oldest	   futures	   exchange	   still	   in	  
operation,	   and	  has	  merged	  with	   the	  Chicago	  Mercantile	   Exchange	   (the	   ‘’Merc’’)	   in	  
2007	  to	  form	  the	  CME	  Group	  (Kumer,	  2012).	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$2000,	  the	  producer	  might	  want	  to	  get	  out	  of	  the	  contract,	  because	  he	  would	  stand	  
to	  make	  more	  money	   if	   he	   could	   sell	   his	   grain	   at	   the	   superior	   price	   (if	   the	   trend	  
continues	   to	   go	   up).	   The	  manufacturer	  might	   think	   that	   this	   price	   increase	   is	   not	  
going	  to	  last,	  so	  could	  agree	  to	  enter	  into	  another	  contract.	  In	  this	  second	  contract	  
the	  manufacturer	  agrees	  to	  sell	  the	  producer	  1	  tone	  of	  grain	  in	  3	  months	  at	  $1500.	  
Now,	   if	  we	   imagine	  that	  the	  two	  parties	  are	  not	  really	   interested	   in	  the	  delivery	  of	  
grain	  but	  are	  two	  futures	  traders,	   it	  would	  be	  possible	  to	  offset	   the	  two	  contracts.	  
This	   is	   possible	   because	   the	   contracts	   are	   standardized	   and	   fungible.	   The	   clearing	  
and	  settlement	  of	   these	   two	  positions	   results	   in	  a	  net	  cash	  payment	  of	  $500	   form	  
the	  producer	   to	   the	  manufacturer	  or	  between	   futures	   trader	  A	   and	   futures	   trader	  
B57.	  	  
	  
While	   the	   example	   above	   is	   relatively	   simple,	   it	   would	   not	   be	   uncommon	   for	   the	  
futures	   traders	   to	   enter	   into	   such	   positions	   several	   times	   over	   the	   course	   of	   the	  
trading	  day.	   If	  we	  now	  extend	  this	  example	  to	  the	  market	  comprising	  the	   initial	  82	  
merchants	  of	  CBOT,	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  expect	  the	  sudden	  development	  of	  a	  complex	  web	  
of	  mutual	  exposures,	  which	  would	  take	  a	  long	  time	  to	  clear	  and	  settle	  one	  by	  one.	  It	  
thus	  becomes	  essential	  to	  develop	  a	  mechanism	  for	  clearing	  offsetting	  positions	  and	  
reduce	   the	   complexity	   of	   trading.	   A	   step	   in	   this	   direction	   was	   taken	   when	   on	  
September	  23,	  1883	  when	  the	  clearing	  of	  transactions	  became	  possible	  through	  the	  
establishment	  of	  a	  clearinghouse,	  the	  Board	  of	  Trade	  Clearing	  Corporation	  (BOTCC).	  
The	   BOTCC	   would	   net	   the	   obligations	   of	   different	   members	   and	   collect	   margin	  
payments	  before	  settling	  contracts.	  The	  initial	  design	  performed	  multilateral	  clearing	  
by	   organizing	   clearing	   rings,	   with	   the	   exchange	   and	   the	   clearinghouse	   acting	   as	  
intermediaries	   and	   mediators.	   In	   fact,	   ringing,	   as	   a	   clearing	   mechanism,	   was	  
particularly	  popular	  in	  Chicago.	  Similar	  to	  the	  clearing	  cycles	  and	  chains	  of	  medieval	  
fairs,	  buyers	  and	  sellers	  would	   form	  clearing	   rings,	   for	   the	  purpose	  of	  compressing	  
their	  offsetting	  positions.	  Efficiency	  gains	  were	  immediate	  in	  the	  first	  9	  months,	  with	  
the	   actual	   transfer	   of	   just	   ‘’76500	   cheques	   compared	   to	   740000	   under	   the	   old	  
system’’	   (Norman,	   2011,	   p.64).	   The	  only	   problem	  with	   the	   system	  was	   that	   it	  was	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 	  Approximately	   97%	   of	   futures	   contracts	   are	   offset	   and	   result	   in	   a	   net	   cash	  
payment,	  with	  only	  3%	  resulting	  in	  actual	  physical	  delivery	  (CME,	  2001).	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‘’only	   as	   strong	   as	   its	   weakest	   link’’	   and	   the	   initial	   clearinghouse	   took	   no	  
responsibility	   for	   contract	  performance.	  That	   is	   to	   say,	  even	   if	  multilateral	   clearing	  
reduced	   the	   complexity	   of	   exposures,	   there	   is	   nothing	   the	   guarantee	   the	  
performance	  of	  derivative	  contracts.	  In	  fact,	  bankruptcies	  were	  not	  unusual	  and	  they	  
usually	  affected	  large	  parts	  of	  total	  membership	  (Norman,	  2011).	  	  
The	  ultimate	  breakthrough	  in	  terms	  of	  managing	  this	  counterparty	  credit	  risk	  came	  
with	   the	   adoption	   of	   central	   clearing,	   when	   the	   clearinghouse	   becomes	   a	   Central	  
Counterparty	  (CCP),	  effectively	  a	  buyer	  to	  every	  seller	  and	  the	  seller	  to	  every	  buyer	  
(Moser,	   1998).	   This	   threshold	   was	   passed	   when	   the	   BOTCC	   decided	   to	   take	   full	  
responsibility	   for	   all	   contracts,	   transitioning	   from	  multilateral	   clearing	   via	   rings	   to	  
complete	  central	  clearing.	  On	  September	  3,	  1925,	  the	  Board	  established	  the	  BOTCC	  
as	  a	  CCP,	  that	   is	  to	  say	  the	  only	  counterparty	  to	  all	  transactions.	   In	  the	  case	  of	  any	  
defaults,	   the	   BOTCC	   would	   take	   responsibility	   for	   the	   portfolio	   of	   the	   defaulting	  
member.	   In	   order	   to	   achieve	   mutualisation,	   members	   of	   the	   exchange	   had	   to	  
purchase	  shares	  in	  the	  clearinghouse.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  a	  default,	  if	  loses	  exceeded	  the	  
posted	  margin	  and	   the	   clearinghouse’s	  own	  capital,	   then	   the	   rest	  of	   the	  members	  
were	   obliged	   to	   purchase	   more	   shares	   and	   effectively	   bail	   out	   the	   clearinghouse	  
(Kroszner,	   2006).	   Coupled	   with	   these	   financial	   buffers,	   the	   BOTCC	   had	   an	  
independent	  governance	  structure,	  which	  allowed	   it	   to	  make	  decisions	   in	   terms	  of	  
safeguarding	   the	   safety	  of	   all	   clearing	  members.	   In	   just	   a	   few	  decades,	   the	  BOTCC	  
evolved	   from	   multilateral	   clearing	   to	   what	   was	   in	   fact	   a	   mutual	   insurance	  
mechanism,	   being	   the	   sole	   counterparty	   and	   guarantor	   for	   every	   trade.	   As	  Moser	  
(1998)	  has	  argued,	  the	  whole	  evolution	  of	  clearing	  mechanisms	  revolves	  around	  the	  
need	  of	  members	  to	  manage	  the	  risk	  of	  nonperformance	  of	  contracts,	  that	  is	  to	  say	  
to	  mitigate	  to	  counterparty	  credit	  risk	  entailed	  by	  the	  sudden	  default	  of	  one	  or	  more	  
clearing	  members.	  This	   last	  aspect	   is	  probably	  what	   really	  distinguishes	  derivatives	  
from	   other	   securities	   such	   as	   shares,	   namely	   the	   higher	   risk	   entailed	   in	   the	  
management	  of	  the	  lifecycle.	  It’s	  one	  thing	  to	  agree	  to	  a	  transaction	  (to	  get	  a	  match)	  
but	  it’s	  a	  totally	  different	  thing	  to	  actually	  make	  good	  on	  it,	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  trade	  
performs	   right	   up	   to	   the	   expiration	   date	   of	   the	   derivative.	   One	   could	   thus	  
understand	   derivatives	   trading	   as	   first	   and	   foremost	   an	   exchange	   of	   promises.	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Consequently,	   the	   clearing	   of	   derivatives	   is	   essentially	   the	   management	   of	   the	  
intrinsic	   contingency	   of	   these	   promises.	   As	   Edward	   Swan	   understands	   them,	  
derivatives	   offer	   everyone	   something	   to	   trade	   on,	   namely	   their	   ability	   to	   keep	   a	  
promise:	  
Such	   promises	   are	   not	  manufactured	   in	   a	   factory,	   grown	   in	   a	   field	   or	  mined	  
from	  the	  earth.	  They	  are	  created	  by	   the	  human	   imagination.	  They	  are	  a	   true	  
and	  virtually	  unlimited	  ‘’intellectual	  capital’’	  (Swan,	  2000,	  p.298).	  
	  
Perhaps	   the	   common	   understanding	   of	   derivatives	   as	   contracts	   that	   derive	   their	  
value	   from	  an	  underlying	  asset	   is	  only	  partially	  correct.	  Also	  partially	  correct	   is	   the	  
understanding	  of	  derivatives	  as	   instruments	  of	  speculation.	   In	   the	  end,	  any	  kind	  of	  
theory	  or	  understanding	  of	  the	  value	  of	  a	  derivative	  contract	  depends	  on	  the	  ability	  
of	   the	   two	  counterparties	   to	   respect	  and	  keep	   their	  promise.	   In	  other	  words,	   ‘’the	  
value	  of	  a	  derivative	   instrument	  depends	  on	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  promisor	  to	  perform	  
on	  his	  promise’’	  (Swan,	  2000,	  p.298).	  Another	  way	  to	  understand	  this	  is	  by	  referring	  
to	  Elie	  Ayache’s	  definition	  of	  derivatives	  as	  contingent	  claims	  (Ayache,	  2010).	  While	  
all	   financial	   instruments	   can	   be	   understood	   as	   promissory	   agreements,	   it	   is	   the	  
longer	  horizon	  and	  higher	  leverage	  entailed	  by	  derivative	  contracts	  that	  makes	  them	  
particularly	   fragile	  and	  contingent	   in	   regards	   to	   the	   risk	  of	  default.	   In	   terms	  of	   the	  
research	  done	  in	  the	  social	  sciences	  and	  humanities	  on	  the	  topic	  of	  derivatives,	  there	  
has	   been	   a	   tendency	   to	   look	   either	   at	   the	   performativity	   of	   derivatives	   pricing	  
models	   	  (Mackenzie,	  2015b)	  or	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  social	  structure	  of	  the	  trading	  
pits	   resisted	   and	   responded	   to	   technological	   innovations	   (Caitlin	   Zaloom,	   2006).	  
What	  we	  are	  suggesting	  here	  is	  that	  in	  order	  for	  a	  derivative	  market	  to	  work	  in	  the	  
first	  place,	  a	  whole	  infrastructure	  needs	  to	  be	  in	  place	  that	  can	  maintain	  continuous	  
trading	  and	  clearing	  of	  transactions.	  In	  the	  previous	  chapter	  on	  exchanges,	  we	  have	  
already	   looked	   at	   the	   importance	   of	   matching	   in	   maintaining	   the	   continuity	   of	  
financial	  flows.	  In	  the	  current	  chapter	  we	  have	  focused	  on	  the	  importance	  of	  clearing	  
mechanisms	  in	  streamlining	  this	  process	  in	  the	  case	  of	  bank	  check	  payments,	  shares	  
and	   futures	   markets.	   Different	   from	   stocks,	   derivatives	   such	   as	   futures	   are	   more	  
complex	   financial	   contracts	   operating	   over	   longer	   time	   horizons	   and	   the	  
	   177	  
management	  of	  their	  lifecycle	  requires	  an	  equally	  complex	  financial	  infrastructure.	  It	  
is	   for	   this	   very	   reason	   that	   derivatives	   markets	   developed	   clearing	   mechanisms	  
almost	   from	   the	   very	   beginning.	   	   Both	   the	  Dojima	  Rice	   Exchange	   and	   the	   Chicago	  
Board	   of	   Trade	   developed	   complex	   risk	   management	   arrangements	   in	   order	   to	  
ensure	   the	   performance	   of	   transactions.	   In	   the	   next	   section	   we	   will	   take	   more	  
detailed	   look	   at	   the	   evolution	   from	   bilateral	   to	   multilateral	   and	   finally	   to	   central	  
clearing	  as	  well	  as	  the	  gradual	  transition	  of	  clearing	  from	  a	  human-­‐based	  paper	  and	  
pencil	  ‘hardware’	  to	  our	  present	  day	  real	  time	  clearing	  electronic	  platforms.	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6.4	  The	  Evolution	  of	  Clearing	  Machines	  
	  
Up	  until	   this	   point,	  we	  have	  described	   the	   long	   and	   complex	   evolution	  of	   clearing	  
machines,	   from	   its	   early	   beginnings	   in	   the	   medieval	   fairs	   to	   the	   more	   complex	  
designs	   developed	   in	   modern	   financial	   markets.	   As	   long	   as	   transactions	   could	   be	  
settled	   on	   the	   spot,	   directly	   between	  buyers	   and	   sellers,	   there	  was	   no	   need	   for	   a	  
clearing	  mechanism.	  But	  as	  soon	  as	  settlement	  is	  not	  possible	  immediately,	  such	  as	  
in	  the	  settlement	  of	  bank	  check	  payments,	  or	  when	  you	  have	  financial	  products	  with	  
long-­‐dated	  maturities,	  such	  as	  futures	  or	  options,	  there	  is	  an	  inevitable	  accumulation	  
of	  unsettled	  balances.	  There	  is	  then	  an	  urgent	  need	  for	  a	  mechanism	  to	  untangle	  the	  
complex	  web	  of	  offsetting	  exposures	  and	  streamline	  the	  flow	  of	  transactions.	  With	  
the	  growth	   in	   trading	  volumes,	  and	  particularly	   in	   the	  20th	  century	  with	  the	  rise	  of	  
institutional	   investors,	   clearing	   arrangements	   were	   put	   under	   increased	   strain	   in	  
terms	  of	  being	  able	  to	  efficiently	  process	  financial	  flows.	  	  In	  this	  sense,	  one	  can	  look	  
that	   evolution	   of	   clearing	   machines	   as	   a	   gradual	   process	   of	   change	   under	   the	  
constraints	   and	  pressures	   of	   the	   financial	   community,	  who	   required	   a	   streamlined	  
and	  efficient	  financial	  infrastructure	  (Matthews,	  1921).	  
	  
As	   we	   have	   seen,	   the	   gradual	   evolution	   of	   clearing	   includes	   a	   multitude	   of	  
multilateral	   and	   central	   clearing	   arrangements.	   In	   fact,	   there	   is	   an	   extensive	  
literature	   dedicated	   to	   the	   diverse	   landscape	   of	   clearing	   designs	   (Moser,	   1998,	  
Kroszner,	  1999).	   	  Without	  being	  able	  to	  rely	  on	  substantial	  historical	  data,	  bilateral	  
clearing	  arrangement	  has	  been	  probably	   the	  most	   simple	  and	  widespread	   clearing	  
solution	  throughout	  history.	  It	  has	  survived	  to	  this	  day	  particularly	  in	  the	  markets	  for	  
complex	   Over-­‐the-­‐Counter	   (OTC)	   derivatives	   (Jackson	   and	  Manning,	   2007,	   p.3).	   In	  
fact,	  Moser	  references	  (Emery,	  1896)	  when	  discussing	  one	  of	  the	  earliest	  examples	  
of	   bilateral	   (direct)	   clearing	   as	   early	   as	   the	   1730s,	   in	   the	   context	   of	   East	   India	  
Company	   forward	   contracts	   for	   certain	   metals.	   Other	   early	   examples	   include	   the	  
settlement	   of	   grain	   contracts	   at	   the	   Buffalo	   Board	   of	   Trade	   in	   the	   1840s	   (Moser,	  
1998,	  p.12).	  In	  the	  case	  of	  bilateral	  clearing,	  market	  participants	  must	  compare	  their	  
positions	  and	  agree	  to	  net	  offsetting	  positions.	   In	  the	  case	  of	  derivatives	  contracts,	  
they	  also	  have	  to	  request	  and	  make	  collateral/margin	  payments	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	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open	  positions.	  As	  the	  value	  of	  the	  contract	  fluctuates	  between	  the	  day	  of	  the	  trade	  
and	   its	   expiration	   date,	   margin	   requirements	   can	   change	   on	   a	   daily	   basis.	   For	  
instance,	  a	   long	   futures	  contract	   in	  a	  market	  where	   the	  price	   is	  going	  down	  would	  
lead	  to	  higher	  margin	  requirements.	  As	   long	  as	  the	  market	  was	   largely	  made	  up	  of	  
traders	   who	   knew	   each	   other,	   bilateral	   clearing	   was	   sufficient	   but	   limited	   to	   the	  
original	   counterparties	  of	   the	   trade.	  As	   the	  number	  of	  market	  participants	  grew,	  a	  
need	   arose	   for	  more	   complex	   clearing	   arrangements	   such	   as	  multilateral	   designs,	  
partially	  driven	  by	   the	  costs	  of	  maintaining	  derivate	  positions	   for	   longer	  periods	  of	  
time.	   As	   we	   have	   seen	   in	   the	   case	   of	   medieval	   clearing	   fairs,	   the	   first	   operation	  
entailed	   merchants	   finding	   possible	   bilateral	   offsets	   before	   engaging	   in	   more	   the	  
complex	   clearing	   mechanisms,	   such	   as	   clearing	   cycles	   and	   chains.	   According	   to	  
Mirowski,	   it’s	  not	   really	   surprising	   that	   simpler	  and	   less	   computationally	  expensive	  
clearing	  designs	  would	  be	  used	  more	  common,	  as	  they	  are	  easier	  to	  implement	  and	  
maintain.	   Similar	   to	   the	   situation	   of	   the	  matching	   function,	  where	   posted	   offer	   of	  
single-­‐sided	  designs	  were	  more	  prevalent	  then	  the	  more	  complex	  continuous	  double	  
auctions,	   clearing	   arrangements	   are	   also	   subject	   to	   a	   hierarchy	   based	   on	  
computational	   complexity.	   Bilateral	   clearing	   was	   perfectly	   adequate	   to	   a	   certain	  
degree	  of	  trading	  complexity,	  namely	  when	  medieval	  merchant-­‐bankers	  or	  modern	  
jobbers/specialists	  could	  come	  together	  and	  quickly	  offset	  their	  reciprocal	  balances.	  
One	   could	  argue	   that	   for	   as	   long	  as	   this	  was	   the	   case,	   there	  was	  no	   real	   need	   for	  
more	   computationally	   expensive	   or	   time	   consuming	   arrangements.	   But	   with	   the	  
growth	  of	   trading	  volumes	  and	   the	   subsequent	   increase	   in	   counterparty	  exposure,	  
more	  complex	  clearing	  machines	  were	  possible,	  affordable	  and	  necessary.	  Thus	  the	  
adoption	   of	   clearing	   chains/cycles	   in	   clearing	   fairs,	   the	   later	   adoption	   of	   clearing	  
arrangements	   in	   the	   case	   of	   bank	   payments	   (London	   Clearinghouse),	   and	   the	  
transition	  to	  ring	  clearing	  in	  the	  futures	  markets	  of	  Chicago.	  	  
	  
Moser	  (1998)	  suggest	  that	  the	  migration	  of	  multilateral	  clearing	  mechanisms	  started	  
with	   the	   banking	   clearinghouses	   of	   London	   and	   New	   York,	   and	   was	   gradually	  
adopted	   by	   stock	   and	   futures	   markets.	   In	   the	   context	   of	   the	   Chicago	   derivatives	  
markets,	  traders	  would	  enter	  into	  ring	  clearing	  arrangements	  in	  order	  to	  reduce	  ‘’the	  
cost	   of	   maintaining	   open	   positions’’	   (Moser,	   1998,	   p.14).	   Different	   to	   bilateral	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clearing,	  multilateral	  clearing	  mechanisms	  make	   individual	  exposures	  substitutable,	  
so	  what	   it	   becomes	   crucial	   to	   finding	   the	  most	   efficient	   compression	  method.	   For	  
instance,	   ringing	   allowed	   the	   traders	   of	   Chicago	   to	   compress	   their	   exposures,	  
thereby	  reducing	  the	  volumes	  of	  transaction	  that	  actually	  needed	  to	  be	  settled	  and	  
reducing	  the	  margin	  required	  for	  maintaining	  non-­‐cleared	  exposures.	  As	  both	  Moser	  
(1998)	   and	   Kroszner	   (1999)	   note,	   ringing	   affords	   the	   ‘‘netting	   of	   exposures,	   but	  
without	  novation	  to	  a	  common	  central	  counterparty’’	  (Jackson	  and	  Manning,	  2007,	  
p.3).	   Moser’s	   research	   offers	   an	   example	   highlighting	   both	   the	   benefits	   of	  
multilateral	  clearing	  as	  well	  as	  the	  added	  complexity	  of	  central	  clearing.	  He	  looks	  at	  
the	  Chicago	  ring	  clearing	  with	  four	  counterparties	  where	  ‘’A	  sold	  to	  B	  at	  $1.00;	  B	  sold	  
to	  A	  at	  $0.95;	  C	  sold	  to	  B	  at	  $0.97;	  and	  D	  sold	  to	  C	  at	  $0.93’’	  (Moser,	  1998,	  p.14).	  The	  
ring	  clearing	  mechanism	  works	  by	  computing	  one	  single	  clearing	  price,	  which	  allows	  
for	   the	  compression	  of	  all	  of	   these	  exposures.	  As	  Moser	  demonstrates,	   the	  correct	  
clearing	  prices	  for	  the	  ring	  comprising	  traders	  A,	  B,	  C	  and	  D	  is	  $0.93.	  So	  while	  not	  all	  
trades	   have	   been	   matched	   at	   $0.93,	   the	   structure	   of	   their	   reciprocal	   exposures	  
means	  that	  they	  can	  compress	  their	  positions	  at	  this	  price,	  without	  modifying	  their	  
profits	   or	   losses.	   Moreover,	   instead	   of	   keeping	   multiple	   positions	   open,	   most	   of	  
which	   require	   the	  posting	  of	  margin,	  each	   trader	  arrives	  at	  one	  single	  net	  position	  
and	  reduces	  its	  overall	  costs.	  	  
Counterparty	   Buy	  Price	   Sell	  Price	   Profit/Loss	   Net	  
A	   0.93	   1.00	   0.07	   0.05	  
0.95	   0.93	   (0.02)	  
B	   1.00	   0.93	   (0.07)	   (0.09)	  
0.93	   0.95	   0.02	  
0.97	   0.93	   (0.04)	  
C	   0.93	   0.97	   0.04	   0.04	  
0.93	   0.93	   0.00	  
D	   0.93	   0.93	   0.00	   0.00	  
Figure	  10:	  Example	  of	  multilateral	  clearing	  with	  rings	  
Table	  reconstructed	  after	  (Moser,	  1998,	  p.18).	  
	  
While	   at	   the	   beginning	   all	   parties	   had	   both	   long	   and/or	   short	   positions,	   after	   the	  
clearing	   process,	   A	   and	   C	   have	   a	   net	   profit,	   B	   has	   a	   net	   loss,	   while	   D	   is	   neutral.	  
Perhaps	  what	   is	  most	   important	   is	   that	   the	  number	  of	  open	  positions	   is	  drastically	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reduced	  (in	  this	  case	  to	  three	  positions)	  leading	  to	  lower	  margin	  requirements	  for	  all	  
participants.	  The	  benefits	  of	  netting	  offsetting	  exposures	  are	  valid	  only	  as	  long	  as	  all	  
counterparties	  keep	  their	  promise	  so	  to	  speak,	  as	  any	  failure	  within	  the	  clearing	  ring	  
could	   endanger	   the	   solvency	   of	   all	   participants	   (Moser,	   1998,	   p.28).	   Efficient	   as	   it	  
was	  in	  term	  of	  netting,	  multilateral	  clearing	  through	  rings	  would	  not	  allow	  for	  a	  clear	  
picture	   of	   the	   total	   exposure	   of	   participants	   the	   risk	   inherent	   in	   their	   portfolios.	  
While	   the	   early	   modern	   clearinghouses	   simply	   reduced	   the	   volumes	   of	   actual	  
payments	   between	  members	   by	   crediting	   and	   debiting	   their	   accounts,	   derivatives	  
clearinghouses	   would	   eventually	   need	   to	   develop	   a	   more	   complete	   clearing	  
machine.	  	  
	  
As	   clearinghouses	   became	   more	   and	   more	   involved	   in	   the	   market,	   they	   also	  
gradually	   became	   the	   effective	   guarantors	   of	   the	   performance	   of	   derivatives	  
contracts	   (Millo	   et	   al.,	   2005).	  With	   the	   advent	   of	   complete	   central	   clearing	   in	   the	  
context	  of	  CCPs,	  all	  contracts	  are	  extracted	  from	  their	   initial	  bilateral	  situation	  and	  
become	  part	  of	  a	  complex	  matrix	  of	  substitutable	  exposures.	  In	  addition	  to	  being	  a	  
more	  efficient	  mechanism,	  the	  central	  clearing	  algorithm	  also	  represents	  an	  increase	  
in	   complexity.	   The	   registration	   process	   entails	   identifying	   counterparties	   and	   their	  
liabilities.	   The	   CCP	   then	   performs	   novation,	   the	   legal	   detachment	   of	   trade	  
counterparties	  and	  the	  establishment	  of	  new	  contractual	  relations	  to	  the	  CCP.	  	  Next,	  
the	   CCP	   performs	   multilateral	   netting	   leading	   to	   substantial	   savings	   for	   all	  
participants.	  This	  function	  allows	  the	  CCP	  to	  net	  all	  offsetting	  positions	  and	  replace	  
them	   with	   a	   ‘’single	   debit/credit	   between	   itself	   and	   each	   counterparty’’	  
(Hasenpusch,	   2009,	   p.24).	   The	   figure	   below	   reproduces	   the	   exposures	   between	  
traders	   A,B,C	   and	   D	   but	   also	   interposes	   the	   clearinghouse/CCP	   as	   an	   additional	  
counterparty.	  For	  all	  counterparties,	  the	  clearinghouse	  takes	  to	  opposite	  side	  of	  the	  
trade.	  So	  for	  instance,	  A	  sold	  at	  $1.00	  and	  bought	  at	  $0.95	  so	  the	  CCP	  buys	  from	  A	  at	  
$1.00	  and	  sells	  at	  $0.95.	  While	  A’s	  initial	  trades	  were	  with	  different	  counterparties,	  
now	   both	   trades	   are	   with	   the	   CCP.	   While	   in	   the	   case	   of	   ring	   clearing,	   the	  
clearinghouse	  would	   perform	   the	  netting	   of	   exposures	   but	   all	   payments	  would	   be	  
done	   bilaterally	   between	   the	   counterparties,	   in	   the	   case	   of	   central	   clearing	   all	  
payments	  are	  process	  by	  the	  CCP.	  Consequently,	  A	  has	  to	  receive	  0.05	  from	  the	  CCP,	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B	  has	  to	  pay	  0.09	  to	  the	  CCP,	  and	  again	  C	  has	  to	  receive	  0.04	  from	  the	  CCP.	  In	  this	  
example,	  the	  CCP	  simply	  receives	  payment	  from	  B	  and	  transmits	  it	  further	  to	  A	  and	  
C,	  with	  counterparty	  D	  being	  neutral.	  
	  













A	   0.93	   1.00	   0.07	   0.05	   1.00	   0.93	   (0.07)	   	  
0.95	   0.93	   (0.02)	   	   0.93	   0.95	   0.02	   (0.05)	  
B	   1.00	   0.93	   (0.07)	   (0.09)	   0.93	   1.00	   0.07	   	  
0.93	   0.95	   0.02	   	   0.95	   0.93	   (0.02)	   	  
0.97	   0.93	   (0.04)	   	   0.93	   0.97	   0.04	   0.09	  
C	   0.93	   0.97	   0.04	   0.04	   0.97	   0.93	   (0.04)	   	  
0.93	   0.93	   0.00	   	   0.93	   0.93	   0.00	   (0.04)	  
D	   0.93	   0.93	   0.00	   0.00	   0.93	   0.93	   0.00	   	  
Figure	  11:	  Example	  of	  central	  clearing	  with	  CCP	  
Table	  reconstructed	  after	  (Moser,	  1998,	  p.32).	  
	  
This	   complete	   integration	   allows	   the	   netting	   of	   offsetting	   exposures	   leading	   to	  
substantial	  capital	  efficiencies	  and	  lower	  margin	  requirements,	  crucial	  in	  the	  context	  
of	  clearing	  large	  volumes	  of	  more	  and	  more	  complex	  exposures.	  In	  addition	  to	  that,	  
the	   CCP	   is	   also	   the	   legal	   guarantor	   of	   all	   contracts,	   and	   takes	   responsibility	   for	  
contract	   performance	   (Jackson	   and	   Manning,	   2007,	   p.3).	   While	   the	   first	   modern	  
clearinghouses	   only	   performed	   a	   ‘’contingent	   integration’’,	   CCPs	   allowed	   for	  
permanent	   integration	  and	  full	  mutualisation	  of	  counterparty	  risk	  (Kroszner,	  1999).	  
So	   while	   bank	   check	   clearing	   simply	   facilitated	   and	   increased	   the	   efficiency	   of	  
payments,	  CCPs	  become	  legal	  parties	  to	  all	  trades,	  the	  buyer	  to	  every	  seller	  and	  the	  
seller	  to	  every	  buyer.	  Moreover,	  CCPs	  developed	  various	  methods	  and	  safeguards	  in	  
order	  to	  mitigate	  credit	  risk	  such	  as:	  strict	  membership	  requirements,	  default	  funds,	  
mutualisation	   of	   losses	   and	  margin	   payments	   in	   order	   to	   collateralize	   transactions	  
(Moskow,	  2006,	  p.47).	  	  
	  
Margin	   payments	   (initial	   and	   variation)	   were	   perhaps	   the	   most	   important	   safety	  
mechanism	  of	  central	  clearing,	  a	  complex	  process	  of	  measurement,	  calculation	  and	  
risk	  management.	   Initial	  margins	  were	  designed	  as	  a	  basic	   firewall,	  which	  protects	  
the	   CCP	   against	   normal	   market	   movements	   and	   risk	   of	   non-­‐performance	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(Hasenpush,	  2009,	  p.29).	  Variation	  margin	  was	  a	   further	   layer	  of	  protection	   that	   is	  
called	  upon	  when	  the	  market	  value	  of	  derivatives	  position	  change	  (Valiante,	  2010).	  
Because	  of	  this,	  the	  CCP	  bears	  no	  market	  risk	  itself,	  only	  credit	  risk	  and	  as	  the	  value	  
or	   open	   positions	   changes	   over	   time,	   this	   market	   risk	   is	   transmitted	   to	   the	  
counterparties	  of	  the	  contract	  through	  periodic	  adjustments	  in	  the	  level	  of	  variation	  
margin.	  So	  while	  the	  CCP	  is	  market	  neutral,	  it	  takes	  full	  responsibility	  for	  credit	  risk,	  
thus	   transferring	   the	   monitoring	   responsibility	   from	   market	   participants	   to	   a	  
centralized	  institution	  (Bliss	  and	  Steigerwald,	  2006,	  p.24).	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  CCP	  has	  a	  
crucial	   role	   to	   play	   in	   promoting	   market	   liquidity	   by	   ensuring	   that	   trades	   as	  
performed	  as	  quickly	  and	  as	  cheaply	  as	  possible	  (Bernanke,	  1990,	  p.140).	  	  	  
	  
Therefore,	  the	  complete	  clearing	  performed	  by	  CCPs	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  the	  most	  recent	  
evolution	  of	  clearing	  machines.	  The	  table	  below	  outlines	  a	  sketch	  for	  an	  evolutionary	  
trajectory	  beginning	  with	  bilateral	   clearing	   (or	  direct	   clearing),	  multilateral	   clearing	  
(medieval	   clearing	  chains	  and	  cycles	  or	  modern	  clearing	   rings)	  and	  central	   clearing	  
(or	  complete	  clearing	  as	  it	  is	  called	  in	  the	  context	  of	  CCPs):	  
Components	   Algorithms	  
	  





















Figure	  12:	  Evolution	  of	  centralized	  clearing	  machines	  
We	  have	  already	  seen	  a	  similar	  trajectory	  for	  matching	  machines	  (from	  bilateral	  to	  
multilateral	  and	  centralized	  designs),	  were	  there	  was	  a	  clear	  evolutionary	  trajectory	  
from	   posted-­‐offer	   to	   single-­‐sided	   and	   then	   continuous	   double	   auctions.	   Similar	   to	  
that,	  each	  new	  generation	  of	  clearing	  machines	  represent	  an	  increase	  in	  complexity	  
as	  well	  as	  being	  more	  difficult	  to	  implement	  and	  maintain:	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Figure	  13:	  Difference	  between	  bilateral	  and	  central	  clearing	  with	  CCP	  
	  
For	  instance,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  simple	  bilateral	  clearing,	  the	  operation	  consists	  basically	  
of	  comparing	   two	  sets	  of	  books,	  a	   relatively	  simple	  machine	   from	  a	  computational	  
point	  of	  view.	  Going	  back	   to	   the	  example	  of	   the	  London	  Clearing	  House,	  one	  bank	  
clerk	  would	  go	  one	  by	  one	  to	  the	  other	  clerks	  and	  submit	  his	  charges.	  Going	  up	  the	  
ladder	  of	  complexity,	  a	  derivatives	  clearing	  machine	  would	  have	  to	  incorporate	  the	  
fact	   that	   positions	   are	   not	   settled	   on	   the	   spot.	   As	  we	   have	   seen	  with	  multilateral	  
clearing	   through	   rings,	   extra	  memory	   capacity	   would	   be	   needed	   in	   order	   to	   keep	  
track	  of	   current,	   future	  and	   settlement	  prices,	   as	  well	   as	   accounting	   for	   the	   larger	  
number	  of	  ring	  participants.	  Things	  get	  even	  more	  complicated	  with	  central	  clearing,	  
which	   would	   have	   to	   be	   modelled	   as	   formal	   automata	   with	   a	   larger	   number	   of	  
memory	   stacks,	   as	   it	  would	   have	   to	   incorporate	  margin	   payments,	   price	   volatility,	  
credit	  ratings,	  offsets	  between	  correlated	  assets,	  etc.	  
	  
Each	  new	  machine	  is	  composed	  of	  more	  elements	  than	  the	  previous	  one,	  having	  to	  
process	   larger	   volumes	   of	   increasingly	  more	   complex	   financial	   products.	   Following	  
Mirowski,	  each	  new	  generation	  can	   simulate	   the	   functioning	  of	   the	  previous	  ones,	  
but	  the	  opposite	  is	  not	  true.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  the	  clearing	  machine	  of	  CCPs	  can	  easily	  
perform	   bilateral	   and	   multilateral	   clearing,	   but	   it	   also	   introduces	   additional	  
capacities,	   namely	   novation,	   guaranteeing	   the	   performance	   of	   all	   contracts	   and	  
managing	  the	  credit	  counterparty	  risk	  of	  market	  participants.	  Evolution	  occurs	  under	  
the	  constraints	  of	  the	  financial	  community,	  such	  as	  the	  need	  of	  market	  participants	  
for	   more	   efficient	   netting,	   lower	   margin	   requirements	   and	   the	   increase	   in	   risks	  
entailed	   by	   clearing	   more	   complex	   and	   less	   liquid	   products.	   So	   far,	   we	   have	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described	  the	  evolution	  of	  clearing	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  process	  and	  procedures,	   i.e.	  the	  
overall	  clearing	  mechanism	  and	  algorithms.	  But	   the	  same	  constraints	  have	  also	   led	  
to	  the	  gradual	  reduction	  of	  the	  human	  element	  within	  the	  clearing	  process	  and	  the	  
move	   towards	  more	  automated	  systems.	   In	   the	  next	   section,	  we	  will	   focus	  on	   this	  
gradual	  transition	  from	  human	  dominated	  pen	  and	  pencil	  ‘hardware’	  to	  modern	  day	  
real	  time	  electronic	  clearing	  platforms.	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6.5	  Clearing	  with	  Computers	  
	  
We	  have	  so	  far	  looked	  the	  evolution	  of	  clearing	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  specific	  algorithmic	  
design	  and	  their	  gradual	  adoption	  across	  different	  financial	  markets.	  At	  this	  point,	  it	  
would	   be	   useful	   to	   understand	   the	   evolution	   of	   clearing	   machines	   more	   broadly.	  
That	  is	  to	  say,	  we	  will	  look	  at	  how	  they	  became	  more	  automated,	  similar	  to	  a	  certain	  
extent	  to	  the	  parallel	  evolution	  of	  matching	  machines.	  Ben	  Bernanke	  has	  addressed	  
the	   technological	   aspects	   of	   clearing	   in	   his	   analysis	   of	   the	   performance	   of	   US	  
clearinghouses	   during	   the	   1987	   crash.	   In	   that	   context,	   there	   were	   several	  
technological	   issues	   with	   the	   clearing	   infrastructure	   as	   the	   volume	   of	   trades	  
‘’clogged	  the	  system’’	  and	  affected	  trade	  completion	  and	  payments	  (Bernanke,	  1990,	  
p.143).	  These	  problems	  had	  the	  potential	  to	  further	  aggravate	  the	  overall	  crash,	  as	  
financial	   institutions	  were	  not	   certain	  of	   their	  own	   financial	  health	  or	   that	  of	   their	  
counterparties.	  His	  work	  highlights	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  clearing	  infrastructure	  for	  
the	  smooth	  functioning	  of	  markets	  as	  well	  as	  its	  systemic	  importance.	  In	  fact,	  as	  we	  
have	  seen,	  clearing	  machines	  have	  always	  performed	  a	  crucial	   function	   in	  terms	  of	  
managing	  financial	  flows.	  With	  the	  growth	  of	  financial	  markets	  and	  the	  need	  to	  clear	  
more	  complex	  products,	  there	  has	  also	  been	  a	  continuous	  pressure	  towards	  higher	  
levels	  of	  automation	  and	  efficiency	  in	  terms	  of	  managing	  the	  transaction	  lifecycle.	  	  
	  
Charles	  Babbage	  was	  intrigued	  by	  the	  complexity	  and	  efficiency	  of	  the	  operations	  of	  
London	  Clearing	  House,	  characterizing	  it	  as	  a	  well-­‐designed	  machine.	  His	  fascination	  
with	   clearing	   is	   described	   in	   a	   little	   known	   text	   dating	   back	   to	   the	   1830s,	  On	   the	  
Economy	   of	  Machinery	   and	  Manufactures	   (Babbage,	   1833),	  where	   he	   dedicates	   a	  
whole	  chapter	  to	  the	  clearinghouse,	  called	  Of	  Money	  as	  a	  Medium	  of	  Exchange.	   In	  
fact,	   as	   Yuval	   Millo	   has	   recently	   argued,	   Babbage’s	   description	   of	   the	   London	  
Clearing	  House	  is	  surprisingly	  similar	  to	  the	  architecture	  of	  modern	  computers:	  
	  
It	  is	  striking	  how	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  Bankers	  Clearing	  House,	  as	  described	  by	  
Babbage,	   resonates	   with	   modern	   computer	   architecture:	   input	   and	   output,	  
some	  kind	  of	  memory	   (the	  clerks,	  books),	  and	  a	  proto-­‐CPU	  organised	  around	  
the	  inspector	  (Millo	  et	  al.,	  2005,	  p.235)	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His	  account	  has	  influenced	  historical	  research,	  such	  as	  some	  of	  the	  work	  done	  on	  the	  
history	   of	   information	   processing.	   For	   instance,	   in	   Campbell-­‐Kelly’s	   account,	  
computation	  in	  the	  Victorian	  period	  is	  seen	  as	  being	  performed	  by	  a	  pen	  and	  paper	  
infrastructure	   (Campbell-­‐Kelly,	   2010).	   Drawing	   from	   Babbage,	   he	   applies	   this	  
perspective	   to	   a	   different	   clearing	   mechanism,	   namely	   the	   19th	   century	   Railway	  
Clearinghouse,	   a	   human-­‐based	   computing	   machine	   processing	   the	   distribution	   of	  
railway	  receipts	   (some	  3423	  clerks	  by	  1921).	  Looking	  at	  clearinghouses	  as	  complex	  
technical	  systems	  is	  thus	  nothing	  new.	  For	  instance,	  in	  1921	  Robert	  Holland-­‐Martin,	  
then	   Chairman	   of	   the	   Committee	   of	   London	   Clearing	   Bankers,	   describes	   the	  
functioning	  of	  the	  London	  Clearinghouse	  as	  a	  complex	   ‘’machinery’’.	  He	  went	  even	  
further	   and	   imagined	   a	   system	   that	   could	   connect	   the	   clearing	   banks	   to	   the	  
clearinghouse	  by:	  
	  
long	  pneumatic	   tubes	   that	  will	   bring	   the	   cheques	   straight	   from	   the	  banks	   to	  
the	  Clearing	  House,	  without	  the	  perils	  of	  the	  road	  and	  the	  interruptions	  of	  the	  
Lord	  Mayor's	  Show	  (Matthews,	  1921)	  
	  
The	   subsequent	   evolution	   of	   clearing	   would	   not	   lead	   to	   any	   designs	   based	   on	  
pneumatic	   tubes	   but	   as	   with	   all	   other	   market	   functions,	   it	   revolved	   around	   the	  
adoption	   of	   electronic	   and	   information	   technology.	   In	   his	   2011	   book,	   The	   Risk	  
Controllers:	   Central	   Counterparty	   Clearing	   in	   Globalised	   Financial	   Markets	   (2011),	  
Peter	  Norman	  has	  offered	  a	  detailed	  account	  of	   the	  technological	  and	   institutional	  
evolution	  of	  clearinghouses.	  As	  he	  describes	   it,	  the	  first	  technological	  displacement	  
did	   not	   originate	   from	   electronics	   but	   from	   mechanical	   technology,	   the	   so-­‐called	  
Burroughs	  adding	  machines.	  The	  clerk-­‐dominated	  pen	  and	  pencil	   ‘hardware’	  of	  the	  
London	   Clearing	   House	   incorporated	   Burroughs	   adding	   machines	   in	   1902,	  
substantially	   improving	   its	   processing	   capacity	   (Matthews,	   1921).	   Even	   if	   in	   some	  
cases	   the	   clerks	   reached	   impressive	   levels	   of	   performance	   (apparently	   up	   to	   1200	  
cheques	   in	   an	  hour),	   the	   clearing	  machine	   could	  not	   keep	  up	  with	   the	   increase	   in	  
volumes	   of	   cheques	   that	   had	   to	   be	   cleared.	   While	   simple	   calculation	   machines	  
increased	   the	   efficiency	   of	   human	   clerks,	   it	  was	   the	   introduction	   of	   the	   computer	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that	  would	  change	  the	  operational	  architecture	  of	  clearing.	  One	  of	  the	  first	  instances	  
of	   this	   was	   the	   London	   Produce	   Clearing	   House	   (LPCH),	   which	   became	   the	  
International	   Commodities	   Clearing	   House	   (ICCH)	   in	   1973	   (Norman,	   2011,	   p.114).	  
LPCH	  was	  a	  very	  innovative	  institution	  as	  it	  took	  the	  path	  of	  computerization	  as	  early	  
as	  1963.	  	  The	  first	  automated	  system	  was	  based	  on	  a	  punch	  card	  computer	  used	  for	  
clerical	  and	  accounting	  operations	  assisting	  with	   the	   registration	  and	  processing	  of	  
contracts.	   A	   further	   innovation	   came	   in	   1965	   when	   the	   punch	   card	   system	   was	  
upgraded	   to	  one	  using	  a	  magnetic	   tape.	   The	  efficiency	   gains	  were	   substantial	   at	   a	  
time	  when	  clearing	  volumes	  increased	  20	  times	  during	  the	  1960s	  (Rees	  et	  al.,	  1972).	  	  
	  
The	   20th	   century	   saw	   a	   similar	   trajectory	   for	   the	   derivatives	   markets	   of	   Chicago.	  
From	  the	  1920s	  on,	  the	  BOTCC	  showed	  great	  resilience	  surviving	  the	  volatile	  period	  
of	  the	  Great	  Depression	  and	  WW2	  when	  volumes	  fell	  from	  9	  million	  in	  1929	  to	  1.9	  
million	   in	   1943	   (Norman,	   2011).	   After	   WW2,	   the	   increase	   in	   volumes	   led	   to	   a	  
growing	  strain	  on	  the	  operations	  of	  the	  BOTCC,	  which	  resulted	  in	  the	  purchase	  of	  a	  
computer	   in	   1963.	   According	   to	   Peter	   Norman,	   the	   impact	   of	   computers	   was	  
significant	  as	  the	  cost	  per	  trade	  fell	  from	  25¢	  in	  1941	  to	  only	  5¢	  in	  1963.	  Automation	  
was	  thus	  extended	  across	  the	  CBOT	  from	  trade	  entry	  and	  matching	  to	  the	  clearing	  
and	   settlement	   of	   contracts.	   The	   introduction	   of	   the	   Transaction	   Accounting	   and	  
Bookkeeping	  Service	   (TABS)	   further	   increased	   the	  efficiency	  of	   calculating	  member	  
position.	   Another	   decisive	   step	   was	   taken	   with	   the	   development	   of	   a	   paperless	  
clearing	   operation,	   the	  Online	   Transaction	   Information	   System	   (OTIS),	   which	  went	  
live	   in	   1981.	   OTIS	   constituted	   a	   streamlined	   and	   continuous	   trade	   processing	   and	  
information	   management	   system.	   	   According	   to	   Norman	   (2011),	   the	   BOTCC	   saw	  
other	   important	   technical	   innovation	   in	   the	   1980s,	   such	   as	   the	   Trade	   Entry	   and	  
Matching	   Service	   (TEAM)	   and	   the	   Shared	   Market	   Information	   Systems	   (SHAMIS).	  
Together	  they	  allowed	  for	  a	  single	  point	  of	  entry	  for	  multiple	  exchanges	  and	  for	  the	  
monitoring	  of	  clearing	  members	  across	  different	  trading	  venues.	  	  
	  
As	  clearinghouses	  embarked	  on	  the	  path	  towards	  automation	  it	  became	  increasingly	  
important	   to	  be	  able	   to	  evaluate	   the	   impact	  of	  market	  events	  on	   the	  portfolios	  of	  
clearing	  members.	  This	  becomes	  evident	  when	  one	  considers	  that	  the	  core	  function	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of	  modern	  CCPs	  is	  one	  of	  risk	  management,	  calculating	  initial	  and	  variation	  margins	  
and	  managing	  the	  credit	  risk	  of	  its	  clearing	  members.	  The	  most	  recent	  innovation	  in	  
terms	   of	   developing	   an	   automated	   risk	   managing	   systems	   for	   clearing	   was	   the	  
development	  of	  the	  Standard	  Portfolio	  Analysis	  of	  Risk	  (SPAN)	  system	  by	  the	  Chicago	  
Mercantile	  Exchange	  in	  1988.	  It	  represented	  a	  breakthrough	  in	  terms	  of	  calculating	  
margin	  requirements	  based	  on	  the	  likely	  impact	  of	  market	  prices	  on	  the	  portfolio	  of	  
clearing	   members.	   Rather	   than	   just	   focusing	   on	   a	   sole	   trade,	   SPAN	   looks	   at	   the	  
overall	   picture,	   the	   total	   exposure	   of	   certain	   portfolio	   and	   number	   of	   possible	  
market	  scenarios	  (Millo	  et	  al.,	  2005,	  p240).	  SPAN’s	  input	  is	  the	  actual	  portfolio	  of	  the	  
clearing	  member	  as	  well	   as	   the	   latest	  prices	   for	   the	   relevant	  derivatives	   contracts.	  
The	  output	  is	  the	  most	  likely	  daily	  loss	  of	  a	  clearing	  member’s	  portfolio	  (Value	  at	  Risk	  
methodology),	  which	  is	  used	  to	  calculate	  margin	  requirements	  for	  their	  portfolios.	  At	  
the	  centre	  of	  all	  of	  this	  is	  the	  so-­‐called	  risk	  array,	  which	  is	  a	  model	  of	  how	  a	  certain	  
contract	  can	  change	  in	  value	  under	  certain	  scenarios.	  The	  SPAN	  algorithm	  requires	  a	  
certain	  number	  of	  parameters,	  historic	  price	   ranges,	  historic	   volatility,	   the	  delivery	  
period,	  etc.	  Because	  of	  this,	  Yuval	  Millo	  has	  argued	  that	  in	  fact,	  central	  clearing	  in	  the	  
case	  of	  derivatives	  becomes	  a	  more	  and	  more	  computationally	  complex	  process,	  as	  
the	  CCP	  ends	  up	  monitoring	  the	  whole	  market	  in	  order	  to	  manage	  the	  counterparty	  
risk	  of	  its	  members	  (Millo	  et	  al.,	  2006,	  p.241).	  	  
	  
To	   this	   day,	   SPAN	   is	   very	   much	   an	   industry	   standard	   particularly	   in	   terms	   of	   the	  
clearing	   of	   futures	   and	   options,	  which	   has	   led	   to	   the	   development	   of	   a	   variety	   of	  
software	   solutions.	   But	  what	   is	   even	  more	   interesting	   is	   the	   recent	   integration	   of	  
SPAN	   type	   algorithms	   into	   more	   complex	   real	   time	   clearing	   systems,	   such	   as	   the	  
ones	   developed	   by	   Cinnober,	   a	   Swedish	   financial	   technology	   company.	   The	  
TRADExpress	  platform	  was	  specifically	  developed	  by	  Cinnober	  in	  order	  to	  clear	  and	  
manage	  the	  risk	  of	  contemporary	  financial	  transactions	  in	  real	  time	  with	  very	  small	  
latencies	  (Christensen	  and	  McPartland,	  2011).	  The	  architecture	  of	  the	  TRADExpress	  
platform	   is	   highly	   adaptable	   and	   has	   been	   implemented	   in	   a	   variety	   of	   market	  
places,	  such	  as	  the	  London	  Metal	  Exchange	  (LME)	  Clearinghouse,	  the	  Brazilian	  Stock	  
Exchange,	   the	   Dubai	   Gold	   &	   Commodities	   Exchange	   and	   the	   Johannesburg	   Stock	  
Exchange	   (JSE).	   This	   is	   a	  highly	   complex	   clearing	   system	  allowing	   for	   real	   time	   risk	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management	  across	  the	  trade	  lifecycle.	  More	  specifically	  the	  systems	  takes	  inputs	  at	  
pre-­‐order	   stage	   (validating	   orders	   before	   the	   enter	   the	   order	   book),	   pre-­‐trade	  
(validating	   an	   order	   before	   it	   is	   executed)	   and	   post-­‐trade	  margining	   and	   portfolio	  
validations	  (using	  a	  variety	  of	  risk	  algorithms	  such	  as	  the	  CME	  SPAN	  method	  outlined	  
above).	  The	  system	  is	  also	  highly	  scalable,	  allowing	  for	  cross-­‐asset	  clearing	  and	  can	  
‘’handle	  millions	  of	  trades	  per	  day	  with	  thousands	  of	  trades	  per	  second	  for	  a	  single	  
instrument,	   and	   still	   be	   able	   to	   disseminate	   position	   updates	   and	   risk	   calculations	  
within	  microseconds’’.	   In	  many	  ways,	   Babbage’s	   early	   idea	   that	   the	   clearinghouse	  
itself	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  giant	  computation	  machine	  has	  taken	  shape	  with	  the	  recent	  
development	   of	   automated	   real-­‐time	   clearing	   systems,	   providing	   the	  market	   with	  
efficient	   margining,	   real-­‐time	   netting	   and	   complex	   risk	   management,	   while	  
processing	   ever-­‐larger	   volumes	   of	   transactions.	   Consequently	   the	   whole	   clearing	  
ecosystem	   is	   gradually	   moving	   away	   from	   the	   more	   ‘’inefficient	   and	   error-­‐prone	  
workflows	  that	  require	  a	  tremendous	  amount	  of	  manual	  intervention’’	  (Christensen	  
and	   McPartland,	   2011)	   to	   fully	   automated	   clearing.	   What	   would	   have	   taken	  
hundreds	  of	  thousands	  of	  human	  clerks	  to	  compute	  can	  now	  be	  done	  by	  these	  highly	  
advanced	  real	  time	  clearing	  machines.	  	  As	  with	  our	  earlier	  discussion	  of	  the	  matching	  
function,	   the	   question	   is	   not	   one	   of	   choosing	   between	   humans	   and	   machines.	  
Humans	   (quants,	   risk	   analysts,	   IT	   engineers	   etc.)	   are	   still	   very	   much	   involved	   in	  
clearing	  but	  they	  are	  largely	  maintainers	  and	  designers	  of	  these	  electronic	  systems.	  
In	  many	  ways,	   this	   can	  be	   seen	  as	   the	  alignment	  of	   the	   clearing	   function	  with	   the	  
technological	  revolution	  already	  at	  hand	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  matching	  function	  where	  
electronic	  /algorithmic	  trading	  is	  very	  much	  an	  established	  norm.	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Conclusions	  
	  
In	   this	   chapter	  we	   described	   the	  modern	   evolution	   of	  multilateral	   and	   centralized	  
clearing.	   First,	   we	   focused	   on	   the	   banking	   clearinghouses	   as	   they	   developed	   in	  
London	   and	  New	   York.	   As	  with	   the	   clearing	  mechanism	   of	   the	  medieval	   fairs,	   the	  
main	  benefit	  of	  multilateral	  clearing	  consisted	  in	  the	  reduction	  of	  the	  actual	  amount	  
of	  money	  used	  for	  settling	  transaction.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  London	  Clearinghouse	  can	  
be	   seen	   as	   more	   complex	   clearing	   machine	   affording	   the	   netting	   of	   offsetting	  
balances	   between	  member	   banks.	   Due	   to	   its	   success	   in	   the	   bank	   check	   payment	  
systems,	   the	  clearing	  mechanism	  slowly	  migrated	   to	  stock	  markets.	   In	  London,	   the	  
Stock	   Exchange	   Clearinghouse	   emerged	   as	   a	   solution	   for	   reducing	   the	   number	   of	  
settlements	   by	  moving	   from	   separate	   bilateral	   arrangements	   to	   having	   one	   single	  
settlement	   with	   all	   counterparties.	   Later	   on,	   the	   New	   York	   Stock	   Exchange	  
Clearinghouse	   organized	   and	   directed	   all	   participants	   towards	   an	   efficient	  
compression	   of	   transaction	   volumes.	   As	   long	   as	   clearing	   was	   only	   performed	  
between	  a	   limited	  number	  of	  participants	  who	  knew	  and	  trusted	  each	  other,	  there	  
was	  no	  pressure	  to	  transition	  from	  multilateral	  designs	  to	  centralized	  clearing.	  	  
	  
The	   evolution	   towards	   central	   clearing	   first	   occurred	   in	   the	   world	   of	   financial	  
derivatives	   such	   as	   futures	   and	   options	   on	   commodities.	   This	   is	   because	   credit	  
counterparty	  risk	  is	  more	  important	  in	  the	  case	  of	  derivatives,	  where	  both	  leverage	  
and	   default	   risk	   are	   issues	   of	   major	   concern.	   The	   Chicago	   Board	   of	   Trade	   (CBOT)	  
founded	  in	  1848	  was	  one	  of	  the	  first	  modern	  derivatives	  exchanges.	  The	  expansion	  
of	   trading	   in	   futures	   and	   options	   meant	   that	   managing	   credit	   counterparty	   risk	  
became	  a	  crucial	  aspect	  of	  ensuring	  market	  stability.	  In	  1883,	  the	  Board	  established	  
the	   Board	   of	   Trade	   Clearing	   Corporation	   (BOTCC)	   performing	  multilateral	   clearing.	  
The	   initial	   clearinghouse	  mechanism	   comprised	  multilateral	   clearing	   through	   rings,	  
with	  the	  clearinghouse	  acting	  as	  intermediary	  and	  mediator.	  The	  BOTCC	  becomes	  a	  
CCP	  in	  1925	  when	  the	  Board	  established	  the	  BOTCC	  as	  the	  only	  counterparty	  to	  all	  
transactions,	  that	  is	  to	  say	  the	  buyer	  to	  every	  seller	  and	  the	  seller	  to	  every	  buyer.	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Figure	  14:	  Evolution	  of	  clearing	  machines	  
The	   table	   above	   provides	   a	   sketch	   for	   an	   evolutionary	   trajectory	   from	   bilateral	  
clearing	   (or	  direct	  clearing)	   to	  multilateral	  clearing	   (medieval	  clearing	  chains/cycles	  
or	  modern	  clearing	  rings)	  and	  central	  clearing	  (or	  complete	  clearing	  with	  CCPs).	  Each	  
new	  generation	  of	  clearing	  machines	  represents	  an	  increase	  in	  complexity	  as	  well	  as	  
being	  more	  difficult	  to	  maintain	  and	  more	  computationally	  expensive.	  For	  instance,	  
the	  growing	  complexity	  of	  clearing	  machines	  was	  highlighted	  in	  our	  analysis	  of	  CCPs,	  
who	  perform	  novation,	  multilateral	  netting	  and	  risk	  management.	  	  
	  
In	  as	  much	  as	  clearing	  is	  subject	  to	  economies	  of	  scale,	  we	  have	  also	  looked	  at	  the	  
increase	   in	   automation	   across	   the	   clearing	   workflow,	   from	   trade	   management	   to	  
margining	  and	  risk	  management.	  This	  is	  particularly	  relevant	  in	  the	  context	  of	  more	  
complex	   risk	   management	   algorithms	   such	   as	   SPAN,	   or	   more	   recently	   with	   the	  
development	   of	   electronic	   real-­‐time	   clearing	   systems.	   Processes	   that	   in	   the	   19th	  
century	  necessitated	   small	   armies	  of	   clerks	   (Campbell-­‐Kelly,	   1998)	   taking	  days	   and	  
weeks	  to	  accomplish,	  can	  now	  be	  done	  in	  real	  time	  by	  automated	  clearing	  systems.	  	  
That	   is	   to	   say,	   clearing	   exhibits	   the	   same	   tendency	   as	   matching,	   namely	   the	  
relentless	  move	  towards	  automation	  and	  the	  transition	  from	  human-­‐based	  pen	  and	  
pencil	  ‘hardware’	  to	  electronic	  systems.	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This	  chapter	  continues	  to	  track	  the	  evolution	  of	  matching	  machines.	   In	  the	  previous	  
chapter	   on	   modern	   stock	   exchanges,	   we	   focused	   on	   the	   transition	   of	   the	   order	  
matching	  function	  from	  the	  control	  of	  human	  specialists/jobbers	  to	  electronic	  orders	  
books	   and	   matching	   engines.	   The	   current	   chapter	   focuses	   on	   the	   other	   function	  
performed	  by	  the	  human	  specialists,	  namely	  liquidity	  provision	  or	  market	  making.	  To	  
this	   aim,	   we	   analyze	   the	   current	   state	   of	   electronic	   market	   making	   and	   the	  
emergence	   of	   High	   Frequency	   Trading	   (HFT).	   We	   begin	   by	   describing	   the	  
contemporary	   structure	   of	   the	   US	   stock	   markets,	   comprising	   both	   the	   established	  
exchanges	  (NYSE,	  NASDAQ)	  and	  also	  alternative	  trading	  platforms	  such	  as	  ECNs	  and	  
darkpools.	  Within	  this	  complex	  network	  of	  trading	  venues,	  HFT	  trading	  firms	  are	  at	  
the	   forefront	  of	  an	  arms	   race	   for	  higher	   speeds,	   lower	   latency	  and	  more	  advanced	  
algorithms.	  We	  review	  some	  of	  the	  more	  interesting	  controversies	  surrounding	  HFTs,	  
particularly	   in	   terms	   of	   how	   they	   exploit	   the	   complexity	   of	   the	   current	   market	  
structure.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  contemporary	  electronic	  markets,	  the	  privilege	  of	  making	  
markets	  and	  facilitating	  matching	  becomes	  a	  question	  of	  who	  has	  better	  algorithms	  
and	  faster	  execution.	   	  Therefore,	  being	  at	  the	  centre	  of	   liquidity	  and	  controlling	  the	  
matching	   of	   order	   flow	   affords	   a	   crucial	   advantage	   in	   any	   market	   as	   well	   as	  
substantial	   profits.	   We	   also	   offer	   an	   understanding	   the	   2010	   Flash	   Crash.	   We	  
leverage	   Doyne	   Farmer’s	   ecological	   perspective,	   the	   work	   of	   Andy	   Haldane	   on	  
financial	   stability	   and	  Mirowski’s	   theory	   of	  markomata,	   in	   arguing	   that	   while	   HFT	  
firms	  are	  not	  directly	   to	  blame	   for	   the	  Flash	  Crash,	   such	  events	  might	  be	  a	  normal	  
output	  of	  HFT-­‐dominated	  financial	  markets.	  While	  contemporary	  matching	  machines	  
have	   reached	   high	   levels	   of	   efficiency	   and	   immediacy	   of	   execution,	   there	   are	  
important	  concerns	   regarding	  market	  stability.	  We	  also	  review	  some	  of	   the	  current	  
reform	  initiatives	  and	  new	  market	  designs	  and	  interpret	  them	  as	  a	  shift	  from	  a	  focus	  
on	  immediacy	  of	  execution	  to	  other	  issues,	  such	  as	  the	  quality	  of	  liquidity	  and	  overall	  
market	  resilience.	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7.1	  Algorithmic	  Ecosystem	  and	  Electronic	  Matching	  
	  
As	   we	   have	   seen,	   computer	   assisted	   trading	   was	   just	   the	   beginning	   of	   a	   gradual	  
transition	  towards	  higher	  levels	  of	  automation.	  The	  second	  part	  of	  the	  20th	  century	  
saw	  a	  series	  of	  technological	  and	  regulatory	   innovations	  that	   led	  to	  the	  emergence	  
of	   new	   trading	   platforms,	   new	   electronic	   liquidity	   suppliers	   but	   also	   new	   types	   of	  
matching	  machines.	  	  Within	  this	  context,	  human	  individuals	  are	  less	  involved	  in	  the	  
actual	   process	   of	   matching	   trades	   and	   begin	   to	   perform	   other	   functions,	   such	   as	  
designing	  market	  structures,	  building	  data	  centres,	  programing	  matching	  algorithms,	  
etc.	   The	   skills	   of	   a	   specialist	   on	   the	   floor	   of	   the	  NYSE	  were	  much	  more	   about	   the	  
ability	   to	   handle	   information	   exchange	   in	   the	   intense	   environment	   of	   the	   trading	  
floor	  (Zaloom,	  2006).	  For	  this	  reason,	  market	  makers	  were	  quite	  vocal,	  well	  built	  and	  
relatively	  adversarial.	  But	  with	  the	  advent	  of	  electronic	  trading	  it	  became	  clear	  that	  
one	   doesn’t	   necessarily	   need	   the	   noisy	   interaction	   and	   the	   jostling	   of	   the	   trading	  
floor,	  just	  to	  be	  able	  to	  match	  incoming	  order	  flow.	  In	  many	  ways,	  the	  first	  attempts	  
at	  building	  electronic	  trading	  platforms	  put	  into	  question	  our	  basic	  understanding	  of	  
what	   is	   an	   exchange.	   That	   is	   to	   say,	   is	   the	   exchange	   a	   community	   of	   human	  
individuals	  performing	  some	  sort	  of	  exoteric	  computation	  or	  is	  in	  fact	  a	  well-­‐defined	  
formal	  algorithm	  for	  matching	  buys	  and	  sells.	  To	  say	  that	  buy	  and	  sell	  orders	  meet	  in	  
the	  market	   is	   one	   thing,	   but	   the	   devil	   is	   in	   the	   details	   because	  what	   is	   at	   stake	   is	  
where	  exactly	  do	  they	  met,	  at	  what	  time,	   in	  what	  order	  of	  arrival	  and	  according	  to	  
which	  set	  of	  rules	  (algorithm).	  As	  we	  have	  seen	  with	  AZX,	  Instinet,	  Island	  and	  Globex,	  
the	   noisy	   interaction	   on	   the	   floor	   of	   the	   exchange	   was	   ultimately	   formalized	   and	  
translated	  into	  a	  set	  procedures	  performed	  by	  computers.	  For	  more	  clarity,	  is	  worth	  
giving	  a	  brief	  example	  of	  such	  an	  order	  book	  and	  its	  matching	  algorithm:	  	  
Quote	   TIME	   QUANTITY	   BID/OFFER	   QUANTITY	   TIME	   Quote	  
	   	   	   100.30	   300	   12:05	   SELL	  
	   	   	   100.30	   100	   12:02	   SELL	  
	   	   	   100.25	   100	   12:04	   SELL	  
BUY	   12:08	   200	   100.20	   	   	   	  
BUY	   12:07	   100	   100.15	   	   	   	  
BUY	   12:10	   200	   100.15	   	   	   	  
Figure	  15:	  Example	  of	  electronic	  order	  book	  I	  
	   195	  
The	  figure	  above	  represents	  a	  limit	  order	  book,	  running	  a	  continuous	  double	  auction	  
matching	  algorithm,	  where	  the	  various	  orders	  are	  organized	  according	  to	  Price/Time	  
priority	  (first	  according	  to	  price	  and	  then	  according	  to	  the	  time	  at	  which	  they	  were	  
submitted).	  Also	  know	  as	  FIFO58,	  this	  particular	  algorithm	  gives	  priority	  to	  the	  lowest	  
sell	  order	  and	  the	  highest	  buy	  order.	  Now,	   if	  someone	  where	  to	  submit	  a	  new	  buy	  
order	  or	  300	  shares	  at	  100.40,	  then	  the	  order	  book	  would	  look	  like	  this:	  
	  
Quote	   TIME	   QUANTITY	   BID/OFFER	   QUANTITY	   TIME	   Quote	  
	   	   	   100.30	   200	   12:05	   SELL	  
BUY	   12:08	   200	   100.20	   	   	   	  
BUY	   12:07	   100	   100.15	   	   	   	  
BUY	   12:10	   200	   100.15	   	   	   	  
Figure	  16:	  Example	  of	  electronic	  order	  book	  II	  
The	   first	  order	   to	  be	   filled	  will	   be	   the	  100	   shares	  at	  100.25	   (time	  12:04),	   then	   the	  
next	  100	  shares	  at	  100.30	  (time	  12:02)	  and	  finally	  another	  100	  shares	  at	  100.30	  from	  
the	  third	  sell	  order	  (time	  12:05).	  	  This	  leaves	  the	  remaining	  200	  shares	  at	  100.30	  in	  
the	  order	   book	   still	   to	   be	   filled.	   If	   on	   the	   contrary	   someone	  were	   to	   submit	   a	   sell	  
order	  of	  say	  400	  shares	  at	  100.10,	  the	  order	  book	  would	  change	  to	  this:	  
	  
Quote	   TIME	   QUANTITY	   BID/OFFER	   QUANTITY	   TIME	   Quote	  
	   	   	   100.30	   300	   12:05	   SELL	  
	   	   	   100.30	   100	   12:02	   SELL	  
	   	   	   100.25	   100	   12:04	   SELL	  
BUY	   12:10	   100	   100.15	   	   	   	  
Figure	  17:	  Example	  of	  electronic	  order	  book	  III	  
Again,	   because	   of	   price	   priority	   the	   first	   order	   to	   be	   filled	   is	   200	   shares	   at	   100.20	  
(time:	   12:08)	   followed	   by	   100	   shares	   at	   100.15	   (time	   12:07)	   and	   finally	   the	   third	  
order	   with	   100	   shares	   at	   100.15	   (time	   12:10);	   leaving	   another	   100	   shares	   of	   that	  
order	  still	  in	  the	  order	  book.	  This	  has	  been	  a	  simple	  example	  of	  what	  happens	  in	  an	  
electronic	   order	   book	   in	   the	   context	   of	   a	   continuous	   two-­‐sided	  market.	   Once	   the	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  FIFO	  is	  one	  of	  the	  many	  matching	  algorithms	  employed	  by	  the	  Chicago	  Mercantile	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basic	  operations	  and	  process	  performed	  by	  the	  floor	  specialist	  where	  formalized	  as	  
specific	   set	   of	   rules	   and	  procedures,	   it	   opened	  up	   the	  possibility	   of	   experimenting	  
with	   many	   different	   market	   structures.	   As	   we	   have	   seen,	   the	   early	   ECNs	   all	   had	  
different	  approaches	  and	  designs	  and	  different	  ideas	  about	  a	  market	  should	  do.	  	  
In	  many	  ways,	   the	  diversity	  of	  matching	  algorithms	   is	  dwarfed	  by	  the	  even	  greater	  
diversity	  of	  trading	  algorithms	  that	  support	  the	  wider	  financial	  markets.	  Recent	  work	  
(Gyurko,	  2011)	  offers	   a	  broad	  description	  of	  different	   algorithmic	   classes	   including	  
matching,	   systematic,	   high	   frequency,	   low-­‐latency,	   market	   making,	   etc.	   Electronic	  
trading	   is	  more	  of	   an	  umbrella	   term,	  designating	   all	   forms	  of	   trading	   in	  which	   the	  
transmission	  of	  orders	   is	   done	  electronically	   as	  opposed	   to	  phone,	  mail	   or	   face	   to	  
face.	   Algorithmic	   trading	   is	   a	   subset	   of	   electronic	   trading	   and	   in	   entails	   a	   higher	  
degree	  of	  automation	  both	  of	  execution	  and	  decision-­‐making	  (Aldridge,	  2010).	  Low-­‐
latency	  refers	  to	  the	  fastest	  possible	  execution	  and	  routing	  of	  orders,	  irrespective	  of	  
trading	   volume	   or	   frequency	   of	   trading.	   This	   usually	   entails	   colocation	   in	   an	  
exchange	  data	  center.	  High	  frequency	  refers	  to	  capability	  to	  make	  and	  cancel	   large	  
numbers	  of	  orders	  in	  short	  time	  intervals.	  There	  are	  also	  systematic	  algorithms	  that	  
perform	  market	  making	  functions	  or	  exchange	  algorithms	  that	  handle	  order	  routing	  
and	  matching	  (as	  the	  FIFO	  algorithm	  described	  above).	  
Contemporary	   markets	   are	   organized	   around	   a	   certain	   number	   of	   trading	   venues	  
and	   their	   matching	   algorithms.	   But	   the	   great	   majority	   of	   trading	   algorithms	   are	  
execution	   algorithms	   handling	   the	   order	   flow	   of	   market	   participants.	   If	   it	   was	  
possible	   to	   automate	   the	   matching	   of	   order	   flows,	   it	   became	   apparent	   that	  
submission	  of	  orders	  was	  even	  easier	  to	  automate.	  In	  his	  now	  famous	  book	  Nerds	  on	  
Wall	  Street	  (2009),	  David	  Leinweber	  goes	  to	  great	  lengths	  to	  describe	  the	  history	  of	  
what	  he	  calls	  the	  ‘’robot	  phase	  transition’’.	  He	  begins	  with	  his	  own	  experience	  in	  the	  
1980s,	   when	   trading	   desks	   were	   still	   dominated	   by	   humans	   operating	   computer	  
screens	  (Leinweber,	  2009,	  p.188).	  The	  basic	  function	  of	  those	  computer	  screens	  was	  
not	  that	  different	  from	  the	  old	  stock	  tickers,	  namely	  the	  dissemination	  of	  price	  data.	  
Moreover,	  the	  PC	  revolution	  allowed	  for	  the	  adoption	  of	  systems	  capable	  of	  higher-­‐
level	  computation,	   like	  displaying	  a	  graph,	  etc.	   In	  1987,	  Leinweber	  and	  Dale	  Prouty	  
founded	  Integrated	  Analytics	  and	  developed	  an	  expert	  system	  tool	  for	  trading	  called	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MarketMind.	  The	  crucial	  aspect	  of	  the	  system	  was	  that	   it	  could	  keep	  up	  with	  high-­‐
speed	  incoming	  market	  data	  in	  real	  time	  and	  make	  trading	  recommendations	  based	  
on	  the	  data	  (Leinweber,	  2009,	  p.161).	  In	  many	  ways,	  this	  could	  be	  as	  seen	  as	  one	  of	  
the	   starting	   points	   of	   electronic	   trading,	   namely	   traders	   could	   make	   and	   execute	  
trading	  decisions	  with	  the	  assistance	  of	  computers.	  	  	  
	  
The	  great	  benefit	  of	  execution	  algorithms	  is	  that	  they	  can	  efficiently	  partition	  orders	  
so	  as	  to	  reduce	  market	   impact,	  which	  has	  always	  been	  a	  major	  concern	  for	  market	  
participants.	   Transparency	   is	   at	   the	   core	   of	   this	   problem,	   as	   too	   much	   of	   it	   can	  
attract	   front	   running	   and	   not	   enough	   can	   scare	   possible	   counterparties	   away	   (i.e.	  
fading	   liquidity).	   Large	   block	   trades	   would	   be	   particularly	   vulnerable	   to	   front-­‐
running,	  as	  well	  informed	  traders	  would	  buy	  or	  sell	  in	  front	  of	  them,	  thus	  raising	  the	  
cost	  of	  trading.	  Fading	  liquidity	  also	  relates	  to	  this	  point,	  as	  limit	  orders	  need	  to	  be	  
constantly	  updated	  as	  a	  large	  trade	  comes	  in,	  or	  face	  getting	  hit	  on	  the	  way	  down.	  As	  
soon	  as	  the	  market	  becomes	  aware	  of	  a	  large	  order	  it	  becomes	  very	  difficult	  to	  fill	  it	  
at	  a	  low	  cost.	  Traditionally,	  institutional	  investors	  who	  wanted	  to	  execute	  large	  block	  
trades	  would	  try	  and	  establish	  close	  relationships	  with	  the	  brokers	  and	  specialists	  on	  
the	  floor,	  whose	  skill	  was	  essential	  in	  minimizing	  market	  impact,	  and	  achieve	  a	  good	  
average	  price.	  The	  pressure	  to	  reduce	  market	  impact	  has	  driven	  the	  development	  of	  
more	  advanced	  execution	  algorithms.	  	  For	  example,	  volume-­‐weighted	  average	  price	  
(VWAP)	  algorithms	  employ	  complex	  randomization	  functions	  optimizing	  the	  size	  and	  
execution	   times.	   There	   are	   other	   execution	   algorithms	   based	   on	   measuring	   the	  
success	  of	  the	  trade:	  time-­‐weighted	  average	  price	  (TWAP),	  implementation	  shortfall	  
or	  arrival	  price,	  volume	  participation,	  smart	  routing	  methods,	  etc.	  (Kim,	  2007,	  p.10).	  
In	  any	  case,	  the	  degree	  of	  their	  success	  depends	  on	  their	  capacity	  to	  stay	  under	  the	  
radar	   so	   to	   speak,	   that	   is	   to	   say	   to	   create	   as	   little	   noise	   as	   possible.	   Advanced	  
versions	  are	  able	  to	  cover	  their	  tracks,	  by	  introducing	  certain	  levels	  of	  randomness,	  
even	   temporarily	   buying	   back	   the	   stock	   that	   they	   are	   actually	   trying	   to	   sell	   (Kim,	  
2007,	   p.13).	   	   Dark	   pools	   are	   another	   adaptation,	   as	   they	   are	   trading	   platforms	  
offering	   a	   ‘safe	   heaven’	   for	   large	   institutional	   orders.	   Dark	   pools	   don’t	   have	   pre-­‐
trade	   transparency,	   thus	   reducing	   the	   advantages	   of	  well-­‐informed	   traders,	  which	  
allows	   the	   large	   institutional	   orders	   to	   get	   a	   better	   average	   price	   than	   on	   a	   fully	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transparent	  exchange	  (Angel	  et	  al.,	  2010,	  p.35).	  The	  dark	  pool’s	  capacity	   to	  reduce	  
price	   impact	   is	  done	   through	  uncertainty/anonymity	  about	   the	  actual	  execution	  of	  
trades.	  As	   they	  do	  not	  provide	  any	  open	  price	  discovery	  process,	   they	  have	   to	  use	  
certain	   reference	   prices	   from	   primary	   lit	   exchanges,	   similar	   to	   early	   ECN	   crossing	  
networks	  (Gyurko,	  2011).	  As	  we	  will	  see	  later,	  we	  can	  understand	  the	  advent	  of	  dark	  
pools	   as	   an	   adaptation	   to	   new	   so-­‐called	   ‘predatory’	   strategies,	   often	   attributed	   to	  
High-­‐Frequency	  Trading	  (HFT)	  practices	  (Mittal,	  2008;	  Kratz	  and	  Schöneborn,	  2014).	  	  
In	   any	   case,	   it	   is	   clear	   that	   contemporary	   financial	   markets,	   particularly	   US	   stock	  
markets,	  are	  best	  understood	  as	  a	  complex	  web	  of	  interacting	  algorithms	  dispersed	  
across	  large	  number	  of	  trading	  venues	  housing	  electronic	  order	  books	  (either	  dark	  or	  
lit)59.	  Within	   this	   complex	  ecosystem,	   trading	  algorithms	  and	  strategies	   continually	  
evolve	   responding	   to	   technological	   innovation	   and	   regulatory	   change	   (Leinweber,	  
2009,	  p.70).	  In	  this	  context,	  the	  algorithmic/electronic	  ecosystem	  is	  in	  some	  ways	  an	  
arms	  race	  in	  which	  human	  traders	  have	  transferred	  the	  ’’heavy	  lifting’’	  to	  computers.	  
But	  more	  precisely,	   it	   is	   the	   transition	   to	   a	   situation	  where	  both	   the	   transactional	  
infrastructure	   of	   the	   market	   and	   market	   participants	   themselves	   are	   based	   on	  









	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59	  Exchanges	  such	  as	  NYSE,	  NASDAQ,	  BATS	  afford	  trading	  and	  listing	  of	  new	  stocks.	  In	  
addition	   to	   that,	   there	  are	  as	  many	  as	  50	  dark	  pools	   in	   the	  US,	  operated	  either	  by	  
exchanges,	   agency	   brokers	   (Instinet,	   Liquidnet),	   broker	   dealers	   (Goldman	   Sachs,	  
Credit	  Suisse,	  Morgan	  Stanley,	  Barclays,	  etc.)	  or	  market	  makers	  (KGC).	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7.2	  High	  Frequency	  Trading	  	  
	  
	  
The	   general	   accepted	   view	   is	   that	   the	   move	   towards	   electronic	   trading	   has	  
revolutionized	  the	  stock	  market.	  The	  advent	  of	  electronic	  order	  books	  has	  reduced	  
bid-­‐ask	   spreads,	   decreased	   volatility	   and	   added	   to	  market	   depth	   (Brogaard,	   2010;	  
Hendershott	  et	  al.,	  2010;	  Brogaard,	  2011;	  Benos	  and	  Sagade,	  2012;	  Hasbrouck	  and	  
Saar,	   2012).	   With	   the	   advent	   of	   ECNs	   and	   electronic	   trading,	   the	   order	   matching	  
functions	  was	   transferred	   from	   the	  hands	  of	   human	   specialists	   to	   electronic	   order	  
books	   and	   their	   matching	   algorithms.	   Trading	   venues	   and	   exchanges	   can	   offer	  
electronic	   order	   books	   and	  matching	   engines	   that	   can	   cross	   incoming	   orders,	   but	  
how	  do	  these	  orders	  reach	  the	  trading	  venue.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  understand	  that	  the	  
exchanges’	  electronic	  order	  books	  do	  not	  post	  bids	  and	  offers,	  as	  their	  role	  is	  only	  to	  
facilitate	  trading.	  This	  begs	  the	  question	  about	  the	  other	  functions	  performed	  by	  the	  
human	  specialists	  on	  the	  floor,	  namely	  market	  making.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  who	  provides	  
continuous	  access	  to	  liquidity	  in	  the	  context	  of	  electronic	  trading?	  Who	  can	  post	  bids	  
and	  offers	  in	  all	  stocks	  so	  as	  to	  maintain	  a	  fair	  and	  orderly	  market?	  While	  matching	  
different	   incoming	   orders	   is	   an	   important	   functionality,	   how	  does	   one	   attract	   and	  
aggregate	   orders	   in	   the	   first	   place.	   How	   does	   a	   certain	   trading	   venue	   become	  
appealing	  to	  all	  sorts	  of	  market	  participants,	  and	  becomes	  a	  conduit	  of	  order	  flow?	  It	  
is	  worth	  going	  back	  to	  our	  previous	  example	  of	  an	  electronic	  order	  book.	  In	  that	  case	  
the	  lowest	  sell	  quote	  was	  100.25	  and	  the	  highest	  buy	  quote	  was	  100.20.	  In	  such	  as	  
situation,	  nothing	  happens,	  matching	  is	  not	  possible	  and	  the	  market	  is	  effectively	  not	  
functioning.	  	  	  
	  
Quote	   TIME	   QUANTITY	   BID/OFFER	   QUANTITY	   TIME	   Quote	  
	   	   	   100.30	   300	   12:05	   SELL	  
	   	   	   100.30	   100	   12:02	   SELL	  
	   	   	   100.25	   100	   12:04	   SELL	  
BUY	   12:08	   200	   100.20	   	   	   	  
BUY	   12:07	   100	   100.15	   	   	   	  
BUY	   12:10	   200	   100.15	   	   	   	  
Figure	  18:	  Example	  of	  electronic	  order	  book	  IV	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If	  the	  market	  is	  liquid	  enough,	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  a	  superior	  buy	  or	  an	  inferior	  sell	  order	  
will	   be	   submitted	   and	   a	  match	  will	   be	   eventually	   executed,	   as	   we	   showed	   in	   our	  
previous	  examples.	  But	  if	  the	  market	  is	  not	  liquid	  enough,	  then	  it	  can	  take	  some	  time	  
for	   an	   order	   to	   arrive	   that	   match	   either	   BUY	   100.20	   or	   SELL	   100.25.	   The	   central	  
question	  here	  is	  who	  provides	  continuous	  liquidity	  and	  effectively	  makes	  the	  market.	  
While	  many	   investors	  may	   trade	   several	   times	  per	  day	  or	   per	  hour,	   depending	  on	  
their	   overall	   strategies,	   any	   liquid	   venue	   requires	   a	   number	   of	   participants	   who	  
perform	  market	  making,	   that	   is	   to	   say	  posting	  buy	  and	   sell	  quotes	   throughout	   the	  
day.	   In	   order	   to	   have	   a	   liquid	   market,	   it	   is	   particularly	   useful	   to	   have	   a	   market	  
participant	  that	  can	  step	   in	  and	  take	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  trade.	  This	   is	  precisely	  what	  
the	  specialists	  did	  on	  the	  floor	  of	  the	  NYSE	  or	  the	  jobbers	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  LSE.	  That	  
is	   to	   say,	   in	   addition	   to	   matching,	   they	   provided	   liquidity	   and	   effectively	   made	  
markets.	  	  
	  
In	  this	  sense,	  an	  important	  aspect	  of	  the	  new	  market	  structure	  of	  electronic	  trading	  
is	  that	  competing	  venues	  need	  to	  attract	  a	  critical	  mass	  of	  trading	  firms	  in	  order	  to	  
maintain	   deep	   and	   liquid	  markets.	   One	  way	   to	   achieve	   this	   is	   to	   have	   designated	  
market	  makers,	   such	   as	   the	   case	   of	   the	   NYSE.	   Another	  way	   is	   to	   offer	   rebates	   to	  
anyone	  who	  posts	  liquidity	  and	  charge	  anyone	  who	  removed	  liquidity.	  This	  led	  to	  the	  
development	  of	  electronic	  market	  making	  strategies	  performed	  by	  particular	  trading	  
firms	  who	  would	  post	  bids	  and	  offers	  and	  get	  rewarded	  by	  the	  trading	  platform	  for	  
providing	   continuous	   liquidity.	  Moreover,	   trading	  platforms	  mostly	   compete	   terms	  
of	  providing	   tighter	   spreads	  between	  bids	   and	  offers.	  As	   these	   spreads	   are	   largely	  
the	  result	  of	   the	  activity	  of	  market	  making	   firms,	   it	  was	  useful	   to	  create	  an	  almost	  
frictionless	  environment	  for	  them	  to	  operate	  in.	  This	  meant	  that	  trading	  venues	  had	  
to	   offer	   certain	   advantages	   to	   market	   makers,	   effectively	   becoming	   a	   privileged	  
group	  not	  unlike	  the	  old	  specialists	  on	  the	  exchange	  floor.	  Some	  of	  the	  advantages	  
offered	   to	   market	   making	   firms	   include	   colocation	   and	   ultra	   low	   latency	  
connectivity60.	   Moreover,	   in	   todays’	   market	   structure	   any	   market	   maker	   requires	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60	  Market	   making	   firms	   need	   to	   have	   their	   servers	   as	   close	   as	   possible	   to	   the	  
matching	   engines	   of	   the	   exchange.	   This	   has	   led	   to	   question	   of	   fairness	   and	   equal	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near	   real-­‐time	   access	   to	   the	   actual	   raw	   data	   feed	   of	   the	   exchange.	   The	   ability	   to	  
quickly	   aggregate	   and	   process	   trading	   data	   from	   multiple	   venues	   is	   absolutely	  
necessary	   in	   order	   to	   quickly	   adapt	   to	   changing	   market	   conditions.	   Market	  
participants	  performing	  electronic	  market	  making	  include	  the	  traditional	  designated	  
market	  makers	  such	  as	  brokers	  and	  broker	  dealers	  (investment	  banks)	  as	  well	  as	  new	  
entrants	   such	   as	   Getco	   or	   Knight	   Capital.	   These	   designated	   market	   makers,	  
particularly	   the	   broker	   dealers	   built	   large	   trade	   execution	   businesses	   facilitating	  
market	  access	   to	  a	  diverse	  set	  of	  clients	   (institutional	  and	  retail	   investors,	  high-­‐net	  
worth	  individuals,	  etc.).	  Competition	  between	  large	  investment	  banks	  consequently	  
led	  to	  the	  development	  of	  services	  such	  as	  Ultra-­‐Low	  Latency	  Direct	  Market	  Access	  
(ULLDMA)	  allowing	  almost	  frictionless	  access	  to	  a	  variety	  trading	  venues	  to	  anyone	  
willing	  to	  pay	  for	  it	  (Dacorogna,	  2001).	  Technical	  innovations	  such	  as	  electronic	  order	  
books,	   algorithmic	   trading	   and	   ULLDMA,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   fragmentation	   of	   liquidity	  
across	  many	  competing	  venues	  means	   that	  designated	  market	  makers	  are	  not	   the	  
only	   market	   participants	   who	   can	   perform	   electronic	   market	   makers.	   In	   fact,	   the	  
conditions	   described	   above	   have	   led	   emergence	   of	   new	  market	   participants	   who	  
could	  also	  thrive	  in	  this	  new	  electronic	  trading	  ecology.	  	  	  
	  
It	  might	   be	  worth	   going	   back	   to	   our	   earlier	   example	   of	   the	   electronic	   order	   book	  
with	   BUY	   100.20	   and	   SELL	   100.25.	   We	   previously	   suggested	   that	   these	   might	   be	  
separate	  orders	  pertaining	  to	  different	   investors.	  But	   in	  contemporary	  markets	   it	   is	  
more	  plausible	  to	  think	  that	  both	  of	  these	  quotes	  are	  posted	  by	  an	  electronic	  market	  
maker,	  hoping	   to	  gain	   the	  spread	   (0.05)	  between	  buying	  and	  100.20	  and	  selling	  at	  
100.25.	   In	   this	   situation	   any	   incoming	   buy	   or	   sell	   order	   at	   those	   levels	   will	   get	  
immediate	   execution.	   But	   even	   more	   important	   is	   that	   any	   executed	   trade	   will	  
impact	   the	   subsequent	   evolution	   of	   the	   market	   makers	   quotes.	   If	   for	   instance	  
someone	   other	   investor	   sends	   a	   buy	   order	   for	   100.25	   it	   will	   execute	   against	   the	  
market	   maker’s	   100.25	   sell	   quote.	   Immediately	   after	   that,	   the	   market	   making	  
algorithm	  would	   have	   to	   cancel	   his	   100.20	   and	   post	   a	   new	   set	   of	   quotes	   such	   as	  
100.26	  /100.27.	  If	  on	  the	  contrary	  someone	  sends	  a	  sell	  order	  for	  100.20,	  then	  this	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
access,	   which	   in	   turn	   led	   the	   exchanges	   to	   provide	   the	   same	   cable	   length	   to	   all	  
members.	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will	  execute	  and	  the	  market	  making	  algorithm	  would	  again	  cancel	  his	  older	  quotes	  
and	   could	   post	   new	   ones	   at	   100.19/100.24.	   If	   there	   are	  more	   buyers,	   the	  market	  
making	   algorithm	   will	   increase	   its	   quotes	   and	   if	   there	   are	   more	   sellers	   it	   will	  
decrease	  them.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  these	  algorithms	  adapt	  to	  incoming	  orders	  and	  adjust	  
their	   quotes	   similarly	   to	   the	   human	   specialist	   on	   the	   floor	   of	   the	   exchange.	   This	  
however	   means	   that	   for	   each	   executed	   quote	   the	   algorithm	   has	   to	   cancel	   the	  
opposite	   quote,	   which	   has	   become	   outdated.	   The	   situation	   becomes	   more	  
complicated	  when	  you	  have	  a	  fragmented	  market	  operating	  a	  number	  of	  exchanges	  
and	  alternative	   trading	  platforms.	  Let	   say	  an	  algorithm	  performs	  market	  making	   in	  
specific	   stock	   across	   10	   different	   venues.	   This	   means	   that,	   lets	   say,	   for	   every	  
executed	  buy	  quote	   it	  will	  have	  to	  cancel	  10	  sells	  and	  the	  remaining	  9	  buys,	  which	  
amounts	   to	   94.74%	  order	   to	   trade	   ratio	   (you	  only	   execute	   5.26%	  or	   your	   quotes).	  
This	   high	   turnover	   of	   posted	   and	   canceled	   quotes	   is	   generally	   refers	   to	   as	   High	  
Frequency	  Trading	  (HFT).	  
	  
HFT	   is	   thus	   a	   subset	   of	   electronic/algorithmic	   trading	   broadly	   referring	   to	   trading	  
strategies	  with	  super-­‐fast	  optimized	  execution	  and	  high	  turnover	  of	  trades	   in	  short	  
periods	  of	  time.	  	  As	  of	  2011,	  the	  Commodity	  Futures	  Trading	  Commission	  (CFTC)	  has	  
provided	   a	   provisional	   definition	   of	   HFT	   algorithmic	   strategies	   based	   on	   certain	  
criteria	   including:	   very	   high	   speed	   of	   submission	   and	   cancelation	   of	   orders,	   high	  
degree	   of	   automation	   in	   terms	   of	   decision	   making,	   use	   of	   co-­‐location	   and	   low-­‐
latency	  access	  to	  exchanges,	  high	  order	  to	  trade	  ratio61,	  no	  overnight	  positions	  and	  
short	   time	   horizon	   (CFTC,	   2011).	   What	   is	   important	   is	   to	   understand	   that	   HFT	  
algorithms	  combine	  both	  very	  sophisticated	  methods	  for	  generating	  trading	  signals	  
and	  highly	  optimized	  execution	  in	  order	  to	  profit	  from	  the	  fragmented	  architecture	  
of	  US	  stock	  markets.	  Moreover,	  different	  from	  the	  larger	  and	  well-­‐capitalized	  market	  
makers	   such	   as	   the	   investment	   banking	   broker	   dealers,	   HFT	   relies	   on	   very	   small	  
returns	   per	   trade	   and	   requires	   high	   volumes	   of	   trading	   and	   usually	   no	   overnight	  
positions.	  Because	  such	  firms	  have	  a	  small	  capital	  base,	  they	  cannot	  carry	  overnight	  
market	  risk	  so	  they	  have	  to	  be	  able	  to	  enter	  and	  exit	  the	  market	  very	  easily.	  As	  long	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61	  Refers	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  high	  percentage	  of	  trades	  are	  actually	  cancelled	  before	  
they	  are	  executed.	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as	   there	   is	   fragmentation	   in	   the	  market,	  HFT	   firms	  can	  access	  a	  variety	  of	   liquidity	  
pools	  and	  alter	  their	  position	  at	  lightning	  speeds,	  which	  also	  leads	  to	  the	  very	  large	  
number	   of	   trade	   volumes	   attributed	   to	   HFT.	   As	   of	   2010,	   HFT	   makes	   up	   70%	   of	  
consolidated	  volume	  in	  the	  US,	  40%	  in	  Europe	  and	  up	  to	  77%	  in	  the	  UK,	  according	  to	  
research	  by	  TABB	  Group	  (Zhang	  and	  Baden	  Powell,	  2011)(Angel	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  
	  
The	  transition	   from	  human-­‐based	  matching	  machines	   to	   the	   low-­‐latency	  electronic	  
ecology	  of	  today	  has	  attracted	  a	  lot	  of	  public	  attention.	  One	  of	  the	  reasons	  has	  to	  do	  
with	   the	   differences	   between	   the	   humans	   and	   contemporary	   trading	   systems.	   A	  
chess	   grandmaster	   who	   needs	   650	   milliseconds	   just	   to	   realize	   he	   is	   in	   trouble	  
(Johnson	  et	  al.,	  2012),	  which	  can	  be	  considered	  an	  eternity	  in	  the	  low-­‐latency	  world	  
of	  HFT.	  Thus	  speed	  becomes	  an	  essential	  element	  of	   this	  new	  financial	  ecosystem.	  
Low-­‐latency	  connections	  and	   sophisticated	  algorithms	  are	   ‘evolutionary	   traits’	   that	  
are	   crucial	   for	   survival	   in	   this	   highly	   competitive	   environment.	   	   The	   difference	  
between	  informed	  and	  uninformed	  traders	  depends	  more	  and	  more	  on	  their	  relative	  
speed	  and	  geographic	   location	  (Haldane,	  2011).	  A	  recent	  study	  has	  shown	  how	  the	  
dramatic	  decrease	  in	  latency	  has	  increased	  the	  importance	  of	  geographical	  location,	  
especially	   for	   statistical	   arbitrage	   strategies	   (Wissner-­‐Gross	   and	   Freer,	   2010).	   In	   a	  
certain	   sense,	   even	   satellite	   links	   might	   be	   too	   slow	   in	   some	   instances,	   as	   250	  
milliseconds	   is	   not	  much	   in	   today’s	  markets	   (Leinweber,	   2009,	   p.72).	   A	   frequently	  
quoted	  example	  is	  a	  company	  called	  Spread	  Networks,	  who	  invested	  $300	  million	  in	  
a	   fiber	   cable	   connecting	   Chicago	   and	   New	   York	   and	   reducing	   latency	   by	   a	   few	  
milliseconds	   (MacKenzie	  et	   al.,	   2012,	   p.14).	   Although	   this	   is	   small	   improvement	   in	  
absolute	  terms,	  it	  allows	  the	  owners	  of	  the	  cable	  to	  charge	  substantial	  amounts	  for	  
those	  willing	  to	  use	   it.	  A	  company	  called	  McKay	  Brothers	  who,	   together	  with	  Aviat	  
Networks,	   developed	   a	   low	   latency	   wireless	   transmission	   system	   and	   has	   taken	  
things	  much	  further.	  Modern	  microwave	  technology	  can	  achieve	  lower	  latency	  than	  
fiber	  optic	  alternatives	  because	  the	  speed	  of	  light	  in	  air	  is	  approximately	  50	  %	  faster	  
than	  the	  speed	  of	  light	  in	  fiber	  optic	  cables	  (Rudisuli	  and	  Schifter,	  2014).	  	  
In	   as	  much	  as	   fiber-­‐optic	   links	  between	  various	  data	   centers	  have	  gained	   strategic	  
importance,	   there	   is	   a	   second	   tactical	   issue	   regarding	   colocation.	   In	   the	   particular	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case	  of	  HFTs,	   it	   is	  of	   crucial	   importance	   for	   these	   firms	   to	  position	   their	   servers	  as	  
close	  as	  possible	  to	  the	  matching	  engines	  of	  the	  venues	  they	  trade	  on.	  As	  the	  race	  to	  
zero	  constantly	  accelerates,	   small	   incremental	  differences	  become	  more	  and	  more	  
important.	  When	   a	   few	  milliseconds	   can	   decide	   the	   future	   of	   a	   group	   of	   firms	   or	  
trading	  strategies,	  investment	  in	  colocation	  and	  low-­‐latency	  seems	  like	  a	  small	  price	  
to	  pay	   for	  ones	  survival.	  Sal	  Arnuk	  and	  Joseph	  Saluzzi	   (2009)	  argue	  that,	   in	   today’s	  
market,	  trading	  is	  not	  done	  by	  people	  who	  analyze	  fundamentals	  about	  companies	  
but	   by	   proprietary	   trading	   firms	   who	   pay	   for	   colocation,	   giving	   them	   an	   unfair	  
advantage.	   The	   issue	   is	   somewhat	  more	   complicated	   as	  Manoj	  Narang	   (2010)	   has	  
demonstrated,	   in	  as	  much	  as	  any	  attempt	  to	  ban	  colocation	  would	  still	  not	  resolve	  
the	   race	   for	   proximity	   (e.g.	   trading	   firms	   renting	   office	   space	   next	   to	   the	   data	  
centre).	   Moreover,	   colocation	   has	   already	   been	   made	   fairer	   through	   equal	   cable	  
length	   to	   all	   servers.	   Finally,	   colocation	   is	   available	   to	   anyone	   who	   can	   bear	   the	  
costs,	  but	  it’s	  mostly	  useful	  for	  specific	  HFTs	  engaging	  in	  above	  mentioned	  electronic	  
market	  making.	  	  
	  
The	   success	   of	   HFT	   strategies	   is	   not	   simply	   a	   product	   of	   their	   technological	  
sophistication	   but	   is	   also	   due	   to	   their	   deep	   understanding	   of	   the	   new	   regulatory	  
environment.	  Certain	  rules	  and	  regulations	  like	  the	  SEC’s	  Flicker	  Quote	  Exception	  to	  
the	  Order	   Protection	   Rule	   can	   lead	   to	   situation	   in	  which	   very	   fast	   traders	   such	   as	  
HFTs	   can	   gain	   strategic	   advances	   over	  much	   slower	   time-­‐delayed	   players	   (McInish	  
and	  Upson,	  2012;	  Biais	  and	  Foucault,	  2014;	  Hoffmann,	  2014).	  Moreover,	  because	  of	  
fragmentation	  in	  US	  stock	  markets,	  there	  are	  latencies	  in	  updating	  quotes	  that	  again	  
provides	   opportunities	   for	   ultra-­‐fast	   HFTs,	   which	   are	   not	   accessible	   to	   slower	  
participants	  (Angel	  et	  al.,	  2010,	  p.38).	  	  Another	  important	  advantage	  of	  HFTs	  comes	  
from	   the	   complexity	   of	   the	   electronic	   order	   books	   itself.	   HFT	   strategies	   are	   highly	  
optimized	  and	  take	  into	  account	  the	  overall	  dynamic	  of	  the	  order	  book,	  i.e.	  if	  orders	  
are	   displayed	   or	   hidden,	   rate	   of	   cancellation	   of	   orders,	   the	   size	   and	   sequence	   of	  
orders,	  depth	  of	  the	  order	  book,	  etc.	  (Brogaard,	  2011).	  In	  a	  similar	  fashion,	  order	  to	  
trade	  ratios,	  trade	  frequency	  and	  time	  of	  day	  can	  be	  equally	  important	  in	  providing	  
leads	  for	  future	  price	  movements.	  What	  might	  seem	  as	  white	  noise	  to	  most	  market	  
participants,	   actually	   represents	   tradable	   signals	   to	   professional	   HFTs.	   Many	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investors	  may	  simply	  have	  no	  incentives	  in	  overly	  optimizing	  their	  strategy,	  but	  their	  
behavior	  represents	  a	  valuable	  resource	  for	  HFTs,	  who	  can	  systematically	  exploit	  it.	  
	  
More	  to	  the	  point,	  the	  current	  situation	  is	  quite	  similar	  to	  old	  floor-­‐based	  exchanges	  
where	  specialists	  would	  always	  have	  certain	  spatial	  and	  temporal	  advantages.	   	  The	  
difference	  is	  that	  in	  that	  context,	  specialists	  were	  required	  to	  match	  orders	  but	  they	  
were	  also	  required	  to	  provide	  continuous	  liquidity.	  But	  in	  today’s	  markets,	  engaging	  
in	   market	   making	   and	   providing	   continuous	   bids	   and	   offers,	   can	   prove	   very	   risky	  
unless	  one	  can	  move	  very	  quickly	  to	  constantly	  adjust	  the	  bid-­‐ask	  spread.	  That	  is	  to	  
say,	  anyone	  who	  wants	  to	  be	  in	  the	  business	  of	  market	  making	  needs	  to	  be	  able	  to	  
quickly	   post	   and	   cancel	   orders	   (Leinweber,	   2009,	   p.70).	   While	   designated	   market	  
makers	  are	  obliged	  to	  post	  two-­‐sided	  quotations,	  HFTs	  engaging	  in	  electronic	  market	  
making	   can	   exist	   the	   market	   entirely	   in	   a	   matter	   of	   milliseconds.	   This	   aspect	   as	  
particularly	  problematic	  as	  many	  participants	  have	  complained	  about	  the	  difference	  
between	   available	   liquidity	   and	   actual	   executed	   volume;	   something	   called	  
‘disappearing	  liquidity’	  (Zhang	  and	  Baden	  Powell,	  2011).	  This	  may	  be	  a	  valid	  point	  in	  
the	  sense	  that	  available	  liquidity	  appears	  just	  as	  quickly	  as	  it	  disappears	  and	  is	  mainly	  
due	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   HFT	   related	   liquidity	   is	   not	   a	   given	   as	   it	   used	   to	   be	  with	   the	  
human	  specialist	  on	  the	  floor	  of	  the	  old	  NYSE.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  contemporary	  HFTs	  are	  
more	  than	  willing	  to	  provide	  double	  sided	  bids	  and	  offers	  but	  they	  will	  only	  do	  it	  as	  
long	  as	  they	  can	  adapt	  their	  spreads	  very	  quickly	  and	  take	  advantage	  of	  low-­‐latency	  
and	  colocation.	  
	  
By	  many	  measures,	  HFTs	  can	  be	  considered	  to	  be	  part	  of	  electronic	  market	  making	  
(Hendershott	   et	   al.,	   2013),	   supplying	   liquidity	   and	   providing	   very	   tight	   bid-­‐offer	  
spreads.	  Nevertheless,	   there	   are	  many	   counter	   arguments	   to	   this	   position,	   as	   it	   is	  
clear	  that	  the	  liquidity	  provide	  by	  HFTs	  is	  not	  as	  reliable	  as	  one	  might	  assume	  (Jarrow	  
and	  Protter,	  2012;	  McInish	  and	  Upson,	  2012;	  Kirilenko	  et	  al.,	  2014).	  	  The	  crucial	  point	  
here	   is	   that	  the	  human	  specialist	  was	  obliged	  to	  step	   in	  and	  take	  the	  other	  side	  of	  
the	   trade,	  maintaining	  a	   fair	  and	  orderly	  market.	  No	  such	   regulatory	   requirements	  
exist	   for	  HFTs	  who	  can	  exit	   the	  market	  at	   lighting	  speeds.	  Whether	  or	  not	  HFT	   is	  a	  
positive	  or	  negative	  aspect	  of	  contemporary	  markets	  is	  still	  hard	  to	  ascertain.	  What	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is	   certain	   is	   that	   HFT	   is	   a	   controversial	   issue	   and	   we	   will	   try	   to	   unpack	   its	  
multifaceted	  nature	  in	  the	  next	  sections	  of	  this	  chapter.	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7.3	  HFT	  Controversies	  
	  
Over	  the	  course	  of	  its	  development,	  HFT	  has	  become	  a	  negative	  buzzword	  reflecting	  
a	  number	  of	  misunderstandings	  of	  the	  function	  of	  market	  making	  but	  also	  genuine	  
concern	   with	   HFT	   practices	   more	   broadly.	   	   In	   a	   well-­‐known	   series	   of	   papers,	   Sal	  
Arnuk	  and	  Joseph	  Saluzzi	  have	  described	  certain	  HFTs	  practices	  as	  ‘’predatory’’	  and	  
even	   illegal	   (2009).	   In	  a	  nutshell,	  predatory	  HFTs	  would	  be	  those	  trading	  strategies	  
that	   go	   beyond	   simply	   performing	   electronic	  market	  making.	   It	   entails	   using	   their	  
technical	   and	   informational	   advantages	   to	   force	   institutional	   investors	   (pension	  
funds,	   insurance	   companies,	  mutual	   funds,	  etc.)	   to	  buy	  or	   sell	   at	   ‘’prices	  higher	  or	  
lower	   than	   where	   the	   stock	   had	   been	   trading,	   creating	   a	   situation	   where	   the	  
predatory	  algorithms	  can	   lock	   in	  a	  profit	   from	  the	  artificial	   increase	  or	  decrease	   in	  
the	  price’’	   (Arnuk	  and	  Saluzzi,	  2009).	   If	   the	   institutional	  order	  has	  a	   limit	  price,	   the	  
whole	  trick	  is	  to	  ascertain	  what	  that	  limit	  is.	  The	  predatory	  HFT	  algorithm	  then	  has	  to	  
‘’run	  up	  the	  institutional	  algo	  to	  its	  limit’’,	  and	  make	  it	  pay	  the	  maximum	  of	  what	  it	  is	  
programed	  to	  pay.	  Manoj	  Narang	  has	  offered	  a	  counter	  critique	  to	  this	  position	  by	  
arguing	   that	   it	   is	  perfectly	   fair	   for	  someone	  with	  superior	  computational	  capacities	  
and	  more	  advanced	  low-­‐latency	  technology	  to	  use	  available	   information	  to	  make	  a	  
profit,	  as	  long	  as	  it	  is	  legal.	  What	  is	  not	  fair,	  in	  his	  opinion,	  is	  to	  abuse	  the	  regulatory	  
framework	  and	   for	   instance	  to	   ‘’jump	  ahead	  of	  an	  order	   that	  was	  placed	  earlier	  at	  
the	  same	  price	  by	  another	  trader’’	  (Manoj	  Narang,	  2010).	  
	  
Another	  contentious	  topic	  relating	  to	  HFT	   is	   the	  previously	  mentioned	  aspect	  of	   to	  
liquidity	  rebates,	  which	  could	  be	  seen	  a	  way	  for	  trading	  venues	  to	  offer	  unfair	  profits	  
to	   HFTs.	   This	   refers	   to	   instances	   in	  which	  HFTs	   perform	   electronic	  market	  making	  
and	  cash	  in	  a	  rebate	  when	  they	  provide	  liquidity.	  As	  we	  have	  said,	  the	  use	  of	  rebates	  
is	   common	   because	   the	   ultimate	   aim	   of	   an	   exchange	   is	   to	   attract	   order	   flow.	   On	  
certain	  venues,	  when	  an	  order	  is	  filled,	  the	  liquidity	  provider	  receives	  a	  rebate	  while	  
the	  remover	   is	  charged	  a	  fee.	  What	  Arnuk	  and	  Saluzzi	  argue	  is	  that	  these	  HFTs	  can	  
make	  a	  profit	  without	   actually	   adding	  much	   to	  overall	   liquidity.	  Again	   the	  work	  of	  
Narang	  helps	  us	  put	  this	  into	  perspective,	  as	  not	  all	  stocks	  are	  equally	  liquid.	  In	  the	  
case	  of	  very	  liquid	  stocks,	  the	  market	  tends	  to	  move	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  taker	  of	  liquidity	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and	  against	  the	  provider	  of	  liquidity,	  i.e.	  the	  market	  maker.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  less	  liquid	  
stocks,	   it	   might	   not	   be	   that	   unreasonable	   for	   the	   market	   maker	   to	   have	   an	  
advantage,	  such	  as	  a	  rebate,	  as	  market	  making	   in	  those	  stocks	   is	  much	  more	  risky.	  
On	  the	  other	  hand,	  what	  is	  certainly	  questionable	  is	  a	  tiered	  rebate	  system,	  in	  which	  
trading	   firms	   with	   higher	   volumes	   (e.g.	   HFTs)	   get	   larger	   rebates	   as	   opposed	   to	  
participants	  with	  smaller	  rebates.	  
The	   third	   and	   probably	   most	   important	   recent	   controversy	   revolves	   around	   the	  
ability	  of	  HFTs	   to	  arbitrage	   the	  regulatory	   framework.	  We	  have	  already	  mentioned	  
this	  in	  the	  previous	  sections	  but	  we	  will	  briefly	  elaborate	  on	  this,	  particularly	  in	  the	  
case	  of	   rule	  611	  of	  Regulation	  National	  Market	   System	   (Reg	  NMS).	   This	   regulatory	  
framework	  was	   promulgated	   in	   2007	   in	   the	   context	   of	   enhancing	   completion	   and	  
investor	  protection	  in	  US	  stock	  markets62.	  It	  entailed	  twelve	  rules	  but	  it	  has	  been	  rule	  
611	  that	  has	  drawn	  a	  lot	  of	  attention	  in	  the	  context	  of	  problems	  associated	  with	  HFT	  
strategies.	  
This	  rule	  is	  particularly	  important	  as	  it	  prohibits	  the	  execution	  of	  quotes	  that	  would	  
lock	  or	  cross	  the	  protected	  quotations	  of	  other	  trading	  centers.	  More	  to	  the	  point,	  
the	   rule	   refers	   to	   the	   way	   in	   which	   broker	   dealers	   and	   exchanges	   are	   obliged	   to	  
enforce	   the	  National	   Best	   Bid	  Offer	   (NBBO)	   and	   prevent	   orders	   to	   be	   executed	   at	  
inferior	  prices.	  For	   instance,	  exchanges	  are	   forced	   to	   route	   incoming	  orders	   to	   the	  
venue	  that	  displays	  the	  most	  competitive	  price.	  This	  framework	   is	   immediately	  put	  
to	  the	  test	  when	  a	  broker	  dealer	  attempts	  to	  access	  all	  markets	  at	  the	  same	  time	  on	  
behalf	   of	   its	   client.	   In	   such	   an	   instance,	   he	  might	   be	   prevented	   from	   accessing	   all	  
venues	  and	  will	  have	  to	  ‘’chase	  liquidity	  with	  orders	  that	  are	  denied	  by	  exchanges	  in	  
an	  effort	   to	  comply	  with	  Rule	  611’’	   (Bodek,	  2013).	   In	   respoding	  to	   this	  proble,	  Reg	  
NMS	   provided	   an	   exemption	   from	   rule	   611,	   called	   the	   Intermarket	   Sweep	   Order	  
(ISO),	  which	  allowed	   the	  execution	  of	   sweep	  ordes	   immediately,	  before	  quotes	  on	  
different	  venues	  get	  a	  chance	  to	  update.	  As	  the	  figure	  below	  shows	  us,	  an	  ISO	  trade	  
is	   	  amuch	  more	  efficeint	  way	  to	  aces	   liquidity	  whereas	  using	  non-­‐ISO	  orders	  opens	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62	  https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/emsac/memo-­‐rule-­‐611-­‐regulation-­‐nms.pdf	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Figure	  19:	  Example	  of	  trading	  with	  Intermarket	  Sweep	  Orders	  
(Chakravarty	  et	  al.,	  2012	  p,26)	  
This	   exemption	   was	   meant	   for	   the	   specific	   case	   of	   executing	   large	   institutional	  
orders,	  also	  called	  block-­‐trades.	  Instead	  of	  executing	  the	  large	  block	  sequentially,	  the	  
use	   of	   ISO	   orders	   allows	   for	   simultaneous	   access	   to	   all	   venues	   and	   thus	   leads	   to	  
more	   efficient	   execution	   (Chakravarty	   et	   al.,	   2012).	   By	   definition,	   ISO	   ordes	   are	  
available	   to	   exchanges	   and	   broker-­‐dealers,	   but	   they	   can	   make	   them	   available	   to	  
other	   participants,	   such	   as	   experienced	   HFTs	   (MacKenzie,	   2014).	   Haim	   Bodek	   has	  
argued	   that	   this	   rule	   has	   in	   fact	   represented	   a	   major	   turning	   point	   for	   HFTs	   and	  
draws	   attention	   to	   the	   way	   in	   which	   it	   helps	   them	   exploit	   the	   current	   regulatory	  
framework	  (Bodek,	  2013).	  The	  asymetric	  acces	  to	  ISOs	  can	  thus	  be	  seen	  as	  another	  
advantage	  given	  to	  certain	  market	  participants	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  others.	  	  
In	  any	  case,	  all	  of	  this	  allows	  us	  to	  highlight	  one	  crucial	  point,	  namley	  the	  continous	  
power	  struggle	  within	  our	  contemporary	  electronic	  trading	  ecosystem.	  First	  of	  all,	  it	  
shows	  us	   that	  being	  a	   liquidity	  provider	  and	  performing	  market	  making	  grants	  one	  
substantial	  advantages	   relative	   to	  other	  market	  participants.	  Second,	   it	   shows	   that	  
certain	   participants,	   who	   operate	   at	   millisecond	   time	   horizons,	   have	  
disproportionate	  impact	  and	  control	  over	  the	  ultimate	  execution	  of	  bids	  and	  offers.	  
Finaly,	   it	   shows	   that	   dependig	   on	   computational	   and	   technological	   capabilities,	  
spatial	   and	   temporal	   proximity,	   different	   participants	   can	   have	   access	   to	  
substantially	   different	   types	   of	   liquidity.	   This	   is	   also	   an	   acurate	   description	   of	   the	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privileged	  status	  afforded	  to	  human	  specialists	  or	  jobbers	  on	  the	  old	  trading	  floors.	  
Similar	   to	   our	   present	   day	   situation,	   the	   specialists	   in	   New	   York,	   the	   jobber	   in	  
London	  or	   the	  market	  makers	  of	  Chicago	  were	  better	   informed	   than	  other	  market	  
participants.	  But	  what	  seems	  stricking	  in	  the	  case	  of	  contemporary	  electronic	  trading	  
is	   that	   the	   present	   asymetries	   are	   of	   much	   higher	   order	   of	   magnitude.	   While	  
traditional	  market	  makers	  were	   able	   to	   earn	   the	   spread	   between	   the	   bid	   and	   the	  
offer,	   contemporary	  electronic	   trading	  has	  vastly	  expanded	   the	   range	  of	  profitable	  
trading	  strategies.	  
In	  the	  past,	  the	  matching	  machine	  was	  directly	  controlled	  and	  managed	  by	  groups	  of	  
human	  specialists	  and	  brokers,	  such	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  NYSE	  in	  the	  19th	  century.	  That	  is	  
no	  longer	  the	  case	  today,	  where	  trading	  in	  US	  stocks	  is	  fragmentated	  across	  a	  large	  
number	   of	   exchanges,	   alternative	   trading	   venues	   such	   as	   ECNs	   and	   dark	   pools.	  
Moreover,	  to	  a	  large	  extent	  both	  the	  mathing	  and	  the	  market	  making	  functions	  have	  
been	   incorporated	   into	   the	   working	   of	   machines.	   The	   introduction	   of	   electronic	  
order	   books	   affords	   direct	   market	   acces	   to	   a	   diverse	   set	   of	   market	   participants,	  
deploying	  a	  variety	  of	  different	  strategies.	  This	  in	  turn	  leads	  to	  a	  arms	  race	  driven	  by	  
lower	   latencies	   of	   execution,	   constant	   optimization	   and	   large	   investments	   in	  
advanced	   technological	   capabilites,	   just	   to	   be	   one	  millisecond	   ahead	   of	   everyone	  
else.	   	   In	   the	   end,	   HFT	   trading	   firms	   enjoy	   an	   advantage,	  which	   is	   ‘’the	   result	   of	   a	  
‘technicality’	  of	  trading	  that	  is	  opaque	  to	  outsiders’’	  20.	  This	  has	  recently	  razed	  many	  
concerns	   as	   to	   the	   fairness	   of	   equity	  markets	   (Bodek,	   2013)	   and	   financial	  markets	  
more	  broadly:	  
Nanex:	   ‘On	   ...	   Aug	   5,	   2011,	   we	   processed	   1	   trillion	   bytes	   of	   data	   ...	   This	   is	  
insane.	  ...	  It	  is	  noise,	  subterfuge,	  manipulation.	  ...	  HFT	  is	  sucking	  the	  life	  blood	  
out	   of	   the	   markets:	   liquidity	   ...	   [A]t	   the	   core,	   [HFT]	   is	   pure	   manipulation’	  
(MacKenzie	  at	  al.,	  2012,	  p18)	  
Such	   reactions	   might	   be	   overly	   dramatic,	   but	   they	   testify	   to	   the	   intense	   struggle	  
going	  on	  in	  the	  electronic	  ecology	  of	  high	  frequency	  trading	  every	  day.	  In	  this	  sense,	  
the	  question	  of	  HTF	   could	  also	  be	   framed	   in	   terms	  of	   this	   intense	  power	   struggle,	  
where	  complex	  trading	  algorithms	  constantly	  jostle	  for	  position	  in	  order	  to	  be	  at	  the	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centre	  of	   liquidity,	  as	  close	  as	  possible	   to	   the	  core	  of	   the	  mathing	  machine.	  This	   is	  
because,	   as	  we	   have	   tried	   to	   show	  before,	   desigining	   and	  maintainign	   transaction	  
machines	   is	   eually	   a	   question	   of	   power	   struggle,	   not	   simply	   one	   of	   deciding	   on	  
technical	   details.	   That	   is	   to	   say,	   the	   way	   in	   which	   market	   making	   is	   performed	  	  
influences	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  HFTs	  are	  allowed	  to	  control	  and	  manage	  the	  dynamics	  
of	  the	  order	  book.	  Consequently,	  one	  could	  attempt	  a	  critique	  of	  HFTs	  not	  in	  terms	  
of	  some	  arbitrary	  moral	  distinctions	  but	  by	  focusing	  the	   impact	  on	  market	  stability	  
and	   resilience	   in	   the	   context	   of	   HFT-­‐dominated	   electronic	   market	   making.	   This	   is	  
exactly	  what	  we	  will	  attempt	  to	  do	  by	  looking	  at	  a	  very	  specific	  event,	  the	  2010	  Flash	  
Crash.	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7.4	  Flashes	  and	  Crashes	  
	  
The	   aftermath	   of	   the	   2008	   financial	   crisis	   has	   seen	   an	   increased	   attention	   for	   the	  
workings	   and	   complexities	   of	   international	   finance.	   As	   a	   result,	   a	   large	   number	   of	  
catch	   phrases	   have	   entered	   into	   the	   public	   discourse,	  mostly	   as	   a	   reaction	   to	   the	  
opacity	   that	   characterises	   the	   world	   of	   finance.	   From	   ‘shadow	   banking’,	   ‘short-­‐
selling’,	   ‘flash	   crashes’,	   ‘weapons	   of	   mass-­‐destruction’	   to	   ‘vampire	   squids’,	   ’dark	  
pools’	   and	   ’greedy	  bankers’.	   All	   of	   them	  have	  had	  quite	   a	   successful	   career	   in	   the	  
public	  media,	   but	   perhaps	   none	   have	   attracted	   as	  much	   attention	   as	  HFT.	   	   As	  we	  
have	   seen,	   HFT	   has	   emerged	   as	   the	   contemporary	   version	   of	   market	   making	  
operating	   across	   a	   ‘’distributed	   patchwork	   of	   exchange	   and	   multilateral	   trading	  
platforms’’	  (Haldane,	  2011,	  p.4).	  This	  has	  been	  the	  case	  particularly	  in	  the	  US	  equity	  
markets	  where	  share	  trading	  has	  at	  the	  same	  time	  become	  more	  efficient	  and	  more	  
fragmented,	  and	  where	  a	  series	  trading	  venues,	   from	  the	  established	  exchanges	  to	  
new	  alternative	  platforms	  such	  as	  ECNs	  and	  dark	  pools,	  compete	  for	  the	  privilege	  of	  
organizing	   and	  managing	   the	  provision	  of	   liquidity.	   	  Within	   this	   environment	  high-­‐
speed	   traders	   such	   as	   HFTs	   have	   evolved	   primarily	   by	   performing	  market	  making	  
strategies.	  Due	  to	  HFTs	  capacity	  to	  provide	  liquidity	  and	  channel	  order	  flow,	  trading	  
venues	  have	  a	  direct	  interest	  in	  attracting	  market	  participants	  to	  their	  platforms.	  Co-­‐
location,	  low-­‐latency,	  liquidity	  rebates,	  privileged	  access	  to	  certain	  order	  types	  such	  
as	   ISO	   are	   all	   examples	   of	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   trading	   venues	   attempt	   to	   gain	   the	  
support	  of	  HFTs.	  Speed	  and	  adaptability	  are	  essential	   for	  today’s	  electronic	  market	  
makers,	   particularly	   the	   ability	   to	   post	   and	   cancel	   large	   numbers	   of	   quotes	   as	   the	  
market	  moves.	   This	   aspect	   of	   HFT	   activity	   relates	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   being	   informed	  
actually	  means	  being	  faster	  and	  able	  to	  quickly	  respond	  to	  market	  movements.	  This	  
begs	   the	  question	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  contemporary	  matching	  machines	  can	  still	  be	  
characterized	   by	   the	   phrase	   ‘’a	   fair	   and	   orderly	   market’’,	   or	   whether	   they	   are	  
intrinsically	  more	  fragile	  than	  earlier	  designs.	  
	  
For	   instance,	   one	   example	   of	   the	   fragility	   of	   contemporary	   ecology	   is	   the	   now	  
famous	   2010	   Flash	   Crash,	   when	   the	   ‘’Dow	   Jones	   Industrial	   Average	   (DJIA)	   index	  
dropped	  almost	  9%	  from	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  day	  (…)	  and	  the	  biggest	  one-­‐day	  point	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decline,	  998.5	  points,	  on	  an	  intra-­‐day	  basis	  in	  the	  history	  of	  the	  DJIA	  index’’	  (Golub	  et	  
al.,	   2012).	   For	   a	   brief	  moment,	   US	   stock	   trading	   halted	   as	   certain	   stocks,	   such	   as	  
Accenture,	  fell	  dramatically	  and	  others	  received	  incredibly	  high	  valuations.	  According	  
to	   Kirilenko,	   Kyle	   Samadi	   and	   Tuzun	   (2014),	   the	   Flash	   Crash	   was	   a	   complex	   and	  
sudden	  market	  crash	  triggered	  by	  the	  unexpected	  sale	  of	  a	  large	  block	  of	  E-­‐mini	  S&P	  
500	  futures	  contracts	  (75,000	  contracts	  worth	  some	  $4.1bn)	  by	  a	  trading	  algorithm.	  
The	  rapid	  and	  continuous	  sale	  of	  such	  a	   large	  block	  of	  futures	  overwhelmed	  the	  E-­‐
mini	   S&P	   500	   market	   as	   market	   making	   algorithms	   were	   not	   able	   to	   handle	   the	  
massive	  order	  imbalance.	  Although	  these	  algorithms	  did	  manage	  to	  buy	  for	  about	  10	  
minutes,	  once	  they	  reached	  they	  maximum	  inventory	   limits,	   the	  market	  effectively	  
began	   a	   downward	   spiral.	   This	   initial	   effect	   immediately	   triggered	   a	   reaction	   from	  
other	   algorithms	   trading	   both	   the	   futures	   contracts	   and	   the	   underlying	   index,	  
namely	  the	  S&P	  500,	  further	  exacerbating	  the	  sell	  off.	   In	  short,	  a	  breakdown	  in	  the	  
futures	  market	  eventually	  found	  is	  way	  and	  was	  amplified	  within	  the	  broader	  stock	  
market.	   To	   put	   things	   into	   perspective,	   it	   represented	   the	   wipe	   out	   of	   about	   $1	  
trillion	  in	  the	  scope	  of	  minutes	  (Haldane,	  2011).	  Both	  the	  SEC-­‐CFTC	  (2010)	  report	  and	  
the	  more	  recent	  UK	  Foresight	  Review	  have	  not	  been	  able	  to	  find	  an	  individual	  blame	  
and	   have	   explained	   the	   phenomenon	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   coming	   together	   of	   several	  
unrelated	   events	   that	   led	   to	   a	   ‘’perfect	   financial	   storm’’	   (Kirilenko	   and	   Lo,	   2013,	  
p.62).	  
	  
One	  initial	  conclusion	  would	  be	  that	  such	  events	  could	  just	  be	  a	  normal	  occurrence	  
in	   the	   complex	   ecology	   that	   has	   emerged	   out	   of	   the	   technological	   and	   regulatory	  
innovation	  of	  the	  past	  decades.	  In	  fact,	  the	  topic	  of	  electronic	  market	  making,	  as	  it	  is	  
performed	  by	  HFTs,	  renders	  a	  lot	  of	  credence	  to	  an	  ecological/evolutionary	  view	  of	  
financial	  markets.	   Doyne	   Farmer	   	   (2011)	   has	   recently	   developed	   precisely	   such	   an	  
approach	  applying	  it	  to	  both	  HFT	  and	  algorithmic	  trading	  in	  general.	  In	  this	  context,	  
he	   identifies	   functional	   similarities	   between	   financial	   systems	   and	   other	   complex	  
biological	   and	   ecological	   systems,	   and	   thus	   understands	   algorithmic	   strategies	   as	  
having	   a	   ‘natural’	   life	   cycle.	   	   As	   a	   new	   inefficiency	   is	   detected,	   i.e.	   a	   new	  niche,	   a	  
strategy	  can	  be	  successful	  as	   long	  as	   it	  does	  not	  become	  to	  common.	  As	  more	  and	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more	  financial	  actors	  adopt	  it,	  the	  performance	  tends	  to	  decrease,	  but	  as	  it	  provides	  
steady	  returns,	  it	  might	  drive	  out	  other	  types	  of	  strategies:	  
	  
Strategies,	   markets	   and	   regulations	   co-­‐evolve	   in	   competitive,	   symbiotic	   or	  
predator-­‐prey	   relationships	   as	   technology	   and	   the	   economy	   change	   in	   the	  
background	  (Farmer	  and	  Skouras,	  2011,	  p.6).	  
	  
An	  interesting	  aspect	  of	  this	  perspective	  revolves	  around	  the	  question	  of	  algorithmic	  
crowding.	  As	  soon	  as	  a	  particular	  algorithmic	  strategy	  becomes	  very	  successful	  other	  
participants	  will	   jump	  on	   it,	   resulting	   in	  a	   lot	  of	   similar	  algorithms	  all	   acting	  at	   the	  
same	  time,	  possibly	  creating	  market	  wide	  trends.	  Perhaps	  the	  most	  valuable	  aspect	  
of	   the	   ecological	   approach	   lies	   in	   understanding	   that	   the	   new	   interdependencies	  
between	   various	   trading	   algorithms	   and	   the	   fragmented	   landscape	   of	   trading	  
platforms	  may	   lead	   to	  a	   fragile	   financial	   ecology.	  Because	  of	   the	  novel	   capabilities	  
offered	   by	   algorithmic	   trading	   and	   the	   nature	   of	   HFT	   activity,	   different	   trading	  
platforms	  become	  more	  closely	  connected,	  leading	  to	  potential	  contagion	  ‘’between	  
stock	  prices	  and	  derivatives	  written	  on	  these	  stocks’’	  (Haldane,	  2011,	  p.14).	  Overall,	  
the	   electronic	   trading	   landscape	   resembles	   a	   tightly	   coupled	   ecosystem	   where	  
changes	  are	  transmitted	  across	  different	  trading	  venues	  and	  markets	  in	  almost	  real-­‐
time:	  
Taken	  together,	  these	  contagion	  channels	  suggest	  that	  fat-­‐tailed	  persistence	  in	  
individual	  stocks	  could	  quickly	  be	  magnified	  to	  wider	  classes	  of	  asset,	  exchange	  
and	  market.	  The	  micro	  would	  transmute	  to	  the	  macro.	  This	  is	  very	  much	  in	  the	  
spirit	  of	  Mandelbrot’s	  fractal	  story.	  Structures	  exhibiting	  self-­‐similarity	  magnify	  
micro	   behaviour	   to	   the	   macro	   level.	   Micro-­‐level	   abnormalities	   manifest	   as	  
system-­‐wide	  instabilities	  (Haldane,	  2011,	  p.10).	  
Although	   this	   type	   of	   approach	   has	   yet	   to	   become	   the	   mainstream	   of	   financial	  
regulation	  and	  supervision,	  recent	  events	  suggest	  that	  the	  new	  ecology	  of	  electronic	  
market	  making	  is	  not	  as	  stable	  as	  one	  might	  think.	  	  One	  can	  build	  on	  the	  ecological	  
perspective	  by	  adding	  insights	  from	  the	  theory	  of	  computation.	  	  Philip	  Mirowski	  has	  
recently	  provided	  an	  interesting	  account	  of	  the	  Flash	  Crash	  along	  these	  lines,	  in	  the	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context	   of	   his	   theory	   of	   markomata.	   What	   is	   common	   to	   both	   the	   ecological	  
interpretation	   and	   Mirowski’s	   computational	   perspective	   is	   the	   question	   of	  
complexity	   and	   interconnectivity.	   For	   instance,	   one	   can	   think	   of	   the	   electronic	  
trading	   landscape	   as	   a	   network	   of	   tightly	   interconnected	   markomata,	   which	  
gradually	  lead	  to	  an	  increase	  in	  systemic	  complexity:	  
	  
As	  individual	  markomata	  become	  increasingly	  networked,	  their	  computational	  
powers	   become	   increasingly	   augmented	   in	   complexity	   (in	   the	   Chomsky	  
definition),	  and	  transcendental	  guarantees	  that	  a	  particular	  market	  format	  will	  
continue	   to	   operate	   as	   it	   has	   done	   in	   the	   past	   are	   repeatedly	   falsified	  
(Mirowski,	  2012,	  p.383)	  
	  
From	   the	   perspective	   of	   mainstream	   economics,	   the	   Flash	   Crash	   could	   simply	   be	  
seen	  as	  a	  market	  failure	  in	  the	  traditional	  sense,	  which	  could	  be	  fixed	  by	  increasing	  
the	  scope	  of	  the	  market	  (more	  competition,	  lower	  transaction	  costs,	  less	  regulation).	  
From	  this	  point	  of	  view,	  it	  would	  be	  easy	  to	  identify	  certain	  obstacles	  and	  transaction	  
costs	  that	  hinder	  free	  competition	  and	  obstruct	  the	  price	  discovery	  process.	  Creating	  
a	   smoother	   trading	   environment	   would	   thus	   allow	   market	   forces	   to	   operate	  
unhindered	  and	  reduce	  the	   likelihood	  of	   failures	  such	  as	   the	  Flash	  Crash.	  But	   from	  
the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  the	  theory	  of	  markomata,	  market	  failure	  has	  a	  totally	  different	  
meaning.	  Rather	  than	  being	  some	  sort	  of	  mispricing,	  the	  failure	  of	  markomata	  is	   in	  
fact	   the	  break	  down	  of	   the	  market	  matching	  machine.	  Given	  erratic	   inputs	  coming	  
from	  a	  number	  of	  HFT	   automated	   trading	   algorithms,	   the	  matching	  engines	  broke	  
down	  and	   ‘’prices	  appear	   to	  have	  no	   floor	  or	   ceiling’’	   (Mirowski,	  2012).	   	  Using	   the	  
vocabulary	  of	  computation,	  Mirowski	  explains	  this	  as	  matching	  algorithms	  not	  being	  
able	   to	  halt.	  As	   there	  were	  either	  no	  bids	  or	   asks,	   the	  matching	  engines	  were	  not	  
able	   to	   match	   orders	   and	   produce	   prices.	   In	   his	   sense,	   the	   near	   real-­‐time	   cross-­‐
market	  arbitrage	  performed	  by	  HFTs	  lead	  to	  a	  tightly	  coupled	  network	  of	  markomata	  
that	  exhibit	  unexpected	  emergent	  properties,	   such	  as	   sudden	  breakdowns	   like	   the	  
Flash	  Crash.	  
	  
In	  conclusion,	  having	  surveyed	  the	  various	  accounts	  of	  the	  Flash	  Crash	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	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argue	  that	  HFTs	  market	  making	  firms	  are	  to	  blame	  for	  it.	  It	  would	  be	  fair	  to	  say	  that	  
HFTs	   are	   the	   present	   culmination	   of	   a	   tendency	   towards	   fragmentation	   and	  
immediacy	  of	  trade	  execution	  that	  ultimately	  leads	  to	  a	  very	  fragile	  financial	  ecology.	  
As	   the	   recent	   evolution	   of	   financial	   markets	   have	   led	   to	   faster	   and	   more	  
interconnected	   financial	   ecology	   (Johnson	  et	  al.,	   2012,	  p.2),	   the	  question	   is	  not	   so	  
much	  on	  the	  good	  or	  bad	  intentions	  of	  HFT,	  but	  more	  on	  its	  impact	  on	  the	  resilience	  
of	  the	  overall	  system	  (Haldane,	  2011,	  p.10).	  Moreover,	  as	  Kirilenko	  has	  shown,	  this	  
points	  to	  a	  much	  more	  deeper	  problem	  of	  the	  inadequacy	  of	  financial	  regulation	  in	  a	  
context	  where	  ‘’the	  growing	  interconnectedness	  of	  financial	  markets	  and	  institutions	  
has	   created	   a	   new	   form	   of	   accident:	   a	   systemic	   event,	   where	   the	   ‘’system’’	   now	  
extends	   beyond	   any	   single	   organization	   or	   market	   and	   affects	   a	   great	   number	   of	  
innocent	   bystanders’’	   (Kirilenko,	   2013,	   p.68).	   Consequently,	   the	   Flash	   Crash	   has	  
triggered	   several	   debates	   as	   possible	   ways	   to	   reform	   the	   current	   matching	   and	  
market	  matching	  infrastructure.	  	  	  
In	  two	  recent	  papers,	  Daniel	  Beunza	  (2013;	  2015)	  has	  argued	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  hybrid	  
market	  structures	  such	  as	  that	  of	  NYSE,	  where	  one	  can	  combine	  the	  benefits	  of	  both	  
a	   closely	   knit	   social	   structure	   (specialists	   on	   the	   floor)	   and	   automated	   electronic	  
systems.	  He	  argues	  that,	  during	  the	  Flash	  Crash,	  fully	  automated	  exchanges	  such	  as	  
BATS	  or	  Direct	  Edge	  had	  many	  erroneous	  traders	  that	  had	  to	  be	  cancelled	  while	  the	  
NYSE	  did	  not	  have	  this	  issue.	  According	  to	  Beunza,	  this	  suggests	  that	  contemporary	  
electronic	   markets	   should	   be	   designed	   by	   taking	   ‘’into	   account	   the	   functions	  
performed	   by	   the	   original	   intermediaries’’	   (Beunza,	   2015,	   p.42).	   Ultimately,	   he	  
argues	   that	   there	   were	   many	   informal	   rules	   on	   the	   open	   outcry	   exchange	   floor,	  
which	   have	   been	   lost	   in	   the	   translation	   to	   automated	   electronic	   trading.	   This	   of	  
course	  presupposes	  that	  there	  are	  certain	  aspects	  of	  the	  behaviour	  of	  human	  market	  
makers	  that	  are	  not	  formalizable,	  but	  were	  essential	  for	  maintaining	  stability.	  Given	  
the	  overall	  perspective	  of	   this	   thesis,	  we	  would	  argue	   that	   there	   is	   little	  benefit	   in	  
framing	   the	   issue	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   dichotomy	   between	   social	   structure	   and	  
technology.	   Once	   we	   understand	   the	   infrastructure	   of	   financial	   markets	   as	  
transaction	   machines	   it	   is	   clear	   that,	   human	   or	   non-­‐human	   components,	   what	  
matters	   is	   the	  design	  of	   the	  matching	  algorithm.	   If	   something	  has	  been	   lost	   in	   the	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transition	  from	  human	  dominated	  trading	  floors	  to	  automated	  electronic	  platforms	  
it	  is	  because	  we	  do	  not	  understand	  the	  full	  complexity	  of	  what	  was	  enacted	  on	  the	  
floors	  by	  the	  human	  market	  makers.	  In	  some	  ways,	  rather	  than	  bringing	  back	  human	  
individuals	  as	  conduits	  for	  order	  flow,	  we	  should	  perhaps	  focus	  more	  on	  improving	  
the	   algorithmic	   structure	   of	   contemporary	   electronic	   markets.	   Just	   as	   computers	  
have	  improved	  the	  aggregation	  and	  matching	  of	  order	  flow,	  they	  should	  be	  equally	  
well	  suited	  to	  supervising	  and	  regulating	  markets,	   fostering	  the	  development	  of	  an	  
equally	  complex	  algorithmic	  infrastructure	  with	  the	  sole	  purpose	  of	  assuring	  market	  
stability	  (Kirilenko,	  2013).	  
In	   this	   regard,	   particularly	   since	   the	   Flash	   Crash,	   both	   regulators	   and	   market	  
participants	  have	  made	  the	  argument	  for	  the	  soundness	  of	  circuit	  breakers	  operating	  
as	   stabilizers	   of	   market	   dynamics.	   Something	   that	   might	   seem	   as	   unnecessary	  
obstacles	   by	   orthodox	   economists,	   have	   been	   of	   crucial	   importance	   for	   the	  
engineers	  and	  designers	  of	  trading	  platforms.	   	   In	   fact,	  on	  the	  occasion	  of	  the	  Flash	  
Crash	  circuit	  breakers	  did	  kick	   in	  as	   the	   ‘’Chicago	  Mercantile	  Exchange	   imposed	  an	  
automatic	   5-­‐second	   pause	   on	   trading	   in	   its	   S&P	   500	   E-­‐mini	   futures	   contracts’’	  
(Haldane,	   2011,	   p.16).	   As	   it	   has	   been	   argued	   by	   Andy	   Haldane,	   circuit	   breakers	  
allowed	   the	  market	   to	   calm	  down,	   as	   it	  where,	   and	  are	   thus	   an	  essential	   element	  
insuring	   financial	   stability63.	   	   Other	   solutions	   to	   the	   unintended	   consequences	   of	  
electronic	  market	  making	   could	  be	   the	   implementation	  of	  minimum	   resting	   times,	  
effectively	   imposing	   a	   limit	   on	   the	   speed	   of	   trade	   execution.	   That	   would	   force	  
market	   making	   HFTs	   to	   hold	   on	   to	   positions	   for	   longer	   periods	   of	   time	   and	   thus	  
widen	  their	  spreads,	  but	  which	  might	  also	  lead	  to	  a	  more	  resilient	  stock	  market.	  	  
Recent	   research	  has	  actually	   shown	   that	   the	   continuous	  double	  auction	   	  matching	  
mechanism,	   run	  on	   limit	   order	   book	   technology,	   is	   perhaps	   not	   an	  optimal	   design	  
(Budish	  et	  al.,	  2015).	  In	  fact,	  Budish,	  Cramton	  and	  Shim	  argue	  for	  complementing	  the	  
continuous	   double	   auction	   market	   design	   with	   an	   additional	   sealed-­‐bid	   double	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63	  During	  an	   interview	  with	  an	  employee	  of	   the	  Deutchse	  Borse	  (the	  German	  stock	  
exchange),	   faulty	   circuit	   breakers	   on	  US	   trading	  platforms	  were	   singled	  out	   as	   the	  
cause	  of	  the	  Flash	  Crash.	  The	  same	  person	  assured	  us	  that	  something	  like	  the	  Flash	  
Crash	   would	   be	   very	   unlikely	   on	   the	   Deutsche	   Borse,	   as	   their	   systems	   have	   well	  
calibrated	  circuit	  breakers.	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auction	  executed	  every	  1-­‐second,	  which	  would	  eliminate	  the	  ‘’socially	  wasteful’’	  race	  
to	  zero	  as	  exhibited	  by	  HFTs.	  This	   idea	  has	  recently	  drawn	  a	   lot	  of	  attention	  as	  the	  
NYSE	  announced	  a	  plan	  to	  introduce	  a	  midday	  auction	  at	  some	  point.	  This	  would	  be	  
a	   5	  minute	   long	   auction	   similar	   to	   the	  open	   and	   close	   auction	  performed	   and	   the	  
beginning	   and	   end	   of	   the	   trading	   day	   (Bullock	   and	   Stafford,	   2015).	   The	   great	  
advantage	  of	  such	  an	  auction	  is	  that	  large	  investors	  can	  execute	  trades	  without	  the	  
danger	  of	  prices	  moving	  against	  them,	  as	  they	  would	  happen	  in	  normal	  continuous	  
trading.	   This	   is	   very	  much	   similar	   to	  what	   happens	   in	   trading	   platforms	   known	   as	  
dark-­‐pools,	  and	  is	  in	  some	  ways	  a	  replica	  of	  the	  sunshine	  auction	  mechanism	  of	  the	  
now	  defunct	  AZX	  exchange.	  Another	  interesting	  new	  development	  is	  IEX,	  which	  is	  a	  
trading	  platform	  owned	  by	  market	  participants	  such	  as	  mutual	  funds,	  hedge	  funds,	  
and	  family	  offices,	  who	  are	  particularly	  sensitive	  to	  issues	  of	  market	  fairness	  and	  the	  
quality	   of	   liquidity.	   IEX	   has	   recently	   received	   a	   lot	   of	   attention	   in	   the	   context	   of	  
Michael	  Lewis’s	  book	  of	  Flash	  Boys	  (2014).	  The	  platform	  has	  recently	  applied	  to	  be	  a	  
public	  stock	  exchange	  and	  markets	  itself	  as	  a	  venue	  providing	  a	  level	  playing	  field	  for	  
all	   participants.	   The	   many	   innovations	   of	   IEX	   include	   simpler	   order	   types,	   equal	  
access	   to	   trade	   data,	   no	   collocation	   and	   more	   importantly,	   a	   38-­‐mile	   fiber-­‐optic	  
cable	   creating	  a	  delay	   that	  deters	   the	  more	  predatory	  aspects	  of	  HFT	   (Bullock	  and	  
Stafford,	  2016).	  
All	   of	   these	   developments	   are	   a	   shift	   from	   the	   ultimate	   focus	   of	   the	   matching	  
machine	   from	   immediacy	  of	  execution	  to	  the	  reliability	  and	  quality	  of	   liquidity	  and	  
overall	   market	   resilience.	   In	   the	   context	   of	   increasing	   automation	   and	  
standardization,	  markets	  have	  obtained	  high	  levels	  of	  efficiency	  affording	  cheap	  and	  
almost	   instant	   execution.	   But	   if	   history	   and	   the	   evolution	  of	   financial	  markets	   can	  
teach	   us	   anything	   is	   that	   immediacy	   is	   perhaps	   not	   the	   only	   aim	   and	   function	   of	  
matching	   machines	   (Kirilenko	   and	   Lo,	   2013,	   p.68).	   It	   would	   be	   useful	   to	   remind	  
ourselves	   of	   the	   central	   task	   of	   the	   specialists	   and	   jobbers	   of	  modern	   exchanges,	  
namely	  to	  maintain	  a	  ‘fair	  and	  orderly	  market’’.	  Perhaps	  the	  next	  evolutionary	  step	  
of	  matching	  machine	  will	  occur	  but	  by	  unpacking	  and	  formalizing	  the	  full	  complexity	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of	  this	  phrase	  and	  the	  rules,	  practices	  and	  algorithms	  that	  supported	  it64.	  The	  future	  
of	  evolution	  of	  matching	  machines	  will	  hopefully	  entail	  more	  complex	  designs	  taking	  
all	  of	  this	  into	  account.	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64	  Marc	   Lenglet	   (2011)	   has	   recently	   highlighted	   the	   complex	   relationship	   between	  
rules	  and	  regulations	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  computer	  code	  o	  the	  other.	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Conclusions	  
	  
This	   chapter	   has	   addressed	   one	   of	   the	   most	   important	   issues	   for	   contemporary	  
matching	  machines,	  namely	  the	  new	  face	  of	  electronic	  market	  making.	  As	  we	  have	  
seen,	   the	  evolution	  of	  matching	  designs	  has	   led	   to	   the	   late	  20th	   century	   transition	  
towards	  centralized	  matching	  machines,	  based	  on	  automated	  electronic	  platforms.	  
On	  the	  floor	  of	  the	  stock	  exchange,	  human	  specialists	  would	  match	  order	  flow	  and	  
perform	  market	  making,	  that	  is	  to	  say	  provide	  liquidity	  and	  ensure	  a	  fair	  and	  orderly	  
market.	  This	  is	  no	  longer	  the	  case	  today,	  where	  trading	  in	  US	  shares	  is	  fragmentated	  
across	   a	   large	   number	   of	   exchanges,	   alternative	   trading	   venues	   such	   as	   ECNs	   and	  
dark	  pools.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  contemporary	  trading	  platforms	  matching	  is	  performed	  
on	  electronic	  order	  books	  executed	  by	  sophisticated	  matching	  engines.	  This	  state	  of	  
afairs	   affords	   direct	   market	   acces	   to	   a	   diverse	   set	   of	   market	   participants	   such	   as	  
HFTs,	  who	  now	  tend	  to	  dominate	  electronic	  market	  making.	  	  
	  
As	   we	   have	   seen	   from	   previous	   chapters,	   power	   in	   financial	   markets	   is	   best	  
understood	  as	  the	  ability	  to	  control	  order	  flow.	  Therefore,	  human	  specialists	  on	  the	  
floors	  of	  the	  exchange	  have	  always	  defended	  this	  privilege,	  because	  matching	  order	  
flow	  affords	  crucial	  advantages	  as	  well	  as	  substantial	  profits.	  In	  today’s	  situation,	  the	  
power	   struggle	   for	   the	  privilege	  of	  being	  at	   the	   centre	  of	   liquidity	   is	   a	  question	  of	  
having	  better	  algorithms	  and	  smarted	  trading	  strategies.	  This	  in	  turn	  leads	  to	  a	  arms	  
race	   driven	   by	   lower	   latencies	   of	   execution,	   constant	   optimization	   and	   large	  
investments	  in	  advanced	  IT	  capabilites,	  just	  to	  be	  one	  millisecond	  ahead	  of	  everyone	  
else.	  As	  highlighted	  by	  Andy	  Haldane,	  this	  new	  algorithmic/electronic	  ecology	  is	  best	  
understood	  as	  a	  downward	  spiral	  or	  a	  race	  to	  zero,	  with	  HFTs	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  a	  daily	  
struggle	  for	  controlling	  and	  channelling	  order	  flow.	  	  
	  
While	   all	   of	   this	   means	   that	   contemporary	  matching	  machines	   are	  more	   efficient	  
than	  the	  earlier	  designs	  of	  open	  outcry	  floor	  trading,	  there	  are	  also	  many	  concerns	  
about	   fairness,	   equal	   access	   to	   liquidity	   and	   market	   resilience.	   Leveraging	   Doyne	  
Farmer’s	  ecological	  perspective,	  the	  work	  of	  Andy	  Haldane	  on	  financial	  stability	  and	  
Mirowski’s	   theory	   of	   markomata,	   we	   argued	   for	   a	   critique	   of	   HFT	   in	   terms	   of	   its	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impact	   on	   overall	  market	   stability	   and	   resilience.	  Namely,	  while	  HFT	   firms	   are	   not	  
directly	  to	  blame	  for	  events	  such	  as	  the	  Flash	  Crash,	   these	   liquidity	  meltdowns	  are	  
perhaps	   the	  normal	  output	  of	  HFT-­‐dominated	  market	  making.	   In	  as	  much	  as	   stock	  
markets	   have	   reached	   high	   levels	   of	   efficiency	   and	   immediacy	   of	   execution,	   these	  
are	  perhaps	  not	  the	  only	  aims	  and	  functions	  of	  matching	  machines.	  We	  suggest	  that	  
contemporary	  matching	  machines	  should	  attempt	  to	  incorporate	  the	  more	  complex	  
set	   of	   rules,	   practices	   and	   techniques	   performed	  by	   the	   traditional	   human	  market	  
makers	   in	   their	   pursuit	   of	   a	   fair	   and	   orderly	  market.	   In	   fact,	   some	   of	   the	   current	  
reform	   initiatives	   and	  new	  matching	  designs	   can	  be	   interpreted	  as	   a	   shift	   in	   focus	  
from	  immediacy	  of	  execution	  to	  the	  quality	  of	  liquidity	  and	  overall	  market	  resilience.	  
This	   includes	   the	   integration	   of	   the	   continuous	   double	   auction	   with	   frequent	   call	  
auctions	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  LSE	  or	  NYSE	  or	  the	  innovative	  market	  structure	  provided	  
by	  IEX.	  This	  new	  design	  affords	  a	  level	  playing	  filed	  to	  all	  participants,	  restricting	  the	  
activity	   and	   profits	   of	   HFTs	   (Lewis,	   2014).	   Finally,	   this	   highlights	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  
design	   of	  matching	  machines	   is	   not	   simply	   a	   question	   of	   technical	   details	   but	   is	   a	  
crucial	   aspect	   of	   the	  power	  dynamics	   in	   financial	  markets,	   understood	   in	   terms	  of	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This	   chapter	   looks	   at	   the	   contemporary	   development	   of	   clearing	  machines	   such	   as	  
CCPs	   in	   the	   context	   a	   more	   complex	   type	   financial	   asset,	   Over-­‐the-­‐Counter	   (OTC)	  
derivatives.	  	  Following	  the	  2008	  crisis,	  the	  failures	  of	  Lehman	  Brothers	  and	  AIG	  have	  
raised	  many	   concerns	   about	   the	   robustness	   of	   the	   OTC	   transaction	   infrastructure.	  
During	  the	  2009	  G20	  summit	  in	  Pittsburgh,	  central	  clearing	  through	  CCPs	  emerged	  as	  
the	   ultimate	   and	   most	   effective	   solution	   for	   a	   safer	   and	   more	   sustainable	   OTC	  
derivatives	   market.	   Upon	   completing	   a	   review	   of	   the	   relevant	   literature	   on	   OTC	  
derivatives,	   we	   pursued	   a	   qualitative	   research	   through	   semi-­‐structured	   interviews	  
and	  secondary	  desk	   research.	  We	  described	  the	  development	  of	   the	  market	  and	   its	  
bilateral	   clearing	   mechanism.	   While	   this	   early	   system	   was	   a	   consequence	   of	   the	  
dealer-­‐dominated	  structure	  of	  the	  OTC	  market,	  we	  describe	  the	  transition	  towards	  a	  
new	   transaction	   machine	   based	   on	   centralized	   clearing	   (CCPs).	   	   The	   rest	   of	   the	  
chapter	   summarizes	   a	   number	   of	   30	   face-­‐to-­‐face	   and	   telephone	   interviews	   with	  
senior	  professionals	  of	  the	  OTC	  derivatives	  market.	  The	  background	  of	  the	  research	  
was	   the	   regulatory	   overhaul	   in	   the	   OTC	   derivatives	   markets,	   in	   the	   context	   of	  
legislation	   such	   as	   Dodd-­‐Frank,	   EMIR	   and	   MiFID	   II.	   Interviews	   were	   conducted	  
between	   October	   2012	   and	   June	   2013	  with	   employees	   of	   CCPs,	   exchanges,	   global	  
banks,	   trade	   associations,	   UK	   and	   EU	   regulators	   and	   independent	   consultants.	  We	  
identified	  a	  number	  of	   themes	   including	   regulation,	   standardization,	   risk,	   collateral	  
scarcity,	   transparency,	   social	   function,	   and	   shifting	   market	   dynamics.	   While	   all	  
participants	  saw	  the	  new	  regulations	  as	  a	  burden,	  there	  was	  a	  strong	  perception	  that	  
reforms	  would	  have	  asymmetric	  effects	  on	  different	  constituencies.	  We	  also	  highlight	  
the	  fact	  that	  the	  design	  of	  clearing	  machines	  is	  not	  just	  a	  technical	  issue	  but	  directly	  
impacts	  the	  power	  distribution	  within	  the	  market.	  The	  new	  regulatory	  framework	  has	  
a	  strong	  impact	  on	  dealer	  banks,	  reducing	  their	  control	  of	  the	  clearing	  function	  and	  
forcing	  them	  to	  direct	  trades	  through	  CCPs.	  More	  to	  the	  point,	  OTC	  products	  move	  to	  
a	   centrally	   cleared	   model,	   they	   also	   more	   standardized	   and	   liquid	   enough	   to	   be	  
traded	  and	  matched	  on	  electronic	  platforms,	  which	  further	  affects	  the	  OTC	  business	  
of	  banks.	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8.1	  OTC	  Derivatives	  	  
	  
	  
In	  terms	  of	  the	  different	  types	  of	  financial	  securities	  we	  have	  mostly	  focused	  on	  the	  
less	  complex	  exchange-­‐traded	  derivatives	  such	  as	  futures	  and	  options.	  In	  this	  context	  
we	   have	   seen	   the	   gradual	   emergence	   of	   exchanges	   and	   CCPs	   as	   transacting	  
machines	  allowing	  for	  centralized	  matching	  and	  clearing,	  guaranteeing	  the	  execution	  
and	   performance	   of	   contracts	   (Singh	   and	   Segoviano,	   2008;	   Gregory,	   2010).	   In	  
addition	   to	   those	   executed	   on	   public	   exchanges,	   financial	   transactions	   have	   also	  
been	  traded	  off-­‐exchange,	  directly	  between	  counterparties.	  We	  are	  referring	  here	  to	  
the	   Over-­‐The-­‐Counter	   (OTC)	   markets,	   which	   until	   recently	   were	   based	   on	   less	  
developed	   matching	   and	   clearing	   mechanism,	   mostly	   voice	   broking	   and	   manual	  
processing	   and	   confirmation.	   The	   existence	   of	   these	  markets	   is	   partially	   explained	  
because	  counterparties	  have	  an	  interest	  in	  not	  disclosing	  their	  intention	  to	  the	  rest	  
of	   the	  market	   and	   because	   their	   needs	   could	   not	   be	   fulfilled	   by	   the	   standardized	  
contracts	   traded	   on	   exchanges,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   fact	   that	   some	   securities	   were	   not	  
liquid	  enough	  for	  a	  continuous	  double	  auction	  design.	  Financial	  markets	  have	  seen	  a	  
recent	  expansion	  of	  these	  more	  tailor-­‐made	  OTC	  derivatives,	  which	  as	  of	  2007	  was	  
five	   times	   large	   than	   the	   one	   for	   exchange-­‐traded	   securities.	   The	   size	   of	   the	   OTC	  
derivatives	  market	  has	  recently	  reached	  a	  total	  notional	  of	  above	  $600	  trillion	  worth	  
of	  contracts65,	  a	  number	  that	  also	  gives	  us	  some	  understanding	  of	  the	  risk	  entailed	  
by	  these	  markets	  (Singh	  and	  Segoviano,	  2008,	  p.6).	  To	  this	  day,	  a	  number	  of	  different	  
financial	  instruments	  are	  transacted	  this	  way,	  namely	  sovereign	  bonds,	  asset-­‐backed	  
securities,	  derivatives	  such	  as	  swaps,	  larger	  blocks	  of	  stocks,	  etc.	  (Duffie,	  2012,	  p.2).	  	  
In	  terms	  of	  matching,	  OTC	  derivatives	  markets	  have	  traditionally	  been	  quote-­‐driven	  
not	  order-­‐driven.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  investors	  need	  to	  contact	  an	  OTC	  dealer	  bank,	  which	  
provides	  two-­‐sided	  quotes	  for	  a	  certain	  products	  (this	  can	  be	  over	  the	  phone	  or	  via	  
an	  electronic	  interface).	  While	  in	  order-­‐driven	  markets	  (such	  as	  contemporary	  stock	  
and	   futures	   exchanges)	   any	   participant	   can	   submit	   orders	   into	   the	   central	   order	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65	  According	  to	  the	  Bank	  of	  International	  Settlements,	  the	  total	  notional	  amounts	  of	  
OTC	  derivatives	   stands	   stood	   at	   $630	   trillion	   as	   of	  December	   2014.	   	   This	   is	   a	   very	  
large	  number	  but	  the	  more	  relevant	  one	  is	  the	  gross	  market	  value	  of	  these	  contracts,	  
which	  stood	  at	  $21	  trillion	  (http://www.bis.org/publ/otc_hy1504.htm).	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book,	   in	  quote-­‐driven	  markets	  only	  market	  makers	   can	  quote	  prices	  and	  everyone	  
else	  is	  a	  price	  taker	  (Fabozzi,	  2008).	  
	  
One	  of	  the	  most	  well	  known	  OTC	  derivatives	  is	  the	  swap,	  which	  can	  include	  interest	  
rate	   swaps,	   currency	  swaps,	  equity	   risk	   swaps,	   total	   return	  swaps	  or	  credit	  default	  
swaps,	   inflation	  swaps,	  etc.	  All	  of	  these	  financial	  products	  are	  more	  or	   less	  created	  
for	  a	  very	  specific	  need	  of	  corporates	  or	   institutional	   investors	   (asset	  management	  
firms,	   hedge	   funds,	   sovereign	   wealth	   funds,	   pension	   funds	   and	   insurance	  
companies).	   That	   being	   said,	   a	   lot	   of	   effort	   has	   been	   put	   in	   standardizing	   OTC	  
contracts,	   particularly	   under	   the	   guidance	   of	   the	   International	   Swaps	   Dealers	  
Associations	   (ISDA),	   which	   was	   founded	   in	   1985.	   The	   higher	   complexity	   of	   OTC	  
derivatives	  is	  evident	  from	  the	  basic	  outline	  of	  the	  Interest	  Rate	  Swap	  (IRS),	  which	  is	  
nevertheless	  one	  of	  the	  simpler	  OTC	  products.	  This	  particular	  type	  of	  product	  allows	  
market	   participants	   to	   change	   the	  way	   in	  which	   they	   pay	   their	   debts	   or	   to	   hedge	  
expected	  changes	  in	  the	  overall	   interest	  rate.	  Lets	  say	  that	  counterparty	  A	  borrows	  
money	  at	  a	  fixed	  rate	  of	  8%	  from	  its	  commercial	  bank	  while	  counterparty	  B	  boroughs	  
at	   a	   floating	   rate	   of	   LIBOR	   +1%	   from	   another	   bank.	   For	   the	   sake	   of	   simplicity	   we	  
assume	  that	  both	  counterparties	  borough	  the	  same	  amount	  of	  money,	  the	  notional	  
amount	  of	  the	  swap.	  	  
	  
Figure	  20:	  Example	  of	  Interest	  Rate	  Swap	  derivative	  contract	  
The	   next	   step	   is	   to	   assume	   that	   due	   to	   some	   unexpected	   event,	   counterparty	   A	  
would	  like	  to	  change	  its	  payments	  from	  fixed	  to	  variable	  and	  counterparty	  B	  would	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also	  like	  to	  swap	  its	  rate	  from	  variable	  to	  fixed.	  At	  this	  point,	  we	  need	  to	  introduce	  a	  
swap	  dealer	  (usually	  an	  investment	  bank)	  who	  can	  resolve	  this	  disparity.	  It	  does	  this	  
by	  performing	  matching,	  that	  is	  to	  say	  entering	  into	  two	  separate	  interest	  rate	  swap	  
contracts.	   It	   negotiates	   the	   first	   contract	  with	   counterparty	  B,	  whereby	   the	  dealer	  
agrees	  to	  pay	  LIBOR	  +	  1.5%	  on	  the	  notional	  amount	  and	  counterparty	  B	  pays	  9%.	  The	  
next	  step	  is	  to	  negotiate	  an	  opposite	  contract	  with	  counterparty	  A,	  whereby	  A	  pays	  
LIBOR	   +	   2%	   to	   the	   dealer	   and	   the	   dealer	   pays	   8.5%	   fixed	   on	   the	   same	   notional	  
amount.	  
	  
The	   dealer	   bank	   is	   thus	   an	   intermediary	   matching	   the	   needs	   of	   the	   two	  
counterparties	   and	  earns	   the	   spread	  between	   the	   two	   swaps	   (profits	   0.5%	   from	  B	  
and	   another	   0.5%	   form	  A).	  We	  have	   to	   keep	   in	  mind	   that	   the	   bigger	   the	   notional	  
amount	  of	  the	  swap,	  the	  bigger	  the	  profit	  for	  the	  swap	  dealer.	  What	  changes	  is	  that	  
counterparty	   A	   now	   pays	   a	   net	   variable	   rate	   of	   LIBOR	   +	   1.5%	   and	   counterparty	   B	  
pays	  a	  fixed	  rate	  of	  9.5%.	  The	  costs	  of	  achieving	  this	  transformation	  are	  effectively	  
the	   profits	   accrued	   by	   the	   dealer.	  What	   is	   even	  more	   interesting	   is	   that	   the	   two	  
counterparties	   could	   be	   multinational	   companies	   looking	   to	   hedge	   exposures	   to	  
potential	   interest	   rate	   changes,	   pension	   funds	   looking	   to	   hedge	   their	   long	   term	  
liabilities	  or	  hedge	  funds	  looking	  to	  speculate	  on	  the	  future	  movement	  of	  the	  LIBOR	  
rate.	  In	  fact,	  the	  speculative	  potential	  of	  the	  swap	  is	  immediately	  apparent	  from	  the	  
structure	   of	   the	   cash	   flows.	   Let	   say	   that	   every	   two	   months	   the	   dealer	   pays	  
counterparty	   B	   the	   difference	   between	   9%	   and	   LIBOR	   +	   1.5%	   and	   it	   pays	  
counterparty	   A	   the	   difference	   between	   LIBOR	   +2	   %	   and	   8.5%.	   What	   if	   after	   six	  
months	   LIBOR	   is	   10%.	   Counterparty	   A	   now	   effectively	   pays	   a	   net	   11.5%	   which	   is	  
higher	  than	  its	  initial	  fixed	  rate	  of	  8%.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  counterparty	  B	  continues	  to	  
pay	  9.5%	  fixed	  which	  is	  lower	  than	  the	  11%	  (LIBOR	  at	  10%	  	  +1%)	  it	  would	  have	  paid	  
without	   the	   swap.	   In	   conclusion	   if	   LIBOR	   goes	   up	  A	   stands	   to	   gain	  while	   if	   it	   goes	  
down	   B	   is	   more	   likely	   to	   gain.	   Either	   way	   the	   swap	   dealer	   earns	   the	   same	   profit	  
because	  it	  matched	  two	  offsetting	  contracts	  and	  earns	  the	  spread.	  
	  
As	  we	  can	  see	  from	  the	  figure	  above,	  even	  a	  simple	  OTC	  derivative	  is	  already	  more	  
complicated	  than	  other	  securities	  such	  as	  stocks	  or	  futures.	  While	  a	  stock	  transaction	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is	   the	   result	   of	   an	   immediate	   intention	   and	   can	   be	   settled	   very	   quickly,	   OTC	  
derivatives	   contract	  operate	  at	  different	   time	  horizons,	  and	   the	  counterparties	  are	  
tied	   together	   for	   the	   whole	   life	   of	   the	   contract.	   Unlike	   stock	   or	   futures	   markets	  
where	   central	   clearing	   is	   performed	   by	   CCPs,	   in	   bilateral	   OTC	   markets	   he	  
counterparties	  have	  to	  monitor	  and	  manage	  market	  and	  credit	  risk	  throughout	  the	  
life	  cycle	  of	  the	  contract	  and	  agree	  margin	  payments	  in	  order	  to	  manage	  the	  risk	  of	  
non-­‐payment.	  For	  this	  very	  reason,	  credit	  risk	  considerations	  are	  absolutely	  essential	  
in	  the	  case	  of	  OTC	  derivatives	  (Pirrong,	  2006).	  Nowhere	  has	  this	  been	  more	  acutely	  
evident	  than	  in	  the	  case	  of	  another	  type	  of	  OTC	  swap,	  the	  credit	  default	  swap	  (CDS).	  
Similar	  to	  the	  IRS,	  the	  CDS	  allows	  two	  counterparties	  to	  exchange	  an	  exposure	  that	  
they	   did	   not	   want	   to	   bear.	   One	   party	   buys	   protection	   against	   the	   default	   of	   a	  
corporate	  bond,	  sovereign	  debt,	  etc.	  and	  pays	  a	  premium	  upfront,	  while	   the	  other	  
offers	   insurance	  against	   such	  dramatic	  events.	  Gillian	  Tett’s	  Fool's	  Gold	   (2009)	   is	   a	  
detailed	  description	  of	  the	  development	  of	  credit	  derivatives	  in	  the	  ‘laboratories’	  of	  
JP	  Morgan	   in	   the	   early	   1990s	   (as	  well	   as	   their	   role	   in	   the	   2008	   financial	   crisis).	   In	  
1994,	  JP	  Morgan	  had	  extended	  several	  billion	  dollars	  to	  Exxon	  who	  was	  also	  facing	  
the	  possibility	  of	  very	  high	  damage	  payments	  due	   to	   the	  Valdez	  oil	   spill.	   	   This	  was	  
thus	  a	  very	  risky	  exposure	  for	  JP	  Morgan	  and	  they	  were	  obliged	  to	  hold	  substantial	  
capital	  against	  the	  possibility	  of	  an	  Exxon	  default.	  In	  order	  to	  reduce	  the	  capital	  they	  
had	  to	  hold,	  JP	  Morgan	  structured	  a	  derivative	  that	  would	  allow	  them	  to	  transfer	  the	  
credit	   default	   risk	   of	   this	   trade	   to	   a	   different	   counterparty,	   the	   European	   Bank	   of	  
Reconstruction	   and	   Development	   (EBRD).	   Having	   eliminated	   the	   credit	   risk	   of	   the	  
Exxon	  trade,	  JP	  Morgan	  could	  free	  up	  more	  capital	  and	  deploy	  it	  elsewhere.	  
	  
It	   is	   clear	   from	   these	   examples	   that	   OTC	   contracts	   are	   not	   as	   standard	   as	   more	  
simple	   securities	   and	   are	   thus	   more	   inherently	   illiquid.	   That	   is	   to	   say,	   the	   more	  
customized	  a	   contract	   is,	   the	  more	  difficult	   it	   is	   to	   transact	   it	  with	  other	   investors	  
other	  than	  the	  original	  counterparties.	  The	  lack	  of	  liquidity	  and	  increased	  complexity	  
means	   that	   most	   OTC	   contracts	   are	   not	   natural	   candidates	   for	   exchange	   trading	  
(Duffie,	   2012,	   p.6).	   Moreover	   due	   to	   the	   infrequency	   of	   publicly	   available	   prices,	  
users	  of	  such	  contracts	  need	  to	  develop	  the	  knowhow	  and	  technical	  sophistication	  in	  
order	   to	   value	   them,	   which	   is	   not	   easy	   to	   do.	   In	   addition,	   the	   need	   to	   manage	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complicated	   cash	   flows	   and	  monitor	   credit	   counterparty	   risk	  means	   that	   the	   OTC	  
markets	   are	   used	   by	   large	   financial	   institutions,	   governments,	   multinational	  
corporations	   and	   sophisticated	   investors	   (Millo	   et	   al.,	   2005),	   as	   they	   are	   the	   only	  
market	  participants	  who	  could	  bear	  the	  costs	  of	  handling	  such	  financial	  products.	  To	  
this	   day	  OTC	  markets	   are	   still	   dominated	   by	  major	   dealer	   banks	   assisted	   by	   inter-­‐
dealers	  brokers.	  Nevertheless,	  because	  of	  the	  efforts	  of	  the	  International	  Swaps	  and	  
Derivatives	   Association	   (ISDA)	   most	   OTC	   products	   have	   become	   much	   more	  
standardized,	  which	  in	  turn	  means	  that	  they	  can	  be	  more	  easily	  traded	  on	  electronic	  
platforms.	   In	   any	   case,	   before	   the	   financial	   crisis,	   the	   OTC	   market	   was	   still	   miles	  
away	   from	   the	   more	   transparent	   matching	   machines,	   based	   on	   centralized	  
electronic	  order	  books,	  used	  for	  the	  trading	  of	  stocks	  or	  futures.	  	  
	  
This	  lack	  of	  transparency	  around	  OTC	  derivatives	  was	  not	  limited	  to	  the	  way	  in	  which	  
they	  were	  traded,	  i.e.	  the	  way	  in	  which	  different	  positions	  were	  matched,	  but	  also	  in	  
terms	  of	  the	  dominant	  clearing	  model,	  which	  was	  bilateral.	  A	  famous	  example	  of	  the	  
limits	   of	   such	   arrangements	   is	   the	   failure	   of	   American	   International	   Group	   (AIG),	  
which	   had	   huge	   exposures	   through	   their	   CDS	   portfolio.	   As	   long	   as	   everything	  was	  
fine	  and	  its	  credit	  rating	  was	  secure,	  AIG	  would	  receive	  premium	  payments	  for	  the	  
CDS	  protection	  they	  were	  offering	  (Huault	  and	  Rainelli-­‐Le	  Montagner,	  2009;	  Huault	  
and	  Richard,	  2012).	  Because	  of	   its	  high	  credit	  rating,	  AIG	  was	  not	  even	  required	  to	  
post	  margin	  by	  some	  of	  its	  counterparties	  (Singh	  and	  Segoviano,	  2008,	  p.9).	  As	  losses	  
mounted	   in	   the	   securitized	  mortgage	  markets,	   AIG	  was	   asked	   to	   post	  margin	   and	  
compensate	  their	  CDS	  counterparties.	  Unfortunately,	  AIG	  failed	   in	  2008,	  when	  CDS	  
related	  losses	  compounded	  the	  firm	  wide	  risk	  failings	  in	  most	  of	   its	  other	  business,	  
such	   as	   securities	   lending.	   It	   has	   been	   argued	   that	   because	   of	   bilateral	   clearing	  
arrangements,	   the	   full	   extent	   of	   AIG’s	   exposures	   where	   not	   apparent.	   As	   long	   as	  
everything	  was	  fine	  and	  AIG’s	  credit	  rating	  was	  outstanding,	  its	  counterparties	  would	  
not	   require	   collateral	   to	   keep	   the	   positions	   open.	   As	   the	   value	   of	   that	   protection	  
skyrocketed,	   AIG	   could	   not	   post	   the	   additional	   collateral	   and	   the	   US	   Government	  
were	  forced	  to	  bailout	  AIG.	  If	  those	  trades	  had	  been	  cleared	  through	  a	  CCP	  then	  the:	  
	  
	   228	  
collateral	  calls	  still	  would	  have	  been	  problematic	  for	  AIG,	  but	  they	  would	  have	  
come	   sooner	   and	  more	   frequently.	   Hence,	   uncollateralized	   exposures	  would	  
not	   have	   been	   given	   the	   chance	   to	   build	   to	   levels	   that	   became	   systemically	  
critical	  (IMF,	  2010,	  p.9).	  
	  
The	   general	   accepted	   view	   is	   that	   if	   the	   CDS	   market	   had	   been	   centrally	   cleared,	  
these	   risky	   exposures	   would	   have	   been	   discovered	   earlier	   and	   could	   have	   been	  
collateralized	  and	  managed	  by	   a	  CCP	   (Lewandowska,	   2010b;	   Lewandowska,	   2015).	  
Following	  the	  2008	  crisis,	  both	  the	  failures	  of	  Lehman	  Brothers	  and	  AIG	  have	  raised	  
many	   concerns	   about	   the	   robustness	   of	   the	   OTC	   transaction	   infrastructure,	  
particularly	   in	  terms	  of	  clearing.	   In	  fact,	  during	  the	  2009	  G20	  summit	   in	  Pittsburgh,	  
central	   clearing	   through	   CCPs	   was	   singled	   out	   as	   the	   solution	   for	   a	   safer	   OTC	  
derivatives	   market.	   In	   the	   next	   section	   we	   will	   explore	   this	   post-­‐2009	   regulatory	  
mandate	  for	  the	  central	  clearing	  of	  OTC	  derivatives	  and	  its	  impact	  on	  various	  market	  
participants.	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8.2	  OTC	  Dealers	  and	  Central	  Clearing	  
	  
As	  we	  have	  seen,	  the	  OTC	  markets	  evolved	  around	  the	  market	  making	  activities	  of	  
large	  dealer	  banks,	  the	  so-­‐called	  G14	  dealers	  (Markose,	  2012).	  As	  clients	  may	  have	  
very	  specific	  hedging	  requirements,	  matching	  and	  market	  making	  is	  not	  as	  simple	  as	  
in	  other	  asset	  classes.	  In	  addition	  to	  this,	  the	  relative	  illiquid	  nature	  of	  OTC	  products	  
has	   traditionally	   limited	   the	   degree	   of	   standardization	   and	   thus	   the	   feasibility	   of	  
matching	  mechanisms	  as	   those	   for	  stocks	  and	   futures	   (Smyth	  and	  Wetherilt,	  2011,	  
p.332).	  Moreover,	  because	  of	  attractive	  spreads	  and	  higher	  potential	  profits	  in	  OTC	  
derivatives,	  the	  large	  dealer	  banks	  always	  had	  an	  interest	  in	  maintaining	  a	  low	  level	  
of	  transparency	  and	  standardization:	  
	  
Dealers	  have	  a	  vested	  interest	  in	  maintaining	  trade	  in	  OTC	  markets,	  where	  the	  
profitability	   of	   intermediation	   is	   enhanced	   by	   market	   opaqueness.	   Once	  
liquidity	   is	   established	   in	   OTC	   markets,	   it	   may	   be	   difficult	   for	   exchanges	   to	  
compete	  for	  a	  critical	  mass	  of	  order	  flow,	  as	   investors	  are	  naturally	  drawn	  to	  
the	  most	  liquid	  available	  market	  (Duffie,	  2012,	  p.7).	  
	  
Smyth	  and	  Wetherilt	  (2011)	  have	  provided	  a	  detailed	  account	  of	  the	  OTC	  derivatives	  
landscape	   and	   its	   transactional	   architecture.	   For	   instance,	   single-­‐dealer	   platforms	  
(SDPs)	  are	  electronic	  systems	  offered	  by	   large	  dealers	  using	  either	  click-­‐to-­‐trade	  or	  
request-­‐for-­‐quote	   types	   of	   execution.	   In	   the	   first	   instance,	   clients	   can	   choose	   the	  
maturity	   and	   the	   size	   and	   then	   decide	   whether	   to	   trade	   or	   not.	   In	   the	   second	  
instance,	  particularly	  for	  bespoke	  products,	  clients	  ask	  for	  quotes	  and	  then	  receive	  a	  
response	   from	  the	  dealer.	  There	  are	  a	   few	  alternatives	   to	  SDPs,	  namely	   the	  multi-­‐
dealer	   platforms	   provided	   by	   Bloomberg,	   Tradeweb	   (owned	   by	   Thomson	   Reuters)	  
and	  MarketAxess.	  These	  platforms	  have	  basically	   the	  same	  structure	  as	  with	  SDPs,	  
but	  prices	  are	  based	  on	  submissions	  from	  a	  variety	  of	  dealers.	  The	  advantage	  of	  such	  
arrangements	   is	   that	  clients	  can	  send	  requests	  to	  more	  than	  one	  dealer	  and	  chose	  
the	  best	  price	  (Smyth	  and	  Wetherilt,	  2011).	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The	  quote-­‐driven	  bilateral	  matching	  design	  allows	  OTC	  dealer	  banks	  to	  dominate	  the	  
market	  and	  extract	  substantial	  profits.	  Being	  a	  market	  maker	  in	  an	  opaque	  market	  is	  
certainly	  a	  useful	  advantage	  for	  large	  dealer	  banks,	  but	  it	  is	  further	  enhanced	  by	  the	  
prevailing	   use	   of	   the	   bilateral	   clearing	   model.	   That	   is	   to	   say,	   the	   level	   of	   margin	  
required	   for	   certain	   OTC	   positions	   are	   decide	   between	   the	   client	   and	   the	   dealer	  
bank.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  the	  lack	  of	  transparency	  and	  the	  risk	  entailed	  in	  such	  clearing	  
arrangements	   has	   led	   to	   spectacular	   failures	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	   recent	   financial	  
crisis	  (Singh	  and	  Segoviano,	  2008).	  By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  20th	  century,	  most	  asset	  classes	  
had	   adopted	   one	   form	   or	   the	   other	   of	   central	   clearing	   through	   a	   CCP	   (Kroszner,	  
1999).	   Monitoring,	   transparency,	   margining	   and	   default	   fund	   contributions	   are	  
normal	   risk	   management	   practices	   performed	   by	   CCPs	   in	   the	   case	   of	   stock	   and	  
futures	  markets	  (Bliss	  and	  Steigerwald,	  2006).	   In	  the	  case	  of	  OTC	  derivatives,	  there	  
was	   not	   incentive	   for	   dealer 66 	  banks	   to	   mutualize	   their	   credit	   risk	   through	   a	  
clearinghouse	   or	   a	   CCP.	   In	   fact,	   it	   has	   been	   argued	   that	   the	   substantial	   difference	  
between	   order-­‐driven	   public	   exchange	   markets	   and	   quote-­‐driven	   OTC	   markets	   is	  
that	  the	  latter	  do	  not	  mutualize	  default	  risk	  (Pirrong,	  2006,	  p.24).	  	  	  
	  
Consequently,	  even	  at	  the	  beginning	  at	  the	  21st	  century,	  most	  of	  the	  OTC	  derivatives	  
markets	  were	  using	  the	  more	  primitive	  bilateral	  clearing	  arrangements,	  relying	  more	  
on	  the	  capacity	  of	  large	  dealer	  banks	  to	  monitor	  and	  evaluate	  the	  counterparty	  risk	  
of	  their	  clients.	  The	  figure	  below	  is	  an	  illustration	  of	  the	  traditional	  bilateral	  clearing	  
model	   servicing	   this	   market	   pre-­‐2009.	   Large	   financial	   institutions	   dominate	   the	  
transaction	  life	  cycle	  but	  are	  supported	  by	  a	  complex	  ecosystem	  of	  information	  and	  
technology	  providers,	  payment	  and	  settlement	  platforms,	  inter-­‐dealer	  brokers,	  trade	  
information	   warehouses	   and	   trade	   organizations	   such	   as	   ISDA	   promoting	  
standardized	  contractual	  terms.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66	  This	  includes	  likes	  of	  JP	  Morgan,	  Bank	  of	  America,	  Citi,	  Deutsche	  Bank,	  Goldman	  
Sachs,	  Morgan	  Stanley,	  etc.	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Figure	  21:	  Bilateral	  clearing	  model	  for	  OTC	  derivatives	  
The	  downside	  of	  this	  model	  is	  that	  dealer	  banks	  are	  managing	  counterparty	  risk	  on	  a	  
bilateral	   basis,	  which	  means	   that	   they	   are	   also	   susceptible	   to	   runs	   (Pirrong,	   2006,	  
p.43).	   The	   situation	   is	   not	   so	   different	   from	   depositors	   who	   can	   collectively	   bring	  
down	  a	  bank,	  as	  seen	  in	  the	  situation	  faced	  by	  Bear	  Sterns67	  and	  Lehman	  Brothers68	  
in	   2008.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   market	   stress,	   rating	   downgrades,	   etc.,	   any	   of	   the	   bank’s	  
counterparties	  can	  ‘pull’	  on	   it	  to	  post	  more	  collateral.	  There	   is	  thus	  an	  incentive	  to	  
be	  the	  first	  to	  exit	  a	  position	  with	  counterparties	  that	  are	  perceived	  to	  be	  weak	  or	  
whose	  creditworthiness	  is	  deteriorating,	  which	  ultimately	  leads	  to	  a	  run	  on	  the	  bank	  
(Pirrong,	  2006,	  p.39).	  Moreover,	   in	   times	  of	  market	  stress,	  participants	  also	  have	  a	  
tendency	  to	  reduce	  trading	  which	  leads	  to	  reduced	  liquidity,	  compounding	  any	  initial	  
fears	  (Smyth	  and	  Wetherilt,	  2011,	  p.331).	  In	  this	  sense,	  confidence	  is	  crucial	  for	  OTC,	  
as	   the	   market	   could	   not	   sustain	   itself	   if	   participants	   can’t	   adequately	   manage	  
counterparty	  risk	  (Lee,	  2011,	  p.62).	  The	  2008	  financial	  crisis	  brought	  to	  light	  the	  risk	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67	  On	  the	  14th	  of	  March	  2008,	  a	  number	  of	  money	  market	  funds	  decided	  to	  exit	  their	  
positions	  with	  Bear	   Sterns,	   refusing	   to	  engage	   in	   repo	   contracts	  even	   though	  Bear	  
Sterns	   could	   provide	   adequate	   collateral.	   The	   investment	   bank	   thus	   went	   from	  
having	  several	  billions	  dollars	  to	  negative	  in	  a	  few	  days,	  which	  led	  to	  its	  collapse.	  	  
68	  In	  September	  of	  2008,	  Lehman	  Brothers	  received	  a	  $5	  billion	  collateral	  call	  from	  JP	  
Morgan,	  one	  of	  its	  largest	  counterparties.	  A	  few	  months	  earlier,	  JP	  Morgan	  required	  
no	   collateral.	  Moreover,	   based	   on	   JP	  Morgan’s	   decision,	   Citigroup	   also	   decided	   to	  
take	   similar	   action.	   This	   compounded	   Lehman’s	   liquidity	   problems	   leading	   to	   its	  
failure	  on	  the	  15th	  of	  September	  2008.	  
	   232	  
and	  limitations	  of	  bilateral	  clearing	  mechanisms	  in	  the	  OTC	  derivatives	  markets.	   	   In	  
the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  crisis,	  the	  2009	  G20	  summit	  in	  Pittsburgh	  decided	  on	  a	  radical	  
overhaul	  of	  the	  OTC	  market	  infrastructure,	  namely	  that:	  
All	   standardized	  OTC	   derivative	   contracts	   should	   be	   traded	   on	   exchanges	   or	  
electronic	   trading	  platforms,	  where	   appropriate,	   and	   cleared	   through	   central	  
counterparties	  by	  end-­‐2012	  at	   the	   latest.	  OTC	  derivative	   contracts	   should	  be	  
reported	   to	   trade	   repositories.	   Non-­‐centrally	   cleared	   contracts	   should	   be	  
subject	  to	  higher	  capital	  requirements	  (FSB,	  2010).	  
The	  introduction	  of	  centralized	  clearing	  corrects	  some	  the	  fundamental	  design	  flaws	  
allowing	  for	  monitoring	  and	  risk	  mitigation	  based	  on	  much	  more	  precise	  information	  
as	   every	   dealer	   bank	   has	   to	   clear	   through	   a	   CCP.	   As	   we	   can	   see	   from	   the	   figure	  
below,	  the	  CCP	   interposes	   itself	  at	   the	  center	  of	   the	  clearing	  ecosystem,	  becoming	  
the	  central	  counterparty	  to	  everyone.	  
	  
Figure	  22:	  Central	  clearing	  model	  for	  OTC	  derivatives	  
	  
The	  CCP	  is	  thus	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  a	  complex	  informational	  ecology,	  performing	  central	  
clearing	  and	  managing	  the	  collective	  counterparty	  risk	  of	  the	  market.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  a	  
transaction	  between	  an	  institutional	  investors	  and	  a	  dealer	  bank,	  the	  trade	  can	  still	  
be	  matched	  either	  directly	  over	  the	  phone	  or	  through	  a	  dealer	  owned	  platform,	  or	  
through	  an	   inter-­‐dealer	  broker	  owned	  platform.	  After	   the	   transaction	   is	   confirmed	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and	  registered	  in	  a	  Trade	  Information	  Warehouse,	  the	  CCPs	  can	  start	  the	  first	  stage	  
of	   clearing,	   namely	   the	   novation	   process.	   This	   replaces	   the	   initial	   transaction	  with	  
two	   separate	   contracts	   between	   the	  CCP	   and	   the	   two	   counterparties.	   As	  we	  have	  
seen,	  this	  is	  essential	  in	  order	  for	  the	  CCP	  to	  guarantee	  the	  initial	  trade	  and	  manage	  
the	  risk	  of	  default.	  Moreover,	  CCPs	  receive	  price	  information	  from	  providers	  such	  as	  
Markit	  (aggregated	  from	  data	  submitted	  from	  the	  large	  dealer	  banks),	  which	  in	  turn	  
allows	  the	  CCP	  to	  set	  initial	  and	  variation	  margins	  (Lewandowska,	  2010a).	  	  	  
	  
We	  have	   thus	   far	  attempted	   to	  provide	  a	  sketch	   for	   the	   transition	  of	  OTC	  markets	  
from	   bilateral	   to	   centralized	   clearing.	   As	   we	   have	   seen,	   this	   process	   of	   redesign	  
entails	   numerous	   intricate	   details	   as	   to	   the	   basic	   architecture	   of	   these	   markets.	  	  
Nevertheless,	   as	  we	  have	   shown	  on	   several	   occasions,	   the	   question	  of	   design	   and	  
evolution	  of	  transaction	  machine	  cannot	  be	  reduced	  to	  specific	  technical	  details	  but	  
is	  also	  a	  question	  of	  politics.	  	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  the	  imposition	  of	  a	  centralized	  clearing	  
machine	  leads	  to	  a	  substantial	  redistribution	  of	  power	  within	  these	  markets.	  We	  will	  
dedicate	   the	   rest	  of	   the	  chapter	   to	  gaining	  a	  better	  grasp	  of	   this	   reorganization	  of	  
the	  OTC	  derivatives	  markets	  in	  the	  context	  of	  centralized	  clearing.	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8.3	  Interviews	  on	  OTC	  Central	  Clearing	  Reforms	  	  
	  
8.3.1	  Methods	  and	  themes	  
	  
As	  we	  began	  to	  explore	  the	  topic	  of	  OTC	  derivatives	  clearing	  reforms	  it	  became	  clear	  
that	  a	  review	  of	  the	  literature,	  publicly	  available	  information	  and	  news	  would	  not	  be	  
sufficient	  in	  understanding	  the	  full	  extent	  of	  these	  changes.	  There	  was	  also	  a	  lack	  of	  
clarity	  as	  details	  of	  these	  reforms	  were	  still	  being	  negotiated	  and	  debated	   in	  2012-­‐
2013.	   In	   trying	   to	   get	   a	   better	   understanding	   of	   a	   situation	   in	   flux,	   we	   set	   out	   to	  
reach	  out	  and	  interview	  individuals	  directly	  involved	  in	  the	  ongoing	  transformations.	  
What	   began	   as	   a	   focused	   inquiry	   led	   to	   a	   number	   of	   encounters	   and	   the	   idea	   of	  
pursuing	  several	  interviews.	  Therefore	  the	  next	  section	  summarizes	  a	  number	  of	  30	  
face-­‐to-­‐face	   and	   telephone	   interviews	   with	   professionals	   of	   the	   financial	   services	  
industry,	   exploring	   the	   overhaul	   of	   the	   OTC	   derivatives	  market.	   The	   research	  was	  
predominantly	   conducted	   in	   London	   and	   Brussels,	   and	   over	   the	   phone	   with	  
professionals	   in	   Paris	   and	   Frankfurt.	   The	   background	   of	   the	   research	   was	   the	  
regulatory	  changes	  in	  the	  context	  of	  legislation	  such	  as	  Dodd-­‐Frank,	  EMIR	  and	  MiFID	  
II.	  First,	  we	  will	  discuss	  the	  methodology	  adopted	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	   this	  empirical	  
research.	   Upon	   completing	   a	   comprehensive	   review	   of	   the	   relevant	   literature	   on	  
OTC	   derivatives,	   we	   pursued	   a	   qualitative	   research	   through	   semi-­‐structured	  
interviews	   and	   secondary	   desk	   research	   (mostly	   online/media	   publications,	   more	  
recent	  academic	  papers,	  conference	  papers,	  webinars,	  etc.).	  	  Secondly,	  the	  results	  of	  
the	  research	  are	  presented	  through	  a	  review	  of	  the	  main	  themes	  of	  the	  interviews.	  	  
	  
It	   is	   important	   to	   highlight	   one	   of	   the	   limitations	   of	   the	   interviews,	   as	   the	   results	  
represent	  only	  a	  limited	  snapshot	  at	  a	  particular	  point	  in	  time.	  They	  were	  conducted	  
between	   October	   2012	   and	   June	   2013	   with	   employees	   of	   Clearinghouses/CCPs,	  
Exchanges,	   Banks,	   Financial	   Trade	   Associations,	   UK	   and	   EU	   Regulators	   and	  
independent	   consultants.	   Each	   semi-­‐structured	   interview	   lasted	   between	   60-­‐90	  
minutes	   and	   a	   research	  outline	   and	   interview	  questions	  were	   emailed	   in	   advance.	  
While	   we	   set	   out	   with	   a	   semi-­‐structured	   approach,	   discussions	   were	   ultimately	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dominated	  by	  open-­‐ended	  questions,	  through	  which	  interviewees	  were	  encouraged	  
to	  expand	  were	  appropriate.	  This	  was	  inevitable	  in	  as	  much	  as	  we	  were	  dealing	  with	  
topics	  and	   issues	  that	  were	  still	  very	  much	   in	  flux.	  During	  the	   interviews,	  extensive	  
notes	  were	   taken	   and	   some	  meetings	  were	   recorded	   and	   transcribed,	   but	   a	  most	  
conversations	   were	   no	   recorded	   due	   to	   confidentiality	   issues.	   In	   fact,	   all	  
interviewees	  requested	  to	  remain	  anonymous	  and	  their	  views	  confidential	  as	  most	  
were	   directly	   involved	   in	   ongoing	   negotiations/dialogue	   with	   regulators	   or	   policy	  
makers.	  This	   research	  coincided	  with	  a	  crucial	  period	   for	   the	  OTC	  markets,	  namely	  
with	  some	  of	   the	   final	  decisions	  on	  essential	  details	  of	   the	  new	  regulatory	   regime.	  
Consequently,	   people	   in	   the	   industry,	   specifically	   banks	   and	   clearinghouses,	   were	  
understandably	  very	  cautious	  about	  opinions	  and	  views	  they	  shared	  with	  outsiders.	  	  
	  
The	  first	  step	  entailed	  identifying	  the	  relevant	  parties	  involved	  in	  the	  overhaul	  of	  the	  
OTC	  derivatives	  markets	  (regulators	  such	  as	  FSA	  and	  EU	  Commission,	  banks	  such	  as	  
Citi,	   Deutsche	   Bank	   and	   JP	   Morgan,	   clearinghouses	   such	   as	   LCH.Clearnet,	   Eurex,	  
DTCC,	   CME	   Clearing,	   trade	   associations	   such	   as	   ISDA,	   FOA,	   FESE,	   AFME,	   etc.).	  
Through	  secondary	  desk	  research,	  we	  identified	  relevant	  individuals	  and	  approached	  
them	  either	  over	  email	  or	  cold	  calling.	  Potential	   interviewees	  were	  selected	  on	  the	  
basis	   of	   their	   experience	   and	   knowledge	   of	   the	   OTC	   derivatives	   markets.	   All	  
interviewees	  had	  a	  good	  understanding	  of	  current	  regulatory	  reforms	  and	  most	  were	  
frequent	  speakers	  on	  the	  conference	  circuit.	  Given	  the	  sample	  used	  and	  short	  time	  
interval	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  make	  any	  ambitious	  claims	  about	  the	  representativeness	  of	  this	  
research.	   Nevertheless,	   the	   diversity	   of	   the	   pool	   of	   interviewees	  was	   a	   deliberate	  
choice	   in	   order	   to	   capture	   a	   comprehensive	   perspective	   and	   to	   collect	   as	   much	  
relevant	  data	  as	  possible.	  This	  is	  precisely	  the	  reason	  why	  we	  have	  also	  interviewed	  a	  
number	  of	  consultants	  who	  were	  advising	   industry	  participants	  on	  how	  to	  respond	  
to	  the	  new	  regulatory	  regime.	  Their	  input	  was	  particularly	  useful	  as	  they	  allowed	  us	  
to	  cross	  check	  the	  main	  themes	  emerging	  out	  of	  the	  discussions.	  As	  they	  stood	  both	  
outside	   and	   were	   also	   involved	   in	   the	   topics	   discussed,	   they	   acted	   as	   a	   crucial	  
benchmark	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  interviews.	  
	  
We	   finally	   constructed	   a	   narrative	   elaborating	   on	   the	   following	   main	   issues	   and	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themes:	   regulation,	   standardization,	   risk,	   transparency,	   social	   function	   and	   shifting	  
market	   dynamics.	   In	   each	   case,	   the	   discussion	   starts	   from	  a	   general	   point	   of	   view	  
(market	  stability,	  systemic	  risk,	  investor	  protection,	  etc.)	  and	  identifies	  certain	  crucial	  
details	  of	   the	  ongoing	   regulatory	  overhaul.	  While	   there	  was	  a	  broad	  consensus	  on	  
most	   issues,	   participants	   from	   different	   constituencies	   (banks,	   clearinghouses,	  
regulators)	   had	   different	   positions	   on	   the	   more	   granular	   details	   of	   the	   new	  
regulatory	  regime.	  Apparently	  technical	  questions	  such	  as	  which	  OTC	  derivatives	  can	  
be	   standardized,	   the	   level	   of	   transparency	   for	   certain	   products,	   the	   margin	  
requirement	  for	  becoming	  a	  clearing	  member,	  what	  qualifies	  as	  eligible	  collateral	  or	  
should	   CCPs	   be	   connected	   or	   standalone	   structures,	   also	   turn	   out	   to	   be	   political	  
issues.	   That	   is	   to	   say,	   as	   a	   new	   clearing	  machine	  was	   being	   constructed,	   all	   these	  
small	   details	   were	   not	   just	   technocratic	   in	   nature,	   but	   were	   leading	   to	   radically	  
different	   power	   dynamics.	   The	   overall	   direction	   of	   the	   redesign	   of	   the	   clearing	  
machine	   was	   indicative	   of	   the	   superior	   power	   position	   of	   regulators	   and	   CCPs	   in	  
relation	  to	  the	  previously	  dominating	  dealer	  banks.	  With	  the	  move	  from	  bilateral	  to	  
central	   clearing,	   CCPs	   become	   the	   central	   hubs	   for	   processing	   and	   clearing	   OTC	  
derivatives.	  As	  we	  will	  see,	  this	  has	  major	  consequences	  for	  dealer	  banks	  but	  all	  for	  
the	  rest	  of	  the	  OTC	  markets.	  This	  reiterates	  our	  assertion	  that	  transaction	  machines	  
are	  crucial	  for	  understanding	  power	  in	  financial	  markets	  
	  
	   	  




Signed	  into	  law	  on	  21	  July	  2010,	  the	  Dodd-­‐Frank	  act	  represents	  a	  major	  overhaul	  of	  
US	   financial	  markets.	   The	   ultimate	   aim	  was	   to	   introduce	   transparency	   to	   the	  OTC	  
derivatives	   markets	   through	   mandatory	   central	   clearing	   and	   electronic	   trading	  
where	   possible.	   Across	   the	   Atlantic,	   the	   European	   Commission	   proposed	   a	   similar	  
piece	   of	   legislation,	   the	   so-­‐called	   European	   Markets	   Infrastructure	   Regulation	  
(EMIR).	   	  While	   central	   clearing	   under	   EMIR	   is	   scheduled	   to	   come	   into	   effect	   from	  
April	   2016,	   the	   new	   rules	   have	   already	   been	   implemented	   in	   the	  US.	   In	   any	   case,	  
both	  pieces	  of	  legislation	  are	  a	  response	  to	  the	  2009	  G20	  agenda	  and	  represent	  an	  
important	  transformation	  of	  the	  OTC	  market	  structure.	  In	  fact,	  the	  radically	  different	  
nature	   of	   incoming	   regulation	   has	   been	   a	   recurring	   theme	   throughout	   all	   the	  
interviews.	   Pre-­‐crisis,	   OTC	   derivatives	   were	   under	   relatively	   light	   regulatory	  
oversight.	  While	   there	  were	   a	   series	   of	   industry	   initiatives	   to	   clear	   swaps,	   central	  
clearing	  did	  not	  become	  an	  industry	  wide	  trend.	  In	  that	  context,	  the	  ruling	  paradigm	  
was	  that	  the	  market	  can	  self-­‐regulate	  and	  that	  unilateral	  state	  regulation	  would	  do	  
more	  harm	  than	  good.	  This	  state	  of	  affairs	  ended	  in	  2008,	  as	  the	  financial	  crisis	  has	  
spurred	  an	  inflation	  of	  proactive	  regulatory	  initiatives.	  	  
	  
Post	  2008,	  the	  political	  and	  social	  pressure	  to	  do	  something	  led	  to	  the	  decision	  that	  
substantial	   reform	   was	   urgently	   needed.	   As	   one	   interviewee	   put	   it:	   ‘’everything	  
technical	   is	   political,	   regulation	   is	   not	   a	   technical	   activity	   of	   cost	   and	   benefits’’	  
(Consultant,	   OTC	   derivatives).	   In	   the	   US,	   it	   was	   the	   Commodity	   Futures	   Trading	  
Commission	   (CFTC)	   that	   took	   centre	   stage	   as	   the	   clearing	   of	   derivatives	  
automatically	  meant	  an	  expansion	  of	  its	  remit	  and	  powers.	  In	  Europe,	  it	  was	  the	  EU	  
Commission	  and	  other	  European	  regulators	  that	  supported	  central	  clearing	  seen	  as	  a	  
way	   to	   bolster	   their	   influence.	   The	   entities	   that	   had	   the	   most	   to	   lose	   from	   this	  
overhaul	  are	  the	  ones	  benefiting	  from	  the	  already	  existing	  transaction	  machines,	  the	  
so-­‐called	  major	   swap	  participants,	   i.e.	   the	   large	  dealer	  banks	  operating	   in	   the	  OTC	  
arena.	  
	  
	   238	  
Within	   financial	   services,	   players	   respond	   when	   their	   interest	   are	   affected.	  
Large	  banks	  trading	  in	  derivatives	  certainly	  don’t	  like	  the	  regulation	  as	  it	  takes	  
away	  a	  very	  profitable	  line	  of	  business	  (Senior	  Economist,	  UK	  Regulator).	  
	  
Echoing	   this	   view,	   interviewees	   from	   banks	   and	   certain	   trade	   associations	   were	  
particularly	  concerned	  about	  the	  shifts	  in	  regulatory	  regimes	  and	  possible	  regulatory	  
overshooting.	   In	   some	   instances	   they	   argued	   that	   problems	   occurring	   in	   certain	  
markets	  and	  with	  certain	  participants	   led	  to	  unnecessary	  wholesale	  changes	  across	  
the	  board.	  More	  to	  the	  point,	  their	  position	  was	  that	  financial	  markets	  are	  complex	  
systems	   that	   should	   be	   handled	   with	   great	   care.	   One	   way	   to	   argue	   for	   this	   was	  
through	   the	   use	   technological	   metaphors	   and	   analogies	   between	   the	   financial	  
system	   and	   other	   complex	   systems.	   One	   participant	   suggested	   regulators	   and	  
industry	  professionals	  could	  learn	  a	  lot	  from	  the	  past	  experience	  with	  other	  complex	  
technical	   systems	   such	   as	   nuclear	   power	   plants	   and	   air	   transport.	   All	   those	   areas	  
abound	  with	  breakdowns,	  accidents	  and	  major	  catastrophes.	  The	  major	  difference	  is	  
that	   in	  all	  of	   those	  cases	   it	   is	  possible	   to	  perform	  crash	   tests	  and	  rigorous	   forensic	  
procedures	  are	  in	  place	  once	  something	  goes	  wrong.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  financial	  markets,	  
we	  are	  not	  even	  close	   to	   ideal	  experimental	   conditions,	   as	   it	  would	   ‘’be	  very	  hard	  
and	   dangerous	   to	   crash	   test	   the	   capital	   markets’’	   (Consultant,	   OTC	   Derivatives).	  
While	   that	   is	   true,	   the	   recent	   adoption	   of	   stress	   tests	   for	   systemically	   important	  
financial	  institutions	  is	  certainly	  a	  step	  in	  the	  right	  direction.	  
	  
Professionals	   from	   CCPs	   were	   less	   concerned	   about	   incoming	   regulation,	   as	   it	  
represents	   a	   new	   set	   of	   opportunities	   for	   their	   respective	   businesses	   with	   more	  
products	   being	   diverted	   to	   their	   platforms	   for	   central	   clearing.	   Nevertheless,	   the	  
new	   regulatory	   frameworks	   were	   generally	   seen	   as	   too	   complex	   and	   therefore	  
difficult	   to	   understand	   and	   implement.	   In	   as	  much	   as	   regulation	   can	   help	   restore	  
confidence,	  there	  was	  genuine	  concern	  around	  regulatory	  overshooting.	  Repeatedly,	  
interviewees	  stated	  that	  current	  regulation	  is	  to	  a	  certain	  extent	  suffocating	  and	  that	  
there	   will	   be	   some	   rolling-­‐back	   of	   regulation,	   eventually.	   In	   fact,	   the	   complicated	  
nature	   of	   regulation	   was	   a	   recurring	   theme	   as	   most	   participants	   characterized	  
regulation	   as	   too	   detailed	   and	   demanding.	   This	   has	   been	   evident	   from	   several	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interviews,	  were	  people	  argued	  that	  ‘’level	  1	  regulation	  is	  too	  inflated’’	  (Regulatory	  
Affairs	  Executive,	  Bank),	  referencing	  the	  move	  from	  an	  environment	  based	  on	  self-­‐
regulation	  towards	  more	  proactive	  regulatory	  mandate.	  This	  was	  compounded	  by	  a	  
shift	  in	  the	  EU	  Commission’s	  approach	  from	  an	  emphasis	  on	  directives,	  where	  there	  
is	  some	  flexibility	  in	  interpretation,	  to	  straightforward	  regulation.	  This	  shift	  was	  seen	  
as	  a	  direct	  consequence	  of	  the	  lessons	  learned	  during	  2008,	  ‘’as	  it	  had	  become	  clear	  
that	  Armageddon	  is	  possible’’	  (Policy	  Officer,	  European	  regulator).	  While	  regulators	  
conceded	  that	  the	  OTC	  derivatives	  reform	  is	  a	  difficult	  process	  that	  affects	  all	  market	  
participants,	  the	  goal	  was	  to	  restore	  the	  reputation	  of	  financial	  services	  industry	  as	  a	  
whole.	   Echoing	   the	   concerns	   of	   industry	   professionals,	   regulators	   were	   also	  
concerned	  about	  potential	   regulatory	  overshooting,	  but	   stressed	   the	  necessity	  and	  
inevitability	   of	   reforms.	   Even	   more	   interesting,	   regulators	   were	   particularly	  
concerned	   about	   the	   degree	   of	   harmonization	   across	   national	   boundaries.	   The	  
convergence	   of	   regulatory	   regimes	   was	   seen	   as	   essential	   in	   order	   to	   prevent	   any	  
regulatory	   arbitrage,	   so	   it	   was	   important	   that	   crucial	   details	   shouldn’t	   be	   left	   to	  
national	  interpretation.	  	  
	  
The	  stated	  aims	  of	  reforms	  revolved	  around	  systemic	  stability,	  market	  integrity	  and	  
efficiency	   and	   last	   but	   not	   least,	   investor	   protection.	   Relative	   to	   theses	   desired	  
outcomes,	   the	   regulators	   themselves	   face	   a	   set	   of	   contradictory	   constraints.	   In	  
periods	   of	   sustained	   growth	   and	   normal	   markets,	   regulators	   were	   told	   not	   to	   do	  
anything,	  as	  the	   ‘’market	  takes	  care	  of	   itself’’.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	   in	  times	  of	  crisis	  
the	  regulatory	  bodies	  got	  most	  of	   the	  blame	  for	   ’’sleeping	  on	  the	   job’’	   (Regulatory	  
Officer,	   EU	  Commission).	   This	   frustration	  was	  often	  voiced,	  namely	   that	   regulators	  
get	  no	  credit	  or	  praise	  when	  things	  go	  well	  but	  get	  most	  of	  the	  blame	  when	  things	  go	  
wrong.	  This	   state	  of	  affairs	  was	  also	   seen	  as	  being	   the	  cause	  of	  discontinuous	  and	  
asymmetric	  interventions.	  This	  has	  been	  evidenced	  during	  one	  interview	  in	  which	  a	  
senior	   officer	   of	   an	   EU	   institution	   suggested	   that	   the	   current	   reforms	   are	   also	   a	  
question	   of	   momentum:	   ‘’some	   regulators	   did	   not	   want	   to	   miss	   the	   chance	   to	  
regulate,	   as	   it	   became	   legitimate	   to	   do	   so	   after	   2008’’	   (Regulatory	   Officer,	   EU	  
Commission).	  In	  other	  words,	  there	  are	  strong	  incentives	  for	  regulatory	  overshooting	  
built	  into	  the	  system	  due	  to	  the	  difficult	  position	  that	  regulators	  find	  themselves	  in.	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A	  majority	  of	   interviewees	  acknowledged	  that,	   in	  the	  post	  2008	  era,	  regulation	  has	  
changed	   both	   its	   scope	   and	   its	   scale.	   Before	   the	   2008	   crisis	   light	   touch	   regulation	  
was	   the	   established	   norm.	   Within	   the	   context	   of	   Dodd-­‐Frank	   and	   EMIR,	   macro-­‐
prudential	  regulation	  and	  focus	  on	  systemic	  risk	  are	  the	  two	  defining	  features	  of	  the	  
new	  regulatory	  regimes.	  As	  the	  clearing	  machine	  of	  OTC	  derivatives	  markets	  is	  being	  
reconfigured	   it	   becomes	   clear	   that	   the	   pressures	   and	   constraints	   of	   regulatory	  
authorities	  are	  the	  main	  driver	  of	  this	  new	  design.	  From	  the	  regulators	  point	  of	  view,	  
the	  reforms	  are	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  the	  whole	  market,	  including	  the	  dealer	  banks,	  CCPs	  
and	  wider	   participants	   (IMF,	   2010),	   but	   they	   also	   affect	   the	   distribution	   of	   power	  
within	  this	  market.	  Most	  regulators	  saw	  the	  2009	  G20	  decision	  as	  a	  signal	  for	  them	  
to	   enter	   the	   OTC	  market	   and	   transform	   the	   regulatory	   approach	   from	   incentives-­‐
based	   to	  detailed	   intervention,	   that	   is	   to	   say:	   ‘’there	  was	   a	  need	   to	  do	   something	  
politically,	   which	   was	   welcomed	   by	   some	   interested	   parties	   in	   the	   market’’	  
(Consultant,	   OTC	   derivatives).	   Thus	   the	   regulatory	   reforms	   represented	   a	  
convergence	   between	   a	   political	   commitment	   at	   the	   G20	   level,	   an	   opportunity	  
window	  exploited	  by	  regulators	  and	  vested	  interests	  of	  the	  CCPs	  that	  were	  already	  
clearing	  OTC	  derivatives	  and	  wanted	  to	  increase	  their	  market	  share.	   	  




As	  we	  have	  seen,	  OTC	  derivatives	  are	  not	  as	  liquid	  or	  as	  standardized	  as	  more	  simple	  
financial	  securities	  such	  as	  stock	  and	  futures.	  For	  example,	  a	  CDS	  depends	  on	  binary	  
events	  (whether	  a	  company	  defaults	  or	  not),	  which	  can	  be	  very	  difficult	  to	  manage.	  
While	  there	  are	  a	  lot	  of	  economic	  benefits	  in	  using	  these	  instruments,	  they	  have	  also	  
proved	  to	  be	  problematic	  mainly	  because	  of	  their	  capacity	  to	  spread	  risk	  through	  the	  
financial	   system	   (Moskow,	   2006,	   p.47)(Singh	   and	   Segoviano,	   2008).	   Credit	  
derivatives	   such	   as	   CDS	   have	   historically	   not	   been	   cleared	   through	   a	   CCP	   but	   the	  
2008	  crisis	  has	   forced	   the	  need	   to	  move	   them	   to	  a	   centrally	   cleared	  environment.	  
Overall,	   the	   people	   interviewed	   acknowledged	   that	   a	   change	   had	   occurred	   in	   the	  
way	   in	  which	  regulators	  understand	  the	  costs	  and	  benefits	  of	  OTC	  derivatives.	  The	  
crisis	  has	  made	  it	  clear	  that	  most	  OTC	  products	  need	  to	  be	  centrally	  cleared,	  but	  this	  
begs	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  all	  OTC	  products	  are	  eligible	  for	  central	  clearing.	  
	  
The	   difference	   between	   the	  more	   standard	   products	   (shares,	   futures	   and	  options)	  
and	   OTC	   products	   (swaps)	   is	   not	   simply	   a	   question	   of	   complexity	   but	   also	   one	   of	  
more	   complex	   and	   longer	   life	   cycles.	   For	   instance,	   contracts	   such	   as	   CDS	   can	   be	  
traded	   frequently	   at	   first	   but	   become	   very	   illiquid	   as	   they	   approach	   maturity	  
(Pirrong,	   2011,	   p.18).	   In	   trying	   to	   remedy	   some	   of	   these	   issues,	   the	   International	  
Swaps	  and	  Dealers	  Association	   (ISDA)	  has	  been	  at	   the	   forefront	  of	   standardization	  
and	  transparency	  of	  CDS	  contractual	   terms.	   	  Without	  earlier	   industry-­‐led	   initiatives	  
as	   the	   ISDA	   Master	   Agreement,	   the	   present	   transition	   towards	   central	   clearing	  
would	  have	  been	  even	  more	  difficult.	  While	  some	  products	  are	  simply	  not	  standard	  
or	   liquid	   enough,	   most	   OTC	   derivatives	   can	   be	   move	   to	   a	   centrally	   cleared	  
environment:	  
	  
(…)	   the	   vast	   majority	   of	   bilateral	   interest	   rate	   swap	   and	   index-­‐based	   CDS	  
contracts	   are	   expected	   to	   move	   to	   CCPs,	   as	   are	   most	   single-­‐name	   CDS	  
contracts.	   However,	   commodity-­‐based,	   equity-­‐based,	   and	   foreign-­‐exchange-­‐
based	  derivatives	  will	  be	  harder	  to	  move	  (IMF,	  2010,	  p.10)	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Any	   concern	   about	   the	   eligibility	   of	   OTC	   products	   for	   central	   clearing	   ultimately	  
relates	  to	  their	  degree	  of	  standardization.	  Standardization	  is	  the	  process	  by	  which	  a	  
product	  becomes	  mature,	  liquid,	  and	  simple	  enough	  to	  be	  transacted	  frequently	  and	  
in	  large	  volumes.	  All	  of	  this	  is	  a	  prerequisite	  for	  CCPs	  to	  be	  able	  demand	  margin	  for	  
these	   products,	   and	   for	   their	   lifecycle	   to	   be	   processed	   automatically.	   In	   case	   a	  
clearing	   member	   defaults	   on	   its	   obligations,	   the	   CCP	   needs	   to	   be	   able	   to	   quickly	  
liquidate	  the	  member’s	  positions.	  This	  means	  that	  it	  is	  essential	  for	  CCPs	  to	  be	  able	  
to	  choose	  the	  products	  they	  clear	  and	  are	  not	  simply	  forced	  to	  clear	  whatever	  type	  
of	  contract.	  While	  the	  ‘’world	  of	  products	  is	  infinite’’,	  it	  is	  important	  that	  regulators	  
don’t	  end	  up	  	  ‘’forcing	  CCP	  to	  clear	  what	  they	  can’t	  clear’’	  (Consultant,	  OTC	  Clearing).	  
In	   order	   for	   central	   clearing	   to	   work,	   contracts	   need	   to	   be	   standardized,	   traded	  
frequently	  at	  publicly	  available	  prices	  (Pirrong,	  2011).	  The	  less	  traded	  an	  instrument	  
is,	  the	  harder	  it	  is	  to	  mark	  it	  to	  market,	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  to	  value	  it.	  While	  CCPs	  reduce	  
the	   impact	   of	   a	   default	   on	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   market,	   they	   can	   also	   amplify	   risk	   by	  
overcollateralization	  (i.e.	  increasing	  margin	  requirements)	  in	  times	  of	  market	  stress.	  
This	  is	  particularly	  true	  regarding	  less	  liquid	  and/or	  less	  standardized	  products.	  
	  
Unsurprisingly,	   professionals	   from	   banks	   had	   a	   heightened	   concern	   about	   the	  
standardization	  of	  these	  less	  liquid	  products.	  In	  most	  cases,	  a	  reference	  was	  made	  to	  
the	   fact	   that	   these	  more	   customized,	   tailor-­‐made	  products	   allow	   for	  more	  precise	  
hedging	   and	   fit	  more	   closely	   to	   the	  needs	   of	   certain	   clients,	   such	   as	  multinational	  
corporations.	  Any	  kind	  of	  increase	  in	  standardization	  will	  obviously	  affect	  that	  side	  of	  
the	  bank’s	  business	  and	  reduce	  profits.	  There	  is	  another	  reason	  why	  bankers	  would	  
be	  concerned	  about	   the	   increased	  standardization	  of	  OTC	  products.	  That	   is	   to	   say,	  
even	  something	  as	  technical	  as	  the	  question	  of	  product	  standardization	  is	  ultimately	  
a	   political	   issue	   in	   terms	   of	   who	   controls	   the	   processing	   of	   order	   flows.	   It	   is	  
important	   to	   note	   that	   standardization	   facilitates	   not	   just	   clearing	   but	   the	   whole	  
trade	   life	   cycle	   from	   trading	   to	   the	   settlement	   process.	   This	   is	   because	   more	  
standardized	  products	   are	  more	   streamlined	   from	  a	   legal	   and	  operational	  point	  of	  
view	   and	   are	   thus	   easier	   to	   process.	   Consequently,	   as	   contracts	   become	   easier	   to	  
process,	   they	   will	   also	   become	   more	   amendable	   to	   be	   traded	   on	   order-­‐driven	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electronic	  automated	  platforms	  (similar	  to	  the	  continuous	  double	  auction	  matching	  
machines	   for	   shares	   and	   futures).	   In	   this	   sense,	   the	   standardization	   required	   by	  
central	   clearing	   would	   have	   the	   added	   effect	   of	   also	   shifting	   the	   trading	   and	  
matching	  of	  OTC	  derivatives	  from	  the	  control	  of	  dealer	  banks.	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8.3.4	  Transparency	  and	  liquidity	  	  
	  
	  
As	  we	  have	  seen,	  the	  eligibility	  of	  OTC	  contracts	  for	  clearing	  is	  an	  essential	  aspect	  for	  
the	  future	  success	  of	  the	  new	  regulatory	  regime.	  Standardization	  is	  one	  element	  of	  
this	  process,	  as	  well	  as	  questions	  of	  adequate	  liquidity	  and	  transparency	  (Lee,	  2011).	  
The	  OTC	  derivatives	  markets	  have	  historically	  been	  opaque	  relative	  to	  the	  exchange-­‐
traded	  products.	  This	  was	  mostly	  due	  to	  product	  specificity	  but	  also	  because	  major	  
participants,	   such	   as	   dealer	   banks,	   had	   an	   interest	   in	  maintaining	   a	   low	  degree	   of	  
transparency.	  Consequently,	  the	  majority	  of	  contracts	  were	  matched	  and	  cleared	  on	  
a	   bilateral	   basis.	   The	   Lehman	  Brothers	   and	  AIG	   failures	   disclosed	   the	   considerable	  
hidden	   risks	   of	   that	   opaque	  market	   structure.	   Before	   2008,	   it	  was	   not	   possible	   to	  
detect	   the	   build-­‐up	   of	   risk	   in	   certain	   institutions	   and	   the	   systemic	   risk	   of	  
interconnectedness.	   Once	   the	   creditworthiness	   of	   some	   systemically	   important	  
players	  was	  put	  into	  question,	  the	  underling	  opacity	  led	  to	  a	  severe	  lack	  of	  liquidity	  
(Gorton	  and	  Metrick,	  2012).	  
	  	  
As	  we	  have	  seen,	  the	  advent	  of	  electronic	  order	  books	  for	  shares	  and	  futures	  as	  well	  
as	  the	  central	  clearing	  of	  these	  products	  led	  to	  more	  transparency	  for	  those	  markets.	  	  
Different	  to	  those	  simpler	   financial	  products,	   it	  has	  be	  argued	  that	  OTC	  derivatives	  
are	  what	  we	  could	  call	  episodic	  products,	  that	  is	  to	  say	  they	  trade	  more	  infrequently.	  
From	  this	  point	  of	  view,	  some	  parts	  of	  the	  bond	  market	  are	  similar	  to	  OTC	  markets	  
and	  for	  that	  very	  reason	  is	  less	  susceptible	  to	  exchange	  trading	  and	  central	  clearing.	  
Some	  OTC	  instruments	  and	  some	  bonds	  trade	   in	  the	  first	  few	  weeks	  after	  they	  are	  
issued	   and	   less	   frequently	   after	   that.	   For	   entities	   that	   are	   not	   directly	   involved	   in	  
markets,	   there	   is	   a	   certain	  misconception	   that	   liquidity	   is	   always	   readily	   available,	  
that	  is	  to	  say	  that	  you	  can	  always	  transact	  easily.	  For	  instance,	  in	  bond	  markets	  the	  
market	  making	  dealer	  banks	  are	  engaged	  in	  the	  constant	  ‘’maintenance’’	  of	  liquidity.	  
A	  product	  that	  does	  not	  trade	  continuously	  entails	  a	  higher	  risk	  in	  terms	  of	  trading,	  
matching	   and	   clearing.	   Consequently,	   for	   certain	   financial	   instruments	   too	   much	  
transparency	   could	  have	   the	  paradoxical	  effect	  of	   limiting	   liquidity,	   in	  other	  words	  
‘‘too	   much	   transparency	   kills	   liquidity’’	   (Senior	   Regulatory	   Affairs	   Officer,	   Global	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Inter-­‐dealer	  Broker).	  Whether	  or	  not	  this	  is	  also	  true	  for	  OTC	  derivatives	  remains	  to	  
be	  seen.	  What	  is	  certain	  is	  that	  increased	  transparency	  impacts	  the	  business	  models	  
of	   dealer	   banks.	   As	   we	   know,	   the	   OTC	   derivatives	   landscape	   has	   largely	   been	  
dominated	  by	   single-­‐dealer	  or	  multi-­‐dealer	  platforms,	  where	  over	   the	  phone	  voice	  
broking	  was	   a	  dominant	  practice	   for	  matching	   trades	   (Smyth	   and	  Wetherilt,	   2011,	  
p.336).	  This	  state	  of	  affairs	  suited	  the	  major	  dealer	  banks,	  as	  they	  profited	  from	  the	  
lack	  of	  transparency	  in	  the	  market.	  Consequently,	  the	  2009	  G20	  mandate	  for	  higher	  
levels	  of	  transparency	  through	  central	  clearing	  and	  electronic	  trading	  is	  likely	  to	  have	  
a	  major	  impact	  on	  the	  profitability	  of	  the	  OTC	  business	  of	  banks.	  
	  
Resistance	   from	  the	  banks,	  as	  why	  should	  dominant	  players	  want	   to	  be	  on	  a	  
level	   playing	   field	  with	   smaller	   competitors?	   The	   introduction	   of	   CCPs	   levels	  
the	  playing	  field	  (Senior	  Executive,	  European	  Clearinghouse).	  
	  
In	  conclusion,	  the	  effects	  of	  increased	  transparency	  are	  intimately	  linked	  with	  more	  
standardization.	  As	  OTC	  markets	  become	  more	   transparent,	   the	  bank’s	  dominance	  
of	   both	   matching	   and	   clearing	   is	   likely	   diminished.	   Nevertheless,	   while	   the	  
combination	  of	  central	  clearing	  and	  matching	  are	  expected	  to	  improve	  the	  resilience	  
of	  OTC	  markets,	   a	   question	   remains	   on	  whether	   transparency	   is	   good	   in	   itself?	   In	  
some	  of	  the	  more	  exotic	  OTC	  products,	  even	  if	  trading	  infrastructure	  improved,	  it	  is	  
still	  hard	  to	  find	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  trade.	   In	  this	  sense,	  both	  pre	  and	  post-­‐trade	  
transparency	  become	  equally	  problematic	  and	  can	  lead	  to	  a	  deterioration	  of	  liquidity	  
provision	  (Smyth	  and	  Wetherilt,	  2011).	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8.3.5	  Risk	  
	  
As	  we	  have	  seen	  from	  our	  description	  of	   the	  simplest	   IRS	  product,	  OTC	  derivatives	  
can	   best	   be	   understood	   as	   risk	   transmission	  mechanisms.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   CDS,	   one	  
party	  is	  looking	  to	  buy	  protection	  from	  certain	  credit	  events	  (defaults),	  while	  others	  
are	  willing	   to	   bear	   that	   risk	   (Valiante,	   2010).	  One	   of	   the	   issues	  with	   these	   kind	   of	  
products	   is	   that	  while	  each	  party	  has	  an	  understanding	  of	   their	  own	  exposure	  and	  
risk,	   they	  have	  no	  way	  of	   grasping	   the	  overall	   levels	  of	   systemic	   risk	   (Haldane	  and	  
May,	  2011).	  In	  fact,	  a	  recurring	  theme	  in	  our	  interviews	  was	  that	  of	  systemic	  risk	  and	  
its	  multifaceted	  nature.	  	  
	  
The	  way	  CCP	  will	  be	  regulated	  should	  make	  them	  super	  robust.	  Multiple	  CCP	  
default	  will	  be	  unthinkable	  (Policy	  Officer,	  European	  Regulator)	  
	  
In	   order	   to	   better	   understand	   the	   issue	   surrounding	   CCPs	   and	   systemic	   risk,	   it	   is	  
important	   to	   stress	   the	  difference	  between	   idiosyncratic	   risk	  on	   the	  one	  hand	  and	  
systemic	   risk	  on	  the	  other.	   In	   the	  case	  of	   idiosyncratic	   risk,	   the	  problem	   lies	   in	   the	  
particular	  situation	  of	  a	  single	   individual	  clearing	  member	  with	  no	  reference	  to	  the	  
rest	   of	   the	  network.	   If	   risk	  was	  only	   idiosyncratic,	   then	  defaults	  would	  be	   random	  
and	   basic	   risk	   management	   techniques	   could	   reduce	   the	   role	   of	   CCP	   to	   simple	  
insurance	   practice	   (Bernanke,	   1990,	   p.141).	   The	   financial	   crisis	   of	   2008	   has	  
highlighted	  the	   importance	  of	  systemic	  risk,	  which	   is	  not	   isolated	  to	  any	  one	  single	  
entity.	   In	   the	   context	  of	   regulatory	   reforms,	   the	   concern	  was	   that	   this	   type	  of	   risk	  
was	  not	  going	  away,	  but	  merely	  being	  transferred	  to	  CCPs:	  
	  
The	  risks	  have	  not	  dematerialized.	  They	  have	  been	  concentrated	  in	  CCPs,	  (…)	  It	  
is	   vitally	   important	   that	   CCPs	   are	   sufficiently	   robust	   that	   they	   don't	   fall	   over	  
(Senior	  Director,	  Derivatives	  Trade	  Association).	  
	  
In	   any	   case,	   it	  was	   obvious	   from	   the	   interviews	   that	   there	  was	   another	   important	  
question	  regarding	  the	  optimal	  architecture	  for	  the	  central	  clearing	  of	  OTC.	  Namely,	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was	  it	  better	  to	  have	  a	  number	  of	  isolated	  CCPs	  consolidating	  OTC	  volumes	  or	  should	  
these	   CCPs	   be	   interoperable	   and	   connected 69 ?	   In	   other	   words,	   was	   the	  
interoperability	  of	  CCPs	  likely	  to	  bring	  huge	  benefits	  or	  was	  it	  more	  likely	  to	  lead	  to	  
more	   risks,	   such	   as	   that	   of	   contagion.	   If	   a	   large	   clearing	   member,	   connected	   to	  
multiple	  CCPs,	  would	  go	  bankrupt,	  this	  would	  raise	  margin	  requirements	  across	  the	  
board,	   affecting	   the	   whole	   market	   at	   once.	   Conversely,	   within	   a	   network	   of	  
interoperable	  CCPs	  any	  default	  would	  immediately	  be	  transmitted	  to	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  
network.	  As	  a	  default	  event	  propagates	   itself	   through	   the	  network,	  all	  CCPs	  would	  
ask	  clearing	  members	  for	  more	  margin,	  requiring	  extra	  collateral	  for	  their	  portfolios.	  
Problems	  could	  arise	  in	  times	  of	  market	  stress	  when	  participants	  engage	  in	  fire	  sales	  
in	  order	  get	  hold	  of	  good	  quality	  collateral	  requested	  by	  CCPs,	  which	  would	  further	  
amplify	  the	  problems.	  While	  a	  lot	  of	  things	  need	  to	  go	  wrong	  before	  a	  CCP	  fails,	  most	  
interviews	   were	   very	   concerned	   about	   the	   issue	   of	   contagion	   risk.	   This	   leads	   to	  
perhaps	   the	  most	   important	   risk-­‐related	   issue,	   namely	  whether	   or	   not	   the	   central	  
clearing	   of	   OTC	   derivatives	   replaces	   one	   type	   of	   ‘’too-­‐big-­‐to-­‐fail’’	   financial	  
institutions	  (banks)	  with	  new	  ones	  (CCPs)?	  In	  as	  much	  as	  CCPs	  need	  to	  be	  robust	  and	  
resilient,	  only	   a	   few	  of	   them	  will	   be	  able	   to	   take	  on	   the	   challenge	  of	   clearing	  OTC	  
products.	  Consequently,	  the	  concentration	  of	  OTC	  clearing	  around	  a	  small	  number	  of	  
CCPs	  means	  that	  they	  could	  become	  the	  next	  systemically	  important	  institutions.	  In	  
this	  sense,	  major	  CCP	  defaults	  would	  be	  another	  catastrophe	  for	  the	  global	  financial	  
systems:	  
	  
CCP	  clearing	  of	  derivatives	  does	  not	  make	  the	  system	  safer,	  it	  simply	  transfers	  
risk	   from	   the	   banks	   to	   the	   CCPs	   (Head	   of	   Collateral	   Management,	   Global	  
Investment	  Bank).	  
	  
While	  it	  is	  generally	  accepted	  that	  CCPs	  have	  very	  robust	  risk	  management	  practices,	  
most	  professionals	   interviewed	  voiced	   serious	   concerns	   that	   central	   clearing	   could	  
actually	  increase	  systemic	  risk	  and	  concentrate	  it	  an	  a	  small	  number	  of	  CCPs.	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69	  The	   contemporary	   landscape	   of	   OTC	   clearing	   is	   relatively	   fragmented	   between	  
LCH.Clearnet,	   Intercontinental	  Exchange,	  CME	  Group	  and	   the	  Depository	  Trust	  and	  
Clearing	  Corporation.	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8.3.6	  Social	  function	  
	  
Throughout	  the	  interviews,	  we	  were	  also	  interested	  to	  understand	  the	  way	  in	  which	  
OTC	   professionals	   relate	   to	   society.	   In	   fact,	   most	   of	   them	   highlighted	   the	   social	  
impact	  of	  OTC	  market	  as	  something	  they	  were	  concerned	  about,	  acknowledging	  that	  
one	  way	  or	  the	  other,	  there	  was	  no	  going	  back	  to	  the	  pre-­‐crisis	  situation.	  Since	  then,	  
it	  has	  become	  apparent	  that	  whatever	  goes	  on	   in	  complex	  derivatives	  markets	  can	  
have	   a	   direct	   impact	   on	   society.	   Therefore,	   the	   regulatory	   response	   has	   been	   to	  
publicize	  what	  used	  to	  be	  opaque	  private	  transactions	  and	  to	  standardize	  what	  used	  
to	  be	  more	  customized	  contracts.	  Moreover,	  as	   the	   taxpayer	  ended	  up	  bailing	  out	  
the	  systems,	  it	  now	  has	  a	  say	  in	  the	  way	  these	  markets	  operate.	  Because	  of	  this,	  the	  
industry	  needs	  to	  explain	  itself	  and	  urgently	  regain	  some	  level	  public	  confidence.	  	  
	  
There	  is	  a	  lot	  of	  populism	  and	  public	  pressure,	  but	  introducing	  clearing	  through	  
legislation	   is	   a	   good	   thing,	   as	   it	   will	   lead	   to	   important	   behavioral	   changes	  
(Regulatory	  Affairs	  Officer,	  Global	  Investment	  Bank).	  
	  
Most	   interviewees	   voiced	   their	   frustration	   with	   the	   negative	   perception	   of	   the	  
financial	  services	  industry,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  recent	  financial	  crisis,	  the	  excess	  of	  the	  
industry	   as	   well	   as	   public’s	   misunderstanding	   of	   financial	   markets.	   Consequently,	  
there	  was	  a	  strong	  recognition	  of	  the	  need	  to	  educate	  the	  public,	  particularly	  as	  the	  
taxpayer	   ended	   up	   supporting	   the	   system	   in	   the	   end.	   As	   one	   participant	   to	   the	  
research	  told	  us:	  ‘’the	  collapse	  of	  AIG	  and	  Lehman	  Brothers	  proved	  that	  there	  were	  a	  
lot	   of	   problems	   with	   OTC	   derivatives’’	   (CEO,	   Derivatives	   Trade	   Association).	  
Nevertheless,	   the	   group	   of	   people	   we	   interviewed	   were	   convinced	   that	   financial	  
services	  in	  general	  and	  most	  OTC	  derivatives	  have	  a	  beneficial	  effect	  on	  society:	  	  
	  
Financial	  services	  are	  ‘’the	  oil	  of	  the	  economy’’.	  The	  more	  open	  the	  economy,	  
the	   more	   important	   the	   financial	   sector.	   There	   is	   something	   real	   in	   the	  
financial	  sector	  (Senior	  Executive,	  European	  Clearinghouse).	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One	   recurrent	  position	  was	   that	  although	  certain	  OTC	  contracts	  were	  deemed	  not	  
’’socially	  useful’’	  and	  should	  be	  made	  more	  expensive	  to	  use	  by	  market	  participants,	  
they	   should	   not	   be	   banned	   altogether.	   In	   their	   view,	   the	   function	   of	   finance	   is	   to	  
provide	  specific	   transactional	   services	   to	   society	  as	  a	  whole.	  Unlike	  academics,	   the	  
professionals	  we	  interviewed	  were	  not	  thinking	  about	  issues	  of	  efficient	  allocation	  of	  
welfare	   maximization.	   They	   actually	   meant	   the	   transactional	   functions	   that	  
ultimately	   provide	   deep	   and	   liquid	   markets	   for	   institutional	   investors	   such	   as	  
‘’pension	   funds	   who	   bring	   assets	   to	   the	   market	   and	   play	   an	   important	   role	   in	  
society’’	   (Senior	   Executive,	   European	   Clearinghouse).	   Therefore,	   the	   general	  
accepted	   view	   was	   that,	   to	   a	   large	   extent,	   OTC	   markets	   service	   the	   long	   term	  
hedging	  needs	  and	  ensuring	  the	  long-­‐terms	  stability	  of	  such	  financial	  institutions.	  	  
	  
On	  the	  other	  hand,	  even	   if	  one	  accepts	   the	  point	  about	   the	  social	   function	  of	  OTC	  
derivatives,	   this	   should	   still	   beg	   the	   question	   as	   to	   the	   multifaceted	   nature	   of	  
hedging	   and/or	   speculation	   in	   financial	   markets.	   Namely	   that	   in	   many	   cases	   the	  
difference	  between	  hedging	   and	   speculation	   is	   a	   question	  of	   interpretation.	  While	  
the	  distinction	  between	  good	  banking	  and	  ’casino’	  banking	  is	  certainty	  too	  simplistic,	  
focusing	   solely	   on	   the	   hedging	   use	   of	   OTC	   derivatives	   precludes	   the	   wide	   spread	  
systemic	   risk	   entailed	   in	   their	   use.	   Earning	   their	   livelihoods	   in	   these	  markets,	   it	   is	  
easy	   to	   understand	   why	   most	   interviewees	   would	   not	   be	   inclined	   to	   make	   these	  
more	  granular	  distinctions	  and	  would	  focus	  predominantly	  on	  the	  positive	  effects	  of	  
these	  financial	  instruments.	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8.3.7	  Shifting	  market	  dynamics	  
	  
All	   participants	   were	   concerned	   that	   a	   major	   market	   structure	   shift	   is	   underway,	  
putting	  huge	  burdens	  on	  all	  participants	  on	  the	  OTC	  markets.	  The	  incoming	  changes	  
entail	   considerable	   cost	   for	   all	   parties	   such	   as	   investments	   in	   IT	   infrastructure,	  
additional	  legal	  and	  compliance	  requirements.	  As	  most	  interviewees	  noted,	  a	  lot	  of	  
investment	  is	  required	  in	  order	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  you	  can	  confirm,	  clear	  and	  report	  
trades.	   Moreover,	   the	   new	   central	   clearing	   regulations	   will	   require	   most	   market	  
participants	  to	  post	  collateral	  in	  order	  to	  trade	  and	  keep	  derivatives	  positions	  open.	  
Collateral	  efficiency	  is	  a	  central	  question	  for	  both	  investors	  and	  dealer	  banks,	  and	  in	  
this	   context	   it	   will	   require	   considerable	   investment	   in	   collateral	   management	  
systems.	  As	  one	  professional	  told	  us:	  ‘’CCP	  clearing	  of	  derivatives	  forces	  investors	  to	  
worry	  about	  intraday	  cash	  positions	  and	  margin/collateral	  calls’’	  (Head	  of	  Collateral	  
Management,	   Global	   Investment	   Bank).	   In	   fact,	   regulators	   are	   conscious	   of	   the	  
burden	  put	  on	   the	   industry	  and	  have	  accepted	  exemptions	  or	  deferrals	   for	   certain	  
categories	  of	  participants.	  
	  
Because	  of	  the	  higher	  costs	  of	  participating	  in	  OTC	  markets,	  most	  people	  expressed	  
concern	   about	   the	   inevitable	   concentration	   and	   consolidation	   resulting	   from	   the	  
reforms.	  The	  complex	  process	  and	  workflows	  entailed	  by	  the	  central	  clearing	  model	  
means	   that	   clearing	   really	   becomes	   a	   question	   of	   economies	   of	   scale	   and	   scope	  
(Hasenpusch,	  2009).	  That	  is	  to	  say	  the	  burden	  of	  operating	  in	  the	  new	  environment	  
will	   likely	   drive	   small	   and	   medium	   sized	   players	   out	   of	   the	   market,	   leading	   to	  
consolidation	   around	   a	   small	   number	   of	   CCPs	   and	   dealer	   banks	   acting	   as	   direct	  
clearing	  members.	  Consequently,	   it	  should	  not	  come	  as	  a	  surprise	  that	  the	  clearing	  
of	  OTC	  products	  becomes	  dominated	  by	  a	  number	  of	  global	  clearinghouses	  such	  as	  
CME	  Clearing	  (owned	  by	  the	  CME	  Group),	  LCH.Clearnet	  (owned	  by	  the	  LSE),	  ICE	  Clear	  
(owned	  by	   the	   Intercontinental	  Exchange)	  and	  Eurex	  Clearing	   (owned	  by	  Deutsche	  
Borse).	  	  
	  
As	  OTC	  derivatives	  transition	  to	  central	  clearing,	  the	  large	  dealer	  banks	  are	  no	  longer	  
in	  control	  of	  the	  clearing	  function	  but	  nevertheless	  remain	  a	  dominant	  group	  within	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this	  new	  ecology.	  This	  is	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  CCP	  are	  very	  risk	  adverse	  and	  prefer	  to	  
interact	  with	  highly	  capitalized	  counterparties,	  which	   leads	  to	  a	  tiered	  membership	  
structure	   (Galbiati	   and	   Soramaki,	   2013).	   This	   first	   tier	   is	  made	   up	   by	   the	   so-­‐called	  
direct	   clearing	   members	   or	   Future	   Commission	   Merchants	   (FCMs)70 ,	   which	   are	  
highly	   collateralized	   financial	   institutions	   who	   contribute	   to	   the	   default	   fund	   and	  
have	   very	   strong	   credit	   rating.	   These	   are	   usually	   the	   large	   dealer	   banks	   that	   have	  
both	  the	  balance	  sheet	  and	  the	  technical	  base	  to	  bear	  the	  costs	  of	  central	  clearing.	  
The	  next	   tier	   is	   that	  of	  non-­‐clearing	  members	  who	  can	  only	  clear	   through	   the	   first	  
tier	  members.	  This	  second	  group	  is	  composed	  of	  participants	  who	  do	  not	  meet	  the	  
high	  standards	  of	  the	  CCPs	  in	  terms	  of	  creditworthiness	  or	  do	  not	  want	  to	  bear	  the	  
full	  costs	  of	  clearing.	  As	  Pirrong	  (1997)	  argues,	  tiered	  clearing	  architectures	  emerge	  
because	   members	   with	   better	   credit	   rating	   would	   not	   be	   inclined	   to	   subsidize	  
weaker	  members.	  This	  goes	  both	  ways,	  as	  the	  CCPs	  are	  also	  not	  inclined	  to	  deal	  with	  
counterparties	   who	   have	   lower	   credit	   rating.	   Moreover,	   a	   highly	   tiered	   clearing	  
ecology	   is	   also	   indicative	   of	   the	   power	   of	   clearing	   members	   with	   a	   more	   robust	  
financial	  position	  (Pirrong,	  2011),	  namely	  the	  dealer	  banks.	  
On	  the	  other	  hand,	  some	  interview	  participants	  argued	  that	  the	  mandatory	  central	  
clearing	  of	  OTC	  derivatives	  is	  likely	  to	  affect	  the	  dominance	  of	  dealer	  banks	  and	  have	  
a	  decisive	  effect	  on	  how	  trading	  and	  matching	  is	  done.	  As	  we	  have	  already	  discussed,	  
when	  a	  market	  adopts	   central	   clearing,	  products	  need	   to	  have	  a	   certain	  degree	  of	  
standardization,	   which	   also	   means	   that	   they	   could	   become	   liquid	   enough	   to	   be	  
traded	  on	  an	  order-­‐driven	  platform,	  such	  as	  the	  electronic	  order	  books.	  In	  this	  sense,	  
clearing	   ultimately	   shifts	   market	   share	   from	   dealer	   banks	   to	   other	   types	   of	  
platforms.	   As	   more	   than	   one	   interviewee	   has	   highlighted:	   ‘’with	   clearing	   comes	  
trading’’	   (Senior	  Executive,	  European	  Clearinghouse)	  which	   refers	   to	   the	  possibility	  
that	   changes	   in	   one	   market	   function	   impacts	   other	   functions.	   In	   fact,	   this	   was	  
already	   implied	   in	   the	   2009	   G20	   declaration,	   as	   “all	   standardized	   OTC	   derivative	  
contracts	   should	   be	   traded	   on	   exchanges	   or	   electronic	   trading	   platforms,	   where	  
appropriate’’	  (FSB,	  2010).	  During	  the	  last	  few	  decades,	  electronic	  trading	  has	  already	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revolutionized	  both	  stock	  and	  futures	  markets,	  but	  it	  had	  a	  more	  limited	  impact	  on	  
OTC	  derivatives	   and	   as	   of	   ‘’June	   2010	   around	  12%	  of	   interest	   rate	   swaps	   and	   just	  
below	   17%	   of	   all	   credit	   default	   swaps	   were	   traded	   electronically’’	   (Smyth	   and	  
Wetherilt,	  2011,	  p.334).	  Nevertheless,	  the	  present	  introduction	  of	  central	  clearing	  is	  
likely	  to	  also	  accelerate	  the	  transition	  of	  matching	  towards	  electronic	  platforms.	  One	  
such	   example	   would	   be	   the	   so-­‐called	   Swap	   Execution	   Facilities	   (SEFs).	   Traditional	  
inter-­‐dealer	   brokers	   (ICAP,	   Tullett	   Prebon,	   Tradition)	   as	   well	   as	   Bloomberg	   and	  
Tradeweb	  have	  set	  up	  such	   facilities.	   In	  addition	   to	   this,	  exchanges	  who	  own	  CCPs	  
such	  as	  CME	  and	  ICE	  have	  also	  established	  SEFs	  and	  are	  competing	  for	  market	  share	  
in	   trading	   and	   matching	   of	   OTC	   products	   such	   as	   interest	   rate	   swaps	   and	   credit	  
default	   swaps,	   according	   to	   recent	   research	   by	   McKinsey	   (Rudisuli	   and	   Schifter,	  
2014).	  	  
In	  conclusion,	  a	  considerable	  number	  of	  interviewees	  suggested	  that	  one	  long-­‐term	  
consequence	  of	  the	  reforms	  is	  the	  gradual	  transfer	  of	  both	  clearing	  and	  matching	  of	  
OTC	   derivatives	   from	   the	   dealer	   banks	   to	   CCPs	   and	   order-­‐driven	   exchange-­‐type	  
platforms	  such	  as	  SEFs.	   In	   fact,	  according	   to	  Rudisuli	  and	  Schifter	   (2014),	   the	   large	  
dealer	   banks	   stand	   to	   lose	   as	   much	   as	   $4.5	   billion	   per	   year	   from	   the	   regulatory	  
changes,	  which	  in	  some	  cases	  could	  pose	  an	  existential	  treat	  to	  entire	  business	  lines.	  
This	  tendency	  seems	  to	  be	  very	  similar	  to	  what	  happened	  over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  20th	  
century	   to	   other	   markets	   such	   those	   for	   shares	   and	   futures.	   In	   fact,	   most	  
interviewees	  interpreted	  current	  reforms	  as	  a	  regulatory-­‐induced	  transition	  towards	  
the	  matching	   and	   clearing	   designs	   already	   established	   in	   these	  markets.	   From	   the	  
perspective	   of	   the	   evolution	   of	   transaction	   machines,	   we	   could	   see	   this	   as	   the	  
transposition	  or	  exaptation	  of	  the	  matching	  and	  clearing	  designs	  from	  one	  financial	  
market	  to	  another,	  an	  example	  of	  ‘machinic’	  contamination.	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Conclusion	  
	  
Following	   the	   2008	   financial	   crash	   and	   the	   failure	   of	   major	   financial	   institutions,	  
regulators	   and	   governments	   decided	   to	   radically	   overhaul	   the	   OTC	   derivatives	  
market.	  The	  2009	  G20	  decision	  promoted	  transparency	  and	  mandated	  the	  transfer	  
of	  more	  standardized	  products	  such	  as	  IRS	  and	  CDS	  from	  bilateral	  to	  central	  clearing	  
via	  CCPs.	  As	  we	  have	   seen,	  CCPs	  act	   as	   the	  buyer	   to	  every	   seller	   and	   the	   seller	   to	  
every	  buyer,	  requiring	  initial	  margins,	  monitoring	  portfolios	  and	  imposing	  robust	  risk	  
management	  methodologies	  (Pirrong,	  2011,	  p.16).	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  
the	  2008	  financial	  crisis,	  regulators	  decided	  there	  was	  an	  urgent	  need	  to	  reconfigure	  
and	  redesign	  the	  clearing	  machine	  of	  OTC	  derivatives	  markets.	  	  
In	   trying	   to	   gain	   a	   better	   understanding	   of	   this	   new	   clearing	  machine	   and	   its	   new	  
dynamics,	   we	   pursued	   a	   number	   of	   interviews	  with	   senior	   professionals	   from	   the	  
OTC	   derivatives	  market.	   The	   results	   of	   these	   interviews	  were	   summarized	   along	   a	  
series	   of	   general	   themes:	   regulation,	   standardization,	   transparency,	   risk,	   social	  
function	   and	   shifting	   market	   dynamics.	   To	   a	   large	   extent,	   all	   of	   these	   themes	  
reflected	   specific	   concerns	   regarding	   the	   new	   regulatory	   regime.	   The	   aim	   of	   this	  
research	  was	  to	  highlight	  the	  current	  state	  of	  the	  OTC	  market	  and	  the	  impact	  of	  this	  
transition	   from	   bank-­‐dominated	   bilateral	   clearing	   towards	   a	   new	   design	   based	   on	  
centralized	  clearing	  dominated	  by	  CCPs.	  
While	   all	   participants	   saw	   the	   new	   regulations	   as	   a	   burden,	   there	   was	   a	   strong	  
perception	  that	  reforms	  would	  have	  asymmetric	  effects	  on	  different	  constituencies.	  
For	   instance,	   banking	   professionals	   were	   mostly	   worried	   about	   the	   levels	   of	  
transparency	  and	  standardization	  brought	  about	  by	  the	  reforms,	  which	  have	  a	  direct	  
impact	   on	   their	   business.	   Regulators	   were	   mostly	   concerned	   with	   questions	   of	  
systemic	  risk	  and	  market	  resilience.	  Another	  important	  point	  regarded	  the	  impact	  on	  
market	  liquidity	  of	  pushing	  less	  standardized	  products	  into	  central	  clearing.	  The	  issue	  
of	  transparency	  frequently	  came	  up	  particularly	  as	  well	  as	  the	  question	  of	  contagion	  
risk,	  particularly	  in	  the	  context	  of	  CCPs	  becoming	  the	  new	  too-­‐big-­‐to-­‐fail	  institutions.	  
In	  the	  face	  of	  intense	  public	  critique,	  most	  interviewees	  tended	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  use	  
of	  OTC	  products	  for	  hedging	  rather	  than	  the	  systemic	  risk	  entailed	  in	  them.	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During	  the	  course	  of	  the	  interviews	  it	  became	  clear	  that	  the	  major	  themes	  emerging	  
could	   be	   brought	   back	   and	   reinterpreted	   in	   light	   of	   our	   transaction	   machines	  
framework.	   Namely,	   that	   the	   intricate	   details	   surrounding	   the	   current	   regulatory	  
reforms	  could	  actually	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  process	  of	  redesigning	  a	  complex	  clearing	  
machine.	   	  Moreover,	   as	   the	  OTC	  market	   transitions	   towards	   central	   clearing,	  CCPs	  
are	  now	  becoming	  its	  dominant	  transactional	  hubs.	  For	  instance,	  all	  participants	  now	  
have	   to	   adopt	   specific	   clearing	   practices	   of	   CCPs,	   such	   as	   netting,	   novation,	  
margining,	  etc.,	  in	  order	  to	  keep	  trading	  OTC	  contracts.	  	  
The	   large	   dealer	   banks	   that	   used	   to	   control	   the	   OTC	   clearing	   business	   now	   find	  
themselves	   in	   a	   secondary	   position,	   as	   clearing	   members	   of	   CCPs.	   They	   must	  
contribute	  to	  CCPs	  default	  funds,	  post	  margins	  and	  ensure	  that	  their	  clients	  comply	  
with	   the	   rules	   and	   procedures	   set	   forth	   by	   CCPs.	   These	   changes	   are	   not	   simply	  
technical	  issues	  but	  are	  very	  much	  political	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  granular	  details	  of	  
the	  new	  clearing	  model	  are	  impacted	  by	  certain	  power	  dynamics	  in	  the	  market,	  such	  
as	   the	   much	   stronger	   position	   of	   regularity	   authorities	   and	   CCPs	   relative	   to	   the	  
dealer	  banks.	  Moreover,	  as	  OTC	  derivatives	  move	  to	  a	  centrally	  cleared	  model,	  they	  
are	   also	   more	   standardized	   and	   liquid	   enough	   to	   be	   traded	   and	   matched	   on	  
electronic	  platforms,	  such	  as	  SEFs.	  This	  will	   likely	  have	  an	  additional	   impact	  on	  the	  
revenues	   of	   dealer	   banks	   (Rudisuli	   and	   Schifter,	   2014).	   While	   banks	   are	   still	   the	  
major	  participants	  in	  the	  OTC	  markets	  as	  market	  makers,	  functions	  such	  as	  matching	  
and	   clearing	  are	  gradually	  moving	   to	  a	  CCP	  utility	   type	  model,	   quite	   similar	   to	   the	  
decade-­‐long	  process	  of	  change	  that	  transformed	  the	  markets	  for	  shares	  and	  futures.	  	   	  




Transactions	  in	  the	  Age	  of	  Intelligent	  Machines	  
	  
Manuel	   DeLanda’s	  War	   in	   the	   Age	   of	   Intelligent	  Machines	   (1991)	  was	   a	   source	   of	  
inspiration	  for	  this	  thesis.	  In	  this	  early	  book,	  he	  offers	  an	  account	  of	  the	  evolution	  of	  
weapon	   technology	   ‘’under	   the	   selective	  pressures	  of	  human	  warfare’’	   (Erik	  Davis,	  
1992).	   In	  a	  certain	  way,	  the	  aim	  of	  this	  thesis	  was	  to	  explore	  a	  similar	  approach	  by	  
describing	   the	   evolution	   of	   transaction	  machines	   under	   the	   selective	   pressures	   of	  
human	   society	   and	   economy.	   In	   his	   history	   of	   weapon	   technology,	   DeLanda	  
proposes	   a	   map	   of	   the	   critical	   thresholds	   of	   the	   development	   of	   warfare,	   with	   a	  
particular	   interest	   for	  modern	  mechanized	   armies	   (DeLanda,	   1991,	   p.23).	   	   In	   that	  
context,	   the	   use	   of	   written	   orders	   ultimately	   led	   to	   a	   substantial	   increase	   in	  
paperwork.	  Under	  these	  constraints,	  he	  sees	  the	  advent	  of	  the	  Prussian	  general	  staff	  
as	   the	   first	   ‘’organization	   for	   gathering,	   process	   and	   transmitting	   information	  over	  
vast	  distances’’	  (DeLanda,	  1991,	  p.70).	  Later	  in	  the	  20th	  century,	  a	  further	  increase	  in	  
the	   information	   flows	   means	   that	   centralized	   command	   centres	   become	   a	   great	  
vulnerability;	  leading	  to	  the	  development	  of	  decentralized	  communication	  networks	  
in	   order	   to	   increase	   overall	   ‘’survivability’’.	   One	   example	   of	   this	   trend	   was	   the	  
ARPANET	   network	   of	   the	   US	   military	   (which	   was	   effectively	   a	   blueprint	   for	   the	  
Internet),	  allowing	  for	  distributed	  information	  processing.	  A	  crucial	  point	  here	  is	  that	  
the	  advent	  of	  electronic	  networks	  allows	  for	  development	  of	  ‘’localized	  intelligence’’.	  
He	  calls	  this	  tendency	  of	  electronic	  networks	  to	  develop	  decentralized	  intelligence	  as	  
‘’demons’’	   or	   ‘’independent	   software	  objects’’	   as	   they	   are	  not	  under	   a	   continuous	  
centralized	  control.	  This	  also	  leads	  to	  higher	  levels	  of	  automation	  and	  a	  reduction	  of	  
the	  role	  played	  by	  humans.	   Interestingly	  enough,	  writing	   in	  1991,	  he	  also	   identifies	  
broader	  socio-­‐economic	  consequences	  such	  as	   the	  advent	  of	  automated	  electronic	  
markets:	  
	  
Independent	  software	  objects	  will	  soon	  begin	  to	  constitute	  even	  more	  complex	  
computational	   societies	   in	   which	   demons	   trade	   with	   one	   another,	   bid	   and	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compete	   for	   resources,	   seed	   and	   spawn	   processes	   spontaneously	   (DeLanda,	  
1991,	  p.121)	  	  
	  
We	  could	  say	  that	  DeLanda’s	   intuition	  was	   incredibly	  accurate	  and	  it	  still	  resonates	  
today	  in	  the	  context	  of	  contemporary	  e-­‐commerce,	  as	  well	  as	  being	  relevant	  to	  the	  
recent	  transformations	  in	  financial	  markets.	  	  As	  we	  have	  argued,	  giving	  an	  account	  of	  
this	  technological	  evolution	  is	  an	  absolutely	  necessary	  step	  for	  any	  kind	  of	  account	  of	  
contemporary	   financial	   markets.	   Moreover,	   as	   we	   have	   also	   seen,	   this	   is	   by	   no	  
means	   an	   easy	   task	   as	   it	   requires	   an	   adequate	   understanding	   of	   the	   relationship	  
between	  the	  social	  and	  the	  technological	  as	  well	  as	  the	  way	  in	  which	  markets	  can	  be	  
understood	  as	  complex	  machines	  in	  their	  own	  right.	  	  
	  
In	   fact,	  Donald	  Mackenzie	   (2014)	   himself	   has	   recently	   argued	   the	  present	   state	  of	  
automated	   electronic	   markets	   is	   still	   ‘’largely	   opaque	   to	   economic	   sociology’’	  
(MacKenzie,	   2014,	   p.3).	   He	   organizes	   the	   Social	   Studies	   of	   Finance	   (SSF)	   literature	  
into	   three	   types	   of	   perspectives.	   First,	   you	   have	   approaches	   describing	   situations	  
where	   market	   participants	   are	   human	   beings	   and	   the	   market	   structure	   is	  
fundamentally	   a	   form	   of	   human	   interaction.	   Secondly,	   there	   are	   accounts	   where	  
most	   participants	   are	   still	   human	   beings	   but	   the	   market	   is	   understood	   as	   an	  
algorithm.	  The	  third	  type	  of	  approach	  is	  where	  both	  the	  users	  and	  market	  structure	  
itself	  is	  driven	  by	  algorithms	  	  (MacKenzie,	  2014).	  Within	  this	  taxonomy,	  he	  positions	  
most	  of	  the	  SSF	  literature	  within	  the	  second	  category	  and	  it	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  
present	   thesis	   tries	   to	   position	   itself	   somewhere	   in	   the	   third	   category,	   while	   also	  
taking	   the	  position	   that	   financial	  markets	  have	  an	  algorithmic	  or	   ‘machinic’	  nature	  
from	  the	  very	  beginning.	  That	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  model	  and	  understand	  even	  the	  oldest	  
forms	  of	   financial	  markets	   as	   comprising	  precise	   rules	   and	  procedures	   that	   can	  be	  
formalized	  as	  a	  series	  of	  algorithms.	  Moreover,	  the	  way	  in	  which	  society	  uses	  these	  
markets	  can	  also	  be	  seen	  in	  an	  algorithmic	  gaze.	  As	  we	  have	  already	  explained,	  this	  
thesis	  assumed	  the	  ‘machinic’	  nature	  of	  financial	  markets	  from	  the	  start,	  rather	  than	  
as	  a	  recent	  epochal	  shift	  disrupting	  a	  pre-­‐established	  social	  structure.	  The	  important	  
difference	   is	   that	   this	   thesis	  has	  not	  engaged	  with	   financial	  markets	   in	  as	  much	  as	  
they	  are	  social	   structures,	  but	  has	   focused	  on	  their	   transactional	   infrastructure,	  on	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those	  mechanisms	  specifically	  designed	  to	  perform	  certain	  market	  functions71.	  	  
	  
We	  used	  the	  term	  transaction	  machines,	  guided	  by	  the	  general	  framework	  provided	  
by	  cybernetics,	  informational	  theory	  and	  computer	  science.	  As	  we	  have	  shown,	  the	  
notion	  of	   transaction	  machines	   allowed	  us	   to	   grasp	  both	   Simondon’s	  multifaceted	  
understanding	   of	   machines	   while	   at	   the	   same	   time	   remain	   focused	   on	   specific	  
transactional	  capabilities	  as	  described	  by	  Mirowski’s	  theory	  of	  markomata.	  The	  aim	  
of	   the	   thesis	   wad	   not	   to	   dehumanize	   financial	   markets	   or	   to	   argue	   that	   human	  
beings	  are	  no	  longer	  involved	  in	  them.	  To	  the	  contrary,	   it	  seemed	  more	  interesting	  
to	  look	  at	  how	  financial	  markets	  function	  at	  their	  most	  basic	  level,	  to	  a	  large	  extent	  
independent	  of	  the	  composition	  of	  their	  ‘hardware’.	  In	  practice,	  this	  meant	  focusing	  
on	   the	   complex	   machines	   that	   process	   and	   manage	   the	   flow	   of	   financial	  
transactions.	   This	   was	   certainly	   different	   from	   studying	   how	   hybrid	   networks	   of	  
humans	  and	  non-­‐humans	  assemble	  in	  order	  to	  create	  a	  new	  financial	  product,	  how	  
financial	   models	   can	   have	   a	   performativity	   effect	   or	   the	   way	   in	   which	   financial	  
technology	   impacts	  on	   the	  behavioural	  patterns	  of	  human	   traders.	  Departing	   from	  
this	   literature,	   the	   thesis	   offered	   an	   understanding	   of	   past	   and	   current	   financial	  
markets	   by	   looking	   at	   the	   unfolding	   of	   a	   ‘machinic’	   trajectory,	   the	   evolution	   of	  
specific	   transaction	   machines	   performing	   a	   number	   of	   functions	   relative	   to	   the	  
processing	  and	  maintenance	  of	  financial	  flows.	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71	  While	  this	   infrastructure	  entails	  a	  diverse	  set	  of	  functions,	  the	  thesis	  has	  focuses	  
on	  two	  of	  them,	  namely	  the	  matching	  and	  clearing	  of	  order	  flow,	  in	  as	  much	  as	  they	  
represent	  essential	  mechanisms	  for	  the	  very	  existence	  of	  financial	  markets.	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The	  Evolution	  of	  Transaction	  Machines	  
	  
The	   structure	   of	   the	   thesis	   was	   divided	   into	   three	   parts.	   Part	   I	   was	   composed	   of	  
three	   theoretical	   chapters	   followed	   by	   Part	   II	   organized	   around	   three	   historical	  
chapters.	   These	   provided	   a	   gradual	   unfolding	   of	   what	   we	   mean	   by	   transaction	  
machines	   and	   then	   reinterpreting	   the	   history	   of	   financial	   markets	   in	   light	   of	   this	  
theoretical	   framework.	   Our	   approach	   was	   directly	   inspired	   by	   Philip	   Mirowski’s	  
assertion	  that	  any	  kind	  of	  critique	  of	  the	  present	  political	  economy	  requires	  a	  natural	  
history	  of	  markets.	  In	  his	  theory	  of	  markomata	  he	  provides	  the	  initial	  building	  blocks	  
for	   such	   a	   history,	   by	   looking	   at	   the	   evolution	   of	   matching/auction	   designs.	   We	  
leveraged	  his	  work	  in	  our	  description	  of	  the	  matching	  function	  and	  also	  provided	  an	  
initial	   sketch	   for	   the	   evolutionary	   trajectory	   of	   clearing.	   In	   fact,	   the	   importance	   of	  
history	  cuts	  across	  the	  whole	  thesis	  as	  we	  endeavored	  to	  shed	  light	  on	  the	  complex	  
evolutionary	  process	  that	  led	  the	  current	  state	  of	  financial	  markets.	  	  
	  
We	   first	   tracked	  matching	  machines	   as	   they	  developed	   in	   the	   context	  of	  medieval	  
brokers	  performing	  bilateral	  direct	  matching.	   Later,	   the	  brokers	  of	   the	  Amsterdam	  
Exchange	  developed	  more	  complex	  multilateral	  matching	  machines.	  In	  the	  18th	  and	  
19th	  centuries	  the	  LSE	  and	  NYSE	  represented	  another	  evolutionary	  step,	  establishing	  
a	  matching	  based	  on	  continuous	  double	  auctions.	  	  
	  
Components	   Algorithms	  
	  




Bilateral	  matching	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(direct	  matchmaking)	  
Shares	   Bourses	  Exchanges	  
Multilateral	  matching	  
(Anglo-­‐Dutch	  auctions)	  
Shares	   Exchanges	  (LSE,	  NYSE)	  
Centralized	  matching	  
(continuous	  double	  auction)	  
Figure	  23:	  Evolution	  of	  matching	  machines	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We	  also	  developed	  a	  different	  narrative	   focused	  on	   the	  clearing	   function	  as	   it	   first	  
emerged	  in	  the	  context	  of	  medieval	  fairs.	  As	  modern	  financial	  markets	  became	  more	  
complex,	   they	   also	   required	   more	   elaborate	   clearing	   machines,	   such	   as	   the	  
multilateral	   designs	   of	   the	   London	   and	   New	   York	   Clearinghouse.	   Moreover,	   we	  
looked	  at	  how	  multilateral	  clearing	  migrated	  to	  the	  stock	  market,	  such	  as	  in	  the	  case	  
of	   the	   NYSE	   Clearinghouse.	   The	   crucial	   step	   occurred	   in	   the	   Chicago	   with	   the	  
transition	  towards	  the	  central	  clearing	  of	  derivatives.	  The	  BOTCC	  initially	  served	  as	  a	  
multilateral	  clearing	  facility,	  but	  ultimately	  became	  a	  Central	  Counterparty	  (CCP),	  the	  
buyer	  to	  every	  seller	  and	  the	  seller	  to	  every	  buyer.	  
	  
Components	   Algorithms	  
	  





















Figure	  24:	  Evolution	  of	  clearing	  machines	  
	  
The	  table	  above	  provides	  a	  sketch	  for	  the	  evolution	  of	  clearing	  similar	  to	  our	  analysis	  
of	   matching,	   from	   bilateral	   clearing	   (or	   direct	   clearing)	   to	   multilateral	   clearing	  
(clearing	   chains	  and	  cycles	  or	  modern	  clearing	   rings)	   and	   finally	   to	   central	   clearing	  
(or	   complete	   clearing	   with	   CCPs).	   In	   fact,	   the	   two	   tables	   above	   summarize	   our	  
attempt	   to	   organize	   the	   evolutionary	   trajectory	   of	   transaction	   machines	   by	  
distinguishing	  between	  bilateral,	  multilateral	  and	  centralized	  designs.	  This	  trajectory	  
takes	   us	   from	   the	   simple	   to	   the	   complex,	   from	   more	   common	   to	   more	   complex	  
designs.	   Under	   certain	   conditions,	   a	   certain	   community	   of	   users	   adopts	   a	   specific	  
transaction	   machine,	   deemed	   sufficient	   and	   adequate	   in	   terms	   of	   servicing	   their	  
transactional	   needs.	   Then	   something	   happens	   such	   as	   increased	   volumes,	   more	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sophisticated	  users,	  new	  financial	  instruments,	  more	  advanced	  technical	  capabilities	  
or	   regulatory/political	   interventions	   that	   trigger	   the	   evolution	   towards	   new	  
transaction	  designs.	  Consequently,	  each	  generation	  of	  transaction	  machines	  tends	  to	  
be	  more	  computationally	  expensive	  and	  more	  difficult	  to	  construct	  and	  maintain.	  As	  
we	   have	   seen,	   more	   elaborate	   matching	   machines,	   such	   as	   continuous	   double	  
auctions,	  and	  clearing	  machines	  performing	  central	  clearing	  only	  emerge	  in	  financial	  
markets	   which	   a	   more	   sophisticated	   investor	   base,	   higher	   levels	   of	   liquidity	   and	  
more	   intricate	   risk	   exposures.	   As	   we	   have	   seen,	   this	   evolutionary	   process	   is	   not	  
simply	  the	  result	  of	  the	  need	  to	  reduce	  costs	  and	  streamline	  the	  process.	  It	  is	  also	  a	  
consequence	  of	  a	   long	  series	  of	  financial	  panics	  and	  crashes	  over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  
last	   200	   years,	   a	   process	   of	   learning	   and	   experimenting.	   As	   a	   response	   to	   these	  
selection	   pressures,	   we	   have	   seen	   the	   gradual	   systematization	   of	   transaction	  
machines	   towards	   centralized	  matching	   and	   clearing	   organized	   in	  more	   integrated	  
structures	   such	   as	   exchanges	   and	   clearinghouses.	   	   For	   instance,	   this	   tendency	   is	  
clearly	   at	   work	   in	   the	   integrated	   silo	   structures	   of	   the	   largest	   global	   stock	   and	  
derivatives	  exchanges.	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Figure	  25:	  Current	  financial	  infrastructure	  providers	  
	  
As	  the	  table	  above	  highlights,	  there	  is	  indeed	  a	  trend	  towards	  consolidation	  around	  a	  
small	  number	  of	  financial	  infrastructure	  providers,	  integrating	  matching	  and	  clearing	  
across	  different	  financial	  instruments72.	  The	  most	  obvious	  examples	  are	  the	  vertical	  
silo	  structures	  of	   the	  Chicago	  Mercantile	  Exchange	  Group	  and	  the	  Deutsche	  Börse,	  
incorporating	   and	   aligning	   the	  matching	   and	   clearing	   functions	   in	   one	   single	   flow	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72	  As	   explained	   by	   Pirrong	   (2009),	   Lee	   (2011)	   and	   Hasenpush	   (2009),	   there	   are	  
considerable	  economies	  of	  scale	  and	  scope	  in	  integrating	  both	  the	  matching	  and	  the	  
clearing	   function	   across	   all	   financial	   instruments	   such	   as	   shares,	   bonds,	   futures,	  
options,	  swaps,	  etc.	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architecture.	   With	   the	   adoption	   of	   electronic	   trading	   and	   central	   clearing	   in	  
conjunction	   with	   the	   increased	   standardization	   of	   financial	   products,	   these	  
integrated	  exchange	  and	  clearinghouse	  become	  the	  dominant	  transactional	  hubs	  of	  
global	  financial	  markets.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  as	  financial	  markets	  mature	  they	  require	  an	  
increasingly	   efficient	   transactional	   infrastructure.	   In	   fact,	   over	   the	   course	   of	   the	  
thesis	   we	   tried	   to	   describe	   the	   gradual	   systematization	   and	   organization	   of	   more	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Part	  III	  of	  the	  thesis	  comprised	  two	  chapters	  focusing	  on	  the	  contemporary	  state	  of	  
matching	  and	  clearing	  machines.	  Part	   I	   and	   II	  of	   the	   thesis	  were	  dedicated	   to	   fully	  
elaborating	   the	   theoretical	   framework	   and	   then	   following	   the	   evolutionary	  
trajectory	   of	   transaction	  machines	   through	   history.	   In	   this	   regard,	   we	   focused	   on	  
how	   different	   transactional	   designs	   move	   from	   bilateral	   to	   multilateral	   and	  
centralized	  algorithms,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  ‘hardware’	  of	  these	  machines	  
gradually	  transitioned	  from	  human-­‐based	  pen	  and	  pencil	  infrastructure	  to	  electronic	  
automated	  platforms.	  Part	  III,	  comprising	  chapter	  7	  and	  8,	  was	  a	  continuation	  of	  this	  
narrative	   but	   also	   an	   attempt	   to	   focus	   on	   the	   question	   of	   politics	   and	   power	   in	  
framing	   and	   designing	   contemporary	   transaction	   machines.	   In	   as	   much	   as	   these	  
machines	  change	  under	  the	  constraints	  and	  pressures	  of	  its	  users,	  it	  would	  be	  wrong	  
to	  look	  at	  their	  evolution	  as	  simply	  a	  narrative	  of	  increased	  technological	  efficiency	  
and	   complexity73.	   In	   fact,	   as	   we	   have	   already	   noted,	   the	   control	   of	   transaction	  
machines	   is	   a	   crucial	   aspect	   in	   grasping	   the	   power	   dynamics	   in	   financial	  markets,	  
understood	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   ability	   to	   maintain,	   organize	   and	   process	   the	   flow	   of	  
financial	   transactions.	  That	   is	   to	   say,	   it	   is	   also	   important	   to	   look	  at	  how	   the	  actual	  
design	  of	   transaction	  machines	   is	  both	   influenced	  and	   impacts	   the	   intricate	  power	  
distribution	  of	  financial	  markets.	  Therefore,	  the	  last	  two	  chapters	  of	  the	  thesis	  have	  
focused	   on	   the	   importance	   of	   power	   in	   the	   context	   of	   contemporary	   transaction	  
machines.	  
	  
In	  Chapter	  7,	  we	  reviewed	  the	  current	  state	  of	  matching	  machines,	  the	  development	  
of	  electronic	  order	  books	  as	  well	  as	  the	  new	  forms	  of	  market	  making	  in	  the	  context	  
of	  HFTs.	  As	  the	  processing	  of	  order	  flow	  shifts	  from	  human	  hands	  to	  electronic	  order	  
books,	  matching	  becomes	  more	  efficient,	  automated	  and	  anonymous.	  At	  the	  same	  
time,	  the	  advent	  of	  electronic	  market	  making	  entails	  a	  shift	  in	  the	  power	  dynamics	  of	  
markets,	  as	  the	  matching	  functions	  is	  no	  longer	  the	  monopoly	  of	  human	  specialists	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73	  In	  fact,	  as	  we	  have	  seen	  both	   in	  Simondon	  and	  Mirowski’s	  case,	  the	  structure	  of	  
machines	  is	  heavily	  influenced	  by	  the	  wider	  human	  society.	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on	   the	   floor	   of	   the	   exchange	  but	   becomes	  open	   to	   competition.	  As	  we	   know,	   the	  
privilege	   of	   making	   markets	   and	   being	   at	   the	   centre	   of	   liquidity	   affords	   a	   crucial	  
advantage	  in	  any	  market	  as	  well	  as	  substantial	  profits.	  This	  in	  turn	  leads	  to	  an	  arms	  
race	   driven	   by	   lower	   latencies	   of	   execution,	   constant	   optimization	   and	   large	  
investments	   in	   IT	   capabilites,	   just	   to	   be	   one	   millisecond	   ahead	   of	   everyone	   else.	  
According	  to	  Andy	  Haldane,	  this	  algorithmic/electronic	  ecology	  is	  best	  understood	  as	  
a	  downward	  spiral	  or	  a	  race	  to	  zero,	  with	  HFTs	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  a	  daily	  struggle	  for	  
controlling	   and	   channelling	   order	   flow.	   We	   also	   offered	   an	   understanding	   of	   the	  
2010	   Flash	  Crash	   as	   an	   inevitable	   output	   of	  HFT-­‐dominated	  markets,	   and	   some	  of	  
the	  recent	  design	  innovations	  aimed	  at	  addressing	  this	  problem.	  	  
	  
In	  Chapter	  8	  we	  addressed	  the	  current	  state	  of	  clearing,	  focusing	  on	  the	  adoption	  of	  
central	  clearing	  for	  OTC	  derivatives.	  Following	  the	  2008	  crisis,	  the	  failure	  of	  several	  
large	  financial	  institutions	  raised	  serious	  concerns	  regarding	  the	  resilience	  of	  the	  OTC	  
clearing	   infrastructure.	   Consequently,	   the	   2009	  G20	   summit	  mandated	   the	   central	  
clearing	   of	   standardized	   OTC	   derivatives,	   resulting	   in	   a	   radical	   overhaul	   of	   OTC	  
markets.	  We	  also	  pursued	  a	  number	  of	  qualitative	  interviews	  to	  highlight	  the	  current	  
state	   of	   the	   OTC	  market	   and	   the	   impact	   of	   the	   transition	   from	   dealer-­‐dominated	  
bilateral	   clearing	   towards	   a	   new	   design	   based	   on	   centralized	   clearing.	   As	   we	   saw	  
over	   the	   course	  of	   the	   interviews,	   issues	   and	   concerns	   that	   seem	   to	  be	   related	   to	  
specific	  technical	  details	  could	  also	  be	  understood	  as	  political,	  in	  the	  broadest	  sense	  
of	   the	   term.	   	   That	   is	   to	   say,	   the	   new	   centralized	   clearing	   design	   obviously	   led	   to	  
different	  power	  distributions,	  as	  dealer	  banks	  would	  lose	  the	  substantial	  benefits	  of	  
the	  bilateral	  clearing	  model.	  While	  these	  banks	  are	  the	  main	  market	  makers	  of	  OTC	  
derivatives	  markets,	  functions	  such	  as	  matching	  and	  clearing	  are	  gradually	  moving	  to	  
the	   CCP	   utility	   type	   model,	   similar	   to	   the	   century-­‐long	   process	   of	   change	   that	  
unfolded	  in	  stock	  and	  futures	  markets.	  	  
	  
We	  thus	  argued	  that	  certain	  processes	  and	  mechanisms	  that	  at	  first	  glance	  seem	  to	  
be	  primarily	  technical	  aspects	  of	  transaction	  machines	  are	  actually	  a	  core	  part	  of	  the	  
functioning	  of	   global	   financial	  markets.	   This	   is	   clearly	   evident	   in	   the	   integration	  of	  
matching	   and	   clearing	  machines	   around	   a	   small	   number	   of	   financial	   infrastructure	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providers	   that	   dominate	   the	   processing	   and	   maintenance	   of	   financial	   flows.	   The	  
design	  of	  this	  complex	  architecture	  has	  a	  decisive	  impact	  on	  the	  structure	  and	  power	  
dynamics	  of	  financial	  markets.	  Details	  pertaining	  to	  issues	  such	  as	  minimum	  resting	  
times	  before	  a	  an	  order	  is	  matched,	  limitations	  on	  the	  number	  of	  canceled	  orders	  or	  
the	   access	   to	   colocation	   and	   low-­‐latency,	   are	   all	   crucial	   in	   determining	   who	   can	  
control	   the	   matching	   of	   order	   flow.	   Similarly	   in	   the	   context	   of	   clearing,	   technical	  
details	   such	   as	   what	   constitutes	   a	   standardized	   products,	   how	   much	   margin	   and	  
collateral	   is	   needed	   in	  order	   to	   clear,	   are	  CCPs	   interoperable	  or	  not,	  what	   are	   the	  
requirements	  for	  clearing	  membership	  are	  all	  crucial	  in	  determining	  the	  landscape	  of	  
clearing	  participants.	  Moreover,	  as	  we	  have	  seen	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  2010	  Flash	  Crash	  
and	  more	  broadly	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  2008	  financial	  crisis,	  apparently	  insignificant	  
technical	   details	   of	   transaction	   machines	   can	   have	   a	   huge	   importance	   and	   have	  
significantly	  impact	  market	  resilience	  and	  stability.	  	  
	  
As	  we	  have	  said	  in	  the	  beginning,	  the	  aim	  of	  the	  thesis	  was	  not	  simply	  to	  satisfy	  an	  
intellectual	   curiosity	   about	   the	   ‘machinic’	   nature	   of	   financial	   markets.	   While	   the	  
initial	  goal	  was	  to	  offer	  an	  account	  of	  the	  past	  and	  present	  of	  these	  markets	  through	  
the	   interdisciplinary	   lens	   of	   transaction	   machines,	   the	   thesis	   also	   opens	   up	   the	  
possibility	   of	   a	   broader	   critical	   engagement	   with	   finance.	   Different	   to	   critical	  
approaches	   looking	   at	   the	   relationship	   between	  money	   and	   debt	   (Graeber,	   2011,	  
Lazzarato,	   2011),	   this	   thesis	   aims	   at	   a	   constructivist	   way	   of	   looking	   at	   financial	  
markets.	   First,	   it	   unpacks	   the	   various	   functional	   layers	   of	   financial	   markets,	  
highlighting	   the	   fact	   that	   categories	   such	   as	   ‘global	   capital’	   or	   the	   ‘Market’	   are	  
perhaps	   too	  general	   and	  preclude	  a	  more	  granular	  understanding	  of	  how	   financial	  
markets	  actually	  work.	  
	  
While	   financial	   markets	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   just	   another	   means	   for	   global	   capital	  
domination	  or	  as	  an	  optimal	  allocation	  mechanism,	  they	  can	  also	  be	  seen	  as	  complex	  
machines	  for	  the	  processing	  and	  maintenance	  of	  financial	  flows.	  In	  fact,	  as	  we	  have	  
seen,	   perhaps	   the	  primary	   function	  of	   financial	  markets	   is	   to	  provide	   a	   stable	   and	  
reliable	  platform	  for	  the	  processing	  of	  financial	  transactions.	  To	  this	  aim,	  the	  thesis	  
developed	   a	   taxonomy	   of	   transactional	   designs	   making	   a	   contribution	   to	   what	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Mirowski	  called	  a	  natural	  history	  of	  markets.	   In	  a	  certain	  sense,	  even	  talking	  about	  
financial	   markets	   in	   general	   can	   be	   problematic	   as	   the	   integration	   of	   different	  
transaction	  machines	  can	   lead	  to	  significantly	  different	  market	  structures,	  different	  
outputs	   and	   significantly	   different	   power	   distributions	   in	   terms	   of	   controlling	  
financial	  flows.	  It	  was	  therefore	  essential	  to	  deconstruct	  the	  various	  functional	  layers	  
of	  financial	  markets	  and	  offer	  an	  account	  of	  the	  evolutionary	  process	  that	  led	  to	  the	  
complex	  flow	  architecture	  underpinning	  contemporary	  financial	  markets.	  
	  
As	  we	  have	  seen,	  this	  approach	  can	  be	  used	  to	  shed	  new	  light	  on	  what	  is	  at	  stake	  in	  
the	  current	  transformations	  of	  transaction	  machines,	  which	  is	  particularly	  important	  
for	   the	   political	   economy	  of	   contemporary	   finance. As	  noted	  by	  Michael	  Moskow,	  
referring	   to	  exchanges	  and	  clearinghouses	  as	   the	   ‘plumbing’	  of	  markets	   is	  perhaps	  
not	   the	  most	   adequate	  metaphor.	   In	   as	  much	   as	   they	   integrate	   the	  matching	   and	  
clearing	   functions,	  managing	   the	   flows	   of	   financial	   transactions,	   it	  might	   be	  more	  
accurate	   to	   refer	   to	   them	   as	   the	   ‘’central	   nervous	   system’’	   of	   financial	   markets	  
(Moskow,	  2006,	  p.46).	  This	  is	  a	  particularly	  important	  point	  in	  the	  context	  of	  clearing	  
and	   the	   migration	   of	   more	   complex	   derivative	   products	   towards	   CCPs.	   As	   larger	  
volumes	   of	   flows	   are	   channelled	   through	   them,	   CCPs	   effectively	   become	   the	   new	  
too-­‐big-­‐to-­‐fail	   financial	   institutions.	   This	   concern	   has	   been	   recently	   been	  
acknowledged	  by	  former	  Deputy	  Governor	  of	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  Paul	  Tucker,	  when	  
he	  characterized	  CCPs	  as	  being	  super-­‐systemic	  institutions	  that	  perhaps	  should	  to	  be	  
regulated	   like	  public	  utilities.	   In	  his	  own	  words,	  their	   importance	  for	  contemporary	  
financial	  markets	  shouldn’t	  be	  ignored: 
	  
Although	  the	  distance	  from	  households	  to	  clearing	  houses	   is	   large,	  the	  public	  
now	  depends	  on	   the	   safety,	   soundness	   and	  efficiency	  of	  CCPs.	   If	   this	  part	  of	  
the	  plumbing	  were	  neglected,	  it	  would	  be	  a	  disaster	  (Tucker,	  2014,	  p.12)	  
	  
While	  the	  post-­‐crisis	  period	  has	  been	  dominated	  by	  the	  critique	  of	  the	  major	  banking	  
institutions,	   it	   is	   clear	   that	   the	   center	  of	   gravity	  of	   global	   financial	  markets	   is	   now	  
shifting	   towards	   the	   integrated	   financial	   infrastructure	   providers,	   comprising	   both	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exchanges	  and	  clearinghouses/CCPs,	   controlling	  and	  maintaining	   the	  matching	  and	  
clearing	  of	  financial	  flows.	  	  
	  
It	  this	  sense,	  a	  detailed	  account	  of	  the	  evolution	  of	  transaction	  machines	  is	  needed	  
more	   than	   ever.	   Understanding	   what	   design	   was	   developed,	   for	   what	   purpose,	  
under	   what	   constraints,	   benefiting	   which	   constituency	   and	   exhibiting	   various	  
degrees	  of	  stability	  and	  resilience	  to	  external	  shocks.	  In	  fact,	  any	  critical	  engagement	  
with	  financial	  markets	  should	  perhaps	  start	  with	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  fragility	  of	  these	  
transaction	  machines,	  acknowledging	  the	  level	  of	  risk	  and	  complexity	  that	  is	  perhaps	  
intrinsic	   to	   these	   systems.	   In	   this	   context,	   one	   does	   not	   need	   to	   choose	   between	  
either	   rejecting	   these	  machines	  outright	  or	   accepting	   the	  dominant	  designs	  of	   the	  
day.	  To	  the	  contrary,	  it	  allows	  us	  to	  act	  more	  like	  engineers,	  effectively	  taking	  these	  
machines	  apart	  and	  perhaps	  designing	  new	  ones,	  which	  could	  be	  more	   resilient	   in	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